JANARDAN SAHAI, J. ( 1 ) T h e petitioner Krishna Saxena was appointed as Principal on ad hoc basis in Balika Inter college, Jalaun. A vacancy having arisen on the post of Principal on the retirement of regular principal Nirmala Agarwal on 30. 6. 1998, resolution dated 8. 7. 1998 was passed by the committee of management for giving charge to the petitioner as Officiating Principal. The charge was given to the petitioner. By order dated 14. 12. 1998, the District Inspector of Schools approved her appointment on ad hoc basis as Principal till a regularly selected candidate on the post joined. The petitioner, however, submitted a letter dated 14. 10. 1998 to the Management that teachers were not satisfied with her and it appeared to her that she was not competent for the post of principal and a direction for appointing another teacher to the post be given. Another letter dated 17. 8. 1999 (Annexure-Xii-F to the writ petition) was sent by her to the Manager stating that ever since she took over charge on 1. 7. 1998, she had worked with honesty and sincerity but she was not paid salary for the period 1. 7. 1998 to 31. 12. 1998 nor increment with effect from 1. 7. 1999 for the post of Principal ; that she was finding herself incompetent to handle the post of Principal and that some other teacher be appointed to accept the responsibility and she may be relieved and approval may be granted for her going back to the Lecturer Grade. The Committee of management treating these letters as her resignation accorded acceptance after a period of one year by resolution dated 6. 8. 2000 (Annexure-IX to the writ petition ). The petitioner has prayed for quashing this resolution of the Committee of Management and a command to the District inspector of Schools, respondent No. 2 and the Committee of Management respondent No. 3 not to appoint any other ad hoc Principal of the college replacing the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE petitioners case is that the letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. ( 2 ) THE petitioners case is that the letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999, were in fact not resignation letters at all; that even if these letters are treated as letters of resignation, the committee of management did not accept the proposal within a reasonable time and it was not open to the committee of management to have acted upon the said letters and to have accepted the resignation after a period of one year especially when by her conduct, the petitioner had indicated that she had no intention to resign. It is stated in para 20 of the writ petition that the petitioner had withdrawn her letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999, by means of her letter dated 24. 1. 2000, addressed to the management before the resignation had become effective. The resolution dated 6. 8. 2000 was never passed and the proceedings of that date are fabricated. ( 3 ) THE case of the management, on the other hand, is that no such letter dated 24. 1. 2000 was sent by the petitioner withdrawing her resignation ; that the. letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999, were resignation letters ; that a meeting of the committee was in fact held on 6. 8. 2000 and on that date, the petitioners resignation was accepted. In the supplementary counter-affidavit, it has also been stated that the petitioner had attended the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000 and put her signatures in the proceedings of the aforesaid date. Photocopy of the minutes of the proceedings have been filed by the committee. It is also stated that the petitioner was not interested in working as Principal and she was sending repeated leave applications and had also expressed her unwillingness to work as Centre Superintendent-a conduct indicating her continued intention to resign. ( 4 ) WE will first examine the petitioners case about having sent the letter dated 24. 1. 2000, withdrawing her previous letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999. This letter dated 24. 1. 2000 is said to have sent under Certificate of Posting. The management has denied that any such letter was sent and its case is that this letter is forged. It is admitted to the petitioner that a notice was sent to her by the committee referring to the letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1. 2000 is said to have sent under Certificate of Posting. The management has denied that any such letter was sent and its case is that this letter is forged. It is admitted to the petitioner that a notice was sent to her by the committee referring to the letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999 and some other letters and calling for the petitioners explanation in regard to disciplinary action to be taken against her. The petitioner sent three letters dated 28. 7. 2000, 2. 8. 2000 and 5. 8. 2000 to the management seeking time to submit her explanation. In hone of these letters, there was any mention of the letter dated 24. 1. 2000 by which the petitioner claims to have withdrawn her previous letters which are being treated by the committee as letters of resignation. The burden of proof that the petitioner had revoked her previous letters lay upon the petitioner. The question whether the letter dated 24. 1. 2000, was at all sent or served upon the management is a disputed question of fact and on the materials filed in the writ petition and in view of the fact that there is no reference of this letter in the subsequent letters of the petitioner referred to, before the resolution dated 6. 8. 2000. no finding can be given in this petition that the letter, dated 24. 1. 2000 was at all sent. The matter would require full fledged evidence including oral evidence to be led. ( 5 ) WE may now examine whether the resolution dated 6. 8. 2000, was passed by the committee of management, whether the petitioner had participated in the proceedings and what is the effect of the said resolution if at all it was passed. The case of the petitioner is that no such meeting was held. However, the respondents have filed photocopy of the minutes of the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000, which purports to contain signatures of the petitioner against the names of the members who attended the meeting. The petitioner has denied her signatures. The burden of proof that the petitioner had attended the meeting lies upon the respondent. There are certain circumstances, however, which suggest that the petitioner could not have been a party to the resolution dated 6. 8. 2000. The petitioner has denied her signatures. The burden of proof that the petitioner had attended the meeting lies upon the respondent. There are certain circumstances, however, which suggest that the petitioner could not have been a party to the resolution dated 6. 8. 2000. She had filed a Writ Petition No. 33503 of 2000, praying that a mandamus be issued directing respondents not to appoint an ad hoc principal in her place. The record of this writ petition was summoned. There is an endorsement of the joint Registrar that it was presented on 1. 8. 2000, that is only a few days before the alleged resolution dated 6. 8. 2000. The petitioner also pursued this Writ Petition No. 33503 of 2000, which was dismissed on 8. 8. 2000, with a direction that no ad hoc arrangement to replace the petitioner would be made until a regularly selected Principal joins. The copy of this resolution was filed in the Special appeal No. 504 of 2000, the record of which was summoned and the signature of the petitioner are not shown below the text of the resolution where all other members who attended the meeting have signed. Thus even assuming that the proceedings of the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000 are not forged, the only inference that can be drawn from the fact that the petitioner had put her signatures along with other members against the list of members at the top of the minutes of the proceedings while she had not signed at the bottom viz. below the resolution where all other members attending had signed is that she did not accept the decision of the committee and was unwilling to resign. ( 6 ) IN the backdrop of these findings, we shall now examine whether the petition can be effectively decided on other issues. By her letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999, the petitioner had expressed her incompetence to handle the responsibilities of the post of Principal and had made a request to the management to appoint some other person. It was thus a proposal made by the petitioner to give up the charge of the post of the Principal. When the petitioner had given latitude to the management to appoint any person on the post of Principal, it was open to the management to accept that offer. It was thus a proposal made by the petitioner to give up the charge of the post of the Principal. When the petitioner had given latitude to the management to appoint any person on the post of Principal, it was open to the management to accept that offer. As such, the proposal made by the petitioner was in the nature of resignation loosely so called as the intention of relinquishing the post was expressed at least in the letter dated 17. 8. 1999. It could thus be treated as a letter of her resignation but it was to become effective only when the management accepted it and appointed some other person as principal on ad hoc basis. The resignation was not to become effective from any particular date and as such, it was open to the petitioner to have withdrawn it at any point of time before it was formally accepted. It has not been disputed in the present case by the respondent that the resignation did require acceptance. In fact the letter dated 17. 8. 1999, clearly indicates that the petitioner had requested the management to give approval to her relinquishing the post of principal to go back into the Lecturers grade. ( 7 ) SHRI Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that resignation being a voluntary act of relinquishment of employment, the intention to resign must continue upto its acceptance and, the resignation had to be accepted within a reasonable time. Its alleged acceptance on 6. 8. 2000 after about one year of the submission of the resignation letter could not be considered to be reasonable time. The conduct of the petitioner indicates that she had no intention to resign when the management did pass the resolution of acceptance on 6. 8. 2000. Before that date, a writ petition had been filed by the petitioner for restraining the respondents from making any appointment in her place until a regularly selected candidate joins on the post of Principal. The petitioner also pursued the writ petition and obtained an order on 8. 8. 2000 in the writ petition. ( 8 ) RESIGNATION is a voluntary act on the part of an employee to relinquish employment. From the terms of the letter dated 17. 8. 1999, it is clear that intention was that the resignation would become effective from its acceptance. 8. 2000 in the writ petition. ( 8 ) RESIGNATION is a voluntary act on the part of an employee to relinquish employment. From the terms of the letter dated 17. 8. 1999, it is clear that intention was that the resignation would become effective from its acceptance. Regulation 29 of Chapter 3 of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act gives liberty to any employee to resign on giving notice or pay in lieu thereof. The period of notice or the pay is to be the same as the management would have to give as pay on terminating the services of an employee. The said regulation is quoted below :. . (VERNACULAR MATTER OMMITED ). . ( 9 ) THE regulation contemplates not merely a resignation from the post but resignation from the service itself. This is evident from the requirement equating the notice period or pay for resignation with the notice period or pay for termination of services. If a person accepts a regular promotion and loses his lien on the post from which he was promoted, he cannot as of right claim to be reverted to his original post though he can voluntarily relinquish service. In the case of an ad hoc promotion the post which the employee holds and upon which he has a lien is the post from which he was promoted. In such a case, the offer of relinquishment of the charge of the promotion post would not be a resignation technically so called but can only be loosely so described. However, as Mr. Tandon for the respondents does not dispute that acceptance was necessary in the present case, it is not necessary to deal with this aspect any further. The offer which the petitioner gave of reverting to the Lecturers Grade was thus a proposal not contemplated by the provisions of the Regulation 29 and could be termed only in loose terms as a resignation letter and the transaction would be governed by general law. The letter of resignation sent by the petitioner was a proposal, which was subject to acceptance of the management. The letter of resignation sent by the petitioner was a proposal, which was subject to acceptance of the management. ( 10 ) SHRI Arun Tandon submitted that the proposal is revoked by the communication of notice of revocation of the proposal to the other party and as the petitioner has not been able to prove sending any notice of revocation, it was open to the committee of management to accept the proposal of resignation in the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000. Reliance is placed on Visheshwardas v. Narayan Singh, AIR 1969 SC 1157 , in which it was held that it would be straining the language of Sections 2 (b), 3 and 7 of the Contract Act if it were held that a plaint in a suit for specific performance amounted to acceptance of the contract itself. The decision has no application on the facts of this case and the submission is not tenable as it overlooks the provisions of Section 6 of the Indian Contract Act which read as follows : "6. Revocation how made.--A proposal is revoked : (1) by the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party ; (2) by the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or, if no time is so prescribed, by the lapse of a reasonable time, without communication of the acceptance ; (3) by the failure of the acceptor to fulfil a condition precedent to acceptances ; or (4) by the death or insanity of the proposer, if the fact of his death or insanity comes to the knowledge of the acceptor before acceptance. ( 11 ) UNDER Section 6 (2), a proposal is also revoked either by lapse of time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance or if no time is so prescribed, by the lapse of a reasonable time without communication of acceptance. Even in the case of statutory requirement to do a particular thing where no time is prescribed the Court has taken the view that it would mean reasonable time vide Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. M/s. K. T. Rolling Mills, JT 1995 (1) SC 138. Thus, even if the provisions of Regulation 29 are applicable, the acceptance of the resignation was required to be made within reasonable time. Thus, even if the provisions of Regulation 29 are applicable, the acceptance of the resignation was required to be made within reasonable time. ( 12 ) IN paragraph 23 of the writ petition, it is stated that after the letters of resignation dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999, several meetings of the committee of management were held but in none of the meetings was the resignation accepted. The copy of the agenda of meetings dated 20. 10. 1998, 17. 8. 1999, 8. 1. 2000, 1. 7. 2000 and 31. 7. 2000, has been annexed along with the writ petition. This goes to show that several meetings were held before 6. 8. 2000 when the resolution of acceptance was passed. In paragraph 31 of the counter-affidavit of the committee, it is stated that earlier meetings before the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000 were irrelevant as the issue of acceptance of resignation was considered by the committee in that meeting. The acceptance of the resignation after a period of one year cannot be said to be acceptance made within reasonable time especially in the context of the facts that several meetings of the Committee of Management were held before the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000. ( 13 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter relating to the acceptance of the letter in the meeting dated 6. 8. 2000, which requires considerations. The committee of management accepted the resignation letters dated 14. 10. 1998 and 17. 8. 1999 together. After the letter dated 14. 10. 1998 of the petitioner, the management itself had written a letter dated 3. 11. 1998 to the District Inspector of Schools for appointing the petitioner as ad hoc Principal. Copy of that letter has been filed as annexure-7 to the writ petition. The District Inspector of Schools appointed the petitioner as principal on ad hoc basis by letter dated 14. 12. 1998. The managements act of recommending to the District Inspector of Schools, the grant of approval to the ad hoc promotion of the petitioner itself implies that the management did not accept the resignation dated 14. 10. 1998 which was submitted before the recommendation. 12. 1998. The managements act of recommending to the District Inspector of Schools, the grant of approval to the ad hoc promotion of the petitioner itself implies that the management did not accept the resignation dated 14. 10. 1998 which was submitted before the recommendation. ( 14 ) IN Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra and others, AIR 1978 SC 694 , it was held that a prospective resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it could become effective and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. Relevant portion of para 51 of the said Judgment is quoted as under : "51. It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional bar. a "prospective" resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of a Government servant or functionary who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office -tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 15 ) IN Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 , it was held that by the Apex Court in para 5 which is quoted hereunder : "5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on Its file without communicating it to the office concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on which the order was actually written out by the said authority ; such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the officer concerned or was otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is Intimated to the employee. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is Intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance the public servant concerned has locus paenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in Intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an Inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of india. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not Immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot get profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties. " ( 16 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion, it is evident from the conduct of the petitioner that she had abandoned her intention to resign and on the date when the resignation was accepted, there remained no voluntary intention to relinquish the post. She had filed Writ Petition No. 33503 of 2000 and pursued it. It is also evident that respondents did not accept her resignation for a period of one year and in view of the fact that several meetings of the Committee of Management were held before the meeting in which resignation of the petitioner was accepted, it is clear that resignation was not accepted within reasonable time and it would be deemed that the proposal was revoked. ( 17 ) IN the result the writ petition is allowed. The resolution dated 6. 8. 2000 impugned in the writ petition is quashed. Respondents are restrained from appointing any other teacher as ad hoc principal of the college replacing the petitioner till regularly selected candidate joins. .