Judgment Altamas Kabir, J. Shri Rathindra Nath Pati, the Secretary of the petitioner society, moved the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal by way of Original Application No. 2807 (L. R.T. T.) purporting to challenge the notices issued by the Revenue Officer, Contai Block-I, in Misc. Case Nos. 59 and 60 of 2000. The notices were issued by the said Revenue Officer under section 50 read with section 57 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, on two separate applications made by one Shri Sasanka Sekhar Pattanayak and Shri Debabrata Jana and Others. By his application Shri Pattanayak prayed for recording his name as possessor of plot No. 315 of Mouza-Athilagari, P.S. Contai, District Midnapur, under the ownership of the petitioner society. By the other application, Shri Debabrata Jana and Others prayed for recording their easement right of passage over a portion of the aforesaid plot also under the ownership of the petitioner society. 2. As will appear from the order sheets in respect of the said two cases annexed to the writ petition, both the cases were allowed by the Revenue Officer concerned and directions were given that the possession of Shri Pattanayak be recorded along with easement right of pathway as claimed by Shri Debabrata Jana and Others. The learned Tribunal by its order dated 22nd February, 2001, rejected the application filed by the petitioner society upon holding that the Revenue Officer was within his jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notices. However, from the tenor of the order it appears that the fact that the two Misc. Cases had been disposed of had not been brought to the notice of the learned Tribunal which gave liberty to the petitioner society to take the points raised by it before the learned Tribunal in the proceedings before the Revenue Officer and if ultimately the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Revenue Officer it was given the liberty to challenge the same in appeal under section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. 3. Appearing in support of the writ application, Mr. Swadesh Ranjan Bhunia submitted that the learned Tribunal had misconstrued the provisions of sub-section (3) section 10 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 and had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under section 6(1) of the said Act. Mr. 3. Appearing in support of the writ application, Mr. Swadesh Ranjan Bhunia submitted that the learned Tribunal had misconstrued the provisions of sub-section (3) section 10 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 and had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under section 6(1) of the said Act. Mr. Bhunia submitted that section 6(1) of the aforesaid Act empowered the Tribunal to entertain applications against original orders passed by any authority under the Acts mentioned in the Schedule, including the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Furthermore, it also empowered the learned Tribunal to interfere in matters of inaction or culpable negligence on the part of the authorities under the concerned statutes. 4. Mr. Bhunia submitted that the learned Tribunal also misunderstood the scope of section 50 of the 1955 Act which did not empower a Revenue Officer to decide question of title as had been done by the Revenue Officer in the present case. According to Mr. Bhunia, instead of directing the petitioner society to prefer a statutory appeal, the learned Tribunal ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under section 6 of the 1997 Act to correct the error committed by the Revenue Officer concerned. 5. Mr. Bhunia urged that although sub-clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 10, imposes in absolute bar on the Tribunal in admitting an application without the petitioner having availed of the alternative remedies under the Act, sub-clause (b) would have to be read along with sub-clause (a) and it must be held that sub-clause (b) carves out two exceptions to sub-clause (a) when the remedial measure is not adequate or causes hardship. 6. Mr. Bhunia submitted that it could not be contended that, unless all the remedial measures were availed of, the Tribunal would not be entitled to admit an application. On the other hand, in order to give a harmonious construction to the provisions of section 10, the Tribunal should have also considered the provisions of sub-clause (a) of section 6 in order to consider if it could entertain a petition where the petitioner had not availed of all the remedial measures under the statute in question. Mr. On the other hand, in order to give a harmonious construction to the provisions of section 10, the Tribunal should have also considered the provisions of sub-clause (a) of section 6 in order to consider if it could entertain a petition where the petitioner had not availed of all the remedial measures under the statute in question. Mr. Bhunia urged that on receipt of an application, the learned Tribunal would have to consider the provisions of section 6(b), section 10(1) and section 10(3) of the 1997 Act in order to consider whether it would admit the application on a finding of either inaction or culpable negligence or whether the order impugned would cause hardship to the petitioner. Mr. Bhunia urged that the learned Tribunal had erred in observing that filing of the application before the learned Tribunal was absolutely meaningless since it would be wrong to conclude that in no case could the learned Tribunal admit an application under section 10(3) unless all the alternative remedies had been availed of. 7. Mr. Bhunia submitted that in other cases the learned Tribunal had admitted applications involving the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act on the ground of hardship, although, the petitioner had not exhausted the alternative remedy available to him under the said Act. Mr. Bhunia sought to draw a parallel between the authority of the Tribunal and the High Court in exercising writ jurisdiction on a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors., reported in (2001) 1 SCC page 516. According to Mr. Bhunia, a close reading of the said decision would make it clear that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is the same as that of the High Courts in specified matters. On the aforesaid analogy, Mr. Bhunia urged that if the High Court could entertain a writ petition inspite of existence of alternative remedy there is no reason as to why the Tribunal could not also admit an application inspite of existence of alternative remedy when the order is either without jurisdiction or is a nullity. 8. In support of his aforesaid. contention, Mr. Bhunia urged that if the High Court could entertain a writ petition inspite of existence of alternative remedy there is no reason as to why the Tribunal could not also admit an application inspite of existence of alternative remedy when the order is either without jurisdiction or is a nullity. 8. In support of his aforesaid. contention, Mr. Bhunia firstly referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors., reported in (1998) 8 SCC page 1, wherein it was observed that having regard to the facts of the case, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution had a discretion either to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. It was observed further that the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions, one of which is that if an equally effective and efficacious remedy is available, it would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But it was also observed that alternative remedy had been consistently held not to operate as a bar where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or violation of an Act has been challenged. 9. Mr. Bhunia submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors. (supra) held that there was no anathema to the Tribunal exercising the jurisdiction of the High Court being supplemental or in addition to the High Court. Mr. Bhunia submitted that in such circumstances, the Tribunal was entitled under section 6(1) of the 1997 Act to entertain a matter even where an alternative remedy was available. 10. In addition to his aforesaid submissions Mr. Bhunia urged that there were pending Civil Suits with regard to the claim of easement right of pathway over the plot in question between the petitioner society and the private respondents, wherein the private respondents had failed to obtain orders of injunction to restrain the petitioner society from making any construction thereon. Mr. Bhunia urged that despite having knowledge of the above, the Revenue Officer did not reject the application filed by the private respondents which amounted to inaction in terms of section 6(b) of the 1997 Act. Mr. Mr. Bhunia urged that despite having knowledge of the above, the Revenue Officer did not reject the application filed by the private respondents which amounted to inaction in terms of section 6(b) of the 1997 Act. Mr. Bhunia submitted that the Revenue Officer was also guilty of culpable negligence on the self-same ground. Mr. Bhuriia urged that the inaction or culpable negligence on the part of the Revenue Officer clearly attracted the Tribunal's powers under section 6(1) of the 1997 Act to entertain the application filed by the petitioner notwithstanding the provisions of section 10(3) of the said Act and the learned Tribunal acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction erroneously in rejecting the application of the petitioner society on that score. 11. Mr. Bhunia concluded his submissions by submitting that since two different views had been taken by two different Benches of this Court, the matter should be referred to a Larger Bench for determination of the question which has arisen in this case as well, regarding the interpretation of sections 6 and 10 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. 12. Appearing for the State and the State respondents, Mr. Ansu Nath Banerjee submitted that the questions raised in the instant application had already been considered and settled by this Bench in W.P.L.R.T. No. 403 of 2001 (Jagadish Prasad Pati vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.) by its judgment dated 25th June, 2001. In was submitted that on a consideration of section 6 and section 19 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, this, Court had held that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal a litigant would be required to exhaust the remedies available to him under the aforesaid Act. Mr. Banerjee urged that in view of the aforesaid decision, the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioner in the instant case was not capable of being entertained and no interference was called for with the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 13. The same submissions were advanced on behalf of the respondent Nos. 7 to 10 and in addition it was submitted that the various decisions cited by Mr. 13. The same submissions were advanced on behalf of the respondent Nos. 7 to 10 and in addition it was submitted that the various decisions cited by Mr. Bhunia on the question involving the High Courts' powers in writ jurisdiction to entertain an application notwithstanding the existence of alternate remedy, had no application to the facts of the instant case, since the Tribunal was not exercising jurisdiction as such under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. It was urged that the writ application was entirely misconceived and was liable to be dismissed. 15. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties we see no reason to differ with the views expressed by us in Jagadish Prasad Pati's case (supra). In the said case we have had occasion to consider in detail the provisions of section 6 and 10 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, and relying on the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 10 of the said Act we had come to the conclusion that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal a litigant would be required to exhaust the remedies available to him under the aforesaid Act. Although, the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal acts as a court of first instance, there is a basic difference between the learned Tribunal and the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Tribunal being a creature of statute it cannot exceed the powers vested in it by the statute. On the other hand, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court may entertain an application notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. There being a specific bar under section 10(3) of the 1997 Act, the Tribunal cannot exercise similar powers as has been sought to be urged by Mr. Bhunia. 16. We, therefore, agree with the submission made on behalf of the respondents and are of the view that no interference is called for with the order of the learned Tribunal. 17. The writ application is, accordingly, dismissed. 18. There will be no order as to costs. 19. This order and/or the order of the learned Tribunal will not prevent the petitioner from preferring statutory appeal within one month form date on the basis of the certified copy already obtained by the petitioner. 20. 17. The writ application is, accordingly, dismissed. 18. There will be no order as to costs. 19. This order and/or the order of the learned Tribunal will not prevent the petitioner from preferring statutory appeal within one month form date on the basis of the certified copy already obtained by the petitioner. 20. Let a xerox plain copy of the operative portion of this order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be made available to the learned Advocate-on-record for the petitioner for communication and implementation. 21. In addition to the above, if an urgent xerox certified copy of the judgment is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant expeditiously, subject to compliance with all the required formalities. Alok Kumar Basu, J.: I agree. Writ application dismissed.