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2002 DIGILAW 7 (CAL)

PRASANT KUMAR DUTTA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2002-01-09

SUJIT BARMAN ROY

body2002
S. BARMAN ROY, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus upon the respondents to issue Stage Carriage Permit for the vehicle No. BEK 4695 in terms of the offer letter which respondent No. 3 being the Regional Transport Authority of Uttar Dinajpur District had earlier issued in favour of the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE case in brief is that on the prayer of the petitioner, Secretary of respondent No. 3 being R. T. A. Uttar Dinajpur by his letter dated 30. 6. 99 informed the petitioner that the board of the said Authority in its meeting held on 28. 3. 1999 took a decision to allow the prayer of the petitioner for granting him permit under agenda No. 11 (k) and accordingly, petitioner was directed to place a vehicle having a sitting capacity of 46+1 and wheel base 205. Petitioner was further directed to place the said vehicle within six months from the date on which the aforesaid letter was issued. Later on in response to the said offer letter, petitioner purchased the vehicle bearing No. BEK 4695 and accordingly after complying with all requirements of law petitioner placed the said vehicle before the Authorities within the extended period of the validity of the said offer letter. However, for a long time as the respondents did not respond on the prayer of the petitioner to issue permit in favour of the petitioner, he had to approach this Court in another writ petition being AST No. 4695 of 2000 for appropriate direction upon the respondents. This Court by an order dated 26. 12. 2000 disposed of the said writ petition. Said order reads as under:-26. 12. 2000. After hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, I dispose of the writ application by directing the Secretary, R. T. A. Board, Uttar Dinajpur, to take decision in terms of the offer letter for issuance of permit positively within December 30, 2000. The Secretary will pass a reasoned order in respect thereof. By consent of parties, I direct that till such decision is arrived at, the offer letter will not be cancelled. Let a plain copy of this order Countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court) be given to learned counsel for the petitioner on usual undertaking. The Secretary will pass a reasoned order in respect thereof. By consent of parties, I direct that till such decision is arrived at, the offer letter will not be cancelled. Let a plain copy of this order Countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court) be given to learned counsel for the petitioner on usual undertaking. " ( 3 ) HOWEVER, after the said order was passed by this Court, the Secretary of the said Authority informed the petitioner that no permit could be issued in respect of the vehicle of the petitioner on various grounds as mentioned therein. In the said letter it was, inter alia, pointed out that the vehicle for which petitioner had asked for stage carriage permit is more than 12 years old from the date of initial registration of the said vehicle and the said authority by a resolution adopted a policy decision that the vehicles which are more than 3 years old from the date of initial registration would not be considered for giving permit view of safety requirements of the travelling passengers and also for controlling pollution in the District. It was further pointed out that the vehicle which was placed for permit had a capacity of 53 seats, wereas in the offer letter dated 30. 6. 1999 petitioner was required to place a vehicle with sitting capacity for 46+1. It was also pointed out that the vehicle in question is in the name of two persons i. e. petitioner himself and one Parimal Das. But, the application for permit was made by petitioner alone and other owner of the vehicle never applied for any such permit. On these grounds the prayer of the petitioner could not be conceded to and hence he was directed to rectify all these anomalies as pointed out above. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Regional Transport Authority, petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 4 ) CONTENTION of the learned counsel for the petitioner is founded mainly on section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Regional Transport Authority, petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 4 ) CONTENTION of the learned counsel for the petitioner is founded mainly on section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Sub-section (1) of section 59, inter alia, provides that the Central Government may, having regard to the public safety, convenience and objects of this Act, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the life of a motor vehicle reckoned form the date of its manufacture, after the expiry of which the motor vehicle shall not be deemed to comply with the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as no such notification has yet been issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power under sub-section (1) of section 59 of the Act, the Regional Transport Authority cannot refuse permit irrespective of whether the vehicle so placed is too old or not. His further case is that as certificate of fitness was granted by the competent authorities under section 56 of the Act, the Regional Transport Authority has absolutely no jurisdiction to reject the prayer of the petitioner for permit. ( 5 ) ON a plain reading of section 56 it appears that it is true that Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette may specify the life of a motor vehicle reckoned from the date of its manufacture and further that after expiry of such period a motor vehicle shall not be deemed to comply with the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder. This provision was incorporated in the Act in the interest of public safety, convenience and objects of the Act. Therefore, it was safety etc. of the passengers which was given highest importance by the legislature while incorporating this provision. This is certainly in accordance with the object of the Act. No authority can sacrifice the safety and comfort of the travelling passengers at the altar of the profit making motive of the transport operators. It is the obligation of all authorities to give highest importance to the safety and comfort of the travelling passengers. In no case it shall be sacrificed at the altar of profit making motive of transport operators. But, the Central Government has not issued any such notification. It is the obligation of all authorities to give highest importance to the safety and comfort of the travelling passengers. In no case it shall be sacrificed at the altar of profit making motive of transport operators. But, the Central Government has not issued any such notification. The absence of any notification being issued by the Central Government does not render the Regional Transport Authority totally powerless in such matters of vital importance. If any such notification is at all issued, it is needless that no certificate of fitness can be granted to such vehicles in view of what is required by or under section 59 of the Act which provides that after expiry of such period the vehicle in question shall not be deemed to comply with the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder. In this connection I may refer to section 72 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 72 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of section 71, a Regional Transport Authority, may on an application made to it under section 70, grant a stage Carriage Permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Therefore, it is manifest from sub-section (1) of section 72 itself that the Regional Transport Authority in its discretion may refuse to grant such permit. It is of course needless to mention that the Authority cannot arbitrarily or malafide refuse to grant such permit. While dealing with such prayer for permit, the Authority is required to act to advance object of the Act. It must be done only with a view to promote the object of the Act and not in derogation thereof. It is one of the principal objective of the Act that all concerned must act in accordance with the requirements of safety and comfort of travelling passengers. Same cannot be sacrificed at the altar of profit making motive of transport operators merely because the Central Government has not issued any notification under sub-section (1) of section 59 of the Act. This power left with the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to reject a prayer for stage carriage permit is clearly for promoting the general interest of travelling passengers and hence same cannot be sacrificed. This power left with the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to reject a prayer for stage carriage permit is clearly for promoting the general interest of travelling passengers and hence same cannot be sacrificed. I am fortified in may aforesaid view in view of what is further provided under Clause XXIV of sub-section (2) of section 72 of the Act. It provides that if the Regional Transport Authority decides to grant a stage carriage permit, it may grant the permit for a stage carriage of a specified description and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act attach to the permit any conditions which may be prescribed. Therefore, the Regional Transport Authority has been empowered to prescribe any condition. In exercise of this power conferred by Clause XXIV of sub-section (2) of section 72 of the Act, the Regional Transport Authority has adopted a policy decision not to grant fresh permit to a vehicle which has been registered for the first time more than 3 years ago. Such a policy decision cannot be said to demote the avowed object of the Act, namely, the safety and comfort of the passengers. This provision has been incorporated apparently to promote the aforesaid objective of the Act. That apart, sub-section (2) of section 72 itself provides that the Transport Authority may grant permit for a stage carriage of a specified description. It is, therefore, well within the power of the Regional Transport Authority to impose such conditions for the purposes of securing safety, comfort and convenience of the travelling passengers. Merely because the Authority committed a mistake by not mentioning so in the offer letter it had earlier issued, we cannot forget and sacrifice the public interest in this regard, namely, the interest, comfort and safety of the travelling passengers. ( 6 ) IN this connection I may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Subhash Chandra v. State of U. P. , 1980 2 SCC 324 . Section 51 (2) (x) of M. V. Act, 1939 is identical to the provision of section 72 (2) (xxiv) of the new Act. This provision of the old act empowered the RTA to impose "any other conditions which may be prescribed. Section 51 (2) (x) of M. V. Act, 1939 is identical to the provision of section 72 (2) (xxiv) of the new Act. This provision of the old act empowered the RTA to impose "any other conditions which may be prescribed. " It has been held in the aforesaid decision of the apex Court that this provision and the condition imposed in permit that the vehicles used shall not be more than seven years old are not ultra vires section 51 (2) (x) of the old Act. It has further been observed in the aforesaid decision that the State has responsibilities" not merely to minibus owners, but also to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian highways under the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. Section 51 (2) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public safety, not private profit and costs solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer-road accident-is to be awarded death sentence, section 51 and like provisions must receive severe enforcement???if Indian life is not ultra vires Indian law every condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision. " ( 7 ) FROM the aforesaid authority it is clear that while prescribing such condition as regards the model of vehicle, respondents never acted beyond or in excess of their jurisdiction. They acted fully within their power. Section 72 (2) (xxiv) of the new Act authorises imposition of any such condition having nexus with the statutory purpose. Borrowing the language of the apex Court in the aforesaid decision, I may further add that "it is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. The state's neglect in this area of policing public transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a condition the Court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at least a seven year modelling is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and its passengers comparative safety and comfort on out chaotic highways. obviously it is. The older the model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. obviously it is. The older the model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strongless likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and mental fatigue leading to unexpected collapse???vintage models are good for centenarian display of curios and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty. " ( 8 ) IT is true that respondents should have pointed out the aforesaid condition regarding the model of the vehicle in the offer letter itself. For its failure to do so, petitioner might have been prompted to purchase an old vehicle. As a result petitioner is bound to suffer some pecuniary loss. But this Court can in no case allow individual interest to transcend above public interest. When there is a clash between interest of an individual and the public interest, no Court of law can sacrifice public interest at the altar of the interest of an individual. An individual may seek other remedies as may be available to him under the law to compensate the pecuniary loss he has suffered. But he is certainly not entitled to a relief which may amount to promotion of the business interest of a private individual at the cost of the public interest i. e. , pollution, safety and comfort of travelling passengers and road users. ( 9 ) IN these circumstances and in view of the aforesaid position of law, I find no infirmity with the impugned letter which may call for any interference therewith. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, if the petitioner removes the anomalies pointed out in the impugned letter within 6 weeks from today, respondent authorities shall consider prayer of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. Subject to the aforesaid observations, this petition is dismissed. Parties to bear their cost. Petition dismissed