Judgment :- Sasidharan, J. This appeal is filed by the accused in Sessions Case 197/1998 on the file of the Sessions Court, Thrissur challenging the order of conviction and sentence made by the learned Session Judge. This is a case in which the allegation is that the appellant caused the death of his wife. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 7.7.1996 at about 9.30 p.m. in the house in which appellant was residing along with Mary, his wife. The allegation is that appellant poured kerosene on the body of Mary and set her on fire with the intention of causing her death. Mary was taken to hospital and when she was undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Thrissur she succumbed to her burn injuries on 22.7.1996. By doing the above act the appellant is alleged to have committed the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There is also allegation against the appellant that he subjected Mary to cruelty while residing together in the house at Pariyaram Panchayat where the occurrence took place and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge, after trial, on an appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case, came to the conclusion that the appellant committed the offences under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Trial Court sentenced the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to undergo imprisonment for life and under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. There is further direction in the judgment of the trial Court that the appellant has to pay compensation of Rs.35,000/- each to P.W.3 and Sinkle, the younger daughter of Mary. The further direction in the judgment is that the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. On 8.7.1996 P.W.2, who is the brother of Mary, gave the first information which led to the registering of a crime against the appellant under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. P.W.10 was the Circle Inspector of Chalakudy Police Station, who went to the place of occurrence and prepared Exhibit-P9 scene mahazar. Exhibit-P1 first information report was recorded by P.W.11, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police on going to the Medical College Hospital, Thrissur where Mary was undergoing treatment. P.W.10 was the Circle Inspector of Chalakudy Police Station, who went to the place of occurrence and prepared Exhibit-P9 scene mahazar. Exhibit-P1 first information report was recorded by P.W.11, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police on going to the Medical College Hospital, Thrissur where Mary was undergoing treatment. P.W.2, brother of Mary was in the hospital at that time and he gave Exhibit-P1 first information. After the death of Mary, a report was sent to Court stating that the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant are punishable under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. On 23.7.1996 P.W.10 held inquest on the dead body of Mary and prepared Exhibit-P5 inquest report. He proceeded with the investigation of the crime on questioning the witnesses. On completing the investigation of the crime he filed final report in Court. 3. From the place of occurrence Mary was taken to hospital in a taxi car brought by P.W.2, her brother. The case of the prosecution is that at the time when the appellant is alleged to have poured kerosene on Mary and set her ablaze P.W.3, the daughter of Mary in her first marriage, was present in the house. Immediately after the occurrence C.W.7, who is the brother-in-law of P.W.2, came to the house of appellant and on seeing that Mary was lying on the floor on sustaining burn injuries he went to the house of P.W.2 for giving information regarding that to him. P.W.1 is the wife of P.W.2 and P.W.1 and P.W.2 went to the house of the appellant. On reaching the house they saw Mary lying on the floor of the house on sustaining burn injuries. Neighbours also came to the house and it is stated that P.W.1, P.W.2, C.W.3, C.W.4 and the appellant took Mary to hospital. The evidence given by P.W.1 and P.W.2 is that Mary was taken to Chalakudy hospital and since the doctor there said that she had to be taken to the Medical College Hospital, Thrissur she was taken to that hospital. P.W.4 is the doctor who examined Mary at 1.45 a.m. on 8.7.1996 and prepared Exhibit-P2 wound certificate. He also examined the appellant and prepared Exhibit-P4 wound certificate. P.W.4 recorded the dying declaration given by Mary. Exhibit-P3 is the dying declaration alleged to have been given by Mary and recorded by P.W.4. P.W.4 is the doctor who examined Mary at 1.45 a.m. on 8.7.1996 and prepared Exhibit-P2 wound certificate. He also examined the appellant and prepared Exhibit-P4 wound certificate. P.W.4 recorded the dying declaration given by Mary. Exhibit-P3 is the dying declaration alleged to have been given by Mary and recorded by P.W.4. After the death of Mary on 22.7.1996, P.W.7, the Associate Professor of Forensic Medicine and Deputy Police Surgeon, Medical College Hospital, Thrissur conducted postmortem examination on the dead body. The antemortem injuries found on the dead body are noted in Exhibit-P7 postmortem certificate. The opinion given by the doctor as to the cause of death is that the deceased died of complications of burns. It is also stated by the doctor that the renal and hepatic involvement and septicaemic complications caused the death. According to the doctor, septicaemic complication means infection spreading form the burnt area to the blood. The doctor went on to say that the burns received by the deceased and the septicaemic complications and the renal and hepatic involvements are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is clear from the evidence of P.W.7 that Mary died as a result of burn injuries suffered by her. 4. Prosecution mainly relies on the evidence of P.W.3, the solitary eyewitness and also the dying declaration alleged to have been given by Mary to P.W.4, the doctor. P.W.1 and P.W.2 would say that when Mary was being taken to hospital she told them that it was the appellant who, on pouring kerosene, set her on fire. P.W.1 and P.W.2 would say about the fact that appellant married Mary and they were residing together along with P.W.3, the daughter of Mary in her first marriage and Sinkle, the daughter born to Mary in her wedlock with the appellant. P.W.2, the brother of Mary says that he did not like Mary marrying the appellant. C.W.7, who according to the prosecution, came to the house of the appellant where occurrence took place and went to inform P.W.2 about the incident, is not examined in this case since he passed away before the trial of the case commenced. P.W.1 and P.W.2 would say that it was C.W.7 who went to their house and told them that Mary was lying in her house on sustaining burn injuries. P.W.1 and P.W.2 would say that it was C.W.7 who went to their house and told them that Mary was lying in her house on sustaining burn injuries. Both these witnesses would say that immediately they went to the house of the appellant and they saw Mary lying on the floor on sustaining burn injuries. The evidence of P.W.1 regarding the dying declaration alleged to have been made by Mary is that when they were going to the hospital Mary, who was lying on the lap of P.W.1, P.W.2, C.W.3 and C.W.4 who were seated in the rear seat of the car, said that this was done by her husband. P.W.2 says that what Mary said was that appellant poured kerosene and set her ablaze. There is contradiction between the versions of P.W.1 and P.W.2 regarding what actually Mary said which, according to the prosecution, was dying declaration. There is also another contradiction in their version regarding the time when such statement is made by Mary. One of the witnesses says that Mary made the declaration before they reached the Government Hospital, Chalakudy whereas the other witness says that the dying declaration was made by Mary when she was being taken from Government Hospital, Chalakudy to the Medical College Hospital, Thrissur. The evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 regarding the dying declaration alleged to have been made by Mary when she was being taken to the hospital, does not inspire confidence of this Court. 5. Exhibit-P3 is the dying declaration recorded by P.W.4, the doctor. The version of the doctor is that when Mary was brought to the hospital and he examined her it was found that Mary was having 75% burn injuries. He would also say that the patient herself told him that her husband poured kerosene on her and set her on fire on 7.7.1996 at about 8.30 p.m. at her house. That statement is alleged to have been given by the patient herself when the doctor asked about the history and the alleged cause. The opinion of the doctor is that the injury could be caused as alleged. Then the patient was admitted in the Medical College Hospital for treatment. Exhibit-P2 is the wound certificate prepared on examining Mary and in that certificate the statement is that Mary suffered 75% burn injuries. The opinion of the doctor is that the injury could be caused as alleged. Then the patient was admitted in the Medical College Hospital for treatment. Exhibit-P2 is the wound certificate prepared on examining Mary and in that certificate the statement is that Mary suffered 75% burn injuries. The history and the alleged cause of injury is given in Exhibit-P2 certificate as follows: "Alleged to have suffered burn injuries when her husband threw kerosene over her and set her on fire on 7.7.96 at about 8.30 PM at her house". 6. P.W.4 says that as the condition of the patient was found to be critical he requested the Town Police over telephone to make arrangements immediately to record dying declaration of the patient. Since it was late in the night the police requested the doctor to record the dying declaration. P.W.4 went on to say that he recorded the dying declaration of Mary on 8.7.1996 at 3.20 a.m. At the time of recording dying declaration Mary was in casualty ward and according to the doctor, she was kept there because it was a case of burns and she had to be dressed and resuscitated. The version of the doctor is that since Mary had told him earlier at the time when she was asked about the cause that she was set on fire by her husband he did not give any medicine internally before recording the dying declaration. Dying declaration was recorded in the presence of two witnesses and before recording the declaration P.W.4 sent away other people who were near the patient. P.W.4 went on to say that he ascertained that the patient was making disclosure to him under no fear or influence and that she was fully conscious and capable of making a declaration. It is his version that Mary identified him as doctor. On going through Exhibit-P3 which is proved by P.W.4 it is seen that what Mary told the doctor was that her husband, the appellant poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. 7. According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, it is not at all possible to place reliance on the dying declaration alleged to have been recorded by P.W.4 for the reason that there is no evidence in the case to show that Mary was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. 7. According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, it is not at all possible to place reliance on the dying declaration alleged to have been recorded by P.W.4 for the reason that there is no evidence in the case to show that Mary was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. As pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in Exhibit-P3 there is no statement that Mary was in a fit state of mind and was capable of making a statement. But the doctor, who recorded the dying declaration when he was examined in Court, said that the patient was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration and she was capable of making statement. He would also say that the statement was given by the patient on knowing that she was giving the statement to the doctor. In Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1999 Cri.L.J.4321) on considering the evidence available in that case regarding dying declaration the Court found that dying declaration the Court found that dying declaration could not be accepted for the reason that there was no evidence to show that the declarant was having a fit state of mind and he was capable of making a statement at the time when the dying declaration was alleged to have been given. That was a case in which dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate in the hospital. The doctor, who was present in the hospital at the time when the Magistrate recorded dying declaration, was examined in that case. When considering the question whether the declarant was conscious and was in a state of mental condition to make a voluntary disclosure of the incident the Supreme Court found that even though the doctor was examined he had only stated that the injured was conscious. Since the doctor did not give evidence before Court that the injured was in a fit state of mind to make a statement the evidence regarding dying declaration was not accepted by the Court. Since the doctor did not give evidence before Court that the injured was in a fit state of mind to make a statement the evidence regarding dying declaration was not accepted by the Court. It is not possible to say in this case that there was no evidence at all to show that Mary was not in a fit state of mind and was not capable of making statement since P.W.4, the doctor when he was examined in Court, says definitely that Mary was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. In Laxmi v. Om Prakash and others ([2001] 6 S.C.C.118) relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant the Supreme Court was considering the evidentiary value of dying declaration recorded by a police officer. The police officer, who recorded the dying declaration gave evidence that before recording the dying declaration the doctor told him that the patient was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. But there was no medical evidence available in that case to show that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. In paragraph 30 of the judgment the Supreme Court said that a dying declaration made to a police officer is admissible in evidence, however, the practice of dying declaration being recorded by an investigating officer has to be discouraged. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for police officers to avail the services of a magistrate for recording dying declaration and said that the police officer can record a dying declaration only if it is not possible to avail the services of a magistrate or before obtaining the service of a magistrate it is necessary to record the dying declaration. There also the Supreme Court said that the evidence regarding dying declaration could not be relied on for the reason that there was no sufficient evidence, medical evidence that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to make a disclosure regarding the reason as to how the incident took place and was capable of making statement. 8. In Kodadi Srinivasa Lingam v. State of A.P. (2001 Cri.L.J.602) a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering the probative value of dying declaration recorded by an officer of the revenue department. Police gave a request to the Revenue Officer for recording dying declaration and dying declaration was recorded. 8. In Kodadi Srinivasa Lingam v. State of A.P. (2001 Cri.L.J.602) a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering the probative value of dying declaration recorded by an officer of the revenue department. Police gave a request to the Revenue Officer for recording dying declaration and dying declaration was recorded. In that case there was no certificate given by the doctor that the declarant was in a fit state of mind and was capable of giving the statement. There was no medical evidence in that case adduced to prove that at the time when the Revenue Officer recorded dying declaration the person, who gave the declaration, was capable of giving statement. It is not correct to say that dying declaration has to be rejected without taking into consideration the same as a piece of evidence merely for the reason that there is no certificate regarding the mental condition of the patient. If there is sufficient evidence made available on records to show that at the time of making dying declaration the declarant was in a fit state of mind to give the declaration, that part of the evidence can be accepted even though there is no certificate obtained from the doctor just before recording the dying declaration. 9. It is well accepted proposition of law that dying declaration can from the sole basis of conviction. Once it is found that the evidence regarding dying declaration is truthful and trustworthy, conviction can be entered on the basis of hat evidence alone. When there is evidence regarding dying declaration, the Court will have to examine whether the evidence adduced in the case that the declarant gave dying declaration, is correct or not. Once it is found that the evidence adduced in the case that the declarant gave statement disclosing as to how the incident took place can be believed, then the Court has to consider whether the declaration made by the declarant is truthful. We are inclined to accept the evidence of P.W.4, the doctor that he recorded the statement given by Mary when she was undergoing treatment in the hospital. We are also prepared to accept the evidence of P.W.4 that at the time when Exhibit-P3 statement was given by Mary she was conscious and fit to make a statement. We are inclined to accept the evidence of P.W.4, the doctor that he recorded the statement given by Mary when she was undergoing treatment in the hospital. We are also prepared to accept the evidence of P.W.4 that at the time when Exhibit-P3 statement was given by Mary she was conscious and fit to make a statement. Then the question which remains to be considered is whether the statement made by Mary to the doctor is the truthful version as to the circumstances in which the incident took place. On examining the evidence regarding dying declaration adduced in the case the Court has to test the veracity of that statement so as to ascertain whether the evidence is reliable and can be acted upon as a dying declaration. If it is found that there is any circumstances which would indicate that the statements made by the declarant are not correct, the Court will be justified in not accepting it as the correct version regarding the incident. 10. Exhibit-P3 is recorded in question and answer form. The doctor asked Mary how it happened and the answer given by her was that he was fully drunk. Then the doctor put questions to ascertain according to Mary who was fully drunk. Mary said that she was mentioning about her husband. She said that her husband used to come home drunk and used to assault her. Then to the question put by the doctor what happened after that she said that appellant told her that there was nothing in his house which belonged to her father thereby meaning that nothing was brought from her father's house to the house of the appellant. It was after making the above statements that Mary said that appellant poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. From the answers given by Mary to the questions put by the doctor it is possible to ascertain what was the state of mind of Mary at the time of giving the dying declaration. There is evidence in this case to show that appellant used to pick up quarrel with Mary. What P.W.3, the sole eye witness says even in the Chief examination is that on the date of occurrence the appellant picked up quarrel with Mary and beat her. There is evidence in this case to show that appellant used to pick up quarrel with Mary. What P.W.3, the sole eye witness says even in the Chief examination is that on the date of occurrence the appellant picked up quarrel with Mary and beat her. That shows that there were frequent quarrels between appellant and Mary and there were instances in which appellant physically assaulted Mary. The doctor says that Mary, when she was taken to the hospital, was in a critical condition and that was why he made a request to the police to make arrangements for recording dying declaration and that he recorded the dying declaration himself because police said that he could record the dying declaration because it was not possible for them to make arrangements for recording dying declaration. Even though as per the version of the doctor Mary was in a critical condition and suffered 75% burn injuries, at the time of giving dying declaration in the opening portion what she said was about the conduct of the appellant in picking up quarrel with her very often and that he used to assault her. What has to be gathered from those statements is that at the time of giving dying declaration Mary had grudge towards the appellant. That is clear from the way in which she gave answers to the questions put by the doctor. 11. We cannot rule out the possibility of a wife who reaches the hospital with burn injuries even though the burn injuries are not sustained as a result of any act done by her husband, making statements implicating the husband towards who she is having grudge for the reason that for a long period she had been ill-treated and tortured by him. The evidence available on records would go to show that the witnesses say that there were instances in which appellant used to pick up quarrel with Mary and assault her. P.W.2, the brother of P.W.1, says that before marriage Mary was in love with the appellant. When a question was put to P.W.2 how was their life, what he said was that their life was miserable. He would also say that appellant used to get drunk and pick up quarrel with Mary. P.W.1, the wife of P.W.2 also said when she was examined in Court that appellant used to pick up quarrel with Mary. When a question was put to P.W.2 how was their life, what he said was that their life was miserable. He would also say that appellant used to get drunk and pick up quarrel with Mary. P.W.1, the wife of P.W.2 also said when she was examined in Court that appellant used to pick up quarrel with Mary. The above evidence gives clear indication that the relationship between Mary and appellant was strained. We have to take into consideration the circumstances in which dying declaration was given by Mary. The dying declaration was given at a time when Mary was having reason for vendetta towards the appellant. The possibility of Mary giving statements falsely implicating her husband towards whom she had some grudge cannot be ruled out. 12. There is evidence in this case to show that at the time of occurrence appellant suffered burn injuries. Exhibit-P4 is the wound certificate prepared by P.W.4 on examining the appellant. In the certificate it is stated that appellant suffered 30% burn injuries. P.W.3, the daughter of Mary, says that after pouring kerosene and setting Mary on fire appellant caught hold of Mary. P.W.3 also says that when Mary was on fire immediately appellant poured water on Mary obviously for the purpose of putting out the fire. The version of P.W.3 is that twice appellant went to kitchen for bringing water and poured water on the body of Mary. There is evidence in this case to show that after the occurrence the appellant went to the nearby property and standing there he was crying aloud. P.W.1 and P.W.2 say that when they reached the house of appellant on getting information from C.W.7 that Mary was lying in her house with burn injuries they saw the appellant standing in the nearby property and crying. This is a case in which the appellant did not go away from the place of occurrence after the incident. He remained there till P.W.1 and P.W.2, the close relatives of Mary reached her house and from the place of occurrence he also went to the hospital in the car in which Mary was taken to the hospital. Appellant was admitted in the Medical College Hospital and was treated there as an inpatient till he was discharged on 19.8.1996. He remained there till P.W.1 and P.W.2, the close relatives of Mary reached her house and from the place of occurrence he also went to the hospital in the car in which Mary was taken to the hospital. Appellant was admitted in the Medical College Hospital and was treated there as an inpatient till he was discharged on 19.8.1996. The above circumstances also have to be taken into account when appreciating the evidence of P.W.3, who says the she has actually seen the appellant pouring kerosene on the body of Mary and setting her on fire. 13. P.W.3 was nine year's old at the time when the occurrence took place. At the time when she was examined in Court she was 13 years' old. After the death of Mary P.W.3 was being looked after by P.W.2, the brother of Mary. At the time when P.W.3 was examined in Court she was in a hostel. Even though no fees had to be given in the hostel for her accommodation, she would say that P.W.2 used to purchase cloths for her. She went on to say that on holidays she used to go to the house of P.W.2. On 8.1.2001 the date on which there was a posting of the case for taking evidence and on the date on which P.W.3 was examined in Court she was going to Court from the house of P.W.2. It is clear from the evidence of P.W.2 that he did not like appellant marrying Mary and he was having some enmity towards them. The fact that P.W.3 is being looked after by P.W.2 and on the date on which she gave evidence in Court she went to Court from the house of P.W.2 has also to be taken into account when ascertaining the truthfulness of the version of P.W.3. What P.W.3 said in the cross-examination was that during Christmas Holidays she went to the house of P.W.2 and then P.W.2 did not allow her to go back to the school and told her that she need go to the school only after giving evidence in this case. That would indicate the interest P.W.2 was having for giving evidence in the case. 14. P.W.3 says that it was the appellant who poured kerosene on the body of Mary and set her on fire. That would indicate the interest P.W.2 was having for giving evidence in the case. 14. P.W.3 says that it was the appellant who poured kerosene on the body of Mary and set her on fire. Her version is that after taking the meals she and her younger sister went to bed and it was after that appellant reached the house. She says that she saw the appellant picking up quarrel with Mary and beating her. It was after that, according to P.W.3, appellant poured kerosene on Mary and set her on fire. C.W.7 is the person, who came to the house immediately after the occurrence. P.W.3 also says that C.W.7 came to the house. In the cross-examination P.W.3 says that even though C.W.7 came to her house she did not tell him that it was the appellant who poured kerosene on the body of Mary and set her ablaze. She says that Mary did not move from the place where she was standing even after pouring kerosene on her body and remained there till the alleged setting her on fire. She went on to say that she did not tell anybody on that day that the appellant poured kerosene on Mary and set her on fire. 15. There is evidence to show that Mary was short tempered. P.W.3, her daughter during cross-examination, says that there were occasions where her mother Mary used to get angry for silly things. There is also evidence of P.W.1, sister-in-law of Mary to the effect that Mary is a very short tempered woman. When the accused was questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, what he said was that Mary committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her body and setting herself on fire. He would also say that Mary used to get angry on silly reasons and she was short tempered. Accused adduced evidence to show that there was an instance in which Mary made an attempt to commit suicide. D.W.1 is the doctor who said before Court that on 14.4.1995 at 4.30 p.m. Mary was taken to Government Hospital, Chalakudy and she admitted there for consuming kerosene. It appears that Mary consumed kerosene for the purpose of committing suicide and that she had to be taken to the hospital and she had to undergo treatment there. 16. D.W.1 is the doctor who said before Court that on 14.4.1995 at 4.30 p.m. Mary was taken to Government Hospital, Chalakudy and she admitted there for consuming kerosene. It appears that Mary consumed kerosene for the purpose of committing suicide and that she had to be taken to the hospital and she had to undergo treatment there. 16. A similar case came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Vithal Sadashiv Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (1994 Cri.L.J.2035) and there also there was dying declaration and the Bombay High Court, when dealing with the question of acceptability of dying declaration, said that when the allegation in a case is bride burning the Court will have to be very careful in accepting the dying declaration as evidence especially where there are materials to show that the relationship with the husband and wife was very much strained. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court said that where there is a background of unhappiness, marital discord, violence, accusations against fidelity and the like and where it is highly suggestive of the fact that the deceased wife has been the victim of harassment torture and character assassination over a period of time and consequently can never be favourably disposed towards the husband, the Court would have to put itself on guard. The Bombay High Court went on to say that in such cases the principle that a dying person would not normally tell a lie, requires serious examination and that one cannot rule out the possibility on the part of some persons to implicate, purely out of a sense of vendetta, the husband who has been responsible for prolonged and protracted ill-treatment. What the materials available in this case would also indicate is that there is accusation against fidelity of the wife and that there was prolonged strained relationship between the appellant and Mary. So, the dying declaration on records will have to be viewed with very great caution and circumspection. 17. In order to test the reliability of evidence regarding dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the fact that dying declaration is recorded in the absence of the accused, the person against whom it is sought to be used and that he is not getting an opportunity to test the veracity of dying declaration by cross-examining the declarant. In order to test the reliability of evidence regarding dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the fact that dying declaration is recorded in the absence of the accused, the person against whom it is sought to be used and that he is not getting an opportunity to test the veracity of dying declaration by cross-examining the declarant. The acceptability of dying declaration as a piece of evidence by treating it as an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible is on the basis of the principle that a person who sees his death before him, will only speak the truth. Even though that is the rule on the basis of which dying declaration, in spite of the fact that it being hearsay and being one the veracity of which could not be tested by cross-examination, is made admissible, the Court will have to be very careful in accepting the evidence regarding dying declaration since once it is found that dying declaration is truthful and voluntary it can form the basis for conviction. 18. The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible and that always best evidence has to be adduced. When a person gives statement as to cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, the statement so given becomes relevant and it is admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Dying declaration given by a person, who is dead, even though it is in the form of hearsay evidence, becomes admissible by virtue of what is said in Section 32 of the Evidence Act and that is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. In a case in which the Court is called upon to decide the question regarding the involvement of the accused in the case in the commission of the offence solely on the basis of dying declaration, the Court can rely on the dying declaration only if it is found to be one which would inspire the confidence of the Court regarding its credibility. In the present case, as we have adverted to earlier, there is evidence to show that there was strained relationship between Mary and the appellant and there were even circumstances in which appellant physically assaulted Mary. There is evidence to show that even on the date of occurrence Mary was assaulted by the appellant and at the opening portion of the dying declaration what Mary said was regarding the conduct on the part of the appellant in coming home very often fully drunk and assaulting her. In the light of the above circumstances, we are not inclined to say that the version of Mary, which is relied upon by the prosecution as dying declaration, can be accepted as truthful version as to the cause of her death. When the Court is not in a position to accept the dying declaration as a truthful version of cause of the death of the person who is giving dying declaration, the evidence regarding dying declaration can be acted upon by the Court only when there is some material to corroborate the version in the dying declaration. 19. P.W.3 is the only witness who says about the occurrence. It is true that this witness says that she saw the appellant pouring kerosene on the body of Mary and setting her on fire. In view of the circumstances, such as the appellant suffering 30% burns as a result of he catching hold of Mary who was going on flames in a bid to save her, appellant going to the kitchen twice, bringing water and pouring water on Mary, that too for saving her, the appellant after the occurrence remaining near the place of occurrence without going away from the place of occurrence, the appellant after the occurrence standing in the property in the neighbourhood and crying aloud and the appellant going to the hospital in the car in which Mary was taken, we are not inclined to accept the evidence of P.W.3 that the appellant poured kerosene on the body of Mary and set her on fire. Since the evidence of P.W.3 does not give corroboration to the dying declaration, we are not in a position to rely on the dying declaration also for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the appellant poured kerosene on Mary and set her on fire. 20. Since the evidence of P.W.3 does not give corroboration to the dying declaration, we are not in a position to rely on the dying declaration also for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the appellant poured kerosene on Mary and set her on fire. 20. This is a case in which the prosecution has not succeeded in proving beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant poured kerosene on Mary and set her on fire. We find that the appellant did not commit the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We have already gone through the evidence available on record which would go to show that there was harassment of Mary by the appellant. P.W.3 says that on the date of occurrence the appellant beat Mary. P.W.2, the brother of Mary and P.W.1, the wife of P.W.2 say that they knew that appellant used to harass his wife, Mary. When the appellant was questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he said that on the date of occurrence since there was some dispute between him and his wife he beat her. A reading of what the appellant says in 313 statement would also indicate that there were quarrels between the appellant and Mary even though he says that he was not responsible for the quarrel. The evidence available on records would clearly indicate that the appellant subjected Mary to cruelty as mentioned in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. In the above circumstances, we agree that appellant committed the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The appeal is allowed to the extent of setting aside the order of conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The order of conviction and sentence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is confirmed. The direction by the trial Court to the appellant to pay compensation of Rs.35,000/- each to P.W.3 and Sinkle within six months and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years is modified directing the appellant to pay Rs.20,000/- to P.W.3 as compensation. The period of detention, if any, the appellant had undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial shall be set off against the term of imprisonment.