JUDGMENT 1. At the joint request of learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor, I have heard arguments for final disposal at the admission stage. 2. This revision petition arises out of the judgment dated 8.8.2000 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Deeg dismissing Criminal Appeal No. 1/98 filed by the petitioners against the order dated 20.12.1997 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate in Cr. Case No. 5/93, thereby the learned Magistrate partly allowed the application of the respondent filed by her under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') and ordered that petitioner Israiyal shall return the Mehar property viz., silver weighing 32.5 Tolas, gold weighing 2 Tolas and Rs. 2152/- to the respondent Mst. Asroopi. It was further ordered that both the petitioners jointly and severally make payment of Rs. 16000/- and 3kg silver to Mst. Asroopi, which were given to her by her father as a measure of gift. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument only to the extent that the respondent had no legal right to make an application for return of property against petitioner No. 2, her father-in-law. She could have filed such application under Section 3 of the Act only against her previous husband. In support of his argument, learned counsel had relied upon a decision of this court in Mahboob v. Gulshan Bano (1997 Cr.L.R. (Rajasthan) 248) , wherein this court after considering the provisions of Section 3 of the Act has held as under : "A bare perusal of the abovesaid provision makes it clear that an order for the payment of the abovesaid amount/return of the property can be passed only against the previous husband of the divorced woman. No provision of the Act has been brought to my notice which empowers the Court to pass an order against father or mother of the previous husband of the divorced woman in regard to any of the matters mentioned above. The learned trial court appears to have not taken note of this fact while passing the impugned order, which has issued directions not only to the present petitioner but also to his wife besides issuing direction to the previous husband of the claimant. The learned trial court appears to have not taken note of this fact while passing the impugned order, which has issued directions not only to the present petitioner but also to his wife besides issuing direction to the previous husband of the claimant. If the impugned order is not set aside as against the present petitioner and his wife, it would amount to injustice to both of them and would amount to abuse of process of the court." 4. In the case at hand, the respondent is divorced and by filing an application u/s. 3 of the Act, she has claimed the Mehar property and the gift given to her at the time of her Nikah with petitioner No. 1. Having glanced at the provisions of Section 3 of the Act and having perused the case law cited at the bar, it is evident that the respondent had no right to make an application against the person other than her previous husband, for return of Mehar property as also the gift property. In my considered view the learned courts below appear to have not taken note of this fact while passing the impugned order/judgment while issuing directions against the previous husband of the respondent and her father-in-law. If the impugned orders are not set-aside as against the petitioner No. 2 it would amount to injustice to the petitioner No. 2 and would amount to abuse of process of Court. 5. Consequently, I quash the order passed by the courts below so as they relate to issuance of directions to the petitioner No. 2 and direct that the impugned orders shall be read only against petitioner No. 1 Israiyal, the previous husband of the respondent-claimant. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.Order directing Father-in-law to pay amount or Return Property Quashed. *******