Fr. P. Augustine Mathew v. The Manager, Deva Matha College
2002-10-05
K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- The short, but interesting question required to be decided in this case is whether a Lecturer working in a private college affiliated to a statutory University can be suspended from service for marrying a lady, for the reason that he is a priest. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the case are the following. 2. The petitioner was appointed Lecturer in English by Ext.P1 order dated 20.09.1994 in Devamatha College, Kuravilangad, by the 1st respondent Manager. The said college is a private college affiliated to the Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. He completed his probation and is now, a regular Lecturer in English in the college. While so, the petitioner was suspended from service by Ext.P2 order dated 27.08.2002. The said order reads as follows:- "I have been informed that at present you are leading a scandalous life, causing scandal to the students of the College. This is a matter which requires a detailed inquiry. Your presence in the College may affect a fair and impartial inquiry. In the circumstances, you are hereby placed under suspension from the service of the College until further orders. During the period of suspension you will be eligible for subsistence allowance as per rules." On receipt of the said order, the petitioner submitted Ext.P3 representation before the Manager denying the allegations raised against him. In the said representation, it is submitted, inter alia, that "being a priest and teacher I am leading a pious, moral and disciplined life. I may also state that I did not commit any offence or any violation of the provisions of the university law." The petitioner submits, the reason for his suspension is that he relinquished his faith in the Catholic Church, embraced the Orthodox Syrian Church and got married to Ms.Hima Jacob (Mary Seena), D/o.Mr. Jacob and Mrs.Mariamma, Nirvruthi Bhavan, Aluva, Ernakulam at the St.Mary's Orthodox Syrian Chapel, Mannuthy, Thrissur according to the rites of the Orthodox Syrian Church on 18.08.2002. The petitioner submits that he is being suspended for changing his faith and for getting married. So, he challenges Ext.P2 on various grounds. 3. The 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit supporting the impugned order. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit dealing with the contentions in the said counter affidavit. 4. I heard both sides.
The petitioner submits that he is being suspended for changing his faith and for getting married. So, he challenges Ext.P2 on various grounds. 3. The 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit supporting the impugned order. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit dealing with the contentions in the said counter affidavit. 4. I heard both sides. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the suspension order is illegal, ultra vires and vitiated by malafides. The petitioner has not committed any offence. Religious intolerance, narrow mindedness and prejudice of the 1st respondent are the reasons for the suspension, it is submitted. It is a religious persecution, it is asserted. According to him, it violates his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. His right to freedom of conscience is infringed. The petitioner also submitted that he has not committed any misconduct warranting disciplinary action. None of the provisions of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act or the Statutes framed thereunder enables the Management to take disciplinary action against the petitioner for changing his religious faith or for getting married, it is contended. 5. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent would submit that the petitioner has been suspended not for changing his faith, but for getting married and leading a married life. A priest, it is contended, whether he belongs to the Catholic Church or the Malaknara Syrian Orthodox Church, is not entitled to get married or lead a married life. According to him, the marriage itself is invalid. Leading a married life by a priest is scandalous and therefore he is suspended, it is asserted. 6. I heard the learned Standing counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent and also the learned Government Pleader appearing for the 3rd respondent. It is a fundamental principle of law that a man can be punished only for violation of law. So, before going into the validity of Ext.P2, it is profitable to refer first, to the relevant statutory provisions. The powers of an educational agency to take disciplinary action against a teacher of a private college are traceable to Section 63 of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act 1985. The relevant portion of the said Section dealing with the power of the Educational Agency to suspend a teacher reads as follows:- "63.
The powers of an educational agency to take disciplinary action against a teacher of a private college are traceable to Section 63 of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act 1985. The relevant portion of the said Section dealing with the power of the Educational Agency to suspend a teacher reads as follows:- "63. Disciplinary powers of Educational Agency over teachers of private Colleges:- (1) The Educational Agency may at any time place a teacher of a Private College under suspension when any disciplinary proceedings is proposed to be taken against him or when such disciplinary proceedings are pending. (2) A teacher of a Private College who is detained in custody whether on a criminal Charge or otherwise for a period exeeding forty eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of detention by an order of the Educational Agency and shall remain under suspension until further orders. (3) When a teacher of a private college is suspended for a period exeeding fifteen days, the matter together with the reasons for the suspension, shall be reported to the Vice-Chancellor." Section 73 of the Act deals with the code of conduct for the teachers of affiliated colleges. The said provision reads as follows:- "Code of conduct for teachers of affiliated colleges:- (1) The Government shall, in consultation with the University and the representatives of the teachers, frame a Code of Conduct to be observed by the teachers of Government and Private Colleges. (2) Any teacher of a Government or Private College who contravenes any of the Provisions of the Code of Conduct shall be liable for disciplinary action which may involve the imposition of a major penalty." The learned Government Pleader, upon instructions, submitted that no code of conduct has been framed by the Government in consultation with the University under the said provision. Chapter 45 of the Mahatma Gandhi University Statutes 1997 deals with the conditions of service of teachers and members of non teaching staff in private colleges. Rule 39 in the said chapter says that certain lapses of teachers will constitute improper conduct. The said Rule reads as follows:- "39. Certain lapses of teachers to constitute improper conduct: The following lapses on the part of a teacher in a private college shall constitute improper conduct inviting disciplinary action.
Rule 39 in the said chapter says that certain lapses of teachers will constitute improper conduct. The said Rule reads as follows:- "39. Certain lapses of teachers to constitute improper conduct: The following lapses on the part of a teacher in a private college shall constitute improper conduct inviting disciplinary action. (1) failure to perform his academic duties such as coming to the class without preparation for conducting lecture classes, demonstration, assessment, guidance, invigilation etc. (2) gross partiality in assessment of students deliberately over marking or under marking or attempting at victimisation on any ground whatsoever. (3) Inciting students against other students or colleagues or against the University or the State Government or the Central Government. (4) raising questions of caste, creed, religion, race or sex in his relationship with his colleagues and trying to use the above consideration for the improvement of his prospects. (5) refusal to carry out the decisions by appropriate administrative or academic bodies or functionaries of the University which are not against the provisions of any law for the time being in force." Rule 81(d) of the said Chapter deals with the duties and responsibilities of teacher. The said provision reads as follows:- "81 (d) Duties and responsibilities of teacher:- (1) All teachers shall report for duty and sign the attendance register atleast 15 minutes before the commencement of the morning session and shall be present in the campus till the end of the afternoon session except during the lunch interval and sign in the attendance register before they leave. However, he/she can avail himself or herself of any exception in this regard with the explicit sanction of the principal. (2) It shall be the duty of every teacher to faithfully observe all the lawful orders of the Principal/Head of the Department, detailing duties of responsibility relating to any academic and co-curricular work that may be assigned to him or her over and above the work allotted. (3) It shall be the duty of every teacher to supervise University and College Examinations and periodical tests, to conduct practical tests, to correct records and composition exercises and submit mark list in time as per directions given from time to time by the University, concerned Head of the Department and the Principal.
(3) It shall be the duty of every teacher to supervise University and College Examinations and periodical tests, to conduct practical tests, to correct records and composition exercises and submit mark list in time as per directions given from time to time by the University, concerned Head of the Department and the Principal. (4) Every teacher shall submit a statement of the work done by him or her during the course of the academic year by the first week of March every year to the Principal through the Head of the Department." 7. Now, whether the conduct of the petitioner is culpable, is the point to be decided in the light of the above statutory provisions. Confronted with the difficulty to relate the alleged misconduct of the petitioner to any of the statutory provisions mentioned above, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent relying on the decision of this Court reported in “Natarajan V. Divisional Superintendent, Southern Railway” (1975 KLT 806) submitted that apart from the misconducts specifically mentioned, there can be other misconducts also. In the said decision, while interpreting Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, this Court has held as follows: "However, that does not mean that the Government could have no right to control the conduct of its servants to a certain extent even in private life or that that Government servants could under no circumstances will be answerable to Government for an act not connected with their official duties unless it is punishable by law........" We are in agreement with what Justice Dhavan said in the Allahabad decision cited above that Article 311 does not restrict the power of the State to dispense with the services of any State to dispense with the services of any Government Servant for conduct which it considers to be unworthy or unbecoming of an official of the State, nor does it fetter the discretion of the State as to what type of conduct it shall consider sufficiently blameworthy to merit dismissal or removal from service.
The State has been invested with a large discretion in this respect and it can undoubtedly demand a certain standard of conduct from Government servants not only when performing their official duties but in their private lives as well." But the 1st respondent has filed to place before this Court, any Rule similar to Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, which is applicable to the petitioner. 8. Further, the above statement of law made by this Court cannot stand with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the decision reported in A.L.Kalra V. Project Equipment Corporation (AIR 1984 SC 1361). In the aid decision, the Apex Court held as follows:- "21 And now to the facts. The gravamen of the two heads of charger is that the appellant is guilty of misconduct as prescribed in Rule 4(1) (i) and (iii). It reads as under: 4(1) Every employee shall at all times: (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) ........................ (iii) do noting which is unbecoming of a public servant Rule 5 prescribes various misconducts for which action can be taken against an employee governed by the rules. 22. Rule 4 bears the heading - General. Rule 5 bear the heading misconduct. The draftsmen of the 1975 rules made a clear distinction about what would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view corporation culture may be a moral or ethical expectation. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in rule 5. Any attempt to telescope R.4 into R.5 must be looked upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation.
What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view of a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. V. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut (1984) 1 SCC 1 (AIR 1984 SC 505). Where this Court held that everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Rule 4 styled as General specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of R.5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in the two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well be mentioned that R.25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct." So, in view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court, the petitioner could be proceeded against only for any of the specified misconducts contained in the Act or the Statutes.
Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct." So, in view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court, the petitioner could be proceeded against only for any of the specified misconducts contained in the Act or the Statutes. It is a fundamental principle of law that what are the commissions or omissions which entail penal consequences, should be defined with precision and notified in advance so that a citizen can avoid doing them. Vagueness in a penal provision makes it ultra vires and unconstitutional. Douglas.J., in the decision in Krishian V. Board of Regents (1967) 385 US 589) has held a follows:- "a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not, in each particular case.........." Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to protect a person against having the Government to impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce." Our Apex Court, in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab (1994 (3) SCC 569), has reiterated this principle in the following words:- "130. It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. It is insisted or emphasised that laws should give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen and also judges for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. More so, uncertain and undefined words deployed inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 9. So, an employee cannot be punished on the basis of the subjective concept in the mind of the disciplinary authority regarding what is misconduct.
More so, uncertain and undefined words deployed inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 9. So, an employee cannot be punished on the basis of the subjective concept in the mind of the disciplinary authority regarding what is misconduct. A priest turning an apostate and getting married is revolting to many, but for a few, it may be a natural thing. It is said, freedom of speech means freedom to speak ideas we hate. Likewise, freedom of conscience means freedom to embrace a faith which we detest. Safe and conservative faiths do not require the protection of the Constitution. Heretics and heresies require it. The protection of fundamental freedoms like the freedom of speech and freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Constitution is most needed for unpopular minorities. 10. A layman may feel outraged by the action of the petitioner. But the point to be decided is whether his action is illegal or contrary to any of the Rules of Conduct prescribed by the competent authority. The 1st respondent has failed to point out any such provision to condemn the conduct of the petitioner as a misconduct. The action taken against the petitioner is similar to the classical example of unreasonable administrative action stated by Warrington L.J in Short V. Poole Corporation (1921 Ch. 26) of dismissing a teacher for being red haired, which is quoted by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture House Limited V. Wednesbury Corporation (1948 (1) KB 223). The statutory provisions governing the disciplinary the disciplinary proceedings against private college teachers do not support the proposition that the petitioner, by marrying and living with a lady, has committed any misconduct. Therefore, Ext.P2 suspension order is plainly ultra vires and unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. So it is quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to all consequential benefits. The Original Petition is allowed as above.