JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. In all these writ applications, the writ petitioners have challenged the validity of the amended provision of section 275(1)(aa) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 ('Act') on the ground that the same infringes the conditions imposed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid fact, notices were issued upon the learned Advocate General and pursuant to such notice, Mr. Kargupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal has supported the legislation. 2. The Kolkata Municipal Corporation ("KMC") has filed affidavit thereby opposing the prayer of the petitioners. 3. Mr. Mitra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the first two matters has attacked the aforesaid provision as ultra vires the Constitution of India by pointing out that prior to its amendment, section 275(1) of the Act contemplated only eleven specific contingencies in which the Municipal Commissioner was authorized to cut off connection between any water-works of the Corporation and the premises to which water is supplied from such works. Mr. Mitra contends that each of the said eleven eventualities bore nexus with and pertained to the use and/or storage of municipal water by the owner and/or occupier in a manner which contravened the provisions of the Act or the Rules and Regulations made thereunder or any function of KMC or a duty on the part of the owner or occupier in relation to municipal water and the supply and/or storage of water. But by the purported amendment, Mr. Mitra submits, the Municipal Commissioner is now empowered to cut off water connection of KMC for non-payment of property tax although charges for supply of water are fully paid and there is no default or delay whatsoever. Such a provision, according to Mr. Mitra, is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and clashes with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to the petitioners, water is the basic minimum amenity of human life and deprivation of such facility despite due payment of water charges is Draconian and is also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. He further points out that from the impugned notices in these writ applications it would appear that the Municipal Commissioner has purported to delegate his power under section 275 of the Act to a subordinate officer of KMC viz. Chief Municipal Engineer, Water Supply, who issued the notices. He further points out that from the impugned notices in these writ applications it would appear that the Municipal Commissioner has purported to delegate his power under section 275 of the Act to a subordinate officer of KMC viz. Chief Municipal Engineer, Water Supply, who issued the notices. According to Mr. Mitra, power of disconnection of water supply given to the Municipal Commissioner under section 275 of the Act cannot and in any event should not be delegated to any other person or officer by the Municipal Commissioner having regard to the serious consequences of water disconnection. 4. Mr. Mitra further contends that mode and manner of recovery of taxes by KMC under the provisions of the Act and the procedure thereof are set out fully in Chapter XVI. Section 214 of the Act prescribes the manner of recovery of taxes under the Act and according to the said provision any tax levied under the Act may be recovered in accordance with the following procedures and such manner as may be prescribed:- a) by presenting a bill, or b) by serving a notice of demand, or c) by distrait and sale of defaulter's movable property, or d) by the attachment and sale of a defaulter's immovable property, or e) in the case of consolidated rates on lands and buildings, by the attachment of rent due in respect of the land or the building, or f) by a certificate under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. 5. Over and above, the property tax constitutes a charge on the premises in question under section 232 of the said Act. However, KMC's additional mode of recovery of tax is filing of civil suit for enforcement of charge and recovery of amount of property tax in arrears. 6. Mr. Mitra contends that procedure for recovery of property tax by disconnection of water supply is more onerous and prejudicial to a defaulting tax payer than the procedure for recovery of property tax as laid down under Chapter. XVI of the said Act and the suit. He further submits that no guideline has been given under section 275 as to when recourse may be had by the Municipal Commissioner to disconnection of water supply for non-payment of Municipal tax. Mr. XVI of the said Act and the suit. He further submits that no guideline has been given under section 275 as to when recourse may be had by the Municipal Commissioner to disconnection of water supply for non-payment of Municipal tax. Mr. Mitra further points out that power of disconnection of municipal water supply is being used by KMC as a mode of recovery of property tax in arrears as confirmed in the affidavit filed by the KMC. 7. It has further been contended that KMC is taking measures to disconnect supply of water for non-payment of property tax without taking recourse first to the provision of Chapter XVI of the said Act and mode and manner of recovery as prescribed thereunder. This has been so done according to Mr. Mitra in these cases. He contends that the provisions of recovery of property tax prescribed under Chapter XVI of the said Act had not been resorted to by KMC in the present cases. Mr. Mitra further asserts that section 275 of the Act as it stands after amendment does not contain any reasonable classification of cases where the procedure for recovery of tax by use of power of disconnection of water supply in case of non-payment of property tax is to be followed and the cases where the procedure as laid down in Chapter XVI of the Act is to be applied. By section 275 of the Act as it now remains, Mr. Mitra continues, the Municipal Commissioner has been purported to be given arbitrary power, unguided and uncontrolled by Rules or otherwise, to realize the arrears of property tax either under Chapter XVI of the Act or by issuing a notice of disconnection of water supply under section 275(1)(aa) of the Act. According to Mr. Mitra, the Act does not lay down any principle or policy or guidelines for exercise" of discretion by the person entrusted with duty and power to disconnect municipal water supply under section 275(1)(aa) of the Act for non-payment of property tax. 8. Mr. Mitra further contends that section 275(1)(aa) of the Act lays down a summary procedure under which the rate-payers have no right of appeal against the order passed by Municipal Commissioner of disconnection of municipal water supply for alleged non-payment of property tax. 8. Mr. Mitra further contends that section 275(1)(aa) of the Act lays down a summary procedure under which the rate-payers have no right of appeal against the order passed by Municipal Commissioner of disconnection of municipal water supply for alleged non-payment of property tax. He further submits that an unreasonable short period of 72 hours has been prescribed for the notice of disconnection of municipal water supply. The said period, he contends, is too short and is totally unreasonable, particularly in cases where demand of alleged arrears of property tax made by KMC is under serious dispute. Mr. Mitra contends that the presence of alternative modes for recovery of arrears without any indication of any principle to guide the discretion of the executive as to the circumstances under which alternative mode is to be applied makes the more onerous procedure of disconnection of water supply void. Thus, Mr. Mitra concludes that section 275(1)(aa) of the Act in so far as it purports to empower the Municipal Commissioner of KMC to disconnect water supply for non-payment of property tax suffers from vice of excessive delegation without any guidelines and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. Mr. Mitra in this connection had taken an additional ground in support of his prayer. According to Mr. Mitra, section 275(1)(aa) of the Act would be a lever in the hands of the owner of the property who is primarily liable for property tax seeking eviction of his tenant/occupier without taking recourse to the due process of law either under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act or the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, for non-payment of tax of land and building of which he is primarily liable, the owner would be in a position to cause disconnection of water supply through the instrumentality of the KMC and thereby to make it practically impossible for the tenant/occupier to continue in possession of the demised premises and force him to seek shelter elsewhere. 10. In support of the aforesaid contentions Mr. Mitra has relied upon the following decisions:- 1) S.M. Nawab Ariff vs. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors., 64 CWN page 1; 2) Avinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 321 (Para 10); 3) Agricultural Market Committee vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Limited, AIR 1997 SC 2502 (Paras 22 and 25); 4) Khyerbari Tea Company Limited & Anr. Mitra has relied upon the following decisions:- 1) S.M. Nawab Ariff vs. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors., 64 CWN page 1; 2) Avinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 321 (Para 10); 3) Agricultural Market Committee vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Limited, AIR 1997 SC 2502 (Paras 22 and 25); 4) Khyerbari Tea Company Limited & Anr. vs. State of Assam & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 925 ; 5) Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India & Anr., 1989(4) SCC 187 (Paras 101, 105 & 107); 6) Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India & Ors., 2000(10) SCC 664 (Paras 223 and 248); 7) Chameli Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., 1996(2) SCC 549 ; 8) Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners' Association vs. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 635 (Paras 9, 12 & 14); 9) Workmen of Meenakshmi Mills Limited & Ors. vs. Meenakshmi Mills Limited & Ors., 1992(3) SCC 336 ; 10) A.N. Parasuraman vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1990 SC 40 (Paras 3 and 10); 11. Mr. Bihani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in one of the matters has adopted the argument of Mr. Mitra and in addition to the decisions cited by Mr. Mitra has placed reliance upon the following decisions :- 1) Shrey Merchantile Private Limited vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 2000(1) CHN page 457 (Para 59); 2) State of West Bengal vs. Shrey Merchantile Private Limited & Ors., 2000(2) CHN 181 ; 3) Narmada Bachao Andalon vs. Union of India & Ors., 2000(10) SCC 664 (Paras 223 and 248); 4) Chameli Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., 1996(2) SCC 549 (Paras 5 and 8); 5) Commissioner of Basirhat Municipality vs. A.C. Das & Ors., AIR 1974 Calcutta 9 (Paras 5 and 6). 12. Mr. Roy, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the KMC has seriously disputed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Mitra and contends that the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Mitra are not tenable. Mr. Roy in this connection draws attention to the provisions of sections 119 and 120 of the Act and points out that an amount equal to 30% of the amount realized on the account of property tax imposed under section 171 other than amount realized from bustees is invested in water supply, sewerage and drainage account. Mitra are not tenable. Mr. Roy in this connection draws attention to the provisions of sections 119 and 120 of the Act and points out that an amount equal to 30% of the amount realized on the account of property tax imposed under section 171 other than amount realized from bustees is invested in water supply, sewerage and drainage account. By pointing out the aforesaid provisions, Mr. Roy contends that supply of water has thus direct connection with property tax and if a person is in default of payment of property tax, the Municipal authority has right to disconnect supply of water. Mr. Roy submits that under the provisions of the Act, KMC is under obligation to supply wholesome water to the entire city of Kolkata and for the purpose of maintenance of such supply, 30% of the property tax must be deposited in the concerned account. According to Mr. Roy, a rate payer's duty does not come to an end merely by paying water tax. In addition to water tax, he is also required to pay property tax, otherwise, it will be impossible for the KMC to supply uninterrupted wholesome water to the entire city Mr. Roy contends that from the amount recovered from water tax the entire costs of maintenance of supply of water cannot be covered. 13. As regards the allegation of excessive and uncontrolled delegation of power of disconnection contended by Mr. Mitra, he points out that the power of disconnection of water supply can be resorted to only if it appears that any taxes, rates, fees or charges in respect of the premises are in arrears for more than one year Mr. Roy thus contends that specific guideline has been given by the Act where the stringent provision of disconnection of supply of water can be resorted to. Moreover, Mr. Roy submits that such power has been delegated to the Municipal Commissioner who is a very responsible officer of the Corporation. Mr. Roy thus contends that while other mode of recovery of taxes as provided in the Act can be availed of immediately after an amount of tax is in arrears, section 275(1)(aa) can only be applied, if the Commissioner finds that such amount is in arrears for more than one year. Thus, according to him, there is no excessive delegation or uncontrolled power conferred upon the Municipal Commissioner by the amended Act. 14. Mr. Thus, according to him, there is no excessive delegation or uncontrolled power conferred upon the Municipal Commissioner by the amended Act. 14. Mr. Roy further submits that merely because power of disconnection has been conferred under different chapter than one meant for recovery of taxes, for that reason the provision cannot be declared to be void. As regards the other contention of Mr. Mitra that by taking aid of such provision innocent tenants can be forced to vacate, Mr. Roy submits that the KMC cannot be held liable for the inaction of a defaulting landlord and it is for the tenants to compel their landlords to pay the amount of arrear of tax by making specific agreement in that behalf with the landlords. 15. Mr. Roy in this connection relies upon the following decisions :- 1) Express Hotel Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 1949 (Paras 6, 8 & 9), 2) Sodhi Transport Co. & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1099 , 3) Federation of Hotel & Restaurant vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 1637 (Para 20). 16. Mr. Kargupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal supports the impugned legislation and has practically adopted the argument advanced by Mr. Roy in this behalf. By pointing out to the provisions contained in section 265(2) of the Act Mr. Kargupta contends that the language used in the said section makes it clear that it will be the duty of the KMC to "endeavour" to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, depreciation, interest payment and other charges related to water charges and distribution costs while fixing rate of supply of water but that does not mean that Corporation will be bound to include everything while fixing the rate of supply of water as mentioned in the said provision. 17. Mr. Kargupta submits that there being no legislative in competency in enacting the amended provisions, this Court should endorse the amended provision of section 275(1) (aa) of the Act. In this connection Mr. Kargupta relies upon the following decisions :- 1) Man Mohan Tuli vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., AIR 1983 Delhi 152 (Paras 12 & 14); 2) Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. vs. Mohd. In this connection Mr. Kargupta relies upon the following decisions :- 1) Man Mohan Tuli vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., AIR 1983 Delhi 152 (Paras 12 & 14); 2) Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. vs. Mohd. Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 (Para 9); 3) City Corporation of Calicut vs. Thachambalath Sadasivan & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 756 (Para 7); 4) Ram Dhari Singh vs. Corporation of Calcutta, 69 CWN 278. Mr. Kargupta thus prays for upholding the amended provision of the Act as intra vires. 18. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the decisions cited by them I find that the meaning, scope and effect of Article 14 of the Constitution of India are now well settled by the Apex Court. The accepted position of law is that while Article 14 prohibits class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the tests of permissible classifications, two conditions must be satisfied; i) that the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that such distinguished mark must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases viz. geographical or according to objects or occupations or like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well settled by the decisions that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. 19. It may further be mentioned here that a statute may not make a classification of persons or things for the purpose of applying its provision but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions will apply. 19. It may further be mentioned here that a statute may not make a classification of persons or things for the purpose of applying its provision but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions will apply. In determining the question of validity or otherwise of such a statute, the Court will not strike down the law only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to Government to make the selection or classification if it appears that the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification. If after scrutiny it appears to the Court that it does not lay down any principle or policy in guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, the Court will strike down such statute on the ground that it provides for delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situated and therefore the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. 20. Similarly, the statute may not make a classification of persons or things to whom their provisions are intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification and in such a case, if the Government in making the selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, in such a case, the executive action but not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional. 21. In the light of the aforesaid principles I now propose to consider the impugned provisions of the Act. 21. In the light of the aforesaid principles I now propose to consider the impugned provisions of the Act. However, before I proceed further I am quite conscious of the position of law that when a court is called upon to adjudge the Constitutionality of any particular law as discriminatory and violative of equal protection of laws, it should bear in mind the following principles:- i) There is always a presumption in favour of Constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been clear transgression of the Constitutional principles; ii) It must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; iii) That the legislature is free to recognize decrees of harm and may confine its restriction to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; iv) That the Court in order to sustain presumption may take into consideration the matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived of at the time of legislation; and v) That while good faith and knowledge of the existing condition on the part of legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of Constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or Corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. 22. In the case before us, we find that Chapter XVI of the Act deals with payment and recovery of taxes. According to the said Chapter, any tax levied under the Act may be recovered in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the said Chapter viz. 22. In the case before us, we find that Chapter XVI of the Act deals with payment and recovery of taxes. According to the said Chapter, any tax levied under the Act may be recovered in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the said Chapter viz. a) by presenting a bill or b) by serving a notice of demand or c) by distraint and sale of defaulter's moveable property or d) by the attachment and sale of a defaulter's immoveable property or e) in the case of property tax on and building, by attachment of rent due in respect of land or building or f) by the certificate under Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. 23. The demand notice as mentioned above can only be served if the tax is not paid inspite of presentation of bill within the time fixed. If such notice of demand is disregarded, it will be lawful for the Corporation to issue warrant of distraint and even sale of the distrained property. If the entire dues are not recovered, in such a case, for recovery of any sum due or balance of the sum due, the Corporation may take recourse to attachment and sale of immoveable property of the person liable. Even after such course is taken, if the entire dues are not satisfied, the Corporation is vested with right to proceed to recover the amount by certificate under Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. 24. Section 195 of the Act however says that attachment of rent as mentioned in section 214(e) can be resorted to only on the failure to recover any sum dues on account of property tax from the person primarily liable thereof under section 193 and such attachment of rent shall be restricted to the portion of the total sum dues which bears, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the sum as the rent annually payable by such occupier, bears to the total of rent annually payable in respect of the whole of land or such building. 25. 25. Thus, the Act prohibits the Corporation from attaching the rent of a tenant unless the person primarily liable to pay is unsuccessfully chased after under the provisions of the law and that too to be restricted to the portion of the total dues as indicated above; on the other hand, by the amendment of section 275(1) of the Act by incorporating clause (aa), the Municipal Commissioner has been given discretion to cut off the water connection in respect of the premises of which any taxes, rates, fees or charges are in arrears for more than one year irrespective of the fact whether the person primarily liable has been proceeded against or not. Therefore, after the amendment of section 275(1) of the Act there are two alternative modes of recovery of arrears of property tax without any indication of any principle to guide the discretion of the Municipal Commissioner as to the circumstances under which the two alternative modes are to be applied and as pointed out by the majority of a Special Bench of this Court in the case of S.M. Nawab Ariff vs. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors., reported in 64 CWN page 1, under such circumstances the more onerous procedure should be held to be void. 26. Mr. Roy and Mr. Kargupta appearing on behalf of the Corporation and the State Government respectively assiduously tried to convince this Court that there is a clear guideline indicated in the amended provision of section 275(1)(aa) of the Act and the guideline pointed out by them is that the Commissioner can exercise such power only in the cases where taxes, rates, fees or charges are in arrears for payment of more than one year. By showing that provision, they contend that the Commissioner is not entitled to exercise such stringent power in all cases. He can, they contend, take decision to cut-off-water supply only in cases where such taxes, rates, fees or charges are in arrears for a long time, at least one year. 27. I am however not at all convinced by such submission. As rightly demonstrated by Mr. He can, they contend, take decision to cut-off-water supply only in cases where such taxes, rates, fees or charges are in arrears for a long time, at least one year. 27. I am however not at all convinced by such submission. As rightly demonstrated by Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the petitioner, there may be several defaulters in payment of such charges, rates, taxes or fees for more than one year; but the Act has not given any guidelines for picking or choosing the persons among those defaulters who will be proceeded against under section 275(1)(aa) of the Act. Thus, the Municipal Commissioner is free to take action against some of such defaulters and may decide not to proceed against others though they are also defaulters for more than one year. There is thus no indication in the Act providing any guidelines to the Municipal Commissioner for taking measures under section 275(1)(aa) of the Act among the defaulters of more than one year. 28. Moreover, I have already pointed out that section 195 of the Act sufficiently protects the interest of the tenants of the building in a case where the taxes are in arrear for the fault of the person primarily liable and if a tenant is prepared to pay the amount of rent payable to his landlord direct to the Corporation pursuant to an order of attachment of rent, he will remain untouched by the Corporation. But the amended provision of section 275(1)(aa) gives authority to the Corporation to disrupt supply of water of a tenant although he is ready to comply with any order of attachment of rent. The said provision gives power to the Municipal Commissioner to disconnect supply of water in a case where the Corporation has not even taken any step whatsoever against the person primarily liable to pay tax for more than one year by invoking the other modes of recovery than mere presentation of a bill. Therefore, there is scope of connivance between landlords and the Corporation for harassing an existing honest tenant for no fault on his part. 29. Mr. Roy in this connection however asserted with vigour that such discretion of cutting-off or turning-off supply of water is given to the Municipal Commissioner who is a high ranking and an experienced Officer of Corporation and thus such apprehension is baseless. 29. Mr. Roy in this connection however asserted with vigour that such discretion of cutting-off or turning-off supply of water is given to the Municipal Commissioner who is a high ranking and an experienced Officer of Corporation and thus such apprehension is baseless. However it appears from section 48(3)(b) of the Act that the Municipal Commissioner can delegate any of his powers and functions to any other officer or employee of the Corporation and in none of these cases before us, the Commissioner himself has passed such order; but in all these cases it has been delegated to some other officers and such delegation cannot be questioned in view of clear authorization given by section 48(3)(b) of the Act. Moreover, I am of the view that merely because such power is given to Municipal Commissioner, for that reason, the aforesaid provision cannot pass the tests of permissible classification unless there is any guidelines given to the Municipal Commissioner for exercise of such power. The discrimination is therefore "inherent in the statute itself". 30. I therefore hold that the power conferred under section 275(1)(aa) of the Act gives unbridled power to Municipal Commissioner to exercise the discretion in the matter of following a stringent mode of recovery of tax by disconnecting the supply of water although there are other alternative modes of recovery of such tax under such circumstances not so harsh as the one prescribed in section 275(1)(aa) of the Act. The provisions of section 275(1)(aa) of the Act is therefore void on that ground alone. 31. The next question is whether there exists any nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. Mr. Mitra in this connection points out that under the provisions of the Act, a person in addition to property tax is liable to pay water tax. But under the amended provision of section 275(1)(aa) of the Act even though water charge is fully paid, the Municipal Commissioner can disconnect supply of water for non-payment of either property tax or any other taxes, charges, rates, fees etc. in respect of the premises for more than one year. Mr. Mitra submits that once fees for water are paid, it necessarily follows that the Corporation has realized the amount spent for supply of water to the said premises and thus the KMC cannot disrupt the supply of water for non-payment of other fees. in respect of the premises for more than one year. Mr. Mitra submits that once fees for water are paid, it necessarily follows that the Corporation has realized the amount spent for supply of water to the said premises and thus the KMC cannot disrupt the supply of water for non-payment of other fees. 32. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation and the State on the other hand submit that from the collection of fees for water, the entire costs of supply of water to a particular premises are not recovered. They point out by referring to sections 119 and 120 of the Act that there is a fund maintained for the water supply, sewerage and drainage account and in the said fund among others, an amount equal to 30% of amount realized on account of the property tax is transferred. By relying upon those provisions, they contend that in addition to water fees, an amount of 30% of property tax is also required for meeting the expenses for supply of water. Thus, they allege that property tax has definite connection with the supply of water. 33. In this connection reference may be made to the provision of section 265(2) of the Act where it has been laid down that the Corporation shall from time to time determine the rate per thousand liters for supply of water at which the amount payable under the sub-section (1) shall be calculated. There is a proviso added to such sub-section (2) and according to such proviso, in fixing pro rata unit rate the Corporation shall endeavour to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, depreciation, interest payment and other charges related to the water works and the distribution costs including distribution losses if any. Therefore, it is apparent that the legislature has cast a duty upon KMC to take into consideration the entire factors relating to supply of water while fixing the rate of water charge. The fund created under section 120 of the Act is meant not only for supply of water but also for sewerage and drainage. Moreover, it appears from various provisions of the Act that the Corporation not only supplies water to the premises within its territorial limit but also sells water to ships, port trust and other areas which are under territorial limit of surrounding Municipalities. Moreover, it appears from various provisions of the Act that the Corporation not only supplies water to the premises within its territorial limit but also sells water to ships, port trust and other areas which are under territorial limit of surrounding Municipalities. Therefore, if for the purpose of supply of water to other area than Kolkata, additional cost is required, a citizen of Kolkata who has paid water tax cannot be penalized for non payment of other taxes simply because the amount realized from those taxes are utilized for supply of water to the other areas. Moreover, I have already indicated that the said fund is created not only for water supply but also for sewerage and drainage and for that reason in addition to water charges, an amount of 30% of property tax is liable to be placed under such account. 34. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to mention that by taking aid of the first explanation added to section 234(1) of the Act, the Municipal Commissioner is entitled to seal even a tube-well in a premises is exercise of power conferred under section 275(1) (aa) of the Act notwithstanding the fact that such tube-well has been sunk by the owner of the premises at his own cost, maintained by him and the annual licence fees are paid in advance. For the purpose of supply of water from a tube-well dug and maintained by the owner, the Corporation is not required to spend any amount from the account mentioned in section 120 of the Act and thus there is no nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act enabling the Municipal Commissioner to disrupt the supply of water even through such a tube-well for non-payment of property tax. 35. Therefore, the impugned enactment in the present case, also fails to pass the second test that there must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 36. I however find no substance in the contention of Mr. Mitra that water being one of the basic amenities of human life, KMC can under no circumstance disconnect the supply of water. In my view, Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not enable a citizen to get supply of potable water free of cost at the niche of his house. Mitra that water being one of the basic amenities of human life, KMC can under no circumstance disconnect the supply of water. In my view, Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not enable a citizen to get supply of potable water free of cost at the niche of his house. Thus, a statute can authorize the Corporation to disrupt supply of wholesome water for non-payment of water charges if such statute otherwise conforms to the requirements prescribed by the Constitution of India. 37 I now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Roy and Mr. Kargupta appearing for the respondents. 38. In the case of Express Hotel Private Limited (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the Constitutional validity of legislation of statutes of four different States viz. Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and West Bengal imposing a tax on luxuries under Entry 62 of List II of VIII Schedule of the Constitution of India. Those Acts were challenged by raising the following seven points:- (a) The Taxation-entry in Entry 62 of List II providing for taxes on "luxuries" contemplates, and takes within its sweep, a tax on goods and articles in their aspect and character as luxuries and does not include "services" or "activities". The levy on the services for lodging provided at the hotels, is, therefore, beyond the scope of Entry 62 List II. (b) Section 4 of the West Bengal Act which envisages a tax on the mere existence of the means of providing the luxury-independently of its utilisation-is outside Entry 62 List II. (c) The real criterion distinguishing 'luxury' is the special attribute or quality of the commodity or the services, as the case may be, and not the price factor simpliciter. The essential distinguishing attribute is a qualitative one. Distinction based purely on the quantitative difference in the price is not a rational criterion to identify 'luxuries'. The imposition based on the mere criterion of price which has no relation to the concept of luxuries, is ultra vires the State power under Entry 62 List II. (d) The scheme of the Act in so far as it makes the price and not quality, the sole basis for identification of the subject of the tax, makes no distinction between the components of the services which include both necessities and comforts, as distinguishable, from 'luxuries'. Levy on such composite subject-matter is bad. (d) The scheme of the Act in so far as it makes the price and not quality, the sole basis for identification of the subject of the tax, makes no distinction between the components of the services which include both necessities and comforts, as distinguishable, from 'luxuries'. Levy on such composite subject-matter is bad. (e) The expression 'and the like' in the definition of "charges for lodging" in section 2 (a) is vague and irrational and read with the explanation which renders the decision of the State Government on what constitutes "Lodging charges" final 'is an unreasonable restriction' violative of Article 19(1)(g). (f) Section 4(3) which provides that tax in respect of accommodation provided free or at concessional rates be taxed as if the full charges were deemed to have been received, is unreasonable and offends Article 19(1)(g). (g) The "luxury" tax imposed on the charges for lodgings has the direct and immediate effect of restricting the freedom under Article 301 of the Constitution as it directly impedes the right of "intercourse" throughout the territories of India. 39. The Supreme Court turned down the aforesaid contentions and upheld those provisions. I do not find any relevancy of the points raised therein to the fact of the present case where absence of guidelines in the exercising power and of nexus between the basis of classification and object of the Act have been alleged and thus the said decision can be of no help to the respondents. 40. In the case of Sodhi Transport Co. & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., reported in AIR 1986 SC 1099 , the provision of section 28(B) as inserted in 1973 in U.P. Sales Tax Act and Rule 87 as inserted in 1974 in U.P. Sales Tax Rules were challenged as ultra vires. The Supreme Court in that context held that the law provided enough protection to the transporters to show that they are not in fact liable to pay any tax and at the same time the provisions were not unreasonable and the State legislature is competent to legislate them. The Supreme Court in that context held that the law provided enough protection to the transporters to show that they are not in fact liable to pay any tax and at the same time the provisions were not unreasonable and the State legislature is competent to legislate them. It was further held that a statutory provision which creates a rebut-table presumption as regards the proof of a set of circumstances which would make a transaction liable to tax with the object of preventing evasion of the tax cannot be considered as conferring on the authority concerned the power to levy a tax which the legislature cannot otherwise levy. A rebut-table presumption, the Apex Court continued, which is clearly a rule of evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and it is hard to see how it is unconstitutional when the person concerned has the opportunity to displace the presumption by leading evidence. By relying upon the aforesaid the decision Mr. Roy wanted to contend that since 72 hours notice is provided in the amended Act before actual disconnection of supply of water, the person served with the notice is getting sufficient opportunity to show that property tax is not due and payable for one year as contemplated in the said provision and thus the provision cannot be said to be unconstitutional. I have already indicated that the provision has been challenged not on the ground that a presumption in favour of imposing tax has been given by virtue of any statute. But in the instant case the Act is impugned on the ground that there is no guideline to the executives for implementation of the provision and that the same has no connection with the object of the Act. Thus, the said decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. 41. But in the instant case the Act is impugned on the ground that there is no guideline to the executives for implementation of the provision and that the same has no connection with the object of the Act. Thus, the said decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. 41. In the case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant vs. Union of India & Ors., (supra), the validity of Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 was challenged, inter alia, on the ground that even if the Act is held to impose a tax which is sui generis or non-descrip, tax with respect to which the Union Parliament is competent to make a law under Article 248 of Entry 97 of List I, then, at all events, the Act is violative of Article 14 of Constitution, inasmuch as the differentia on which hotels are classified is arbitrary and unintelligible and has no rational nexus with taxing policy under the Act. In paragraph 20 of the said judgement the aforesaid contention was negatived. In that connection the Supreme Court pointed out that though taxing laws are not outside Article 14, however, having regard to wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formation of a fiscal policy, legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject matter, events etc. for taxation. The tests of vice of discrimination in a taxing law are accordingly less rigorous. In examining the allegations of hostile discriminatory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. In my view, the aforesaid principle cannot be applied to the fact of the present case where there is no guidelines at all prescribed for exercise of the power conferred under the Act. Thus the said decision cannot help the respondents in any way. 42. In the case of Man Mohan Tuli vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., reported in AIR 1983 Delhi 152, a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court was of the view that property tax can be levied by the Municipal Corporation only for the fulfilment of its mandatory and discretionary functions under the Act which are to provide civic amenities such as supplying drinking water, scavenging, supply of electricity etc. and improvement of the area as per improvement schemes etc. respectively. and improvement of the area as per improvement schemes etc. respectively. According to the said Court it is the beneficial enjoyment of the property which is subjected to taxation under the Act and not merely the physical presence of a corporeal thing. Thus for the purpose of property tax the nexus is functional and not physical or merely territorial. The territorial jurisdiction and taxation, according to the said judgment, need not always be conterminous. It may be that in a given case it is not possible for the Municipal authorities to extend its function for administration to the farthest end of its territory and in such a case, the learned Judge concluded, property cannot be taxed by Municipal authority. 43. By relying upon the said decision Mr. Kar Gupta tried to submit that property tax has always nexus to the supply of water and as such for nonpayment of property tax, water supply can be disconnected. I am afraid, I am not at all impressed by such submission. In a statute when there is specific guidelines for fixation of water charge for the purpose of supply to a particular premises and all the relevant factors including distribution costs and distribution losses, if any, are required to be taken into consideration while fixing water fees, the property tax cannot have any role to play for the purpose of supply of water to the said premises. Thus, the said decision cannot be of any assistance to Mr. Kargupta. 44. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. vs. Md. Yasin, reported in AIR 1983 SC 617 , the enhancement of fee for slaughtering animals under Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was challenged. In that context, in paragraph 9 of the judgement, the Supreme Court held that there no generic difference between a tax and a fee though broadly a tax is a compulsory exaction as part of a common burden without promise of any special advantages to classes of tax payers whereas a fee is a payment for services rendered, benefit provided or privilege conferred. Compulsion is not the hallmark of the distinction between a tax and the fee. That the money collected does not go into a separate fund but goes into the consolidated fund does not also necessarily make a levy, a tax. Compulsion is not the hallmark of the distinction between a tax and the fee. That the money collected does not go into a separate fund but goes into the consolidated fund does not also necessarily make a levy, a tax. The Apex Court further pointed out that though, a fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. Further neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. That others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee. In fact, the Court proceeded, the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Nor is the Court to assume the role of a cost accountant. The Supreme Court further held it is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the cost of the services rendered against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two. A broad co-relationship is all that is necessary. Quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee nor is it necessarily absent in a tax. By relying upon the aforesaid provision Mr. Kargupta wanted to submit that the traditional concept of quid pro quo is under going a transformation. 45. In the case of City Corporation of Calicut (supra) it was stated that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is under going a transformation and that though the fee must have a relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. 46. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. 46. In my view, the principle laid down in aforesaid two decisions cannot be relied upon for the purpose of contending that even if the fees fixed under the statute for giving particular benefit have been paid. The person taking such fees is entitled to stop the benefit for non-payment of some other taxes which has no connection with the supply of water. 47. In the case of Ram Dhari Singh vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in 69 CWN 278, it was pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court that the Commissioner of Corporation of Calcutta has powers directly conferred upon him by statute, which are not given to Corporation but are given exclusively and solely by the statute to the Commissioner and so far as such powers are concerned the Commissioner being the sole repository and authority, any challenge to the same cannot be made in his absence. There are however other powers given to the Commissioner for carrying out duties entrusted to him by the Corporation for which expressed provision is made in section 30 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951. In one case the Commissioner exercises statutory function imposed upon him by statute and in regard to these he is the sole authority; in the other case, he exercises powers as an agent of the Corporation or of any standing committee and in such cases the impleading of the Corporation, the principal would be enough for the purpose of challenging the impugned order. In such cases the absence of the Commissioner will not render the suit defective. I fail to understand how the said decision can have any application to these writ applications where vires of the Act has been challenged and the Municipal Commissioner is also made a party respondent. 48. On consideration of the entire materials on record I thus hold that the provisions contained in section 275(1)(aa) of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and so void under Article 13 of the Constitution. 49. 48. On consideration of the entire materials on record I thus hold that the provisions contained in section 275(1)(aa) of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and so void under Article 13 of the Constitution. 49. I would therefore order that a writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue commanding the respondents to forbear from disconnecting the supply of water to the premises involved in these writ applications in exercise of the power conferred under section 275(1)(aa) of the Act. 50. Since the learned counsel for the parties restricted their submissions to the question of validity of the aforesaid provisions of the Act but in these applications the quantums of property tax demanded are also in dispute, let these writ applications appear one week after re-opening of the Court for further hearing on other questions involved herein. 57. Xerox certified copy of this order be given to the parties by Thursday next.