AMITAVA LALA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner company and its Managing Director filed this writ petition as far back as on August 23, 1994 challenging inter alia notice of demand for recovery of contribution under Section 45-C to Section 45-I of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (as amended) dated June 29, 1994 along with certificate case dated July 11, 1994. The amount so fixed under the certificate in the form of notice of demand to defaulter dated July 11, 1994 is Rs. 2,27,972/ -. The outcome of such notice and certificate is that the petitioner company is liable to pay proportionate contribution of the Employees' State Insurance on overtime allowance. ( 2 ) THE petitioners' case is that 'overtime allowance' cannot be said to be 'wages' under Section 2 (22) of the Employees' State, Insurance Act, 1948. If at all the 'overtime' allowance' is construed as 'wages' no retrospective effect can be given in recovering such contribution. ( 3 ) THEREFORE the following questions are formulated for due considerations: (a) Can 'overtime allowance' be called as 'wages' within the meaning of Section 2 (22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948? (b) Is the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited and Ors. v. E. S. I. Corporation and Ors. , has prospective effect? ( 4 ) SO far as the first point is concerned I find that in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited v. E. S. I. Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court had already held that whatever remuneration, paid or payable for overtime work forms 'wages' under an implied term of the contract of employment and the remuneration paid therefor forms part of the 'wages' under Section 2 (22) of the Act. The employer is obligated to pay wages when the employee works. This will be in addition to payment of wages that he receives for normal work. In other words, both the remunerations received during the working hours and overtime constitute a composite wages and thereby it is a wage within the meaning of Section 2 (22) of the Act. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER the Supreme Court discussed about the merits and demerits of various judgments of different High Courts and then declared that the ratio of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is correct proposition of law. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER the Supreme Court discussed about the merits and demerits of various judgments of different High Courts and then declared that the ratio of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is correct proposition of law. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that effectivity of such judgment will be prospective. According to him that before the judgment and order passed by the Supreme Court there was conflict of judgment in between different High Courts. Out of those judgments there was a judgment of the Calcutta High Court. The Supreme Court refused to accept the Calcutta High Court's view. But the petitioners did not deposit the contribution due to Calcutta High Court judgment which was prevailing at the material point of time. Therefore there was no fault of the petitioners. Hence contribution to the Employees' State Insurance has to be effective prospectively with the judgment of the Supreme Court having a prevailing effect over and above the judgment of Calcutta High Court. ( 7 ) I have gone through the aforesaid judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in Hindusthan Motors Ltd. v. E. S. I. Corporation and Ors. 1979 Lab. IC 852. I find that the Division Bench of this Court held that payment on account of overtime having once been excluded from the wages in Section 2 (9) should not be included unless specifically so included by the Legislature in the definition of wages in Section 2 (22) of the Act. It cannot be said that the Legislature intended to have two different meanings of 'wages' in the same statute. According to the Division Bench an employee has a right to his wages, but an employee for overtime work cannot claim as a matter of right additional remuneration for such work beyond the scheduled hours of work. Such a nature of work does not flow out of the general contract of employment between the employer and employees but it is something which arises out of an independent arrangement depending on various factors. ( 8 ) ULTIMATELY, in the penultimate paragraph the Division Bench declared that no special contribution is payable for the remuneration paid since January 28, 1968. There is a reason for giving such cut-off date. The reason is that Section 2 (9) (b) was introduced with effect from such date. ( 8 ) ULTIMATELY, in the penultimate paragraph the Division Bench declared that no special contribution is payable for the remuneration paid since January 28, 1968. There is a reason for giving such cut-off date. The reason is that Section 2 (9) (b) was introduced with effect from such date. It appears that in such section that a portion being any person so employed whose wages (excluding remuneration for overtime work etc.) has been provided therein. Therefore, in that context the question had been interpreted. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to me, as soon as such declaration is made by the Supreme Court the ban under the Calcutta High Court judgment has been lifted. The lifting is that the declaration of the Calcutta High Court for not giving special contribution from January 28, 1968. Hence it will automatically relate back to the date which cut-off date was declared by the Calcutta High Court. Under such circumstances, this is the one way of looking into the matter that the judgment and order passed by the Supreme Court cannot be prospective one. It has to be effective from any date on and from the cut-off date i. e. January 28, 1968. ( 10 ) SECONDLY, a Division Bench of Orissa High Court reported in Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. P. B. Gupta 2002-I-LLJ-1143, already interpreted the Supreme Court judgment by saying that it had never declared that the law will have only the prospective operation. It is further held that it is well settled principle that when a law is declared by the Supreme Court it is the law as it always was and it does not become law only from the date it was so declared. The competency of the Supreme Court to declare the law making it prospective is only a Constitutional question as per the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Goloknath v. State of Punjab, but the Supreme Court applied the same principles to the other statutory interpretations. The Division Bench further held that High Court does not have any power to declare that any decision would operate only prospectively. ( 11 ) THIRDLY, there are two types of statutes. One is remedial statutes and another is declaratory statutes. The remedial statutes are always prospective but declaratory statutes are always retrospective. The Division Bench further held that High Court does not have any power to declare that any decision would operate only prospectively. ( 11 ) THIRDLY, there are two types of statutes. One is remedial statutes and another is declaratory statutes. The remedial statutes are always prospective but declaratory statutes are always retrospective. Similarly, when remedial orders are passed those have to be given prospective effect but if declaratory orders are passed the same have to be given retrospective effect. There is a reason behind it. The reason is that the declaration can be given upon the existing right. It cannot be made for the future right unless so specified. Therefore, when existing right is already available and the Supreme Court declares that the same is valid it will automatically relate back for the valid period under the statutes itself whenever the cause of action for a particular case arises. ( 12 ) LASTLY, according to me, there is a difference between two terms 'retrospective' and 'retroactive' although both of them are synonymous in nature. Strictly speaking, a retrospective law only looks backward on things that are past and it is a retroactive law that acts on things that are past. Therefore, such thinner line has also to be understood in the cases whereunder a declaratory relief is granted by a Court of Law. As soon as such declaration is made it becomes retroactive which should be the proper nomenclature herein. ( 13 ) THUS, in my view the aforesaid questions are to be answered as follows: (a) No more res integra; (b) Not prospective alone.