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2002 DIGILAW 653 (PAT)

Jan Kalyan Press v. Bhargava Bhushan Press

2002-05-23

CHANDRAMAULI KR.PRASAD, NAGENDRA RAI

body2002
Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Pd., J. 1. Both the appeals preferred under Clause 10 of the Rules of this Court arise out of the common judgment dated 17.8.2001 passed by a learned Single in C.W.J.C. No. 4863 of 2001 and as such they are being disposed of together. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Bihar State Text Books Publishing Corporation invited bids in sealed cover for printing and supply of text books, details whereof were given in clause 2 of Invitation for Bids. Last date for sale of tender paper, after extension, was 5.1.2001 and the last date for receipt and opening of the bids, after extension, was fixed as 6.1.2001. 3. Clause 15 of Invitation for Bids required furnishing of security and Clauses 15, 15.1 and 15.3 which are relevant for the purpose read as follows : "15. Bid Security 15.1 Pursuant to lTB Clause 9, the Bidder shall furnish as part of its bid, a bid security in the amount as specified in Section-V-Schedule of Requirements xx xx xx 15.3 The bid security shall be in Indian Rupees and shall be in one of the following forms : (a) A bank guarantee or an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a nationalized scheduled bank located in India or a bank located abroad acceptable to the Purchaser in the form provided in the bidding documents and valid for 45 days beyoned the validity of the bid: or (b) A crossed demand draft of pay order drawn in favour on Bihar State Text Book Publishing Corporation Ltd. payable at Patna". 4. Clause 15.4 provided for rejection of the bid in case same is not secured in accordance with clause 15.1 and 15.3 of the Invitation for Bids referred to above. Clause 15.4 of the Invitation for Bids which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows : "15.4 Any bid not secured in accordance with lTB Clauses 15.1 and 15.3 above will be rejected by the Purchaser as non-responsive pursuant to ITB Clause 24". 5. In order to secure smooth printing and timely supply of text books another condition provided in the Invitation for Bids is the evidence in support of minimum production. Clause 13 inter alia provides furnishing of documents establishing bidders eligibility and qualifications. Clause 13.2 (b)(iv) provided for duly authenticated evidence in support of minimum production. 5. In order to secure smooth printing and timely supply of text books another condition provided in the Invitation for Bids is the evidence in support of minimum production. Clause 13 inter alia provides furnishing of documents establishing bidders eligibility and qualifications. Clause 13.2 (b)(iv) provided for duly authenticated evidence in support of minimum production. Same reads as follows : "13.2 The documentary evidence of the Bidders qualifications to perform the Contract if its bid is accepted shall establish to the Purchasers satisfaction. XX XX XX XX (b) that the Bidder has the financial, technical and production capability necessary to perform the Contract and meets the criteria outlined in the Qualification requirements specified in Section Vl-A. To this end all bids submitted shall include the following information/ documents : XX XX XX XX (iv) Duly authenticated evidence in support of minimum production (not installed) capacity of 200 MT per day of the paper mill from whom paper is proposed to be procured by the bidder." 6. In response to the aforesaid invitation for bids, writ petitioner as also Respondent nos. 2 to 10 submitted their bids. In the bank guarantee submitted by the writ petitioner it is stated that the guarantee cover is from 3.1.2001 to 27.2.2001 but, in the same guarantee; at its bottom it has been stated that the guarantee will remain in force upto and including 45 days after the period of bid validity, it has been averred that when the aforesaid discrepancy in the validity period of bank guarantee came to its knowledge; a request was made to the bank to rectify its mistake and the said mistake was rectified within the validity period of the bank guarantee and a communication to the said effect was made by the bank to the Corporation by its letter dated 22.1.2001 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). A portion of the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner reads as follows : "This guarantee will remain in force up to and including forty five (45) days after the period of the bid validity and any demand in respect thereof should reach the Bank not later than the above date". 7. A portion of the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner reads as follows : "This guarantee will remain in force up to and including forty five (45) days after the period of the bid validity and any demand in respect thereof should reach the Bank not later than the above date". 7. The Technical Committee for screening of the bids held meeting on various dates upto 1st of February, 2001 and rejected bids of five bidders including that of the writ petitioner on the ground that the bank guarantee submitted towards bid security was not valid for the required period of 135 days in terms of Clause 15.3. Thereafter the Bid Evaluation Committee in its meeting held on. 2.2.2001 recommended to award contract to lowest evaluated bidders i.e. respondent nos. 3 to 10 of the writ application. The recommendation of the Bid Evaluation Committee along with its report with regard to rejection of offer of seven bidders including the writ petitioner was forwarded to the Ministry of Human Resources, Government of India for seeking the approval of the World Bank. After its approval by the competent authority the matter was placed before the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 4th of April, 2002 and contract was awarded to the successful bidders. 8. Writ petitioner filed the writ petition on 12.4.2001 inter alia praying for quashing the decision of the Bihar State Text Book Publishing Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) rejecting its bids for printing and supplying text books and to quash the grant of said contract to Respondent nos. 3 to 10 of the writ application by issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction. Writ petitioner also sought issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Corporation to award the contract in its favour. 9. Writ application was primarily founded on the ground that the writ petitioner was eligible for consideration of its bids as it had furnished the Bank guarantee in terms of the Invitation for bids, Corporation wrongly rejected its bid on the ground that the bank guarantee submitted by it is not in conformity with the requirement prescribed in the Invitation for bids. It was inter alia contended before the learned single Judge that there being difference in words and numericals as regards the validity period of bank guarantee the words should have been given preference and in any view of the matter same having been committed by the Bank, the Corporation ought to have ignored these defects. It was also contended that the defect, if any, was actually cured by the Bank by its letter dated 22.1.2001 i.e. prior to the preliminary examination, the bid ought to have been considered. Lastly it was highlighted that the Corporation could have sought clarification in case it found any discrepancy in the period of its validity, in terms of Clause 23.1 of the Invitation for bids. However, the plea of the Corporation and the contesting respondents was that the bank guarantee was not on prescribed format and it was not valid for the period required under the invitation. 10. The learned single Judge negatived the aforesaid pleas of the writ petitioners in the following words : "On a comparison of annexure-3, the bank guarantee and the prescribed format for bid security, this court finds that the third line makes the bank guarantee defective as not conforming to the required format. The defect is not clerical or insignificant and submissions to this effect are not fit to be accepted. The Bid Security as per clause 9.1 comprises the Bid itself and the bank guarantee furnished as Bid Security had to be in the prescribed format as well as of requisite validity. Thus, the bank guarantee furnished was not in accordance with clause 15.3. The other submissions on behalf of the petitioner that the discrepency between the third line in the bank guarantee and the last paragraph was required to be resolved as per clause 24.2 by accepting the period of validity mentioned in words is also not acceptable. Clause 24.2, as has been righty submitted on behalf of the respondents, deals only with arithmetical errors relating to price and only the "amount" in words is to prevail over that in figures. Clause 24.2, as has been righty submitted on behalf of the respondents, deals only with arithmetical errors relating to price and only the "amount" in words is to prevail over that in figures. The discrepancy relating to period of validity of Bid Security cannot be treated to be a discrepancy with regard to any amount." However the plea for providing opportunity for removing defect did find favour with the learned single Judge and it observed as follows : "Fairness as well as public interest required granting of an opportunity to remove such mistake before rejection of Bid under clause 24. On grant of such opportunity if the defect is removed before the crucial stage of preliminary examination under clause 24 is over, the bid can not be treated as one not secured in accordance with clause 15.3. Since such examination has to be only at the stage of clause 24, if a bid is permitted to be secured in accordance with clause 15 before the stage of preliminary examination is concluded, the rejection as required by clause 15.4 will not be attracted at all and the bid, after it has been secured, cannot be treated as non-responsive." 11. Grant of award was also attacked on the ground that respondents 6 to 8 in the writ application did not fulfil minimum production (not installed) capacity of 200 metric tonne per day, required under the terms of invitation. 12. Aforesaid plea has been answered by this Court in the following words : "Thus, it is found that respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8 did not fulfil the requirements of clause 13.2(b)(iv) and therefore were not having the requisite quali fication and eligibility to be a bidder. Their bids have been accepted improperly and against the terms contained in the bidding document/tender notice and hence the contract/supply orders awarded to them are illegal. It is not possible to accept the contention of the respondents that requirement of clause 1.2.(b)(iv), although it relates to eligibility and qualification, should be treated as directory only because there is no explicit provision laying down the effect of non-compliance with the eligibility and qualification clauses." 13. On the aforesaid findings the learned single Judge allowed the writ application with the following direction : "... On the aforesaid findings the learned single Judge allowed the writ application with the following direction : "... Hence instead of quashing forthwith the contracts/supply orders issued to individual suppliers on the basis of their bids which had been made subject to result of this writ petition as per order dated 19.4.2001, the supply orders/ contracts made with respondents suppliers are ordered to be treated as invalid or inoperative after one week from today. Whatever supply will be made by the suppliers during that period of one week may be accepted by respondent no. 1 as per earlier terms and conditions of supply but thereafter no suppiy shall be accepted from any supplier and an intimation of the supply position along with balance quantity remaining to be supplied shall be made to this court through and affidavit to be filed on the eighth day. For the balance quantity, if any, the respondent no. 1 is directed to reconsider the bids of only the qualified bidders in accordance with this order at the earliest and preferably within two weeks. It will be open for respondent no. 1 to ask the qualified bidders to furnish fresh bid Security or other securities or to ask for extending the validity of bank guarantees already furnished by them as securities. Thereafter, on the basis of fresh evaluation in accordance with the terms and conditions in the original bidding document fresh supply orders/contracts may be awarded to deserving bidders within a further period of one week so that supply of remaining books may not be delayed un-necessarily". 14. Corporation and Respondent no. 6 of the writ application i.e. Jankalyan Press aggrieved by the same have preferred these appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. 15. It is common ground that in terms of Clause 15.3 of the invitation for bids, the amount of security as well as the format of Bank guarantee are provided and the bank guarantee is to remain valid for 45 days beyond the period of validity of the bid. It is further an admitted position that the period of validity of the bid is 90 days and the bank guarantee is required to be valid for 45 days more, beyond the period of validity of the bid and as such the total validity period of the bank guarantee has to be for 135 days. 16. It is further an admitted position that the period of validity of the bid is 90 days and the bank guarantee is required to be valid for 45 days more, beyond the period of validity of the bid and as such the total validity period of the bank guarantee has to be for 135 days. 16. As stated earlier the learned single Judge turned down the aforesaid pleas of the writ petitioner and found the bank guarantee furnished by it not in conformity with Clause 15.3 of the invitation for the bid. However it held the action of the Corporation to be bad in law as in its opinion the writ petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to remove the defect at the stage of preliminary examination. The learned single Judge had also found the decision of the Corporation for awarding contract for printing and supply of text books illegal on its finding that Respondent nos. 6 to 8 did not fulfil the requirement of Clause 13.2 (b)(iv) of invitation for bide which requires minimum production (not installed) capacity of 200 metric tonne per day of the paper mill from whom paper is proposed to be procured by the bidder. 17. Dr. Sadanand Jha, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant in L.P.A. No. 885 of 2001 and Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh appearing on behalf of the appellant in L.P.A. No. 867 of 2001 submit that in view of Clause 15.4 of the invitation for bids, the respondent-Corporation had no option than to reject the bid of the writ petitioner as non-responsive and none of the clauses cast obligation on the Corporation to ask for clarification from the petitioner. Mr. Amrendra Sharan, Senior Advocate, however, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner submits that Clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids obliged the Corporation to seek clarification and having failed to do the same the learned single Judge rightly held the action of the Corporation to be bad in law. 18. Having appreciated the rival submissions, I find substance in the submission of Dr. Jha and Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh. Clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids contemplates clarification of bids. It reads as follows : "23. Clarification of Bids 23.1 During evaluation of bids, the Purchaser may, at its discretion ask the Bidder for a clarification of its bid. 18. Having appreciated the rival submissions, I find substance in the submission of Dr. Jha and Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh. Clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids contemplates clarification of bids. It reads as follows : "23. Clarification of Bids 23.1 During evaluation of bids, the Purchaser may, at its discretion ask the Bidder for a clarification of its bid. The request for clarification and the response shall be in writing and no change in prices or substance of the bid shall be sought, offered or permitted." 19. It is relevant here to state that Clause 15.4 of the Invitation for Bids provides that any bid not secured in accordance with Clauses 15.5 and 15.3 has to be rejected as non-responsive. Clause 24 of the invitation for Bids provides for preliminary examination of the bids; whereas clause 26 contemplates of evaluation and comparison of bids. So far as clarification of bids as contemplated in clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids is concerned, in my opinion, the clarification is required to be sought during evaluation of bids and not at its preliminary examination under Clause 24 of the Invitation for Bids. From the scheme of the Invitation for Bids, l am of the opinion that different stages have been provided for examination of the bids i.e. preliminary examination and thereafter evaluation of bids. As the bank guarantee of the writ petitioner was not in conformity with Clause 15.3 of the Invitation for Bids as regards the validity period of the bank guarantee, as also its format, same was rejected as non-responsive under Clause 15.4 read with Clause 24 of the Invitation for Bids and the stage of evaluation and comparison of bid did not reach. Even at the cost of repetition, I may state that clauses 24 and 26, inter alia, contemplate of preliminary examination and evaluation of bids respectively and clause 23 provides for clarification of bids during evaluation. In view of aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the Corporation did not err in rejecting the bid of the petitioner, without calling for any clarification from the petitioner. 20. Not only this; Clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids which contemplates clarification of bids during its evaluation does not confer any right to the bidder to furnish clarification and Corporation any obligation to seek clarification. 20. Not only this; Clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids which contemplates clarification of bids during its evaluation does not confer any right to the bidder to furnish clarification and Corporation any obligation to seek clarification. This clause has conferred discretion to the Corporation to ask for a clarification and in case such a clarification is not sought, the action of the Corporation cannot be faulted on the ground that it did not ask for clarification from the petitioner. It is not the case of the petitioner that in case of any other bidder in similar circumstances the Corporation had exercised its discretion. In that view of the matter, l am of the opinion that the action of the Corporation cannot be faulted on the ground that it did not invoke its power under Clause 23 of the Invitation for Bids and did not seek clarification from the writ petitioner. 21. It may be mentioned here that the bank guarantee furnished by the writ petitioner was found to be defective on many counts. It was found to be not in the prescribed format and its validity was not for 135 days which was required under the terms of invitation. Mr. Sharan representing the writ petitioner attempted to assail the aforesaid finding. It has been contended that the bank guarantee so furnished was of the proper amount and in the format prescribed and the period of its validity was rightly mentioned in the last paragraph as provided in the format. It was contended that the expression bank guarantee cover from 3.1.2001 to 27.2.2001 was a mistake by the bank which should have been ingored by the Corporation. 22. As stated earlier the 3rd line from the top of the bank guarantee in specific term stated that the "bank guarantee cover is from 3.1.2001 to 27.2.2001". This is not in accordance with the terms of invitation for bids. l agree with the learned single Judge that the same renders the bank guarantee defective as not conforming to the required format. Said defect cannot be said to be clerical or insignificant so as to ignore the same. This is not in accordance with the terms of invitation for bids. l agree with the learned single Judge that the same renders the bank guarantee defective as not conforming to the required format. Said defect cannot be said to be clerical or insignificant so as to ignore the same. True it is that Clause 24.2 of the Invitation for Bids provides for that in case of error the word is to prevail over figure, but this is not of any help to the writ petitioner, as the said Clause deals with arithmetical error in relation to price. From what has been stated above l am entirely in agreement with the learned single Judge that the bank guarantee furnished by the writ petitioner was not in accordance with Clause 15.3. of Invitation for Bids, and the Corporation was not obliged to ignore the same as the Corporation has not contributed to its defect. 23. As observed earlier, the learned single Judge has found that respondents 6, 7 and 8 of the writ application not eligible to be a bidder, as the material placed on record does not establish that the paper mill from where the bidder had proposed to procure the paper, the minimum production capacity of 200 metric tonnes per day. While assailing the aforesaid conclusion it has been contended by Dr. Jha and Shri Singh on behalf of the appellants that once an unit had the capacity to produce 200 metric tonnes of paper per day but in fact it is not producing to that extent because of various constraints viz. low market demand, break down in the factory, strike by workers etc. that would not make its production capacity to be less than 200 metric tonnes per day. I do not find any force in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. Clause 13.2 (b)(iv) referred to above in specific terms provided for evidence in support of minimum production and not installed capacity of 200 metric tonnes per day of the paper mill from whom paper is proposed to be procured by the bidder. Thus the Corporation was conscious of the fact that minimum production capacity of the paper mill was to be taken and not the installed capacity. Thus the Corporation was conscious of the fact that minimum production capacity of the paper mill was to be taken and not the installed capacity. Corporation having made the distinction between the two, it does not lie in its mouth to contend that in case the paper mill had the installed capacity of 200 metric tonnes per day, same will satisfy the requirement of minimum. production capacity. 24. Mr. Sharan, counsel for the writ petitioner submits that once this finding is affirmed natural corollary of the same is that respondents no. 6, 7 and 8 did not satisfy the aforesaid requirement, award of contract to them is illegal. In support of this submission reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & others (A.l.R. 1979 S.C. 1628) and my attention has been drawn to the following passage : ".... Admittedly the standard or norm was reasonable and non-discriminatory and once such a standard or norm for running a llnd class restaurant should be awarded was laid down, the lst respondent was not entitled to depart from it and to award the contract to the 4th respondent who did not satisfy the condition of eligibility prescribed by the standard or norm. If there was no acceptable tender from a person who satisfied the condition of eligibility, the lst respondent could have rejected the tenders and invited fresh tenders on the basis of a less stringent standard or norm, but it could not depart from the standard or norm prescribed by it and arbitrarily accept the tender of the 4th respondents. When the lst respondent entertained the tender of the 4th respondents even though they did not have 5 years experience of running a llnd class restaurant or hotel, it denied equality of opportunity to others similarly situate in the matter of tendering for the contract. There might have been many other persons, in fact the appellant himself claimed to be one such person, who did not have 5 years experience of running a llnd class restaurant, but who were otherwise competent to run such a restaurant and they might also have competed with the 4th respondents for obtaining the contract, but they were precluded from doing so by the condition of eligibility requiring five years experience. The action of the lst respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents, even though they did not satisfy the prescribed condition of eligibility, was clearly discriminatory, since it excluded other persons similarly situate from tendering for the contract and it was afso arbitrary and without reason. The acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents was, in the circumstances invalid as being violative of the equality clause of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative law inhibiting arbitrary action". 25. There is no difficulty in accepting the broad submission of the writ petitioner that in case prospective bidder does not satisfy the condition of eligibility prescribed, award of contract to such person would be arbitrary and against the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This necessarily requires consideration as to whether the requirement of production of certain quantity of paper by the paper mill is an essential condition for grant of contract. It has been contended by the appellants that the same is not an essential condition for grant of contract and to judge as to whether the successful bidder shall be capable to carry out the orders, the said condition was put so that the Corporation could satisfy itself that the successful bidder would be in a position to carry out its obligation under the contract. It has also been contended that it is not a fit case in which this Court should have exercised its power of judicial review and knocked down the award of contract to the successful bidders. Learned counsel representing the appellants has placed reliance on large number of authorities in support of their submissions. It is contended by the writ petitioner that it is a fit case in which power of judicial review is to be exercised whereas the Corporation and successful bidders contend that it is not so. It is of interest to note that the learned counsels representing both the shades have placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India [(1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 651]. In the said case it has been held as follows : "It can not be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. In the said case it has been held as follows : "It can not be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitation in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down". "Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review". "Lord Scarman in Nottinghmshire County Council vs. Secretary of State for the Environment (1986 AC 240 , 251) proclaimed : Judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power". Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 says : "If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher vs. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18.3.1991". "Observance of Judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher vs. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18.3.1991". "Observance of Judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the courts ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action". "Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself". 26. From the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is evident that statutory Corporation had the right to choose with whom it wants to enter into a contract like any other citizen but there is distinction between the right of an individual and the right of the Government or the Corporation. While Court cannot interfere with the Governments decisions in respect of term and condition of tender and refusal of any tender etc. but in case the decision making process is found to be arbitrary, the same shall be fit case for exercise of power of judicial review. In view of authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the scope of judicial review in matters of grant of contract etc. deem it inexpedient to refer to various other authorities cited at the Bar. Suffice it to say that power of judicial review is not in respect of reviewing the merit of the decision but the decision making process and while exercising this power the Court cannot substitute its own decision. However, in case the selection or rejection is arbitrary, certainly power of judicial review is available to the Court. It is well known that there can be essential and non-essential qualification in tender notice and it is well settled that non-fulfilment of non-essential qualification does not ipso facto result into rejection of offer. 27. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, l proceed to consider the merits of the submissions. Writ petitioner did not submit the bank guarantee in terms of the invitation for bids. Same was an essential condition for submission of the bid. 27. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, l proceed to consider the merits of the submissions. Writ petitioner did not submit the bank guarantee in terms of the invitation for bids. Same was an essential condition for submission of the bid. I have found that the Corporation did not had the obligation to seek for clarification from the petitioner in this regard. Hence the offer of the writ petitioner was not in compliance of the essential condition of invitation for bids and hence Corporation did not err in rejecting its offer. Further the condition of minimum production capacity of 200 metric tonnes per day of the paper mill from whom paper is proposed to be procured is not an essential qualification for submission of the bid, as Clause 13.2 of the Invitation for Bids in specific term casts an obligation to the bidder to satisfy to the Corporation that it has production capacity necessary to perform the contract. The satisfaction of the Corporation on this question makes it a non-essential qualification. However, in case the satisfaction of the Corporation is based on grounds not germane to the issue, same may be subject to judicial review. However, in the present case, the action of the Corporation has not been assailed on this ground. Accordingly, l am of the opinion that the rejection of the bid of the petitioner and grant of contract to successful bidders, do not require interference by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. 28. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Resultantly, writ application stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the present case, there shall be no order as to costs. Nagendra Rai, J. 29 I agree.