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2002 DIGILAW 691 (PNJ)

Janak Raj v. State Of Haryana

2002-07-19

V.M.JAIN

body2002
Judgment V.M.Jain, J. 1. This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., filed by the accused-petitioner, seeking quashment of FIR No. 490 dated 9.11.1983, registered in PS Ambala City, for the violation of the provisions of Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Annexure P1 is the copy of the aforesaid FIR, which was registered in the Police Station, on the basis of letter dated 8.7.1983 received from District Town Planner, Ambala. It was alleged that M/s. Upper India Glass Works c/o Seth Janak Raj, was the owner of the land measuring 30250 square meters (60 kanals) and that he had sub-divided the land into plots for residential, industrial and commercial purposes, without obtaining a licence from the Director, Town and Counter Planning, Haryana, as required under the Act. It was alleged that he had sold the plots to Smt. Kamlesh Kumari, Sohan Lal Sharma and Smt. Sushma and in this manner he had contravened the provisions of Clause (i) of Section 3 of the said Act. Details of the sale transactions of the said three persons were given in the document attached with the said letter. 3. In the present petition filed by the accused-petitioner, it was alleged that after registration of the aforesaid FIR on 9.11.1983, the challan was submitted in the Court only on 11.11.1986 and that the petitioner was served with notice of accusation on 7.4.1988. It was alleged that the FIR was hopelessly barred by time. It was further alleged that the petitioner filed application on 20.10.1995 for the discharge of the accused-petitioner, but the said application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate on 9.8.1997, copy Annexure P-2. It was alleged that the FIR and all subsequent proceedings taken thereon be quashed, on various grounds including limitation. 4. Inspector Udai Singh, SHO PS Ambala City in the written statement admitted that FIR dated 8.11.1983 was registered on the basis of letter dated 8.7.1983, received from the office of Town and Country Planning Department and that after investigation, challan was submitted in the court on 11.11.1986. It was alleged that the proceedings could not be quashed on the ground of limitation or on any other ground. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 6. It was alleged that the proceedings could not be quashed on the ground of limitation or on any other ground. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 6. Any contravention of the provisions of the Act is punishable under Section 10 of the said Act. It has been provided therein that any person, who contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the Rules made thereunder or any of the conditions of a licence granted under Section 3 shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. As referred to above, the FIR in question was registered on 8.11.1983 on the basis of letter dated 8.7.1983, received from the District Town Planner, Ambala. Alongwith said letter, list of sale transactions was attached by way of annexure. As per the said list, sale transactions had taken place on 7.9.1982. If the District Town Planner had sent letter dated 8.7.1983 to the police for the registration of the FIR on account of violation of the provisions of the Act, it can be presumed that the authorities had come to know about the alleged contravention on 8.7.1983. Police had registered the FIR on 8.11.1983. It is admitted case of the parties that the challan was submitted in the court on 11.11.1986 i.e. more than three years after the registration of the formal FIR on 8.11.1983. 7. Under Section 468(1) Cr.P.C. it has been provided that no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified under sub-section (2) after the expiry of period of limitation. As per sub-section (2) of Section 468, period of limitation shall be (a) 6 months if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; and (c) three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. Under Section 469 Cr.P.C., it is provided that period of limitation in relation to an offender shall commence (a) on the date of offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. Section 473 Cr.P.C., provides for extension of period of limitation in certain cases. It has been provided that any court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. 8. In the present case, as referred to above, the maximum period of punishment provided under Section 10 of the Act is three years. That being so, the limitation for the Court to take cognizance of the offence shall be three years, from the date when the commission of offence was known to the person aggrieved i.e. District Town Planner. As referred to above, District Town Planner had informed the police, vide letter dated 8.7.1983 about the alleged offence having been committed by the accused. Police registered the FIR on 8.11.1983. Thereafter, police took more than three years in investigating the case and it was only on 11.11.1986 that the challan was submitted in the court. It was thereafter, that the Court took cognizance of the offence. There is absolutely nothing on the record to show that while submitting the challan, police had explained the delay in any manner, whatsoever. That being the position, in my opinion, the court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence or to serve the notice of accusation upon the accused petitioner. There is absolutely nothing on the record to show that while submitting the challan, police had explained the delay in any manner, whatsoever. That being the position, in my opinion, the court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence or to serve the notice of accusation upon the accused petitioner. Furthermore, when the accused petitioner moved application before the learned Magistrate for his discharge, on the ground that the case was barred by time, learned Magistrate dismissed the said application on 9.8.1997, copy Annexure P2, on the ground that notice of accusation had already been served upon him. In my opinion, continuation of the proceedings against the accused petitioner would be abuse of the process of law, especially when on the face of it, challan submitted in the court was beyond the period of limitation and the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said offence. 9. For the reasons recorded above, present petition is allowed. FIR and all subsequent proceedings taken thereon, including the notice of accusation and order dated 9.8.1997, copy Annexure P2, are hereby quashed.