JUDGMENT Sinha, J.: This appeal has been preferred by the defendant No.2 appellant and is directed against the order dated 23rd July, 2001 passed by the Learned Judge in G.A. No. 3028 of 1999 in connection with Extra Ordinary Suit No.32 of 1987. The appellant filed an application being G.A. No.1746 of 1999 in the said suit claiming himself as legal heir of Anjali Pyne since deceased and prayed for order of the Court to sell premises Nos. 56 and 58, Chetla Road, Calcutta-700 027 in his favour under Section 3 of the Partition Act and the Learned Court by the impugned order rejected his prayer and allowed the prayer of Amal Roy who purchased the said properties as highest bidder in public auction. 2. The appellant in his application contended inter alia as follows. He is the husband of late Anjali Pyne (Nee Addy). His wife Anjali Pyne had undivided share in premises Nos. 56 and 58, Chetla Road, commonly known as Chetla Hat. The suit is for possession and administration of joint properties belonging to the Addy family and as such Anjali Pyne was a co-owner and was impleaded as defendant in the suit. After death of Anjali pyne on 6th December, 1994 he and his two daughters were substituted in place of Anjali Pyne. 3. After he was impleaded as a party and during discussion with one of his daughter i.e., defendant No.3 he learnt that the suit premises is going to be sold to one Amal Roy for a total consideration of Rs. 7.25 lacs. He also learnt that Hiralal Dutta, husband of defendant No. 3 made an attempt to purchase the said premises but failed and sale has been confirmed in favour of Amal Roy. 4. Amal Roy is an outsider and stranger and has no connection at all with the Addy family. The Chetla Hat is one of the joint properties which is closely associated with the Addy family for 6n generations. Amal Roy was the highest bidder in Court auction and offer of Amal Roy for purchase of the said properties at Rs. 7.25 lacs was accepted by the Court vide order dated 7th February, 1994. 5. Hiralal Dutta filed an application for recalling the said order which was rejected by the High Court vide order dated 19th February, 1995. Amal Roy was the highest bidder in Court auction and offer of Amal Roy for purchase of the said properties at Rs. 7.25 lacs was accepted by the Court vide order dated 7th February, 1994. 5. Hiralal Dutta filed an application for recalling the said order which was rejected by the High Court vide order dated 19th February, 1995. An appeal was preferred against the said order and the appeal was rejected and special leave petition filed against the order of the Division Bench was also rejected. The price offered by Amal Roy is inadequate and insufficient and he is ready and willing to match such offer of Amal Roy. A better offer would ensure benefit of all parties to the suit. 6. If the Chetla Hat is sold to an outsider who is not a member of the Addy family, it would be detrimental to the estate. The sale has not yet been completed and present market value of Chetla Hat is much higher. Accordingly, the defendant No.2 prayed for permission to sell the premises Nos. 56 and 58, Chetla Road to him setting aside the order of sale in favour of Amal Roy. 7. It appears from the impugned order dated 23rd July, 2001 passed by the Learned Trial Court that the application filed by defendant No.2 appellant being G.A. No. 1746 of 1999 was dismissed and the application filed by the auction purchaser Amal Roy being G.A. No. 3028 of 1999 was allowed. 8. The learned Judge observed that Section 3 of the Partition Act comes into play before the property is put to sell. As soon as there is a decision that the property is to be sold, but not before, Section 3 becomes applicable and it is open to any of the co-sharers to apply under Section 3. If no application is made under Section 3, the Court is empowered to put the property into sell. Once the property is put to sell and the sale is confirmed Section 3 remains no more operative. 9. It was further observed by the Learned Judge that in the present case until the property was sold and the sale was confirmed, there was no application under Section 3. Therefore, Section 3 cannot be attracted after the sale is confirmed. Once the property is put to sell and the sale is confirmed Section 3 remains no more operative. 9. It was further observed by the Learned Judge that in the present case until the property was sold and the sale was confirmed, there was no application under Section 3. Therefore, Section 3 cannot be attracted after the sale is confirmed. As order Under Section 2 is a deemed decree it can be set aside only through appeal or by such manner as a decree can be set aside. Thus, after the sale is confirmed the same cannot be altered simply on the basis of an application for direction to sell the property to respondent No.2 or for modification of the order confirming the sale. 10. Accordingly, Learned Judge rejected the petition filed by the present defendant No.2 appellant and allowed the prayer of the auction purchaser and vacated the interim order passed earlier and directed the joint receivers to execute and register deed of conveyance in favour of Amal Roy and being dissatisfied with the said order the instant appeal was preferred. 11. It has been contended by the Learned Advocate for the appellant that the defendant No.2 appellant is a legal heir of Anjali Pyne, since deceased, under Sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956. the appellant is a co-sharer in the suit property and Amal Roy, the auction purchaser is a stranger purchaser and not a member of the Addy family. A public auction of joint property can be made only under Section 3(2) of the Partition Act amongst the co-sharers and sale may be confirmed in favour of the co-sharer who offers highest price. It was also contended by him that there is no limitation for filing application under Section 3 of the Act. An application under Section 3 can be made even after order of sale of the property has been passed under Section 2 of the Partition Act. He also contended that the Supreme Court in AIR 1973 SC 643 observed that from the scheme of Sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act it will appear that the sale is confirmed among co-sharers. So in this case the Amal Roy who is a stranger purchaser, has no right to become owner of the property by auction purchase. 12. So in this case the Amal Roy who is a stranger purchaser, has no right to become owner of the property by auction purchase. 12. He also contended that the whole object of sale under the Partition Act is for the benefit of co-sharer and to protect the interest of co-sharers. It was also contended that Section 3 of the Partition Act requires valuation of the property but no valuation was made before putting the property into sell. Section 3 gives an over riding right to co-sharer when it has to be exercised. No third party stranger purchaser can defeat the right of the co-sharer under Section 3 of the Act. The sale in favour of stranger purchaser and outsider Sri Amal Roy is a nullity, and it is void ab initio. Therefore, the sale in favour of Amal Roy should be set aside and the said property should be sold to co-sharer appellant. 13. On the other hand Mr. Jayanta Mitra, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of auction purchaser Amal Roy contended that there was no application by the alleged co-sharer under Section 3 of the Partition Act till the sale was confirmed in favour of his client. Once the sale had taken place under Section 2, right under Section 3 of the Partition Act cannot be exercised. Question of valuation is immaterial when the right under Section 3 is exercised before the property is put into auction and the sale is confirmed. Hiralal Dutta, husband of Priya Dutta and son-in-law of the appellant made an attempt to purchase the property in auction sale but he was unsuccessful bidder. Therefore, the appellant and his daughter cannot deny knowledge of the sale. The appellant and his daughter who were defendant respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had every right to apply under Section 3 of the Act before the auction sale had taken place but instead of exercising their right they waited and allowed sale to be completed and confirmed. If one allows the opportunity to slip off their hands they cannot turn on it by reason of principles of waivers, acquiescence and estoppel. The impugned order requires no interference at all as the Learned Judge has passed an well reasoned order. The appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. If one allows the opportunity to slip off their hands they cannot turn on it by reason of principles of waivers, acquiescence and estoppel. The impugned order requires no interference at all as the Learned Judge has passed an well reasoned order. The appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. After hearing the Learned Advocates of the parties and going through the materials-on-record we find that the fate of the appeal depends upon the question whether an application under Section 3 of the Partition Act can be made at any time and even after a sale has actually been held under Section 2 of the Act. It is clear that premises Nos. 56 and 58, Chetla Road commonly known as Chetla Hat was ordered for sale in a suit for partition. The said order for sale was definitely under Section 2 of the Partition Act as that Section gives power to Court to order sale instead of division in partition suit, if it appears to the Court that by reason of the nature of the property or of the number of shareholders therein, or of any other special circumstances a division of the property cannot reasonably or conveniently be made. There were two bidders namely Amal Roy and Hiralal Dutta. The order of the Court dated 7th February, 1994 reveals that the bidding took place in open Court and ultimately the highest bid was given by Amal Roy for Rs. 7,25,000/-. Hiralal Dutta stopped his bid at Rs. 7,20,000/-. Accordingly, the sale in respect of premises situated at 56 and 58, Chetla Road, was confirmed in favour of Amal Roy. 15. There was one apparent mistake in the order relating to the time limit for deposit of the amount and by order dated 23rd February, 1994 the said mistake was corrected and six weeks time was given to Amal Roy for deposit of the amount. Hiralal Dutta filed an application for recalling the order dated 23rd February, 1994. On 21st March, 1994 Amal Roy deposited the entire bid money. The application made by Hiralal Dutta was rejected on 19th June, 1995. The appeal preferred by Hiralal Dutta against the said order was dismissed on 26th November, 1997. Hiralal Dutta preferred a special leave petition in the Supreme Court against the order of dismissal of appeal but the special leave petition was also dismissed on 20th February, 1998. The application made by Hiralal Dutta was rejected on 19th June, 1995. The appeal preferred by Hiralal Dutta against the said order was dismissed on 26th November, 1997. Hiralal Dutta preferred a special leave petition in the Supreme Court against the order of dismissal of appeal but the special leave petition was also dismissed on 20th February, 1998. On 9th April, Amal Roy submitted draft conveyance to the joint receivers for fixation of a date for registration. It is clear that so far the deed of conveyance in favour of Amal Roy has not yet been executed and registered. 16. In the meantime the present appellant who was defendant respondent No.2 filed an application on 23rd April, 1999 as a co-sharer praying for modifying earlier orders in respect of sale of the said premises with a further prayer to pass order for sale of premises Nos. 56 and 58, Chetla Road, in his favour. Undoubtedly, this application by defendant No.2 appellant as a co-sharer is an application under Section 3 of the Partition Act. 17. Learned Trial Judge by his order dated 23rd July, 2001 rejected the said application observing that the application under Section 3 of the Partition Act comes into play before the property is put to sell. It is the contention of the appellant that there is no time limit for making application by co-sharer under Section 3 of the Partition Act. 18. We have carefully gone through the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act and also the decisions citt3d on behalf of the appellant in this respect. All the decisions on behalf of the appellant are not relevant in the instant appeal, for example AIR 1937 Madras 448, 53 CWN 375, AIR 1975 Karnataka 13. 19. We place reliance on the following decisions which would help us in coming to a decision in the instant matter and these are the cases of Narendra Nath Das v. Gnanendra Nath Das reported in 90 CLJ 147, Manik Lal Duff & Ors. v. Pulin Behari Pal & Ors. reported in AIR 1950 Cal 431 , Nitish Chandra & Anr. v. Promod Kumar & Ors. reported in AIR 1953 Calcutta 18, Baldeo Das & Ors. v. Kishanlal & Anr. v. Pulin Behari Pal & Ors. reported in AIR 1950 Cal 431 , Nitish Chandra & Anr. v. Promod Kumar & Ors. reported in AIR 1953 Calcutta 18, Baldeo Das & Ors. v. Kishanlal & Anr. reported in AIR 1971 Rajasthan 42, Sarayakaran v. Perumal reported in AIR 1973 Madras 448, R. Ramamurthi Aiyar v. Raja V. Rajeswararao reported in AIR 1973 SC 643 and Mrs. Malati Ram Chandra Raut & Ors. v. Mahadevo Vasudeo Joshi & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 700 . The decision in the case of Narendra Nath Das (supra) is not much relevant here as it deals with different principles of law and its facts and circumstances are different. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.Ramamurthi Aiyar (supra) is also not important as it deals with principles which are not akin to the facts and circumstances of this case. However, this decision makes it clear that one of the essential conditions for applicability of Section 2 of the Partition Act is that it should appear to the Court that a division of the property cannot reasonably or conveniently be made. To attract the applicability of Section 3 all that the law requires is that the other shareholder should apply for leave to buy at a valuation. 20. In the case of Sarayakaran (supra) it was held that “on a plain reading of Sections 2 and 3, it seems to us that the right to apply under Section 3 (1) arises the moment a request has been made under Section 2. If a direction for sale of the property has been given under Section 2, is does not follow that an application under Section 3(1) cannot be made thereafter. All that is necessary is that in order that an application under Section 3(1) may be considered, the petitioner should apply to have the order under Section 2 set aside because, so long as that order stands, the application under Section 3(1) does not call for consideration. It may be even visualised that a sale has taken place under Section 2, Even in such a case, as it seems to us, there is no bar to be inferred from the two sections, to an application being made under Section 3(1), but only it cannot be considered unless the order for sale made under Section 2 is set aside.” 21. In the case of Nitish Chandra & Anr. (supra) it was held that, “on a plain reading of the section, it seems to us that an application under Section 3 can be filed after the request has been made to the Court under Section 2, Partition Act. The section does not provide for any limit of time after which the application cannot be entertained. In these circumstances, on a plain reading of the section we would hold that an application under Section 3 could be made at any time after the request is made under Section 2 and before a sale has actually been held under Section 2.” 22. In the case of Manik Lal Duff and Others (supra) it was held that “The foundation for attracting the provisions contained in Section 3, is the earlier application under Section 2 of the Act. An application under Section 2 may be preferred after the passing of the preliminary decree. It is incontestable accordingly that the procedure laid down under Section 3 may be initiated after an application is made under Section 2 of the Act. The passing of a preliminary decree will not be a bar to Section 3 being attracted. The election by the defendant afforded under Section 3 need not be exercised immediately after an application under Section 2 is made and before the order for sale. .................. I do not see any reason why before the sale actually takes place, it will not be open to the defendant to exercise the option which is given to him under Section 3 of the Act.” 23. In the case of Baldeo Das and Others (supra) it was held that “All that Section 3 requires is that the application should be filed after a request has been made by the co-sharers under Section 2 of the Act for the public sale of the property. In the absence of any restrictive provision in Section 3 it cannot be held that the limiting point of time when the application should be made under that section is the date on which the order under Section 2 is made. Of course if a sale actually takes place no application under Section 3 can be made till the sale is set aside.” 24. Of course if a sale actually takes place no application under Section 3 can be made till the sale is set aside.” 24. The principles of law as can be gathered from the above decisions makes it clear that an application under Section 3 of the Partition Act can be made at any time after the request for sale is made under Section 2 of the Partition Act but before a sale has actually been held under Section 2 of the Act. In the instant case the defendant No.2 appellant filed the application on 23rd April, 1999 whereas the sale was actually held on 7th February, 1994 and the said sale was also confirmed. The application filed by the appellant is, therefore, not entertainable until and unless the said sale is set aside. The above decisions also makes it clear that order for sale under Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Partition Act is a decree in view of provisions of Section 8 of the Act. Learned Trial Judge was right by observing that the application made by the defendant No.2 under Section 3 cannot be attracted after the sale is confirmed. There is specific provision for setting aside a sale and there must be grounds for setting aside a sale and the appellant did not take step for setting aside sale in question. The instant application for direction to sell the said property to him or for modification of the earlier order through such application, is not maintainable. 25. It is clear, therefore, there was no infirmity in the order passed by the Learned Trial Judge and the Learned Trial Judge has passed an well reasoned order. The impugned order dated 23rd July, 2001 requires no interference. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of the judgment be given to the parties, if applied for, expeditiously. Banerjea, J. : I agree.