JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. By this writ application CESC Limited has challenged the decision of the Appellate Authority under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979 ("Act") thereby affirming the order of assessment of development charge by the Chairman, Bhatpara Municipality at the rate fixed by the Act for conversion of the land from agricultural to commercial use. 2. The following facts are not in dispute:- The petitioner No.1 after purchasing a plot of agricultural land filed an application before the Municipality for mutation informing that the land would be utilized for constructing a switching sub-station for augmenting the power supply system in 6hyamnagar-Bhatpara area. The Municipality having asked the petitioner No. 1 to pay development charges for the use of the land under section 103 of the Act at the rate mentioned therein for alteration of mode of use of land from agricultural to commercial, the petitioners retorted claiming that they were liable to pay at the rate fixed for change of manner of utilization from agricultural to industrial inasmuch as the activity of a switching-cum-sub-station, proposed to be installed, came within the definition of , industry' as mentioned in the Act. Suffice it to say, the charge for commercial user is much higher than that for industrial one. The Chairman, Bhatpara Municipality as well as the Appellate Authority having turned down the contention of the petitioners, they have come up with the instant writ application. 3. the sole question that arises for determination herein is whether proposed construction of a switching/sub-station for augmenting the power supply in the area where no electricity will be "generated" but by virtue of such substation, power is sought to be transformed or transmitted can be said to be one for industrial purpose. 4. 3. the sole question that arises for determination herein is whether proposed construction of a switching/sub-station for augmenting the power supply in the area where no electricity will be "generated" but by virtue of such substation, power is sought to be transformed or transmitted can be said to be one for industrial purpose. 4. Before I proceed to deal with the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it will be pertinent to refer to the following definitions appearing in the Act:- "Section 2(5)- 'commerce' means the carrying on of any trade, business or profession, sale or exchange of goods of any type whatsoever and includes the running of, with a view to make profit, hospitals, nursing homes, infirmaries, educational institutions as also hotels, restaurants, boarding houses not attached to any educational institution and sarais; and the expression 'commercial' shall be construed accordingly; Section 2(6)- 'commercial use' means use of any land or building or plant thereof for purposes of commerce or for storage of goods or as an office, whether attached to any industry or otherwise; Section 2(10)- 'industrial use' includes carrying on of a manufacturing process as defined in the Factories Act, 1948 and the expression 'industrial' shall be construed accordingly; Section 2(11)- 'industrial use' includes the use of any land or building or part thereof for purposes of industry." 5. The definition of "manufacturing process" mentioned in section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 is also quoted below:- "Section 2(k)- 'manufacturing process' means process for- i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or ii) pumping oil, water, sewerage or any other substance, or iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power, or iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding, or v) constructing, re-constructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels, or vi) preserving any article in cold storage;" 6. Mr. Roy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that a sub-station is installed as a part of manufacturing process and as such the operation of such a sub-station comes within the definition of "industrial use". Mr. Mr. Roy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that a sub-station is installed as a part of manufacturing process and as such the operation of such a sub-station comes within the definition of "industrial use". Mr. Roy submits that the generation or production of electricity coincides almost instantaneously with its consumption and that electricity can by on means be stored. He thus contends that transformation and transmission of electricity is also a part of manufacturing process even though it is not generated in such sub-station. According to Mr. Roy the words generating, transforming or transmitting appearing in section 2(k) (iii) of the Factories Act should be read disjunctively for the purpose of construing the word "manufacturing process". Mr. Roy contends that mere generation of power is of no avail to his clients unless those are transformed and transmitted to the consumer in a controlled way. Therefore each of the stages viz. generation, transformation and transmission is part of the total manufacturing process and if any of the aforesaid three jobs is carried on in a place, such place should be deemed to be used for industrial purpose. 7. Mr. Sen, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Municipality has vehemently disputed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Roy and has submitted that electricity being held to be 'good's by the Supreme Court, it should be concluded that the place where sub-station is proposed to be installed will be used for the 'purpose' of promoting sale of goods and thus comes within the purview of 'commercial use'. Mr. Sen asserts that in order that the sub-station may come within the meaning of industry, all the three ingredients viz. generation, transformation and transmission must take place. In. support of such contention Mr. Sen strongly relies upon two decisions, one of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., reported in 1981 Lab IC 1678 and the other of Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Electricity Board vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in 1984 (II) LLJ page 370. 8. After the conclusion of hearing, the matter was adjourned for delivery of judgment. 8. After the conclusion of hearing, the matter was adjourned for delivery of judgment. At the time of preparing the judgment it appeared to me that in view of the Supreme Court decisions holding electricity to be goods, there was no reason why transformation of electricity for the purpose of sale and delivery should not come within the purview of section 2(k) (i) of the .Factories Act in addition to that of section 2(k)(iii). Since the learned counsel for the petitioners did not argue such point at the time of hearing nor was such ground taken in the writ application I directed the matter to be placed in the list for further hearing to enable Mr. Sen the learned counsel for the Municipality to meet the aforesaid point. 9. At the time of further hearing, Mr. Sen raised the following objections to such additional point:- a) The point raised by the Court being a mixed question of law and fact should not be considered for the first time in this writ application. Moreover, such point is beyond the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. b) When there are in a statute two provisions which are in conflict with each other to such extent that both of them cannot stand, they should, if possible, be so interpreted that effect can be given to both and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative or useless should not be adopted except as a last resort. In support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Sen relies upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Bengal Immunity Company vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1955 SC page 661. c) Even on merit, transformation or transmission of electric power does not come within the meaning of the word 'adapt'. According to Mr. Sen, the word 'adapt' means to alter something so as to fit for a new use, situation etc. Mr. Sen submits that even after transformation, electricity does not become a new substance but remains the same electricity and as such by mere variation of power, there is no "adaptation". 10. At the very outset I proceed to deal with the first two additional objections raised by Mr. Sen. 11. Mr. Sen submits that even after transformation, electricity does not become a new substance but remains the same electricity and as such by mere variation of power, there is no "adaptation". 10. At the very outset I proceed to deal with the first two additional objections raised by Mr. Sen. 11. In my opinion, the point, the Court has raised, is not a mixed question of law and fact but a pure question of law requiring no new investigation of facts. In the case before us, the petitioners have come up with a proposal of construction of switching-sub station. It appears from annexure- 'P-5', the application for permission of lay out plan under section 193 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 that in paragraph 5 thereof "Installation of 132/220 KV switching sub-station for augmentation of power distribution system in the area" has been described as the "proposed use" of the land. It appears from Annexure- 'P-15', the reply given by the petitioners before the appellate authority that they have further explained the purpose in the following terms:- "Switching-cum-sub-station in the instant case is basically a switching station to be installed by CESC Limited i. e. there is no power transformer installation for step up/down of voltage. It is a part of the entire electricity net work. In the switching station, several high voltage/high tension circuits coverage to facilitate the efficient transmission of energy and diverting or redirecting power flow, in case of increase in availability in any generating or power station or break down or failure in any specific segment of the entire transmission network, in between Mulajore Power Station and Titagarh Power Station.........." 12. Since at this stage, the petitioners have come forward with the proposed construction, there is no scope of disputing the veracity of the proposal and the Municipality should consider whether such proposal, as it stands, comes within "commercial use" or "industrial use". Ultimately, if it is found that the petitioners have installed equipment different from the one proposed, the Municipality will be free to take appropriate action in accordance with law. Thus, we are required to make inference from the aforesaid proposal by treating the same to be genuine for the time being. Therefore, this is a pure question of law requiring no new enquiry of fact. Thus, we are required to make inference from the aforesaid proposal by treating the same to be genuine for the time being. Therefore, this is a pure question of law requiring no new enquiry of fact. It is now settled position of law that a pure question of law can be raised for the first time even before the Supreme Forum not with standing the fact that such point was not earlier taken or even conceded at one stage of the proceedings. (See Union of India & Anr. vs. Babu Singh & Ors., 1996 (1) SCC 477 ; Tripura Goods Transport Association vs. Commissioner of Taxes, 1998 (2) SCC 264 ; State of U. P. vs. Anupam Gupta & Ors., (1993) Sup (1) SCC 594. 13. The next question is whether such a pure question of law can be raised by the court suo moto even though such point has not been raised by the petitioners. The grievance of the petitioners herein is that the Municipality cannot realize any amount in excess of the one fixed by law. If in deciding such a case it appears to the court that the authorities below failed to take notice of a provision of law which stands in the way of the Municipality to realize any amount at a higher rate proposed, a writ court can of its own motion point out such 'want of authority' of the Municipality to claim the charge at the rate; in such a case, the Municipality however must be given an opportunity of hearing to meet such point. After all, a writ court is within its competence to take judicial notice of any law of the land and if it appears that in a given case any such law confers a right upon the petitioners which is sought to be infringed by the State in ignorance of the same, the court can by relying upon such law protect the interest of the petitioner. Therefore, if it is established that the proposed construction comes within the purview of section 2(K)(i), the question being one of jurisdiction, can be entertained within the scope of judicial review. 14. Therefore, if it is established that the proposed construction comes within the purview of section 2(K)(i), the question being one of jurisdiction, can be entertained within the scope of judicial review. 14. As regards the second additional objection, mentioned above, r do not for a moment dispute the broad proposition of law that when there are in a statute two provision which are in conflict with each other to such extent that both of them cannot stand, they should, if possible, be so construed that effect can be given to both and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative or useless should not be adopted except as a last resort. Apart from• relying upon the aforesaid proposition Mr. Sen also tried to convince this court that the legislature inspite of existence of section 2(k) (i) having further enacted section 2(k) (iii), it necessarily follows that the law-makers were quite conscious that the phrase "generating, transforming or transmitting power" did not fall within the words "treating" or "adapting" any article or substance employed in section 2(k)(i). 15. I am however not at all impressed by any of the aforesaid submissions. 16. First, there is no conflict between section 2(k)(i) and section 2(k)(iii) and it is not a case that both of them cannot stand together. Here is a case when a particular act can come within the meaning of both. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bengal Immunity (supra) has no application. 17. Secondly, although there is some substance in the contention of Mr. Sen that in interpreting a provision, the general presumption is that the legislature does not enact superfluous provision, the law is equally settled that such presumption is not a strong presumption and statutes are full of provisions introduced because 'abundans cautela non nocet' (there is no harm in being cautious). (See Gokaraju vs. State of A. P., AIR 1981 SC 1473 at 1479 and also Hakim Ali & Anr. vs. Board of Revenue & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 972 ). 18. Moreover, section 2(k)(iii) may also cover a case of generating, transforming or transmitting any other form of energy than Electrical energy which is mechanically transmitted but not generated by human or animal agency and at the same time not with a view to its own use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. 19. 18. Moreover, section 2(k)(iii) may also cover a case of generating, transforming or transmitting any other form of energy than Electrical energy which is mechanically transmitted but not generated by human or animal agency and at the same time not with a view to its own use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. 19. Therefore, section 2(k) (iii) of the Factories Act also contemplates cases not coming within the scope of section 2(k)(i) of the said Act. 20. I now turn over to the other points raised by Mr. Sen. 21. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record I find that the words "commerce" and "commercial use" defined in the Act are wide enough to include within their ambit the words. "industry" and "industrial use" respectively. Therefore, according to the definitions employed in the Act, all industries come within the meaning of the word 'commerce'. Thus, even if the activity of a sub-station falls within the scope of commerce, the petitioners are entitled to circumvent the development charge for commercial purpose fixed by the Act if they can bring such project within the scope of 'industry' as defined. However, the store room or office room attached even to an industry will not get the benefit of industrial use and such rooms are always treated as part of commercial use. The Act has adopted an inclusive definition of industry by taking aid of the definition of "manufacturing process" appearing in the Factories Act, 1948 and declaring that industry includes carrying on of such process. According to section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act, 'manufacturing process' means process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. (Emphasis given) 22. The fact that the purpose of installation of the sub-station is to transmit electricity at a required controlled voltage for the purpose of its sale being admitted, it necessarily follows that the petitioners want to 'adapt' the electricity through such process so that it can effectively reach the doors of the consumer for its use. Therefore, the purpose of the sub-station definitely comes within the definition of manufacturing process and as such should be deemed to be 'industry' within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the purpose of the sub-station definitely comes within the definition of manufacturing process and as such should be deemed to be 'industry' within the meaning of the Act. The case in hand having squarely fallen within section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act there is no necessity of considering whether it also comes within section 2(k) (iii) of the said Act. Now that is apparent that the petitioners through the sub-station want to 'adapt' such goods to suit the needs of its consumers and convey the same to them for sale and such course of adaptation is definitely a manufacturing process. The word 'adapt' according to the Concise Oxford Thesaurus compiled by Betty Kirkpatrick, 1st Indian Edition, 'is synonymous with the words adjust, tailor, convert, change, alter, modify, transform, remodel, reshape. Therefore, the object of sub-station being admittedly transformation and transmission of electricity in a calculated way amounts to 'adaptation' of the manufactured goods with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal within the meaning of section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act. 23. I now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Sen. 24. In the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (supra), the question was whether an electrical substation only transforming and transmitting electricity, as the case before us, was a factory within the meaning of Factories Act. A Division Bench of that court held that the activity of such a sub-station did not fall within the conditions of section 2(k)(iii) of the Factories Act because that provisions required that there should be a process of generating, transforming and transmitting of power. The Division Bench held the process of merely transforming and transmitting is not sufficient to bring a case within the definition. The word 'or' occurring therein, the Division Bench proceeded, should be read as 'and'. In arriving at such conclusion, Division Bench relied upon a Supreme Court decision in the case of Workmen Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking vs. Management, reported in AIR 1973 SC page 365. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench I am unable to agree with the view that the word 'or' appearing in section 2(k) (iii) of the Factories Act should be construed as 'and'. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench I am unable to agree with the view that the word 'or' appearing in section 2(k) (iii) of the Factories Act should be construed as 'and'. If the aforesaid interpretation is accepted, then a generating station which generates electric power will not even come under the definition of 'manufacturing process' if the process of transformation takes place in a different location. Moreover, the said Division Bench did not at all take into consideration the outcome of pro visions contained in section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act. 25. In the case of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking vs. Management (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the question whether Inspectors and Superintendents required to work beyond their normal duty hours were entitled to payment of overtime for the extra-time. If they were governed by the Factories Act, they were eligible for overtime pay. The Supreme Court after considering the evidence on record held that in the said case several sub-stations and zonal-stations were left unattended and no manufacturing process took place in those premises. The Apex Court further held that a factory must occupy a fixed site. In the said decision although an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd. vs. Regional Director, AIR 1967 SC 1364 , was referred to but the Bench noticed only one paragraph of the said earlier decision but totally remained silent as regards the other portions of the earlier judgment and the conclusion arrived therein that the processes of transforming and transmitting electric energy were "manufacturing process". In the said earlier decision, the Court however did not approve the contention that every inch of the wide area over which the transmission lines are spread is a factory. But in the later decision, the Supreme Court merely highlighted the above observation of the earlier judgment. 26. In my view, the earlier judgment in Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd. (supra) is binding upon this Court as precedent. When there are conflicting views of two Benches having equal strength, the former prevails. [See Bagala Sundari vs. Prosanna, 21 CWN 375 (D.B)]. 27. For the similar reason the other Division Bench decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Electricity Board (supra) does not reflect the correct position of law. When there are conflicting views of two Benches having equal strength, the former prevails. [See Bagala Sundari vs. Prosanna, 21 CWN 375 (D.B)]. 27. For the similar reason the other Division Bench decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Electricity Board (supra) does not reflect the correct position of law. Moreover, in none of those decisions the Court considered the provisions of section. 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act even though the Supreme Court has ruled out electricity to be moveable property or goods. [See State of A. P. vs. T. P. C. & Ors., 2002(5) SCC 203 ; CST vs. M. P. Electricity Board, 1969 (1) SCC 200 ]. 28. On consideration of the entire materials on record I am thus of the view that both the authorities below erred in law in holding that the proposal of construction of switching sub-station by the petitioners falls within "commercial use". I therefore set aside the orders impugned and direct the Municipality to mutate the name of CESC Limited within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of deposit of mutation fees of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand) and the charge of conversion of the use of land from agricultural to industrial one at the rate fixed by the Act. The Municipality will assess such amount and ask the petitioner No.1 to pay within a fortnight from date. 29. Xerox certified copy, if applied for, .be given to the parties by tomorrow. 30. No costs.