., J. ( 1 ) THESE criminal petitions are filed under Section 482 of the cr. P. c. by the accused for quashing the proceedings in c. c. nos. 1023 to 1025 of 1990 on the file of the vii additional chief metropolitan magistrate, bangalore. ( 2 ) THE brief facts necessary for consideration are as follows. Petitioner 1-management dismissed the workmen by name Sri N. Sampangirama, N. Shama and N. Aswatha, from service on 2-8-1974, 12 8-1974 and 12-8-1974 respectively. They raised the dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') before the labour court and by the awards, the labour court directed the accused management to reinstate the workmen with full back wages. The same was challenged before this court in W. P. nos. 18717 of 1980, 19806 of 1979 and 5459 of 1980 and this court by the order, dated 29-5-1989 dismissed the writ petitions thereby upholding the awards. Thereafter, the awards became final as they were not challenged any further. On 29-5-1989 the workmen gave representation to this court for implementation of the orders passed in writ petitions. As the same were not complied with contempt cases came to be filed against the management. This court while disposing of the contempt petitions reserved liberty to the workmen to file a complaint under Section 29 of the act. Accordingly, the complainants gave an application under Section 29 of the Act for prosecution before the labour commissioners. After issuance of show-cause notice, by the Order dated 1-3-1990, the labour commissioner issued authorisation in favour of the present respondent viz. , bangalore general labour union to file a complaint. As such the present complaints came to be filed. ( 3 ) AFTER receipt of the complaint on 29-5-1990 the trial court took cognizance and issued summons to the accused, which was challenged by the management before this court in W. P. nos. 25134 to 25136 of 1991 and the same came to be rejected in the year 1998. Writ appeal nos. 2479, 4332 and 4333 of 1998 filed by the management were also dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners approached the hon'ble Supreme Court in s. l. p. nos. 3596 to 3598 of 1999 (civil appeal nos. 7388 to 7390 of 2001 ). Writ appeal nos. 2479, 4332 and 4333 of 1998 filed by the management were also dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners approached the hon'ble Supreme Court in s. l. p. nos. 3596 to 3598 of 1999 (civil appeal nos. 7388 to 7390 of 2001 ). The hon'ble Supreme Court also dismissed the appeals giving liberty to the petitioners to raise all the contentions, urged before the hon'ble Supreme Court, in their defence in the proceedings launched against them in consequence to grant of sanction under Section 34 of the act. ( 4 ) IN the light of the said observations, the present petitioners had filed applications under Section 204 of the cr. P. c. , for setting aside the Order of issuance of process and dropping of the proceedings on the ground that the complainants were not authorised to file complaint and no prima facie case has been made out for proceeding against the other accused viz. , directors of petitioner 1. After hearing both the sides by the impugned Order dated 12-6-2002, the trial court rejected the application of the petitioners. Hence, the present petitions. ( 5 ) THE main contentions raised by the petitioners in these petitions are two-fold. (i) whether the trial court committed illegality in issuing process without examination of complainant and his witnesses as is mandatory under Section 200 of the cr. P. c. , and (ii) whether the complainant / union is a competent person to file complaint as it is not a public servant and it is an unauthorised person to prosecute the petitioners. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners non-examination of complainant and his witnesses as is mandatory under Section 200 of the cr. P. c. , vitiates the entire proceedings. Insofar as this contention is concerned, in my view, it is necessary to consider the proceedings chronologically. (i) workmen were dismissed on 2-8-1974 and 12-8-1974 and 12-8-1974; (ii) awards came to be passed on 19-11-1979, 19-9-1979 and 31-10-1979; (iii) writ petition nos. 18717 of 1980, 19806 of 1979 and 5459 of 1980 filed challenging the award by the management were dismissed on 29-5-1989; (iv) contempt proceedings disposed of on 15-10-1990; (v) authorisation of labour commissioner on 1-3-1990; (vi) complaint filed on 21-3-1990; (vii) summons/process issued on 9-8-1990; (viii) management filed writ petition nos. 18717 of 1980, 19806 of 1979 and 5459 of 1980 filed challenging the award by the management were dismissed on 29-5-1989; (iv) contempt proceedings disposed of on 15-10-1990; (v) authorisation of labour commissioner on 1-3-1990; (vi) complaint filed on 21-3-1990; (vii) summons/process issued on 9-8-1990; (viii) management filed writ petition nos. 25134 to 25136 of 1991 challenging the issue of summons/process which were dismissed on 26-3-1998; (ix) writ appeal nos. 2479 and 4332 and 4333 of 1998 dismissed on 18-12-1998; (x) s. l. p. nos. 3596 to 3598 of 1999 (civil appeal nos. 7338 to 7390 of 2001) dismissed on 30-10-2001. In view of these dates especially keeping in view the Order of issuance of process is almost 11 years back and thereafter much water has flown and adverse orders have been issued against the complainant in the writ petitions and writ appeals and the fact that at present the case has reached a stage of recording of plea of the accused, I am of the view that these are only a belated plea raised by the petitioners to drag on the proceedings. Even otherwise as held by this court in Davud Bhai Hasan Alli Kolhapurwala v Abhas Bhai Abdul Karim Bhurishet and another and the hon'ble Supreme Court in T. J. Stephen and others v M/s. Parle bottling company (private) limited and others, it is only a curable defect and not a total illegality and I am of the view that even if issuance of summons is erroneous, only on that count after a lapse of almost a decade need not be considered by this court while exercising the inherent jurisdiction. Hence, I am of the view, that as this is a curable defect petition cannot be quashed only on that count that too after a lapse of a decade from the date of the impugned order. ( 7 ) INSOFAR as the competency of the complainant for filing the complaint is concerned, Section 34 itself provides that the complaint should be filed by or under the authority of the proper government. The words "by or under the authority" clearly indicate that the complaint can be filed by the government itself or by any person authorised by the government. This view of mine is supported by the judgment of full bench of this court in the case of S. N. Hada v The Binny Limited Staff Association. The words "by or under the authority" clearly indicate that the complaint can be filed by the government itself or by any person authorised by the government. This view of mine is supported by the judgment of full bench of this court in the case of S. N. Hada v The Binny Limited Staff Association. This court has held that the phrase "under authority of the appropriate government" implied a sanction by the government after it has considered the desirability of the prosecution. On perusal of Section 34, the scope and object under the industrial disputes act, I am of the view that this provision has been introduced only to avoid frivolous litigations and nothing more. On considering the material, I am of the view that the government itself has authorised the complainant / union to file the present complaint which fact is not much in dispute. The finding of the trial court that the complainant is duly authorised to file the complaint has to be upheld. Hence, there is no merit in both the contentions raised by the petitioners. ( 8 ) THE last limb of argument of the petitioners' counsel is that insofar as accused 2 to 7 are concerned they being the directors and as there is no specific allegation against them in the complaint, for want of necessary pleadings and in the light of pronouncements of this court in the case of Nucor Wires Limited, Bangalore and others v Hmt (international) Limited, bangalore, the proceedings so far as these directors/accused 2 to 7 are concerned is liable to be rejected. It is to be noted that the decision in nucor wires limited's case, supra, is in respect of proceedings arising under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the negotiable instruments act. Under the Negotiable Instruments Act it is specifically required to show that where the company is the main accused of the persons in charge and responsible to the company are deemed to be guilty of the offence and as such this court in the aforesaid judgment has held that all the partners and members of association need not be arrayed as accused except those who are found to be in charge or responsible to the affairs of the conduct of the business of the company. In my view, these principles are not attracted to the present set of facts. In my view, these principles are not attracted to the present set of facts. If one peruses Section 32 of the act, there is no such requirement to be shown like "in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business". Under Section 32 of the Act it is stated that where a person committed an offence is a company or other body corporate or an association of persons whether incorporated or not, every director, manager, joint secretary or either officers or person concerned with the management thereof shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence. In the absence of specific words like requirement of showing "was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business" the ratio laid down in nucor wires limited's case, supra, and for that matter the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v Brij Lal Mittal, which is under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are not attracted to the present case. On perusal of the impugned Order it is seen that the learned trial judge has even considered this aspect in detail and since I am in full agreement with the findings arrived at by the trial court in its impugned order, I am of the view that the present petitions are devoid of merits and are liable to be rejected. Hence, the petitions are dismissed as devoid of merits. --- *** --- .