Amitava Roy, J.:- The appellants are the defendants in Title Suit No. 362 of 1975 which was dismissed by the Court of the Munsiff No. 2, Karimganj, the trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 29.3.86. They are aggrieved by the judgment and decree of reversal dated 2.2.96 passed in Title Appeal No. 22/86 by the learned Assistant District Judge, Karimganj, decreeing the suit. 2. I have heard Mr S.A. Laskar, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. C.R. De, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr D. Saikia, counsel for the respondents. 3. A short narration of relevant facts would be necessary for disposing of the appeal. The respondents as plaintiffs filed the above suit against the appellant No. 1 and Sajid Ali (since deceased) predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant 2(Ka), 2(Kha) and 2(Ga) praying for decree inter-alia for declaration of their right title and interest in the suit land measuring 1 Bigha 7 Katha as described in the schedule therein and also for a declaration that the defendants had no right or title therein as well as for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner with the plaintiff's possession of the suit land. The case of the respondents plaintiffs as set out in the plaint in short is that their predecessor-in-interest Sanat Kumar Das had taken settlement of the land in the year 1942 and got annual patta No. 24/2 in respect thereof. He enjoyed the suit land for more than 30 years and after his death, the suit land devolved on the respondents plaintiffs by succession who thereafter developed and invested the same by making substantial investments and applied to the appropriate authorities for conversion of the annual patta into a periodic patta in respect of the suit land. While the respondents plaintiffs were thus possessing the suit land by cultivating paddy thereon, the defendant No. 2 (Sajid Ali) got his name recorded in a Chatian published in respect of the suit land, showing his possession thereof. Thereafter the said defendant sold the suit land to the appellant defendant No. 1 by executing a sale-deed on 3.4.75. The appellant defendant No. 1 after the execution of the said sale-deed openly declared to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land. The respondents plaintiffs thereafter initiated a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC but the same was dismissed. Thereafter the said defendant sold the suit land to the appellant defendant No. 1 by executing a sale-deed on 3.4.75. The appellant defendant No. 1 after the execution of the said sale-deed openly declared to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land. The respondents plaintiffs thereafter initiated a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC but the same was dismissed. They therefore filed the suit praying for the above reliefs. 4. The appellant defendant No. 1 and the original defendant No. 2 Sajid Ali contested the suit by filing a joint written statement wherein they inter-alia contended that the defendant No. 2 (Sajid Ali) had been possessing the suit land under Sanat Kumar Das as bhagidar. It was further contended that on 3.4.75 the defendant No. 2 (Sajid Ali) sold the suit land to the appellant defendant No. 1 and handed over possession thereof to him and since then the suit land was in possession of the appellant defendant No. 1. It was asserted that the suit land had never been possessed by the respondents plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest, Sanat Kumar Das. It was also averred that Sanat Kumar Das got annual patta in respect of the suit land and therefore on his death the respondents plaintiffs as his heirs could not succeed to the suit land on the right of inheritance. 5. The original defendant No. 2, Sajid Ali expired during the pendency of the suit and was substituted by his heirs, the present appellant 2(Ka), 2(Kha) and 2(Ga) respectively. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Have the plaintiffs any cause of action for the suit? 2. Is the suit barred by limitation? 3. Is the suit bad for defect of parties? 4. 5. 4. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 6. 5. Has the suit been properly valued and stamped? 6. Have the plaintiffs any right, title and interest over the suit land? 7. To what reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled? The parties thereafter examined witnesses in support of their respective cases. They also adduced documentary evidence. 7. The learned trial Court on a consideration of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record dismissed the suit. Have the plaintiffs any right, title and interest over the suit land? 7. To what reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled? The parties thereafter examined witnesses in support of their respective cases. They also adduced documentary evidence. 7. The learned trial Court on a consideration of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record dismissed the suit. It held that annual patta does not create any transferable or heritable right and on the death of Sanat Kumar Das, the annual patta holder of the suit land, his heirs, the plaintiffs did not inherit any title therein. It further held that exhibit-1, 2, 3 and 4 claimed to be rent receipts relating to payment of rent by the respondents plaintiffs to the Government in respect of the suit land could not be related thereto, though there mentioned about the annual patta number to be 104/1. Referring to a statement made by PW-1 that the suit land was then covered by new patta No. 104/1, the learned trial Court recorded that the said statement was not reliable in absence of the said patta or any reliable witness in support of the said statement. It also rejected exhibit-5, the certified copy of the judgment in Title Suit No. 364/75 as irrelevant on the ground that the land involved therein had no connection with the suit land. The learned trial Court also rejected the claim of the respondents plaintiffs to be in possession of the suit land on the ground that they had failed to examine the labourer, Hiralal who used to cultivate on behalf of them. In this connection, the learned trial Court also discarded the evidence of PW-2 as unreliable. The trial Court took note of exhibit-A by which original defendant Sajid Ali had sold the suit land in favour of the appellant defendant No. 1 It also relied on exhibit-C, a khatian issued in favour of Sajid Ali, original defendant No. 2 which showed that the said defendant was in possession of the suit land for more than 12 years. The learned trial Court placed reliance on exhibit-B, a khatian issued in the name of the appellant defendant No. 1 in place of Sajid Ali, original defendant No. 2, after the above sale. The learned trial Court placed reliance on exhibit-B, a khatian issued in the name of the appellant defendant No. 1 in place of Sajid Ali, original defendant No. 2, after the above sale. After considering the evidence of DW-1, 2 and 3, the learned trial Court accepted that appellant defendant No. 1 had been possessing the suit land for last 8/10 years. The learned trial Court therefore concluded that the respondent plaintiffs had failed to prove their right land. Having held so, it decided issued No. 6 in favour of the appellants defendants. It further held that there was no cause of action for the suit and that the suit was no maintainable. The learned trial Court however decided the issue Nos. 2, 3 and 5 in favour of the respondents plaintiffs. 8. In the appeal that was preferred by the respondents plaintiffs, the learned lower appellate Court by the impugned judgment and decree reversed the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court and decreed the suit. While deciding the issue No. 6 with regard to the right title and interest of the respondents plaintiffs in the suit land, the learned Court below observed that after the death of Sanat Kumar Das, the names of the respondents plaintiffs were recorded as the annual patta holders and that the same was evident from exhibit-B, khatian. The learned lower appellate Court however on the same reasoning as that of the trial court held that the rent receipt exhibit-1,2, 3 and 4 were not relatable to the suit land. On a consideration of the evidence adduced by the appellants defendants the learned Court below came to the conclusion that they had admitted that Sanat Kumar Das was the annual patta holder but had failed to prove that Sajid Ali (original defendant No. 2) had taken settlement of the suit land as bhagidar from him (Sanat Kumar Das). It was of the opinion that the respondents plaintiffs were annual patta holders of the suit land and been cultivating the same through labourers. It relied on the evidence of PW-2 to hold that the respondents plaintiffs had proved their possession of the suit land. It was of the opinion that the respondents plaintiffs were annual patta holders of the suit land and been cultivating the same through labourers. It relied on the evidence of PW-2 to hold that the respondents plaintiffs had proved their possession of the suit land. It concluded that an annual patta unless is cancelled or a notice of non-renewal thereof is given confers good title upon the patta holder and therefore, the limited right of user acquired by a transferee or a successor of the patta holder would continue until the annual patta is cancelled. On that reasoning, the learned Court below held that as the plaintiffs were successors in interest of Sanat Kumar Das, annual patta holder and there being no evidence that the patta holder had transferred his limited right of use to Sajid Ali, the plaintiffs had right title and interest in the suit land. It further observed that there was no provision in Rule l(c) of the Settlement Rules framed under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 in issuing Rayoti katcha khatian in the case of annual patta and in fact no such annual patta had been issued by the authorities in favour of Sajid Ali. The learned Court below relied on a decision reported in 1949 ILR 382 (Assam) in concluding that the plaintiffs being the successor in interest of the annual patta holder, they were more preferable for the purpose of issuing the annual patta. 9. This Court while admitting the appeal on 26.6.96 observed that the appeal would be heard on the substantial question of law as enumerated in the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal. Thus no substantial question of law as such was formulated by this Court. The learned counsel for the parties at the time of the hearing of the appeal however agreed that the grounds Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the memorandum of appeal be construed as the substantial questions of law. The grounds as enumerated in the memorandum of appeal for the purpose of convenience can be re-cast as hereunder:- 1. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred on a substantial question of law in deciding the issues Nos. 4 and 6 by mis-interpreting the documents, exhibit-A, B, C, D and E as well as by leaving out of consideration other materials pieces of evidence on record? 2. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred on a substantial question of law in deciding the issues Nos. 4 and 6 by mis-interpreting the documents, exhibit-A, B, C, D and E as well as by leaving out of consideration other materials pieces of evidence on record? 2. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred on a substantial question of law in interpreting the Rule l(c) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 while reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court? 10. Mr Laskar, learned counsel for the appellants has emphatically argued that the impugned judgment and decree are vitiated by gross errors of law and being ex-facie unsustainable in law and on facts are liable to be set aside. He submitted that the very basis of the impugned judgment was manifestly erroneous inasmuch as the learned lower Court proceeded on the supposition that an annual patta in respect of a land conferred a heritable right and on the death of the annual patta holder, the land automatically devolves on his successor even in absence of any fresh annual patta in their favour. He argued that the right of an annual patta holder is co­terminous with the period of the patta and therefore in absence of a fresh annual patta, the patta holder has no right beyond the period of the original annual patta. He argued that during the period of the said patta the patta holder thereof can however transfer his limited right of user to another person. He submitted that transfer of possession of annual patta land to a tenant is not prohibited by the conditions of annual lease and is recognised by the provision of the Assam (Temporary Settled Areas) Tenancy Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He submitted that in terms of Section 11 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886, a settlement holder which includes an annual patta holder cannot have right in the land held by him beyond such as are expressed in the annual patta. In other words, he would have no right in the land except the right of user for the period of lease. On his demise, his legal heirs may inherit the lease and become settlement holders only for the rest period of the lease subject to renewal of the lease if not otherwise terminated by the competent authority. In other words, he would have no right in the land except the right of user for the period of lease. On his demise, his legal heirs may inherit the lease and become settlement holders only for the rest period of the lease subject to renewal of the lease if not otherwise terminated by the competent authority. However, he argued, in case of an occupancy tenant of an annual patta land he enjoys a permanent, heritable and transferable right of use and occupancy but the holder of the annual patta does not. The learned counsel referred to the definition of tenant as provided in 3(17) of the Act as well as the provisions therein with regard to the acquisition of occupancy rights and the incidence of such right. The learned counsel, relying on the provisions of the Act incorporated under Chapter-X thereof relating to preparation and maintenance of record of rights of tenants as well as the corresponding rules in the Assam (Temporary Settled Areas) Tenancy Rule 1972 strongly contended that in the instant case the rayoti katcha khatian was issued initially in favour of Sajid Ali, original defendant No. 2 under Sanat Kumar Das the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents plaintiffs in the form of exhibit-C. He argued that the said document apart from establishing that Sajid Ali defendant No. 2 was a tenant in respect of the suit land under the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent-plaintiffs also clearly proved that he was in possession of the land for last 12 years. The learned counsel, drawing the attention of this Court to exhibit-B and D strongly urged that it was evident from the said documents that the appellant defendant No. 1 was a tenant in respect of the land and had acquired the status of occupancy tenant on transfer of the suit land to him by the original defendant No. 2 Sajid Ali. He has therefore argued that on one hand the respondents plaintiffs in absence of any fresh annual patta had no right, title or interest in the suit land and on the other, in view of the overwhelming evidence on record namely exhibit-B, C and D and the supporting oral evidence, the appellants had acquired the status of non-occupancy tenant in respect of the land and were not evictable therefrom. The learned counsel while criticising the observation of the learned lower appellate Court that there was no provision in Rule l(c) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 for issuing rayoti in case of annual patta, argued that it was permissible under the provision of the Act and in support of his said submission has referred to this Court relevant excerpts of the introductory notes on the subject as set out in the book titled "Commentaries of Land Laws of Assam" by K.C. Mazumdar and J.N. Chowdhury. 11. The learned counsel, turning to the evidence on record has contended that the respondents plaintiffs totally failed to prove that a fresh annual patta had been issued to them and that they were in possession of the suit land as claimed. He submitted that an adverse presumption in terms of 114(h) of the Evidence Act 1872 was available against the respondents plaintiffs inasmuch as though PW-1 had made a casual reference of the new patta being 104/1, the same was not produced in the suit. Similarly the labourer Hiralal through whom the respondents plaintiffs claimed to be cultivating the suit land was also not examined in the suit. The learned counsel for the appellants argued with considerable force that the impugned judgment being one of reversal, the learned Court below ought to have scrupulously complied with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC and ought to have recorded reasons in details for differing from the findings and conclusions of the learned trial Court. This not having been done, according to the learned counsel, the impugned judgment being passed without satisfying the mandatory requirements of the above provision of law, the same is liable to be set aside on these ground alone. 12. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the following authorities:- 1. AIR 1977 SC 1481 (Md. Salamatulla and others- Vs-Govt. of Andhra Pradesh) 2. (1999)2 GLR 410 (On the death of respondent No. 1, his legal heirs Surendra Chauhan and others-Vs-Hangsaraj Chauhan and others) 3. AIR 1967 (Assam & Nagaland) 9 (Abdul Hasem and others- Vs-Haji Mahiuddin and others) 4. AIR 1951 Assam 20 (Jainur Alt and others- Vs-Mt. Chafina Bibi and others. 5. AIR 1953 Assam 90 (Maheswar Talukdar- Vs-Bhupendra Kalita) 6. 1949 ILR 382 (Assam) (Bahuna Deka-Vs-Srikanta Deka). 7. (1987)2 GLR 64 (Mustt. AIR 1967 (Assam & Nagaland) 9 (Abdul Hasem and others- Vs-Haji Mahiuddin and others) 4. AIR 1951 Assam 20 (Jainur Alt and others- Vs-Mt. Chafina Bibi and others. 5. AIR 1953 Assam 90 (Maheswar Talukdar- Vs-Bhupendra Kalita) 6. 1949 ILR 382 (Assam) (Bahuna Deka-Vs-Srikanta Deka). 7. (1987)2 GLR 64 (Mustt. Safatun Nessa andothers-Vs-Gitarani Kundu and another) 8. ( 1990)1 GLR (NOC) 1 (Shri Pradip Chandra Bora- Vs-Assam Board of Revenue and others) 9. (1991)1 GLJ 525 (Nawab Nurul Islam and others-Vs-Khagaru Sheikh and others) 10. (1982)1 GLR 107 (Jayshree Tea and Industries Ltd.-Vs-Rupeswar Gogoi and another) 11. (2001)1 GLT 141 (Mahespur Tea and Industries Pvt. Ltd.-Vs-Mantala Tea Company Ltd. and others) 13. Countering the above submission, Mr De, learned senior counsel for the respondents has argued that the impugned judgment and decree are legal and valid in all respects. He submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants will have to be appreciated in the background of the fact that the suit land is an annual patta land. According to him, a rayoti katcha khatian can be issued only in respect of the periodic patta land and no such rayoti khatian can be issued in respect of an annual patta land and as such there is no provision for such khatian under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886. He argued that having regard to the materials on record, the claim of the appellants defendants that they are rayots in respect of the suit land is neither acceptable nor tenable. He argued that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to annual patta land. According to the learned senior counsel, the rayoti khatian exhibit-D could not thus have been issued and thus amply establishes the contention of the respondents plaintiffs that the said document is a product of a collusion between the appellants defendants and the concerned revenue staff. He further argued that the annual patta issued in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents plaintiffs had not been cancelled and therefore the respondents plaintiffs as the heirs of the original patta holder, have the right title and interest in the suit land. He has argued that the appellants defendants have failed to prove that they are tenants in respect of the land under the respondents plaintiffs and the documents exhibit-B and C being collusive, they have no manner of any right therein. He has argued that the appellants defendants have failed to prove that they are tenants in respect of the land under the respondents plaintiffs and the documents exhibit-B and C being collusive, they have no manner of any right therein. With reference to the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants defendants in the suit relating to their claim of possession of their suit land, the learned senior counsel has argued that the learned lower appellate Court on a proper application thereof has come to the conclusion that they have failed to prove their possession of the suit land and therefore this Court sitting in second appeal would not re-appreciate the evidence on record. He contended that the findings and conclusions of the learned lower Court are founded on a proper' understanding of the law and consideration of the evidence on record and can neither be termed as perverse or manifestly erroneous on a fundamental principle of law and therefore no interference therewith is called for in the present appeal. In support of his said submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on two decisions of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1959 SC 57 (Deity Pattabhirama-swamy-Vs-S. Hanymayya and others and AIR 1963 SC 302 (V. Ramachandra Ayyar and another- Vs-Ramalingam Chettiar and another). While rounding up his argument, the learned senior counsel has further submitted that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants defendants are not relevant to the issue in hand and were clearly distinguishable on facts. 14. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. However, before dealing with the same, I propose to first take up for consideration the authorities cited at the Bar. 15. In Abdul Hasem (supra), the respondent therein, had filed a suit for declaration of his title and confirmation of possession over the disputed land on the strength of an annual patta issued to him in the settlement process for the year 1930-31. In the suit he placed reliance on Jamabandis, exhibit-1 and exhibit-2. In exhibit-1 which was for the year 1942-43 along with his name, the names of two of the defendants were also recorded as the pattadars. In exhibit-2 which was for the year 1931-32, the name of the respondent plaintiff only appeared as the pattadar. In the suit he placed reliance on Jamabandis, exhibit-1 and exhibit-2. In exhibit-1 which was for the year 1942-43 along with his name, the names of two of the defendants were also recorded as the pattadars. In exhibit-2 which was for the year 1931-32, the name of the respondent plaintiff only appeared as the pattadar. This Court in that factual background held that the land being an annual patta land, the settlement entry for 1942-43 could not be a conclusive prove of the fact that all along the patta was in the name of the plaintiff respondent. It held that the jamabandi prepared in 1942-43 settlement, represented possession of the land in that year and that in case of annual patta land, the entry was liable to be corrected over the year on the basis of the patta and possession. In that context, this Court held that the right of an annual pattadar is neither heritable nor transferable and thus the question of mutation by transfer or inheritance would not arise in the case of an annual patta holder. Having held so this Court concluded that the plaintiffs respondents had failed to prove that he was the exclusive owner of the land. 16. In Jainur Ali (supra) one of the questions which arose for consideration before this Court was whether the transfer of the suit land which was covered by annual patta conferred title upon the plaintiffs transferee. Referring to Rule l(c) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886, this Court held that when an annual patta holder purports to transfer his ownership in such land for consideration, the transferee takes good title to the property subject only to the paramount title of the Government that is to say, if the government so chooses it may at the expiry of the period of annual patta refuse to grant an annual patta to the transferee. In a separate judgment rendered by Hon'ble Ram Labhya J. it was observed that the annual patta holder would only transfer his limited right of user and the rights acquired by the transferee under the sale deed would expire with the lease in favour of the transferee. In that case, after the transaction of sale by the annual patta holder, defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff, the annual patta was renewed. In that case, after the transaction of sale by the annual patta holder, defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff, the annual patta was renewed. It was held that the re-settlement of the land in favour of the defendant No. 1 had the effect of keeping the contractual obligation between the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff alive. 17. In Maheswar Talukdar (supra) it was held that when following a transfer by an annual patta holder, somebody comes into possession of the land covered by the said patta, the possession of the transferee is legal. 18. This Court in Bahuna Deka (supra) was seized with a situation as to on the death of an annual pattadar, who, between his successor in interest and someone with whom he had no relationship, is to be preferred for granting settlement of the land. It was held that in such a case the successor interest of the deceased annual pattadar is to be preferred for the purpose. 19. The question posed before this Court in Musstt. Safatun Nessa (supra) was whether the transferee of an annual patta land would acquire a valid title therein when the annual patta was subsequently converted into a periodic patta. This Court after surveying all earlier decision on this point including those rendered in Jainur AH (supra) and Maheswar Talukdar (supra) answered the question in the negative holding that the validity of transfer of an annual patta land would continue till the annual lease is not cancelled or converted into a periodic one either in the name of the annual lease holder or in the name of somebody-else. It was however observed that in case the annual patta was converted to a periodic one in favour of the transferee, he would certainly get valid title and his sale transaction would be a supporting document in his favour to obtain mutation and enjoy the possession of the land. In coming to this conclusion, this Court relied on its earlier decision reported in (1983)1 GLR 497, (Tamiram Keot-Vs-Padoram Kalita). 20. A Division Bench of this Court in Pradip Chandra Bora (supra) held that the possessor's right over annual patta land is transferable and the purchaser can enjoy the right even if covered by annual patta. A change in the approach while dealing with the right of the annual* pattadar as reported in Abdul Hasem, (supra) is noticeable. 21. 20. A Division Bench of this Court in Pradip Chandra Bora (supra) held that the possessor's right over annual patta land is transferable and the purchaser can enjoy the right even if covered by annual patta. A change in the approach while dealing with the right of the annual* pattadar as reported in Abdul Hasem, (supra) is noticeable. 21. In Nawab Nurul Islam (supra), this Court while dealing with the scope and content of Rule l(c) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886, had an occasion to consider the earlier decisions of this Court, on the point. This Court held, that annual patta unless it was cancelled or notice of non-renewal was given to the patta holder by the authorities concerned, conferred valid title upon the person to whom the patta is issued and therefore the limited right of user acquired by a transferee (or successor of patta holders) would also continue until the cancellation of the annual patta in favour of the transferor. The question which arose for consideration of this Court in the facts of that case inter-alia was whether on the death of their mother, who was the annual patta holder, the plaintiffs in the related suit had lost their right and interest over the suit land. This Court held, in view of his opinion entertained as above, that the plaintiffs did not loose their right and interest in the suit land on the death of their mother in whose name the annual palta in respect thereof stood. . 22. While dealing with the aspect of the probative value of a katcha khatian under the provisions of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886, this Court in Jayshree Tea and Industries Ltd. (supra) held that a katcha khatian establishes the legal right to possess, use and occupy the land in respect of which the same is granted. 23. This Court in a decision reported in (1999) 2 GLR 410 was examining the scope and purport of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. It held that the requirements recorded in the said provision of the C.P.C. are to be complied within a strict manner when the Lower Appellate Court reverses the judgment of the Trial Court. 23. This Court in a decision reported in (1999) 2 GLR 410 was examining the scope and purport of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. It held that the requirements recorded in the said provision of the C.P.C. are to be complied within a strict manner when the Lower Appellate Court reverses the judgment of the Trial Court. It was further observed that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, must record its decision and given its own reasons for the findings arrived at by it to reverse the findings of the Trial Court, otherwise, such a judgment can be interfered within exercise of the power under a second appeal jurisdiction, inasmuch as, the findings arrived at by the Appellate Court in such a situation cannot be deemed to be findings of facts. This Court held that it is the duty of the appellate Court to consider independently the entire facts and the law and give its own independent findings along with reasons in support thereof. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Md. Salamatullah and others (supra), in support of the same view. The Apex Court, in that decision while reversing the findings of the High Court held that there was no justification to interfere with the finding of fact given by the trial Court unless some reasons based on some fact was traceable on the record. 25. The decision rendered in Maheshpur Tea and Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra), was relied upon in order to highlight the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 100 of the C.P.C. This Court held therein, relying on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (1999) AIR SCW 4573, that interference with findings of fact is permissible in a second appeal in two situations, firstly; when material or relevant evidence has not been considered, which if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion and secondly, where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence, which if omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. 26. 26. The propositions of law thus laid down by the above decisions on the topic of annual patta in short are that, the annual patta holder may validly transfer his right of user to another person and that he (transferor) would continue to enjoy that right unless the annual patta is cancelled or is converted into a periodic patta in favour of the annual patta holder or a third person. The decision rendered by this Court in Nawab Nurul Islam and others (supra) extends, and recognises such limited right of user in favour of the successors of the patta holder as well. The question as to whether the successors of an annual patta holder, on his death had any right or interest therein or not was not categorically in question in the case covered by the decision of this Court rendered in Abdul Hasem and others (supra). 27. The decisions cited by the learned senior counsel for the respondents now deserve the attention of this Court. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy (supra), the Apex Court, while dealing with the extent of jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a second appeal, held in no uncertain terms that such an appeal cannot be entertained on the ground of erroneous findings of fact the High Court has no jurisdiction to interference in a second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first Appellate Court based upon and on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 28. Reiterating the same view, the Apex Court, in V. Ramachandra Ayyar (supra) enumerated the limited grounds on which the High Court can interfere with the conclusions of the lower appellate Court. It held that an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence is not an error or defect in procedure referred to in Clause (c) of Section 100(1) of the CPC (as it was then) and the High Court cannot interfere with conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however, erroneous the conclusions may appear to be. It held that an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence is not an error or defect in procedure referred to in Clause (c) of Section 100(1) of the CPC (as it was then) and the High Court cannot interfere with conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however, erroneous the conclusions may appear to be. If the finding of fact is recorded by the first appellate Court without any evidence, it may be successfully challenged in second appeal and only because the judgment of the lower appellate Court was not as elaborated as that of the trial Judge or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge have not been expressedly reversed by the lower appellate Court, it would not be a situation where interference by the High Court in second appeal is called for. 29. Before examining the merits of the contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to clear the deck vis-a-vis the scope of the High Court to interfere with findings of fact in a given case. In a recent decision of the Apex Court on this aspect of law reported in (2001) 4 SCC 262 Kulwant Kaur and others appellants-Vs-Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRS and others, respondents, it was held that it would be too broad a proposition, and too rigid an interpretation of law, that scrutiny of evidence would be totally prohibited in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in second appeal, to be worthy of acceptance. The Apex Court held that, if the concept of justice so warrants, there is no reason why such an exercise would be deprecated. It went on to observe that if in a second appeal, a finding of fact is found to be vitiated on wrong test and is on the basis of assumptions and conjecturers, and as a result whereof there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court would be within its jurisdiction to deal with issue. 30. In a later decision reported in (2002)2 SCC 440 Neelakantan and others, appellants-Vs-Mallika Begum, respondents, the Apex Court, dealing with the said aspect, had held that it is not an absolute proposition that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction in second appeal would not reverse the finding of fact as recorded by the Courts below. 30. In a later decision reported in (2002)2 SCC 440 Neelakantan and others, appellants-Vs-Mallika Begum, respondents, the Apex Court, dealing with the said aspect, had held that it is not an absolute proposition that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction in second appeal would not reverse the finding of fact as recorded by the Courts below. It held that in a case where the finding is recorded without any legal evidence on record or on misreading of the evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity, which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties or the finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view. 31. It therefore, follows from the above judicial pronouncements, that limited though, there is a scope for the High Court not only to examine the ten-ability of a finding of fact recorded by the Court below but also in an appropriate case reverse the same on the basis of the materials on record. However, for the purpose of doing so, the circumstances enumerated in the above two decisions of the Apex Court must exist. 32. The rival contentions of the parties turn around primarily following three questions. 1) Whether the respondents plaintiffs are entitled in law to enjoy the rights and privileges of their predecessor-in-interest of Sanat Kumar Das under the annual patta, after his death as his heirs? 2) Whether rayoti khatians could have been issued in favour of appellants defendants No. 1 and 2 Sajid Ah X since deceased) in respect of the annual patta land recording them to be rayots under the respondents plaintiffs? 3) Whether the learned lower appellate Court in passing the impugned judgment and decree had left out of consideration oral or documentary evidence on record, more particularly exhibits A, B, C, D and E? The above questions if answered would answer the substantial questions of law formulated in the appeal. 3) Whether the learned lower appellate Court in passing the impugned judgment and decree had left out of consideration oral or documentary evidence on record, more particularly exhibits A, B, C, D and E? The above questions if answered would answer the substantial questions of law formulated in the appeal. In a decision of this Court reported in 1999(1) GLT 642 Ajgarh Alt his legal heirs Mustt Joynab Bewa & others, petitioners-Vs-Abdul Siddique, opposite party it was held that the right of an annual patta holder cannot be affected without issuing non-renewal notice and when a valid annual patta exists/ stands no further settlement can be made in favour of another person on the simple ground that no land is available for settlement as the same had already been made in favour of a person and he is continuing in possession. It was further held that, in order to make a valid settlement in favour of another person during the subsistence of an annual patta, first the annual patta must be cancelled by issuing non-renewal notice and thereafter only the settlement can be made in favour of a person. 33. In the same vein, this Court in a later decision reported in 2000(2) GLT 669 Govinda Chandra Das, appellants-Vs-Boloram Boro and others, respondents after making a detailed survey of several decisions of this Court on the subject held that there was no prohibition with regard to transfer of annual patta land and that the sale of an annual patta is a valid sale which can be enforced against the transferor as well as his heirs. This Court, further, held that the transferee by a sale would acquire a good title even if the annual patta is later on converted in the name of the vendor. While holding so, this Court, distinguished its earlier decision rendered in Tanuram (supra), on the ground that the law as laid down therein was in the facts of that case and reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1951 Assam 20 Jenur Ali- Vs-M. T. Chafina Bibi and others in support of the said conclusion. 34. 34. Thus the pronounced judicial interpretation on the above topic is that a land covered by an annual patta can be sold and on such sale a good and valid title therein would be transferred to the transferee which would not be dislodged even by conversion of the annual patta subsequently, in favour of the vendor. The annual patta once granted continues till it is cancelled by issuing a non-renewal notice and in absence of valid cancellation of the annual lease, the same would continue to be operative. This has been the dicta of this Court also in two earlier cases, one in Second Appeal No. 84/1951, Md. Azad Khan-Vs-Kandarpa Kumar and the other reported in AIR 1951 Assam 91, Malan Saikia, appellant-Vs-State of Assam, respondents. In Abdul Hasem (supra) the question whether an annual patta holder could transfer his right thereunder or such right was heritable or not was not in issue before the Division Bench of this Court. The observation made by it on the scope of Rule l(c) was therefore in general terms. A Division Bench of this Court, as alluded above, in a later decision, Pradip Chandra Bora (supra) recognised the right of an annual patta holder to transfer his right thereunder. The above view has been consistently reiterated in all the later decisions. I respectfully subscribe to the same. Having noticed thus that not only the right in the land covered by an annual patta is transferable, but also such transfer conveys a legally enforceable claim, therein, the question is whether the right of the annual patta holder on his death passes on to his heirs and successors-in-interest? Rule 1(C) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation") is extracted as hereunder for ready reference: "(c) An annual lease means a lease granted for one year only and confers no right in the soil beyond a right of user for the year for which it is given. It confers no right of inheritance beyond the year of issue. It confers no right of inheritance beyond the year of issue. It confers no right of transfer or of sub-letting and shall be liable to cancellation for any transfer or sub-letting even during the year of issue: (Provided that the State Government may waive their right to cancel an annual lease and may allow its renewal automatically till such time as the State Government may direct in those cases in which the land is mortgaged to Government or to a State-sponsored Co­operative Society)." A bare perusal of the above provision of the rules would clearly indicate that an annual lease does not confer any right of inheritance beyond the year of issue, and that it does not confer any right of transfer or subletting as well. The right of transfer has been sufficiently dealt with above and the same should not detain this Court any further. 35. In my considered opinion, a reading of the above provision of the rules does not contemplate an absolute bar of inheritance of the right under the annual lease, but certainly restricts it to the period of the lease. If, as held above, by a plethora of decisions, that the right under an annual patta does not extinguish unless the same is cancelled or a notice of its non-renewal is given by the appropriate authorities, is the settled proposition of law, as it is so, in my view, such right of the original annual patta holder has to percolate to his heirs and successors-in-interest during the subsistence of the annual patta till it is cancelled in accordance with law. Any other interpretation would lead to a totally anomalous situation. If the law has recognised passing of valid title by transfer of a land covered by an annual patta during the subsistence thereof, even after the expiry of the initial period of one year without the same being cancelled thereafter by the appropriate authorities, there appears to be no intelligible justification to hold that the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original patta holder, on his demise, should be deprived of such right on succession or inheritance as the case may be. This view of mine is reinforced by the decision of this Court reported in Nawab Nurul Islam and others (supra). 36. This view of mine is reinforced by the decision of this Court reported in Nawab Nurul Islam and others (supra). 36. It is profitable at this stage to refer to the expressions 'heirs', 'inheritance' and 'succession', meaning whereof has been furnished in the two celebrated works "Words and Phrases" and "Corpus Juris Secundum". "Heir" has been defined in Volume 39 A of "Corpus Juris Secundum" as hereunder: "The word is ordinarily a word of inheritance, or connects itself logically with the concept of inheritance, and refers to a class of persons who take by succession from generation to generation, and means all legally entitled to partake of the inheritance." "Succession" has been defined inter alia, in "words and phrases" as below: "Succession" means order in which or conditions under which one person after another succeeds to property or title rights of person or line to succeed. "Succession" is the transmission of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his heirs, and it signifies also the estates, rights and charges, which a person leaves after his death, whether the charges exceed the property, or there is nothing left but the charges, or the property exceeds the charges, and it includes, not only the rights and obligations of the deceased, as they exist at the time of his death, but all that has accrued thereto since the opening of the succession, as also the new charges to which it becomes subject. The word "succession", in its common legal use, denotes the devolution of title to property under the law of descent and distribution. It is defined as "the coming on of another to take the property of one who died without disposing of it by Will." "Succession" is the transmission of the rights and obligations of a deceased to his heirs." "Inheritance" has been defined in Volume 43 of the "Corpus Juris Secundum" thus: "As used in law, in its technical sense, it is a word of limitation, properly restricted to real property which descends by operation of law, although sometimes more broadly construed as including both real and personal property which passes either by descent or by Will." 37. In view of the meaning of the above expressions as provided hereinabove, in my opinion, as the right of an annual patta holder during the currency of the annual patta subsists in him, it has to be construed to be an existing right in such person at the time of his demise and though such right may be one contingent on the cancellation of the annual patta and is subject to the paramount title of the government in the land, the same would devolve on his heirs and successors-in-interest by operation of law. The right may be limited, but it exists to be inherited by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original annual patta holder. 38. Turning to the facts, I find that the above position have been acceded to by the appropriate authorities as well, so much so, that in the rayoti khatians Exts. B, C and D issued by them, the name of Sonot Kumar Das, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents plaintiffs and on his death those of the respondents plaintiffs have been recorded as the pattadars in respect of the suit land which admittedly is covered by the annual patta originally issued in favour of Sonot Kumar Das. The learned lower appellate Court, in holding that right of the original annual patta holder Sonot Kumar Das would devolve on the respondents plaintiffs and would continue till the annual patta is cancelled by the appropriate authorities in accordance with law, in the opinion of this Court, is sustainable and is thus upheld. It is not the case of any of the parties in the appeal that the annual patta issued in favour of Sonot Kumar Das had either been cancelled by the Government or a notice for non-renewal thereof had been issued. Therefore, as alluded above, unless the annual patta granted to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents plaintiffs is cancelled or a notice of non renewal is issued by the appropriate authorities of the government, the annual patta is deemed to subsist in law and the right of the original patta holder on his death, devolves on his heirs and successors-in-interest. Therefore, as alluded above, unless the annual patta granted to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents plaintiffs is cancelled or a notice of non renewal is issued by the appropriate authorities of the government, the annual patta is deemed to subsist in law and the right of the original patta holder on his death, devolves on his heirs and successors-in-interest. As a corollary, the respondents plaintiffs have succeed in the above facts and circumstances, to the rights of their predecessor-in-interest under the annual patta and therefore, are the annual pattadars in respect of the suit land and are entitled in law to enjoy the rights and privileges of their predecessor-in-interest, Sonot Kumar Das, under the annual patta, after his death as his heirs. 39. The regulation as such, does not contain any bar for issuance of rayoti khatians in respect of tenants of land covered by annual patta. It is quite possible that an annual patta holder may create a tenancy in respect of the land covered by the patta and if the annual patta is renewed year after year or is not cancelled or no notice of non-renewal is given, the annual patta in law continues to subsist and the annual patta holder continues to enjoy the rights under the said patta. It a person under an arrangement of tenancy cultivates the land on the condition of payment of rent or deposit of crops as contemplated under the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971 and is thus a tenant under the said Act, can he be deprived of his protection under the said Act by refusing him the status of a tenant on the purported ground that he holds a land covered by an annual patta? In my opinion, the answer has to be in the negative. 40. Chapter X of the said Act contains provisions for preparation and maintenance or records of rights of tenants thereunder. Correspondingly, Chapter VII of the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Rules, 1972 lay down the detailed procedure for preparation of records of rights. Rule 31 amongst others provides for issuing drafts khatians for tenants, record attestation and local explanation. Provisions have been made for recording objections to the preparation of record of rights at various stages. Provisions have also been made for preferring an appeal against the orders and decisions of the contended authorities in the process. Rule 31 amongst others provides for issuing drafts khatians for tenants, record attestation and local explanation. Provisions have been made for recording objections to the preparation of record of rights at various stages. Provisions have also been made for preferring an appeal against the orders and decisions of the contended authorities in the process. The purpose of the Act is to regulate the relationship of a landlord and tenant in temporarily settled areas of Assam and the same is an enactment for agrarian reforms. Section 4 of the Act recognises two classes of tenants, namely occupancy tenants and non occupancy of tenants holding lands under proprietor, land holder or settlement holder other than land holder. An occupancy tenant under Section 6 of the Act has a permanent, heritable and transferable right of use and occupancy in the land of his holding. The Act provides in details for the protection of such tenants in the matter of their eviction from the lands in their occupation. Therefore, in order to decide as to whether a rayoti khatian in respect of land covered by an annual patta can be issued or not, the provisions of the regulation cannot be considered in isolation. The land involved in the present proceeding is an agricultural land and is therefore, certainly covered by the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The appellants defendants claimed that they are tenants under the respondents plaintiffs and they have sought to support their claim by providing the rayoti khatians, Exts. B, C and D. In my opinion, there is no bar in law to issue a rayoti khatian in favour of a tenant of an annual patta land under the provisions of the Act. A contrary view, would in my opinion, render the provisions of the Act to a great extend nugatory. The definition of the expression 'landlord' as contained in Section 3(7) is significant in this regard. Landlord has been defined to be a person immediately under whom a tenant holds the land in question. Had it been the intention of the law makers that annual patta lands should be excluded from the purview of the Act, it would have been explicitly indicated therein. Annual patta signifies a patta for an annual lease, and the annual patta holder is a settlement holder as defined under Section 2(h) of the regulation. Had it been the intention of the law makers that annual patta lands should be excluded from the purview of the Act, it would have been explicitly indicated therein. Annual patta signifies a patta for an annual lease, and the annual patta holder is a settlement holder as defined under Section 2(h) of the regulation. If, going by the language of Section 4 of the said Act, tenancy can be contemplated in respect of lands under a settlement holder, I fail to see why such a tenancy cannot be contemplated under an annual patta holder during the subsistence of the annual patta. If that be so, it would lead to an incongruous situation if on one hand tenancy in respect of land of a settlement holder is recognised under the Act while rejecting such a claim in respect of a land covered by annual patta. In my opinion, therefore, it is permissible and in fact authorised in law to issue rayoti khatians in respect of tenants of lands covered by annual patta. In other words, even if a tenant holds a land covered by an annual patta, a rayoti khatian can be issued in his favour under the aforesaid Act, and in doing so, there would not be a breach of any provision of the regulation, the finding and conclusion of the learned lower appellate Court to the contrary is therefore, not sustainable in law and on facts. The question is thus answered accordingly. 41. A brief discussion of the facts if not made, the approach would not be complete, the respondents plaintiffs in their suit have not prayed for any decree for khas possession, their case is that they are in possession of the land in suit Exts. B, C and D indicate that initially the original defendant No. 2 was in possession of the suit land as a tenant under the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents plaintiffs and thereafter, the appellant defendant No. 1 had been possessing the same as tenant under the respondents plaintiffs. Issuance of a rayoti khatian presupposes possession of the land by the tenant recorded therein, issuance of the khatians is admitted by the respondents plaintiffs, they have however, taken a plea that the said khatians had been cancelled on objection being raised by them. Issuance of a rayoti khatian presupposes possession of the land by the tenant recorded therein, issuance of the khatians is admitted by the respondents plaintiffs, they have however, taken a plea that the said khatians had been cancelled on objection being raised by them. The respondents plaintiffs, however, have not been able to adduce any evidence in that regard barring a bald settlement made by PW-1 in his evidence. This, in my opinion is not sufficient to nullify Exts. B, C and D. The rayoti khatians are records of official acts, validity whereof can be presumed unless rebutted. The respondents plaintiffs have railed to rebut that presumption by adducing any evidence whatsoever. 42. The impugned judgment and decree are one of reversal and on a perusal thereof it appears that the learned lower appellate Court had not at all taken into consideration the rayoti khatians Exts. B, C and D, while appreciating the cases of the parties. Being guided by the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Kulwant Kaur (supra) and Neelkantan (supra) I have examined the evidence on record as well, in order to satisfy myself as to whether the findings of the learned lower appellate Court on facts suffer from perversity due to non consideration of material evidence on record. 43. I find that though the respondents plaintiff through PW-1 had denied that the appellants defendants are their tenants or that they are in possession of the suit land, they have failed to discharge their said burden, in view of the stand taken by the appellants defendants in their written statements to the contrary that the khatians issued in favour of the defendants appellants had not been cancelled and that they are in possession of the suit land by paying revenue. On the other hand, the appellants defendants have supported their claim of tenancy and possession by proving Exts. B, C and D, the rayoti khatians as well as by adducing oral evidence though DW-1, DW-2 and DW-3 in support of the tenancy as well as possession. The rayoti khatians clearly mention that Sajid Ali (original defendant No. 2) and thereafter, the appellant defendant No! 1, in all, are in possession of the suit land for 12 years. No evidence has been adduced by the respondents plaintiffs in support of the allegation that the sale deed is collusive. The rayoti khatians clearly mention that Sajid Ali (original defendant No. 2) and thereafter, the appellant defendant No! 1, in all, are in possession of the suit land for 12 years. No evidence has been adduced by the respondents plaintiffs in support of the allegation that the sale deed is collusive. As alluded above, the learned lower appellate Court in holding that there was no evidence on record to show that Sonot Kumar Das had transferred the right in the suit land to the original defendant No. 2 and that the respondents plaintiffs had been able to prove their possession of the suit land totally left out of consideration Ext. A (sale deed) Exts. B, C and D (rayoti khatians) and Ext. E (order passed in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding) wherein it was held that the appellants defendants were in possession of the suit land. In my opinion, therefore, the findings and conclusions of the learned lower appellate Court with regard to the tenancy and possession as above cannot be sustained in law being vitiated by perversity, consequent upon non consideration of material pieces of evidence. The learned lower appellate Court has thus failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. while reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. The third question is also answered accordingly. 44. As a result, I hold that the respondents plaintiffs are the annual pattadars in respect of the suit land and would continue to be so till the annual patta originally issued in favour of their predecessor-in-interest, Sonot Kumar Das is either cancelled or noticed of non-renewal is issued or it is converted into a periodic patta as the case may be. The appellant defendant No. 1 is the tenant in possession of the suit land in respect of the suit land under the respondents plaintiffs on the strength of the rayoti khatians Exts. B, C and D and would continue to be so till the same are cancelled in accordance with law. The findings of the learned lower appellate Court with regard to tenancy and possession of the suit land to be contrary are hereby set aside. B, C and D and would continue to be so till the same are cancelled in accordance with law. The findings of the learned lower appellate Court with regard to tenancy and possession of the suit land to be contrary are hereby set aside. It is needless to say that the decision arrived at by this Court in the present appeal would not be a bar for the parties to pursue their remedy under the law in the event of a fresh cause of action arising in relation to the rights of the respondents plaintiffs in the suit land and that of the appellant defendant No. 1 as a tenant in respect thereof. 45. I am constrained to make this observation in view of the fact that the rights of the respondents plaintiffs and the appellants defendants are contingent on the subsistence of the annual patta and rayoti khatians, respectively, which the respondents plaintiffs alleged have in the meantime been cancelled. 46. The appeal is thus partly allowed to the extent indicated above. The office is directed to prepare a decree accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there would be no order as to costs. ………………