JUDGMENT Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. The petitioner was the Secretary of Durgapur Notified Area Authority (hereinafter referred to as "the said Authority"). He was appointed on March 19, 1985. 2. On or about October 7,1997 Durgapur Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the said Corporation") came into existence taking over the said Authority. By the Government notification the provisions of the Siliguri Municipal Corporation Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act") was made applicable to the said Corporation. 3. On or about October 18, 1996 the Chairman of the said Corporation issued an order redesignating the petitioner as Education Officer. His service conditions including salaries and other perquisites remain unchanged. 4. By another order passed on the same day i.e. October 18, 1996 respondent No.5 was appointed as Secretary of the said Corporation. 5. The petitioner challenged such appointment on the ground that since he was so long acting as the Secretary, such redesignation amounted to lowring his post which is contrary to the provisions of section 284(1)(d) of the said Act of 1990. 6. When the petition was initially moved, by an order dated March 11, 1997 this court passed an interim order staying the operation of the impugned order dated October 18, 1996 by which the respondent No.5 was appointed as Secretary of the Corporation. 7. An appeal was preferred from the said order by the respondent No.5. The appellate court by its judgment and order dated September 1, 1997 set aside the order of the learned single Judge passed on March 11, 1997. Some of the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted below:- "During the pendency of this appeal Siliguir Municipal Corporation (method and Qualification for appointment of the officers appointed by the State Government and the Mayor-in-Council) Rules, 1997 came into force. Actually, these rules were framed under the powers vesting in the Government by virture of section 259(1) read with section 14(4) of the Siliguri Municipal Corporation Act, 1990, as would be noticed these rules were to apply mutatis mutandis to the newly constituted Durgapur Municipal Corporation as well. By virtue of these Rules, amongst other method and qualification for the post of Secretary was also prescribed and one of the eligibility criteria was that he should have at least 10 years experience as a Government Officer with a scale of pay of W. B. C. S. (Executive) Cadre. By virtue of these Rules, amongst other method and qualification for the post of Secretary was also prescribed and one of the eligibility criteria was that he should have at least 10 years experience as a Government Officer with a scale of pay of W. B. C. S. (Executive) Cadre. Simultaneously, the Durgapur Municipal Corporation by notification dated 31.3.1997 also created some posts, Education Officer, being one of them. We have heard in details the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties and considered relevant aspects of the case. In our opinion, it is very doubtful as to whether the respondent/writ petitioner could claim any right of either continuing as Secretary in the newly constituted Durgapur Municipal Corporation or for that matter even the basic right of being appointed on this post merely because he had been working since 1985 on the post of Secretary in the then Notified Area Authority and continued until the constitution of the Durgapur Municipal Corporation. This question, of course, shall be finally determined in the pending writ application but prima facie we are of the opinion that with the coming into force of the 1994 Act and the constitution of the new Corporation, the power to appoint officers of the Corporation including its Secretary vested in the Municipal Authorities by virtue of section 14 of the 1990 Act, and specifically, power to appoint Secretary of the Corporation was to be exercised by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State Public Service Commission. Actually it was in exercise of such power that the methods and qualifications for various posts including that of the Secretary were prescribed by the Durgapur Municipal Corporation. Reliance was placed upon section 3(5) of the 1994 Act by the learned Advocate for the respondents/writ petitioner to urge that under this provisions the writ petitioner has a right to continue. In our opinion the submission is not correct. The context in which the provision for taking over the rights and liabilities and obligations of the Notified Area Authority by the Corporation has been prescribed and used by the Legislature in section 3(5) is entirely different. It cannot be stretched to include a situation like the present one. In our opinion the submission is not correct. The context in which the provision for taking over the rights and liabilities and obligations of the Notified Area Authority by the Corporation has been prescribed and used by the Legislature in section 3(5) is entirely different. It cannot be stretched to include a situation like the present one. Power to appoint the officers of the Corporation having been prescribed in section 14, section 283 of the Act being merely transitory in nature, we prima facie feel that the appointment of the appellant as Secretary by the Board on 18.10.96 did not suffer from any infirmity or legal defect. The Board at that time had the exclusive power to appoint the Secretary. In that view of the matter, therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge ought not to have granted the interim relief since it not only was contrary to principles of balance of convenience between the parties but even prima facie the writ petitioner perhaps did not satisfy all the requirements warranting grant of relief in the manner it has been done. We have been told that pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge the appellant has not been actually working as Secretary of the Corporation and that the duties of the Secretary are being performed by the Chief Executive Officer. Be that as it may, we wish to observe and direct that, in the light of the specific provision contained in section 14 of the Act, it shall be for the Mayor-in-Council to decide immediately and without any delay as to who is the person to be appointed as Secretary of Durgapur Municipal Corporation, strictly in accordance with the provisions of law, in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and keeping in view the eligibility criteria as prescribed, and observing all other norms and procedure. Till such time, as the Mayor-in-Council finally decides to appoint appropriate person as the Secretary of the Corporation, we direct that it shall be for the Corporation in the interregnum to ensure that the duties of the Secretary are performed by such appropriate persons as the Corporation deems fit and suitable." 8. It would appear from the observations of the court of appeal as quoted (supra) that under the Rules of 1997 the eligibility criteria for the post of Secretary was prescribed. It would appear from the observations of the court of appeal as quoted (supra) that under the Rules of 1997 the eligibility criteria for the post of Secretary was prescribed. The petitioner do not come within such criteria. Hence, he could not have been appointed as Secretary of the said Corporation. 9. Mr. Jawhar Lal De, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Secretary of the Authority and not as Education Officer. When the said Authority was converted into Municipal Corporation such eligibility criteria would only be applicable in case of new appointment. According to Mr. De, under section 284(1)(d) the Officers appointed under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 continuing in office immediately before the commencement of the said Act be deemed to have been appointed under the said Act, 1990. As such the petitioner's service was not affected by the change of status of the said Corporation as the same was protected under section 284(1)(d) of the said Act. 10. Mr. Tapan Chandra Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the said Corporation, contended that section 284(1)(d) gave protection to the employees working under the notified authority. Since petitioner's pay was protected he was not entitled to challenge the order as well as the appointment of the respondent No.5. According to Mr. Dutta after incorporation of the Municipal Corporation all the employees of the said Authority were transferred along with the petitioners in the Corporation. The Municipal Corporation as per the requirements prescribed thereto required a Secretary to be appointed from persons enjoying pay equivalent to WBCS cadre. The petitioner admittedly did not have such qualification. Considering his qualification and status petitioner was given the Category B post in the new Municipal Corporation without disturbing his pay. 11. Considering the rival contentions two issues appear to me relevant herein:- (i) Did section 284(1) (d) protect the interest of the petitioner adequately as had been done herein ? (ii) In absence of challenge to the appropriate rules, was the petitioner entitled to challenge the appointment of the respondent No.5 as Secretary? 12. To decide the first issue the relevant section is quoted below:- "Section 284(1)(d)-all officers or other employees appointed under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, and continuing in office immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall, at the end of commencement of this Act, be deemed to have been appointed under this Act." 13. 12. To decide the first issue the relevant section is quoted below:- "Section 284(1)(d)-all officers or other employees appointed under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, and continuing in office immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall, at the end of commencement of this Act, be deemed to have been appointed under this Act." 13. The aforesaid section, in my view, had protected the right of the employees of the erstwhile Authority in continuity of their service. It did not prescribe any protection with regard to redesignation and/or refitment. Since the petitioner's pay was not disturbed, in my view, such redesignation was not ultra vires to section 284(1)(d) and the contention of the petitioner on such score is therefore rejected. 14. With regard to the appointment of the respondent No.5 under section 14 of the said Act of 1990, officers of the Corporation had been defined. Under section 14(1)(g) Secretary was an officer of the said Corporation. The rules framed under the said Act of 1990 require a Secretary to be a person enjoying pay equivalent to W. B. C. S. cadre. The petitioner did not have such qualification and as such he was not entitled to be appointed as Secretary of the said Corporation as long the said rules exist. The petitioner did not challenge the said rules. In absence of such challenge the petitioner's contention on the score is not tenable as such is rejected. 15. The writ petition thus fails and is hereby dismissed. 16. There would be no order as to costs. 17. Urgent xerox certified copy will be given to the parties, if applied for. Writ petition dismissed.