JUDGMENT R. Gururajan, J.--The Plaintiff is the Appellant in this case. 2. The facts of this case would show how the wheel of justice is moving in Trial Courts. A suit of 1972 in O.S. No. 2336 of 1972 (renumbered as 342 of 1980) is disposed of on 21.12.2001 exactly after 29 years. The prayer in the suit is for a declaration for the previous proceedings taken by the Plaintiff against the Defendant in respect of suit property are vitiated and the decisions, orders and decrees passed in those proceedings are not binding on the Plaintiff. Those proceedings were initiated way back in the years 1960 and 1963. I have given these brief facts to show the necessity of moving forward the wheels of justice so that the confidence in our Courts are not shaken or disturbed in the larger interest of an orderly society. Unless effective steps are taken to speed up these civil disputes, days are not far off for the litigant public to avail other extra legal methods to get the relief to the detriment of orderly society. 3. With the above said preface, let me give the facts in the case on hand. 4. The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a declaration as the owner of the suit property in addition to a declaration that all previous proceedings taken by her against the Defendants in respect of suit property are vitiated and the decisions, orders and decrees passed in those proceedings are not binding on the Plaintiff-Appellant and her right in the suit property is not affected in any manner. She has also sought for an injunction. Suit property involves a site bearing No. 94 in Sy. No. 67 of Kethamaranahalli now called as Ramachandrapuram bearing Corporation No. 21, consisting of 6 tenements and two bunk shops measuring 30' East-West and 100' North-South. 5. The Plaintiff states that the suit schedule property originally belonged to one Balaji Rao. The property was inherited by Balaji's brothers Mannoji Rao and Eswara Rao. The Plaintiff is the purchaser of the property in terms of a Sale Deed dated 20.5.1959 from Mannoji Rao and Eswara Rao out of her own funds. She was in continuous and undisturbed possession of the property. She has put up construction spending nearly Rs.4,000/- for the small 6 tenements. The Plaintiff is the purchaser of the property in terms of a Sale Deed dated 20.5.1959 from Mannoji Rao and Eswara Rao out of her own funds. She was in continuous and undisturbed possession of the property. She has put up construction spending nearly Rs.4,000/- for the small 6 tenements. She is in occupation of one of the tenements and she has let out to others the other tenements and collecting rents. The site in question forms part of Sy. No. 67 of Kethamaranahalli. The said Sy. No. resumed to the Government under Section 64 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code in terms of an Order dated 25.8.1934. This resumption extinguishes rights and title of all the individuals. The resumption is upheld by this Court in various proceedings. After investigation of the Plaintiff's claim and title by the Revenue authorities and recovering the upset price, the special Tahsildar, Bangalore Taluk, issued the title deed in favour of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff claims her title from paramount title holders, namely, the Government. The Plaintiff says that she recently learnt that a suit has been filed by her husband in the Court of II Additional Munsiff, Bangalore, against the first Defendant for declaration of title and injunction. He was unsuccessful. A Regular Second Appeal No. 686 of 1967 was pending before the High Court of Mysore. She was ignorant of these proceedings. She made an application to implead herself as a party in the said appeal. But her application was rejected. The property was acquired by the Plaintiff by her Stridhana property and in order to give respect to her husband, the document was taken in the name of her husband. She claims binami. Her husband had no title to the property in question. She was in possession for more than 13 years. It is the case of the Plaintiff that the orders and decrees passed in the previous proceedings in respect of suit property will not bind the Plaintiff. Previous proceedings up to R.S.A. were initiated on an erroneous beliefs that the parties had title to the property in question and litigated on that mistaken basis. The resumption has not been brought to the notice of the Court in those proceedings. It is her further case that the Defendants derived no title to the property. 6. Previous proceedings up to R.S.A. were initiated on an erroneous beliefs that the parties had title to the property in question and litigated on that mistaken basis. The resumption has not been brought to the notice of the Court in those proceedings. It is her further case that the Defendants derived no title to the property. 6. She got her plaint amended and in terms of the amended petition, she further says that the Government was not implement as a party in the previous proceedings and therefore those proceedings do not bind the Government. The Government has recognized the Plaintiffs title and granted title Deed in the year 1972. The purchase of the site by the first Defendant in the year 1958 is invalid since the Government has resumed the entire Survey Number at that time. 7. The suit was contested. The first Defendant states that the suit property belongs to Mannoji Rao and Venkata Rao. They sold the same to Subba Raju in terms of a Sale Deed dated 14.2.1931. Subba Raju was in possession of the same. He had leased the same to the second Defendant on monthly rent of Rs.3/- and second Defendant was in possession thereof as a tenant of Subba Raju. On 24.9.1958, Subbaraju sold the same to the first Defendant in terms of a registered document. The second Defendant attorned himself as a tenant of first Defendant and became his tenant. After the second Defendant became the tenant, he did not pay the rent to the first Defendant. Proceedings were initiated in Misc. Petition No. 71 of 1959. Matter was contested. Petition was allowed and an eviction Order was passed against the Defendant. A decree for arrears of rent was obtained by the first Defendant against the second Defendant. The first Defendant filed execution petition before the second Munsiff, Bangalore. At the time of executing the warrant, the husband of the Plaintiff obstructed delivery and an application was filed for removal of the obstruction caused by Munithimmaiah. The petition was allowed. 8. The second Defendant set up his cousin Muni Thimmaiah, the husband of the Plaintiff to defeat his rights. He brought about a sale deed in favour of Munithimmaiah from Mukunda Rao and Eswara Rao. In Mis. 170 of 1960 under Order 21, Rule 97 Code of Civil procedure Munithimmaiah failed to establish his title. The petition was allowed. 8. The second Defendant set up his cousin Muni Thimmaiah, the husband of the Plaintiff to defeat his rights. He brought about a sale deed in favour of Munithimmaiah from Mukunda Rao and Eswara Rao. In Mis. 170 of 1960 under Order 21, Rule 97 Code of Civil procedure Munithimmaiah failed to establish his title. Thereafter, he filed a suit in O.S. No. 414 of 1963. It was dismissed on 24.4.1965. Munithimmaiah filed an appeal in RA No. 120 of 1966. The appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, he filed RSA No. 686 of 1967, when the said appeal was pending, the husband of the Plaintiff Munithimmaiah died. The appeal abated. Thereafter, the Plaintiff and her son and daughter made an L.R.application and the same was rejected. 9. After all these proceedings, the second Defendant instigated Plaintiff to file the present suit in the year 1972. When the first Defendant purchased the said property, there was only one temporary structure now and then in the property. This Defendant denied various allegations. He further denied that Government has resumed the land. The Tahsildar has no right to investigate the ownership of the suit and grant to anybody. This Defendant further says that this suit is filed in collusion with the second Defendant to defraud this Defendant. The principles of resjudicata was pressed into service. Limitation plea was taken in the matter. 10. The second Defendant, the brother of the Plaintiff filed written statement and admit that the Plaintiff is living in one of the tenements. He is not aware of the enquiry by the Tahsildar. He never interfered with the possession of the Plaintiff. He wanted the suit to be dismissed. Learned Trial Judge has framed 12 issues. He has answered the issues in the impugned judgment. Before the Trial Judge three witnesses have been examined on behalf of the Plaintiff and 15 documents were marked. The Defendant marked two documents. The learned Judge, after hearing, has dismissed the suit with costs of Rs.10,000/- payable to the LRS of the first Defendant. 11. Sri. Ramaiah, learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that the impugned Order requires my interference. He states that the principle of constructive res judicate is not available in the case on hand. He refers to Section 113 of the Evidence Act. 11. Sri. Ramaiah, learned Counsel for the Appellant argues that the impugned Order requires my interference. He states that the principle of constructive res judicate is not available in the case on hand. He refers to Section 113 of the Evidence Act. He says that the learned Judge without any material facts has chosen to pass this Order. He also refers to the earlier Orders passed in various judgments to contend that those Orders are not binding on the Plaintiff. Matter was reserved. At that instance, the appeal was again heard by me. 12. After hearing, I have carefully perused the impugned judgment. 13. The Learned Trial Judge in the impugned judgment has framed 12 issues. Issue No. 6 was answered against the Defendants. That has become final.P Ws 1-3 were examined and they have filed as many as 15 documents. Defendants have filed two documents. 14. The learned Trial Judge notices the pleadings in the case on hand. In fact, the pleadings in the case on hand is not to my satisfaction. In the prayer, the Petitioner seeks a blanket prayer by stating that all decisions and orders and decrees passed in the earlier petitions are void and not binding on the Plaintiff. It is not shown as to what were those Orders which were passed against the Appellant and under what circumstances? It is also not shown to me as to how those Orders could be set at naught at one stroke in the case on hand at the instance of the Plaintiff. In fact, in my subsequent paragraphs, I have held that the Plaintiffs are parties to certain proceedings. Plaintiffs have participated in these proceedings and the Plaintiffs case was rejected by Courts. Those Orders cannot be set aside by the Trial Court at the instance of the Plaintiffs, even after rejection by the High Court. In short, what the Plaintiff wants is to nullify all Court Orders by seeking a blanket prayer. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court with regard to the pleadings in the judgment in Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Another Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi and Others, AIR 1999 SC 162 . In short, what the Plaintiff wants is to nullify all Court Orders by seeking a blanket prayer. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court with regard to the pleadings in the judgment in Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Another Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi and Others, AIR 1999 SC 162 . The Apex court ruled as under: The object of Order VI, Rule 2(2) is to afford the other side intimation regarding the particular facts of the case so that they may be met by the other side. Second is to enable the Court to determine what is really the issue between the parties. The words in the sub-rule 'a statement in a concise form' are definitely suggestive that brevity should be adhered to while drafting pleadings. Of course, brevity should not be at the cost of setting out necessary facts, but it does not mean neggling in the pleadings. If care is taken in the syntactic process, pleadings can be saved from tautology. Elaboration of facts in pleadings is not the ideal measures and that is why the sub-rule embodies the word 'and contain only' just before the succeeding words 'a statement in a concise form of the material facts. The vague pleadings/prayers in this case is staring at the Plaintiffs. 15. It is also to be noticed the dates and events of the previous proceedings as mentioned in para 8 of the judgment. They are as under: Dates: Events: 1. Original owners: Mannoji Rao and Venkatarao 2. 4.2.1931: Munnoji Rao and Venkata Rao sold to Subbaraju and delivered possession, 3. Subbaraju had leased to 2nd Defendant Hanumaiah on a rent of Rs.3/- 4. 24.9.1958: Subbaraju sold the suit schedule property to 1st Defendant and delivered possession 5. 21.3.1956: Munnojirao and Venkatarao filed O.S. No. 140 of 1956 against 1st Defendant (Vijendra Rao) 6. 4.4.1958 R.A.197 of 1957-dismissed. 7. 15.6.1960: HRC Misc. No. 71 of 1959 under Section 8 of K.R.C. Act-decreed against 1st Defendant. 8. S.C. No. 1953 of 1960-decreed for arrears of rent. 9. 2.11.1960 Ex. Case No. 312 of 1960 filed 10. 2.11.1960 - at that time Munithimmaiah, husband of Plaintiff obstructed the delivery of possession. 11. 26.6.1963 - Misc. Petn. No. 170 of 1960 under Order 21, Rule 97 Code of Civil procedure allowed-obstructions removed. 12. 2.4.1965: O.S. 414 of 1963 dismissed. 13. 10.8.1966: R.A. 120 of 1966 dismissed. 9. 2.11.1960 Ex. Case No. 312 of 1960 filed 10. 2.11.1960 - at that time Munithimmaiah, husband of Plaintiff obstructed the delivery of possession. 11. 26.6.1963 - Misc. Petn. No. 170 of 1960 under Order 21, Rule 97 Code of Civil procedure allowed-obstructions removed. 12. 2.4.1965: O.S. 414 of 1963 dismissed. 13. 10.8.1966: R.A. 120 of 1966 dismissed. 14. 22.2.1972: R.S.A. 686 of 1967 dismissed. 15. 25.9.1972: present O.S. 342 of 1980 filed. 16. 23.9.1967: The purported Order on Munithimmaiah's application to Deputy Commissioner for grant. 17. 23.7.1970: Death of Munithimmiah. 18. 14.1.1972: Chalan by Plaintiff Munilakshmamma. 19. 10.2.1972: purported grant by Special Tahsildar. Note: No. grant Order by Deputy Commissioner. 20. 22.2.1972: RSA 686 of 1987 dismissed. 21. No review or SLP filed. 22. 10.2.1972: right of Plaintiff Munilakshmamma, if any, only from 10.2.1972. 23. 25.9.1972: O.S. No. 342 of 1980 filed. Various Orders as referred to here, the Petitioner wants to be set aside in one stroke without proper pleadings and prayers. The Plaintiff wants even those Orders in which he participated to be set aside without any foundation. Such prayers cannot be granted. The learned Judge is therefore, right in dismissing the suit. 16. The Plaintiff's case is that the Plaintiff purchased a property in terms of Ex.P1 and he was not aware of Ex.P2, a Notification issued for regrant. Plaintiff also says that in terms of Ex.P10, a title was issued by the Tahsildar. According to the plaint averments, Subbaraju's claim for grant of claim was rejected. The Petitioner sought for summons to the Special Tahsildar and the same was rejected by a detailed Order dated 30.11.2001. That Order has not been challenged and it has become final. Therefore, the learned Judge did not have the benefit of the Orders which are placed before him before the Trial Court. it is to be stated and reiterated here that civil proceedings are not writ proceedings. Civil proceedings are regulated by procedures in the matter of conducting cases. When the Plaintiff-Appellant failed in getting the summons issued to the Special Tahsildar and when that Order has become final, he cannot be permitted to argue in this Court based on those documents at this stage. 17. The learned Judge notices the conduct of the Plaintiff. Initially the Appellant has concealed datas in O.S. 414 of 1963 and RA. 120 of 1966. 17. The learned Judge notices the conduct of the Plaintiff. Initially the Appellant has concealed datas in O.S. 414 of 1963 and RA. 120 of 1966. Thereafter, amendment was sought for and it was granted. She has stated therein that the Government was not a party Ex.P15 is an Order passed by this Court in RA No. 76 of 1955. It cannot be forgotten that the second Defendant is a tenant and he is none other than the brother of the Appellant. The husband of the Petitioner and the second Defendant obstructed in the earlier proceedings and having failed in those proceedings, an attempt is now made through the sister to question the sale deed in subsequent proceedings. An impression is given to this Court that the first Defendant is being harrased right from the date of purchase till date, either by the husband of the Plaintiff and the second Defendant and now by the Plaintiff. 18. The learned Judge in para 12 notices the eviction Order passed in HRC Misc. No. 71 of 1959 dated 15.6.1960. It was put in execution case No. 312 of 1960. The landlord filed an application in Misc. No. 170 of 1960 for the removal of obstruction under Order 21, Rule 97 Code of Civil procedure. The husband of the Plaintiff was heard and obstruction was removed in terms of an Order dated 26.6.1963. The husband of the Plaintiff thereafter filed O.S. 414 of 1963. 19. At this stage, it is also to be noticed that a sale deed in favour of Defendant No. 1 is earlier to that of Ex.P-3. Munithimmaiah was the subsequent purchaser. He is a close relative of tenant Hanummaiah. After losing the earlier legal battle, the material facts are clear to me that Hanummaiah must have set him up for further proceedings. It may be necessary to point out that the earlier suit in O.S. 140 of 1956 is filed by her husband and it went against the Plaintiff. Munithimmaiah had not title. The appeal was dismissed and this Court confirmed the same. The Plaintiff is none other than the wife of Munithimmaiah. The Plaintiff is fully aware of these proceedings and she has not chosen to take any action, whatsoever for a long time. In these circumstances, the earlier proceedings would come in the way of the present Plaintiff. The appeal was dismissed and this Court confirmed the same. The Plaintiff is none other than the wife of Munithimmaiah. The Plaintiff is fully aware of these proceedings and she has not chosen to take any action, whatsoever for a long time. In these circumstances, the earlier proceedings would come in the way of the present Plaintiff. The learned Judge, after noticing all these aspects has answered issue No. 8 and I do not find any justification to differ from the said findings based on the material on record. 20. The Trial Judge has considered issue Nos. 1, 3 and 9 in the impugned Order. He has referred to various facts in the case on hand. It is no doubt true that Ex.P-10 was produced before the learned Judge. It was a title deed issued by the Special Tahsildar. But the same has not been proved in a manner known to law. In fact, Ex.P-10 has been issued by the Special Tahsildar for prevention of unauthorised construction. There is no such Act preventing unauthorised construction. Ex.P-10 also refers to regrant and the details of regrant are not forthcoming. In these circumstances, the learned Judge is right in not relying on Ex.P-10. Learned Judge has also discussed in detail with regard to Ex.P-10. As rightly held by the learned Judge, Ex.P-10 cannot come to the aid of the Plaintiff particularly in the light of the previous proceedings against the Plaintiff. In these circumstances, the learned Judge is right in rejecting the contention of the Appellant in the impugned judgment. The learned Judge also has discussed the evidence of PW-1. PW-1, expresses his ignorance with regard to the property belonging to Mannoji Rao and Venkara Rao. The Plaintiff does not know when Mannoji Rao sold the land and executed a sale deed on 14.2.2001. The Plaintiff has also expressed his ignorance to various material issues as culled out by the learned Judge in ink pages 57 to 60. After noticing this, the learned Judge has come to a conclusion that no reliance can be placed on such evidence in the case on hand. In these circumstances, the evidence also do not support the contention of the Appellant. I fully agree with the learned Judge in this regard. It is also to be seen at this stage that the suit is one for declaration and for consequential injunction. In these circumstances, the evidence also do not support the contention of the Appellant. I fully agree with the learned Judge in this regard. It is also to be seen at this stage that the suit is one for declaration and for consequential injunction. As I mentioned earlier, the manner in which it was sought for cannot be granted in the case on hand. The learned Judge has seen the conduct of the Appellant herein and also the facts of the case. He refers in para 23 as under: The first Defendant purchased the property on 24.9.1958. He obtained an Order of eviction on 15.6.1960 against the second Defendant, who is the brother of the Plaintiff. The obstruction was removed on 26.6.1963. The suit was terminated on 22.2.1972. He was put out of possession for 12 years. Thereafter, at the instance of the Plaintiff, he is again out of possession not-withstanding a sale in his favour for another 27 years." The learned Judge also notices that PW-1 was examined in 1989-90. After 10 long years. P Ws.2 and 3 were in cross-examination. In the light of an enormous delay, the learned Judge notices that the Defendant was tired and he did not participate later. The learned Judge also notices the judgment of the in ILR 2001 SC 3746. After noticing this, he has stated that despite eviction Order the legitimate landlord Defendant No. 1 could not get possession. After noticing this, he has chosen to dismiss the suit with Rs.10,000/- costs. I am in agreement with the findings in the given set of facts. 21. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relies on two judgments of the Supreme Court. The first judgment is Ferro Alloys Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. U.O.I. and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1236 with regard to resjudicata. The Supreme Court in the said case has noticed that the plea of bar of res judicata can be considered only when such a plea was required by the contesting Respondent to meet the claim of the Appellant. The learned Judge has not dismissed the suit only on the principle of constructive res judicata. He has noticed all the earlier proceedings and thereafter taking note of the proceedings and the conduct has chosen to dismiss the suit. Thereafter, in my view, it is unnecessary for me to give any separate finding with regard to res judicata. The learned Judge has not dismissed the suit only on the principle of constructive res judicata. He has noticed all the earlier proceedings and thereafter taking note of the proceedings and the conduct has chosen to dismiss the suit. Thereafter, in my view, it is unnecessary for me to give any separate finding with regard to res judicata. The Order even otherwise is sustainable in the given set of facts. 21.1 The second judgment is Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate, AIR 1995 SC 1377 with regard to dispossession. That was a case in which an injunction was sought for restraining the Respondent from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff. 22. In these circumstances, I do not think that the learned Judge has committed any error, what so ever, in not only dismissing the suit but also in awarding costs. I must add at this juncture that Rule of law is a basic structure of an orderly society. In the case on hand, a lawful vendor is successfully prevented for more than 40 years resulting in his tiredness of the proceedings itself. He is not tired of justice but justice procedure has tired him. All that I would say is that such tiresome justice procedure of such a long time is required to be arrested by the Courts so that the litigant public may not lose confidence in the system itself. Any such act on the part of any litigant is not good either for Rule of law or justice delivery system. I do hope that the Trial Court Judges will keep in mind the object of speedy disposal while conducting their proceedings. It is not a good sign either for Rule of law or for manning the Courts. With these words, I deem it proper to dismiss the appeal. 23. One other question that remains for my consideration is after dismissal of the suit, whether possession can be restored to the first Defendant. Material facts reveal of an Order in his favour way back 1972. He is out of possession for nearly 40 years. When I confronted the Counsel for the Appellant as to why he should not handover possession, he stated that it is not an issue in the case on hand. Material facts reveal of an Order in his favour way back 1972. He is out of possession for nearly 40 years. When I confronted the Counsel for the Appellant as to why he should not handover possession, he stated that it is not an issue in the case on hand. Taking note of the history of the case and the conduct of the Plaintiff, I am certain in my mind that a second litigation is ready even in the event of this appeal being dismissed. With a view to see that no further litigation is continued, in the light of an earlier successful Order in favour of the Defendant No. 1 and in the light of the Plaintiff filing a suit on the ground of interference by the first Defendant, I deem it proper to direct the Plaintiff to restore possession within 3 months from today. This in my view would meet the ends of justice. No.