Judgment :- A.S. VENKATACHALAMOORTHY, J. 1. This appeal was in fact heard and allowed by their Lordships Justice Doraisamy Raju (as he then was) and Justice T. Meenakumari on 21.4.1998. First respondent took up an application before this Court praying this Court to rehear the appeal as he was not able to be present through his counsel at the time of hearing. This Court allowed the said application and heard the matter. 2. The above appeal has been filed against the decree and judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing A.S. 254 of 1983 on the file of this Court. The fourth defendant is the appellant therein. 3. We intend to adopt the cause title in the suit for the purpose of convenience and clarity. 4. The first defendant is the maternal grandfather of the plaintiff. Second defendant is the natural mother of the plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4 are the daughters of the first defendant. 5. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. 102 of 1982 on the file of Second Additional Sub Court, Pondicherry against the appellant as 4th defendant and three others praying the Court to grant a decree declaring that the plaintiff is the adopted son of the first defendant and that there had been a partition between the plaintiff and the first defendant on 21.10.1970 and that in the said partition the plaintiff was allotted the properties more particularly described in the schedule to the plaint and for injunction restraining the 4th defendant from proceeding in any manner inconsistent with the adoption and the partition between the plaintiff and the first defendant in relation to the proceedings before him under the Land Ceiling Act. 6. The case of the plaintiff can be briefly stated as under. The plaintiff is the natural son of one Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar. The first defendant, since had no sons, adopted the plaintiff on 28.8.1970 in accordance with custom and religious formalities. The adoption took place at Melpakkam in the presence of respectable people interested in the welfare of the family and its members. The plaintiff was physically given by his natural parents and was physically taken by his adoptive father. Since the date of adoption, plaintiff became the son of the first defendant by adoption and became a member of his family. The plaintiff was physically given by his natural parents and was physically taken by his adoptive father. Since the date of adoption, plaintiff became the son of the first defendant by adoption and became a member of his family. A deed of adoption was also written, but the same was not registered in view of the fact that the first defendant was advised that registration is not necessary. Later on, it was thought between the parties that it would be proper that the adoption is recorded under a registered deed and a deed dated 24.10.1979 was written affirming the fact of adoption on 28.8.1970 and the same was also registered. The specific case of the plaintiff is, the first defendant made oral partition and partitioned all the family properties between himself and the plaintiff in the presence of respectable people and the natural father of the plaintiff on 21.10.1970 and plaintiff was also put in possession of his allotted share. It is further pleaded in the plaint that Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act was passed in the year 1974 and the appointed date was retrospectively fixed in the said Act as 24.1.1971. The plaintiff attained majority on 1.3.1975 and since the partition was prior to the appointed date viz., 24.1.1971, plaintiff should have been treated as separate unit. According to the plaintiff, he came to know just prior to the filing of the suit that there were several proceedings between the 4th defendant and first defendant regarding fixation of ceiling and that those proceedings before the 4th defendant are all illegal, improper and contrary to the facts. It is also mentioned in the plaint that plaintiff came to know that on 30.6.1975 returns had been filed before the Authorised Office in pursuance of the provisions of the Act and the draft statement was published in the Gazette on 23.10.1975. Subsequently, a revised return was filed on 28.5.1976 and there was an enquiry on 4.10.1976 and final orders were passed by the Authorised Officer on 3.11.1976. According to the plaintiff, the Authorised Officer, without considering the question of adoption and partition before the appointed date, decided the matter. The appeal filed in L.T.C.M.A. 56 of 1976 was dismissed on 24.8.1977, so also the revision (C.R.P. 457 of 1978) by the High Court on 27.4.1978. According to the plaintiff, the Authorised Officer, without considering the question of adoption and partition before the appointed date, decided the matter. The appeal filed in L.T.C.M.A. 56 of 1976 was dismissed on 24.8.1977, so also the revision (C.R.P. 457 of 1978) by the High Court on 27.4.1978. Subsequently, Authorised Officer passed an order dated 23.10.1978 for preparation of final statement under Section 9(6)(b) of the Act and final statement under Section 11 was published in the Gazette on 25.10.1978. Aggrieved by that first defendant took up the matter by way of an appeal in L.T.C.M.A. 56 of 1978 before the Appellate Land Tribunal, Pondicherry. The Tribunal pointed out that the adoption as it is had not been averred in the first statement, but only in the second statement by the appellant and that further there was no partition prior to the appointed date or the notified date. Hence the adopted son Ramanathan would not be entitled to any separate allotment of six hectares to his share. With regard to the plea of oral donation, the Tribunal held that the oral donations are seldom heard in favour of the married daughters and the argument must have been intended only for the purpose of saving the estate of the appellant in the appeal from operation of the Act. Holding so, the Appellate Land Tribunal (Subordinate Court) dismissed the appeal. It is as against the said order, first defendant filed C.R.P. 2870 of 1979 before this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the authorised Officer to have fresh enquiry to consider all the objections raised at the stage of Section 9(6) of the Act and also to consider the plea of adoption. Pursuant to that order, the Authorised Officer posted the matter for fresh enquiry on 25.2.1982. The specific case put forth by the plaintiff is that the question of adoption and the question of partition are civil rights and in a summary enquiry before the 4th defendant, the plaintiffs right may not be properly appreciated and adjudicated upon. In that view of the matter, plaintiff thought it fit to file the present suit. 7. The specific case put forth by the plaintiff is that the question of adoption and the question of partition are civil rights and in a summary enquiry before the 4th defendant, the plaintiffs right may not be properly appreciated and adjudicated upon. In that view of the matter, plaintiff thought it fit to file the present suit. 7. Fourth defendant resisted the suit contending that during enquiry under Section 9(6)(b) of the Act, the first defendant, land owner filed an objection stating that all his properties had been donated to his two daughters, who were married long before the appointed date. But however, he has not substantiated the same. The matter was taken on appeal to this Court and the same was remanded. Thereafter in revision, High Court remanded the matter back to the Authorised Officer for fresh consideration. It is contended that after getting adjournment of the enquiry the first defendant has set up the plaintiff to file the suit. It is also contended by the 4th defendant that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question. 8. The Trial Court decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by that, appellant/4th defendant filed A.S. 254 of 1983 on the file of this Court. By a Judgment dated 22.12.1993, a learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the appeal. 9. Three questions arise for consideration in this appeal, (a) Whether the suit is maintainable? (b) Whether there was valid adoption? (c) Whether the oral partition pleaded is true? 10. Let us proceed to consider the third question first, since if the plaintiff is not able to prove the oral partition on 21.10.1970 as pleaded by him in the plaint, or on any date prior to the appointed date viz., 24.1.1971, then the plaintiff who was admittedly a minor on that date, by virtue of provisions of the Act and in particular in view of the definition for the term family, he cannot be considered as a separate unit. At this stage it may be made clear that this position has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. 11. The case of the plaintiff is that he was adopted by the first defendant Duraisamy Reddiar on 28.8.1970. The claim that is made in the plaint is that on 21.10.1970 there was oral partition in the presence of respectable people and the natural father of the plaintiff. 11. The case of the plaintiff is that he was adopted by the first defendant Duraisamy Reddiar on 28.8.1970. The claim that is made in the plaint is that on 21.10.1970 there was oral partition in the presence of respectable people and the natural father of the plaintiff. Needless to mention, the burden is solely on the plaintiff to prove the fact. It has to be borne in mind that a case of this nature is entirely different where there are rival claimants such as brothers and sisters of a person and putting forth a different case. Secondly the claim of the oral partition claimed by the plaintiff has to be examined in the following background. 12. On 30.6.1975, Duraisamy Reddiar, who is none else than the person, who according to the plaintiff adopted him, filed Form 2 under Rule 5 of the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land, Compensation for and Disposal of Surplus Lands) Rules, 1975. In the said return, nothing has been mentioned with regard to oral partition that took place in 1970 between the plaintiff and Duraisamy Reddiar. Of course, learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that only in cases where such partition is reduced to writing and duly registered or where preliminary decree is passed before 21.4.1971 has to be mentioned. For the purpose of argument sake, we are prepared to accept this argument. 13. The Authorised Officer rejected the contention of the first defendant, against which first defendant filed appeal in L.T.C.M.A. 56 of 1976 on the file of Principal Subordinate Court, Pondicherry. The main ground urged is that the adoption had not been taken into account and that without enquiry the Authorised Officer held that the adopted son is not living with the first defendant and that Section 3 has no overriding effect. It has to be mentioned even at that stage first defendant did not come forward with the plea of oral partition in October 1970 and what was pleaded was only adoption in August 1970. Having failed before the Principal Subordinate Court, Pondicherry, first defendant filed C.R.P. No. 457 of 1978 before this Court. It has to be mentioned even at that stage first defendant did not come forward with the plea of oral partition in October 1970 and what was pleaded was only adoption in August 1970. Having failed before the Principal Subordinate Court, Pondicherry, first defendant filed C.R.P. No. 457 of 1978 before this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court pointed out that the only question that was raised related to the adoption of the Ramanathan (plaintiff) by the first defendant and that whether the adoption was true or not, the position was not affected because even if the adoption wa s true under Section 2(10) of the Pondicherry Act, the definition of ‘family’ would include an adopted son and consequently the family as such would be entitled to hold only six hectares and the adopted son would not be entitled to hold a separate six standard hectares. This prompted the first defendant to file his objections to the draft statement published under Section 9 of the Act taking a plea that he has orally divided the properties and had allotted his properties in equal shares to his two daugh ters after retaining six hectares for his share. The Authorised Officer considered the said objection and passed an order on 23.10.1978 wherein the Officer rejected the claim of the first defendant that he has orally donated to his two daughters the properties who were married long before the appointed day since the said donation is not a registered one. As against this order, the first defendant filed an appeal before the Appellate Land Tribunal, (Principal Sub Court), Pondicherry in L.T.C.M.A. No. 56 of 1978, however the same was also dismissed. The first defendant thereafter filed a revision in C.R.P. 2870 of 1979 on the file of this Court against the said order of the Appellate Land Tribunal. A learned single Judge of this Court remitted the matter back to the Officer for fresh enquiry after setting aside the order of the Tribunal in L.T.C.M.A. 56 of 1978 to consider all the objections raised at the stage of Section 9(6) of the Act and also to consider the plea of adoption. It has to be noted till that point of time, first defendant did not come forward with a case of oral partition in October 1970. It has to be noted till that point of time, first defendant did not come forward with a case of oral partition in October 1970. We are conscious of the fact that now the suit has been filed by the adopted son Ramanathan, who was not a party in any of the previous proceedings. However, the oral and documentary evidence now let in by the plaintiff have to be examined in the background of previous proceedings. 14. The case that is put forward by the plaintiff in the plaint is that he was adopted by the first defendant on 28.8.1970 and that there was a oral partition between himself and the first defendant on 21.10.1970 and in that partition, plaintiff was allotted the properties morefully described in the schedule. But if we peruse the chief examination of PW-1, he has deposed that the scheduled properties were given to him on the date of adoption in the presence of witnesses who took part in the execution of adoption deed. Thus it could be seen that there is a clear contradiction between the testimony before Court and averments in the plaint. PW-2 is the brother of the first defendant, who would claim that he was present on the date of Ex.A-1 i.e, in August, 1970. In the chief examination he has stated that on the date of adoption first defendant declared that the properties described in the plaint schedule are given to the plaintiff and from the date of adoption plaintiff is residing at Ramanathapuram village with the first defendant and that the plaintiff had taken possession and enjoying the lands. Here again we find the testimony of this witness goes contra to the plaint. The natural father of the plaintiff has been examined as PW-4 and he has not specifically given any date as to when the partition was made. If one looks at Ex.A-1, apart from first defendant and the natural father fo the plaintiff five more witnesses were present but strangely none of them have been examined. 15. While confirming the decree and judgment in O.S. 102 of 1982 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, a learned single Judge of this Court came to the conclusion that there was oral partition as pleaded, placing reliance on certain documents viz. Exs.A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-7. Let us proceed to consider those documents one by one. Exs.A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-7. Let us proceed to consider those documents one by one. Ex.A-2 is a Cane supply passbook issued by New Horizon Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. The entries therein are of the year 1980-1981 and for the subsequent period. Obviously this cannot in any way advance the case of the plaintiff that there was an oral partition in October, 1970. Ex.A-3 is the Family Identity Card. It relates to the period 1976 to 1980. From this document there is nothing to show that the plaintiff was a member of the family of the first defendant in the year 1970. With regard to Ex.A-4, which is a mortgage deed dated 25th April, 1977, we are at a loss to understand as to how this will help the plaintiff to substantiate his case since there is nothing in the recitals to show that the oral partition could have taken place in October, 1970. Ex. A-5 is a xerox copy of first page of Family Identity Card. True, the name of the plaintiff finds a place there, but there is nothing in the document, which would give an indication as to for which period the document relates to. Coming to Ex.A-7, it is a receipt issued by Revenue Department of Government of Pondicherry and that mentions payment of kist for the year 1982 and the document is dated 24.3.1982. We do not understand as to how the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the above documents prove the oral partition in October, 1970, as pleaded. 16. To sum up, it is crystal clear that none of the documents referred to by the learned single Judge would show that there was adoption in August 1970 by the first defendant adopting the plaintiff and secondly that there was an oral partition in October, 1970 between the plaintiff and first defendant. 17. Once this Court comes to the conclusion viz, oral evidence let in by the plaintiff are inconsistent vis-a-vis the pleading in the plaint and none of the documents relate to the period prior to the appointed date viz., 24.1.1971, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff has not proved his case of oral partition between himself and first defendant on 21.10.1970 or on any date prior to the appointed date. 18. 18. Of course, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that this Court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of fact and in that view of the matter, the appeal has to be dismissed. We do not find any substance in this submission since way back in the year 1963 a five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has ruled as under, “But there is no doubt that in an appropriate case a Letters Patent Bench hearing an appeal from a learned Single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal heard by him is entitled to review even findings of fact. The contention of the appellant therefore that the Letters Patent Bench was not in law entitled to reverse the concurrent findings of fact must be negatived.” (Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. A. Sivarama Krishnayya , C.A. 232 of 1961, dt. 11.1.1963 (SC) - unreported Judgment). We are very confident and clear in our view that this is most fit and proper case where we have to interfere into the facts of the case and come to the factual finding. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider a similar question in Smt. Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao and another , AIR 1974 SC 2048 and the Court referred to the earlier cited judgment and held that the consistent view of almost all the High Courts is that the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal, can reverse the concurrent findings of fact in appropriate cases. 19. Once we come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the oral partition on 21.10.1970 or any other date prior to the appointed date viz., 24.1.1971, plaintiff has to fail in view of the definition for the term ‘family’ in Section 2(10) of the Act, which reads as under, “‘Family’, in relation to a person, means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters.” even assuming that the plaintiff was validly adopted. 20. In view of the above, we are of the view that it would be only futile exercise to go into the remaining two questions referred earlier. 21. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. 20. In view of the above, we are of the view that it would be only futile exercise to go into the remaining two questions referred earlier. 21. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned single Judge in A.S. 245 of 1983 confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Judge are hereby set aside. O.S. 102 of 1982 shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Connected C.M.Ps. are closed.