Judgment 1. The present appeal has been filed by Saroop Singh plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 15-9-1979 passed by the Add. District Judge, Amritsar, vide which the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court decreeing the suit for possession filed by the plaintiff-appellant, was reversed and the suit of the plaintiff-appellant for possession was dismissed. 2. Undisputedly, the plaintiff Saroop Singh is the owner of the land measuring 16 kanals 16 marlas, which is the disputed property. According to the plaintiff, Surjan Singh defendant took illegal possession of the land in dispute forcibly in the year 1971. Immediately thereafter Surjan Singh filed a suit for permanent injunction against the plaintiff alleging therein that he is a tenant on the land in dispute and Saroop Singh landlord wanted to take forcible possession from him. In that suit, the plaintiff Saroop Singh denied the allegations of the defendant and stated that Surjan Singh is a trespasser and he has taken forcible possession of his land. 3. The said suit was decided on 8-5-1974, in which a finding was recorded that Surjan Singh is in possession of the land in dispute, but his possession on the suit land was as a trespasser and not as a tenant. However, the appellant Saroop Singh was restrained from taking forcible possession of the land in dispute except in due course of the law. This judgment rendered by the Sub Judge, Ist Class, Amritsar, became final between the parties which is Ex. P1 on the record. 4. After the aforesaid decision, the appellant Saroop Singh filed the present suit for possession on 14-2-1977 alleging therein that the defendant Surjan Singh is a trespasser and he has no legal right to retain the possession of the land in dispute. He also claimed a compensation of Rs.36,00/- @ Rs. 300/- per bighas per annum. 5. Defendant Surjan Singh contested the suit alleging that he is not a trespasser but he is a tenant. He also stated that relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties and that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit. He further stated that the Assistant Collector, 2nd Class vide his order dated 23-2-1976 (Ex. 5. Defendant Surjan Singh contested the suit alleging that he is not a trespasser but he is a tenant. He also stated that relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties and that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit. He further stated that the Assistant Collector, 2nd Class vide his order dated 23-2-1976 (Ex. D1) held in the proceedings under Sec. 14 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), that relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed including main-tainability of the suit and regarding res judi-cata. The learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant for possession and granted degree for recovery of Rs. 3600/- as compensation while holding that Surjan Singh defendant is not a tenant on the land in dispute, his possession is of a trespasser. It was further held that the judgment dated 8-5-1974 Ex. P1 will operate res judicata between the parties as in that suit, it was decided that the defendant is not a tenant but is a trespasser on the suit land. It was further held that the order dated 23-1-1977 passed by the Revenue Court in the proceedings under Sec. 14 of the Act, is also of no consequence and the same will not have a riding effect on the judgment and decree of the civil Court between the same parties in which a finding was recorded that the defendant Surjan Singh is a trespasser on the suit land. 7. Against that judgment and decree, the defendant filed an appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Amritsar, which was allowed vide judgment dated 15-9-1979 and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed after holding that the defendant Surjan Singh is a tenant and not a trespasser on the land in question. It was further that the judgment and decree dated 8-5-1974 Ex.P1 will not operate as res judicata. It was also held by the learned first appellate Court that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as the revenue Court had already decided the said question in the proceedings held under Sec. 14 of the Act. It was also held by the learned first appellate Court that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as the revenue Court had already decided the said question in the proceedings held under Sec. 14 of the Act. Further, it was held that there is a plenty of evidence on record which shows that the defendant was not a trespasser on the suit land, but he was a tenant on the same. 8. Against this judgment of the learned first appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 9. This appeal was admitted by this Court on 8-5-1980 and at the time of admission, it was observed that substantial question of law involved in this appeal is as to whether previous judgment between the parties dated 8-5-1974 would operate as res judicata or not ? 10. While assailing the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the previous judgment between the parties will operate as res judicata in view of Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code). He submitted that the previous suit was between the same parties regarding the same property. That suit was for permanent injunction. It was specifically held in that suit that the defendant Surjan Singh is a trespasser and not a tenant. Merely, because an injunction was granted against the appellant to dispossess the defendant except in due course of law does not debar the Court from holding that the earlier suit between the same parties will operate as res judicata. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s. Deepak Grit Udyog Village, Naurangpur V/s. The State of Haryana 1996 (112) Pun LR 609 , wherein it was held as under (Para 5 of AIR) :- "The principle of res judicata has been acknowledged to be founded on equity, justice and good conscience, intended to give conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided in every subsequent suit between the same parties. The principle of res judicata is based partly on the maxim of Roman Jurisprudence, "interest reipublicae ut sit firms litium it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits and partly on the maxim memo debet his vexari pro una et eadem causa no man should be vexed twice over the same cause". In the absence of such a rule, there is every likelihood of the multiplicity of litigation, with no end to it and rights of the persons would be involved in endless confusion and great injustice done under the cover of law. The principle of res judicata is intended not only to prevent a new decision but also to prevent a new investigation so that the same person cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same question of law." 11. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the first appellate Court has not properly considered this aspect of the matter while passing the impugned judgment. On the other hand, the learned trial Court has discussed this aspect of the matter in detail while giving several reasons but the first appellate Court has not touched this aspect of the matter. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that earlier judgment and decree Ex. P1 dated 8-5-1974 between the same parties in the suit for permanent injunction, will not operate as res judicata because any finding recorded in suit for permanent injunction will not operate as res judicata. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sri Pal V/s. Swami Nath, AIR 1968 All 282, wherein it was held that a finding given against a party, in a litigation which terminates in favour of that party, cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent litigation in which a similar controversy arises. He contended that since the appellant in the present case was restrained in the previous suit from dispossessing the defendant in due course of law, therefore, against that judgment, he could not have filed an appeal. So, the said judgment and decree will not operate as res judicata. The learned counsel also relied on Bhagwan Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh, 1992 (2) Recent Revenue Reports 500 and Nahar Singh V/s. Kaka Singh, 2000 (3) Rec Civ R (Civil) 310. 13. So, the said judgment and decree will not operate as res judicata. The learned counsel also relied on Bhagwan Singh V/s. Bahadur Singh, 1992 (2) Recent Revenue Reports 500 and Nahar Singh V/s. Kaka Singh, 2000 (3) Rec Civ R (Civil) 310. 13. I find force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. I have also gone through the judgments pass-ed by the Courts below. The learned first appellate Court has placed reliance on the order dated 23-2-1976 (Ex. D1) passed by the Assistant Collector IInd Grade in the proceedings held under Sec. 14 of the Act. While allowing the application of the defendant for depositing of the rent, it was observed by the revenue court that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. In may opinion, on the basis of order Ex. D1, it cannot be held in the present suit that the defendant is in possession of the suit land as a tenant and not as a trespasser, particularly in view of the findings recorded by the Civil Court vide Ex. P1 in the earlier suit between the same parties. There are two reasons for arriving at this conclusion, firstly when the application for deposit of the rent was made before the revenue Court by the defendant, the present suit for possession filed by the appellant was pending before the civil Court. It was not necessary for the appellant to file an appeal against the order of the revenue Court Ex. D1 when a civil suit for possession was already pending in which the question was to be decided whether the defendant was a trespasser or a tenant on the suit land. Secondly, when the order Ex.D1 was passed by the revenue Court, a finding of the civil Court was already existing between the same parties that the defendant is in possession of the suit land as a trespasser and not as a tenant. All the ingredients of Sec. 11 of the Code are available in the present case and the finding recorded in the previous suit between the same parties will definitely operate as res judicata between the parties. All the ingredients of Sec. 11 of the Code are available in the present case and the finding recorded in the previous suit between the same parties will definitely operate as res judicata between the parties. Furthermore, if some casual reference about the relationship of landlord and tenant has been made by the revenue Courts which are Courts of a limited jurisdiction, the same will not have an effect on the civil Court while adjudicating the dispute between the parties as held by this Court in Gurdial Singh (Dead) V/s. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh 1996 (113) Pun LR 536, wherein it was held that while deciding the matter, if some observation has been made by the Court to limited jurisdiction about the title of the parties, the same will not bind the parties in the subsequent proceedings before the civil Court. 14. I have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent and have also gone through the judgments cited by him. In my opinion, all the three judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents are not applicable on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. 15. In Sri Pals case (supra), it was held that a finding given against a party in a litigation which terminates in favour of that party cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent litigation, in which arises a similar controversy. But in the present case, a finding was recorded that the defendant was a trespasser and he was not a tenant. The defendant was given the relief of permanent injunction restriaining the defendant from dispossessing him in due course of law. The said relief granted to the defendant will not be construed as a judgment in favour of the defendant. The finding recorded about the nature of possession in the earlier suit between the parties will definitely operate as res judicata. 16. The judgment rendered in Bhagwan Singhs case (supra), is also not relevant as in that judgment, it was held held that before it can be said that earlier suit operates as res judicata between the same parties, the same should be decided by going through the evidence and the written statement in the earlier suit. 17. Similarly, in Nahar Singhs case (supra) it was held that if earlier suit was withdrawn by the party, that will not operate as res judicata. 17. Similarly, in Nahar Singhs case (supra) it was held that if earlier suit was withdrawn by the party, that will not operate as res judicata. This judgment has no bearing on the controversy in the present suit. Thus, from the above said discussion. I have reached to the conclusion that the previous judgment dated 8-5-1974 Ex. P1 between the parties will operate as res judicata and the defendant has to be held as trespasser on the suit land. The finding recorded by the learned first appellate Court that the defendant is a tenant on the suit is liable to be reversed. 18. In view of my above discussion, I allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 15-9-1979 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar and restore the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1977 passed by the trial Court with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.