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2002 DIGILAW 650 (PAT)

Jaya Pandey v. Nirmal Kumar Singh

2002-05-23

RADHA MOHAN PRASAD

body2002
Judgment 1. This appeal by the claimants is directed against the judgment and award dated 4th June, 1999 passed by 3rd Additional Motor Vehicle Accident Claim Tribunal, Bhagalpur in Claim Case No. 27 of 1998. 2. Briefly stating the facts are that one Alok Kumar Pandey son of Hari Narain Pandey, resident of Indumati Path, Vikramshila Nagar, Kahalgaon died in motor accident on 9.10.1997 due to rash and negligent driving of the Bus bearing registration no. BR-10 A 8035 on way to Hospital. The wife, minor children and mother of the deceased claimed compensation of Rs. 7,84,168/- under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter referred to as the Act for his death. The deceased was aged about 33 years and was a Government servant earning Rs. 4282/- per month and according to the claimants there was bright prospect of promotion of the deceased. The Bus was owned by Respondent no. 1 and Respondent no. 2 was the Driver. Respondent nos. 3 & 4 are Insurer of the Bus. The owner and the Insurer appeared and filed separate written statement contesting the claim. In support of their case the parties led evidence and the Tribunal on consideration of the same has awarded compensation of Rs. 4,17,600/- besides Rs. 10,000/- as loss of consolitium (sicconsortium ?) loss of estate and for funeral expenses. Out of the said amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid by way of adinterim compensation and, therefore, after holding that Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation directed the Insurer to pay Rs. 3,77,600/- along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. 21st April, 1998 within one month. The Tribunal has also mentioned the manner in which the compensation amount is to be utilised on the interest of minor children, mother and wife of the deceased. Admittedly, no appeal has been preferred by the owner or the Insurer. In the present appeal, the Claimant-appellants have only challenged the method applied by the Tribunal for the award of compensation amount. 3. Admittedly, no appeal has been preferred by the owner or the Insurer. In the present appeal, the Claimant-appellants have only challenged the method applied by the Tribunal for the award of compensation amount. 3. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has not considered the future prospect of promotion as well as pay revision and only monthly income of the deceased getting at the time of death has been considered for the purpose of compensation, which is contrary to the order of the Division Bench passed in the case of Kumari Anupama & anr. V/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (L.P.A. No. 382 of 1999 disposed of on 11.12.2001). According to him, after the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of G. M. Kerala SRTC V/s. Susamma Thomas, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 176 , the legislature has brought major changes in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 to be effective from 14.11.1994. As such, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, adopting of the multiplier 12 is not permissible in terms of Section 163A of the Act. According to him, till Section 163A of the Act is not declared ultra vires, the Tribunal is bound to follow and pass award in accordance with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and award and, in fact the learned Tribunal has fixed the compensation by applying multiplier of 12 which is also much more than the mode prescribed by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. V/s. Trilok Chandra & Ors., reported in (1996) 4 S.C.C. 362 , which provides that the multiplier should be such that if the total amount of compensation is allowed to be deposited in some term deposit scheme of the Bank the interest coming from that should be the same which the claimant would have been getting if the deceased was alive. Further he submitted that on the face of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Trilok Chandra (supra) that the schedule attached in the Motor Vehicles Act for choosing multiplier is not a sound one and the Tribunal is not bound to follow that; there is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that until Section 163A of the Act is declared ultra vires, the Tribunal is bound to follow and pass award in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule. 5. This Court finds substance in the submission of Mr. Priyadarshi. In view of the provisions contained in Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. In the case of P.L.O. Corporation V/s. Labour Court, reported in (1990) 3 S.C.C. 632 (paragraph 59 & 81) the Apex Court has considered the scope of Article 141 and held that it recognises the role of the Supreme Court to alter the law, in course of its function to interpret legislation, in order to bring the law in harmony with social changes. Once the Apex Court has held that the schedule attached with the Motor Vehicles Act for choosing multiplier is not a sound one and the Tribunal is not bound to follow that, the question of declaration of Section 163A ultra vires has no relevance. In fact, the Supreme Court has approved the important changes introduced by the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 in regard to determination of compensation by insertion of Sections 163-A, 163-B and 165-A. However, in regard to the calculation of compensation and the amount worked out in the Second Schedule, the Apex Court has held that it suffers from several defects. Neither the Tribunal nor the Court can go by the ready reckoner, and that it can only be used as a guide. It has also been held that the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. As such, this Court does not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that until Section 163-A of the Act is declared ultra vires, the Tribunal is bound to follow and pass award in accordance with the provisions contained in Second Schedule. As such, this Court does not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that until Section 163-A of the Act is declared ultra vires, the Tribunal is bound to follow and pass award in accordance with the provisions contained in Second Schedule. However, as regards the quantum of compensation, it is true that the Division Bench in its order passed in the case of Kumari Anupama & anr. V/s. National Insurance Company Limited & Ors. (supra) has also taken into consideration the bright future of the deceased and that he would have earned more money than what he was getting at the time of his death, and, thus, reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge and restored the judgment of the Tribunal. But that is not the law laid down rather the only question involved in the said appeal was as to whether the multiplier of 18 be used or some other multiplier be used and the Division Bench considering the fact that the deceased was aged about 27 years and his wife was also approximately of the same age held that the age of any of them can be taken into consideration for deciding the application of multiplier. In the present case, learned Tribunal on consideration of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Trilok Chandra (supra) that in choosing the multiplier the age of the deceased or of the claimant, whichever is higher, is also taken into consideration as also that the multiplier should be such that if the total amount of compensation is allowed to be deposited in some term deposit scheme of the Bank, the interest coming from that should be the same which the claimant would have been getting if the deceased was alive, found that the proper multiplier would be 12, and thus, a sum of Rs. 4,17,600/- has been found to be the amount of compensation payable besides the statutory compensation for general damage in case of death. As it is not in dispute that the proper multiplicant would be Rs. 2900/- per month after deducting 1/3rd of the monthly income of the deceased for his personal expenses, and the loss of dependency on that basis is Rs. As it is not in dispute that the proper multiplicant would be Rs. 2900/- per month after deducting 1/3rd of the monthly income of the deceased for his personal expenses, and the loss of dependency on that basis is Rs. 34,800/- per annum, in my opinion, learned Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of 12 following the principle laid down by the Apex Court that if the total amount of compensation allowed is deposited in some term deposit scheme of the Bank the interest coming from that should be the same which the claimant would have been getting if the deceased was alive. The maximum rate of interest on term deposit scheme of the Bank as on today is much lower, yet the Tribunal has awarded the compensation on taking into consideration the maximum rate of interest of 10% which a term deposit in the Bank would fetch. 6. Accordingly, this Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment and award. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.