Karuppayee Ammal & Others v. Arulmigu Mariamman Temple by its Hereditary Trustee
2002-07-29
M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- Arulmighu Mariamman Temple, the plaintiff, filed the suit against the defendant for mandatory injunction against one V.P.Ramasamy. During the pendency of the suit, the said Ramasamy died. So, his legal representatives, the appellants herein, were added as defendants 2 to 5. The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court also confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. Hence, this Second Appeal. 2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows : The suit temple Arulmighu Mariamman Temple is an ancient temple, existing for more than 100 years. The said temple is situate in Re-Survey No.93/2 in 0-15-0 Hectares. V.P.Ramasamy, the first defendant, owns his property to the south of the temple. He constructed the residential buildings about three years ago. He also filed a suit in O.S.No.132 of 1991 against the temple, represented by Hereditry Trustee Thangavel, claiming easementary right over the temple property. When the land was measured, it was found that the defendant encroached upon a portion of the land, measuring about 50.5 sq.mts. of the land. Hence, the present suit is filed for the relief of mandatory injunction for the removal of encroachment. 3. The case of the defendant is as follows : The suit temple is situate in the poramboke land on the south of the temple. There runs an east-west ditch. Further south of the ditch, the defendant put up construction in the land, which belongs to the defendant. The construction was made long back more than 50 years ago. The defendant filed an earlier suit O.S.No.132 of 1991, disputing the right of Thangavel as the Hereditary Trustee of the said temple. Therefore, as a counterblast, he has filed this suit on behalf of the temple. The plaintiff temple has no property right over the entire extent of land, since it is a poramboke land, owned by the Government. Even assuming for the arguments sake that the defendant encroached the property three years ago, the plaintiff, having silently watched the construction without any protest, is not entitled to claim removal, as he is estopped from claiming any such relief by his conduct of acquiescence. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. On the basis of the above said pleadings, necessary issues were framed.
Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. On the basis of the above said pleadings, necessary issues were framed. During the course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiff temple, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-15 were marked. On the side of the defendants, the fifth defendant and one Thangamuthu were examined as D.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked. The Commissioner's Report and sketch were marked as Exs.C-1 to C-3. The trial Court ultimately decreed the suit, granting mandatory injunction for removal of the encroachment. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court, which, in turn, dismissed the same and confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, this Second Appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would argue the Second Appeal on the basis of the following substantial questions of law: i)In view of the admission made in the plaint by the plaintiff and also by P.W.1 both in chief-examination and also in the cross-examination to the effect that he was aware of the construction put up by the defendant three years prior to the filing of the suit, whether the Courts below are right in granting the decree for mandatory injunction without adverting to the law laid down by this Hon'ble Court reported in 1993 (1) M.L.J.73 ? ii)Whether the learned Judge is right in granting the decree for mandatory injunction without producing any document of title in favour of the plaintiff-temple ? In elaborating these questions of law, he would cite 1993 (1) M.L.J.73(G.S.Ramachar v.The Block Development Officer,Kaveripatnam and Others) and 2000 (III) C.T.C.663 (The Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Chennai v. M.Balakrishnan and another) and contend that P.W.1 admitted in the cross-examination that he was aware of the construction put up by the defendant three years prior to the filing of the suit and as such, the discretionary relief of mandatory injunction should not have been granted to the plaintiff, especially, when any document of title in favour of the plaintiff has not been produced. 7. I have given my anxious considertion to the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants and also gone through the judgments rendered by both the Courts below and the decisions cited by the counsel for the appellants. 8.
7. I have given my anxious considertion to the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants and also gone through the judgments rendered by both the Courts below and the decisions cited by the counsel for the appellants. 8. On going through the judgments of the Courts below and other records, including the deposition of P.W.1; I am unable to find any merit in the Second Appeal. I do not propose to deal with the factual aspects, as both the Courts below concurrently would hold that the plaintiff would be entitled to the decree for mandatory injunction, by making threadbare discussion over each and every aspect of the mater. 9. The main point that has been argued before this court is that, P.W.1, having known about the construction put up by the defendant three years prior to the filing of the suit, was kept quiet all along and as such, after three years, he is estopped from claiming any such relief, by his own conduct. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court discussed the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to claim removal of the encroachment, and, particularly, the lower appellate Court placed reliance on the Advocate Commissioner's Report and the evidence of the surveyor to hold that the defendant made an encroachment to the extent of 6 cents. When those materials would prove encroachment on the suit property, the defendant ought to have filed his settlement deed, which is available with him, to show that the construction was made only in the land of the defendant and not the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court, though concluded the encroachment to the extent of 6 cents, in view of the fact that the trial Court decreed only in respect of the extent of 50.5 Sq.mts., which is less than 6 cents, did not choose to modify the decree in favour of the plaintiff to the extent indicated above, as there is no appeal filed by the plaintiff with reference to the said finding, even though the lower appellate Court has got powers for making such a modification. Admittedly, no contra evidence was let in by the defendant, opposing the Advocate Commissioner's Report, which would clearly support the case of the plaintiff. 10.
Admittedly, no contra evidence was let in by the defendant, opposing the Advocate Commissioner's Report, which would clearly support the case of the plaintiff. 10. On the ground of limitation and the laches on the part of the plaintiff in filing the suit, learned counsel for the appellants would cite two authorities, namely, 2000 (III) CTC 663 and 1993 (1) M.L.J.73. In the decision rendered by this Court i.e., 2000 (III) CTC 663 , it has been held that under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, time begins to run, that is starting point under the Limitaion Act, when the right to claim accrues. In this case, the plaintiff as P.W.1 would categorically state in the cross-examination that though the defendant put up construction three years ago, it came to light that the defendant had encroached the temple property, when the measurement was taken in the suit property, during the pendency of the earlier suit filed by the defendant against the plaintiff. Thus, his explanation is, the claim for his right accrued only when he came to know that the construction, which was put up in the land, did not belong to the defendant, but it belonged to the temple. The decision in 1993 (1) M.L.J.73 would show that the plaintiff would not be entitled to mandtory injunction on the ground of laches. In the said case, the Second Appeal was filed by the plaintiff when the mandatory injunction was not granted by the lower Courts. The said decision would not apply to the present case, because, both the Courts below concurrently would find that the plaintiff would be entitled to mandatory injunction and also it cannot be contended that there are laches on the part of P.W.1 in filing the present suit. P.W.1 would give details under what circumstances he had approached the Civil Court by filing the suit. According to him, the earlier suit was filed by the first defendant against the plaintiff in O.S.No.132 of 1991 for easementary right and that suit was dismissed and against that, he filed an appeal and the same was dismissed, as withdrawn. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff has decided to file a suit for mandatory injunction, after obtaining necessary permission from the Hindu Religious Endowment. Ex.A-6, dated 04.03.1992, is the Sanction granted by the Hindu Religious Endowment. Only then, the suit was filed on 11.03.1992.
Under those circumstances, the plaintiff has decided to file a suit for mandatory injunction, after obtaining necessary permission from the Hindu Religious Endowment. Ex.A-6, dated 04.03.1992, is the Sanction granted by the Hindu Religious Endowment. Only then, the suit was filed on 11.03.1992. Under those circumstances, this Court would not be able to find any laches on the part of the plaintiff/respondent herein. Thus, it is clear that no substantial question of law would arise, in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case, especially, when these points are already dealt with by the Courts below and the findings have been correctly given on law and facts. 11. Second Appeal, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed at the admission stage itself. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P.is closed.