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2002 DIGILAW 7 (MP)

Sakharam v. Vijay Kumar Jain

2002-01-02

S.P.KHARE

body2002
ORDER 1. This is a revision by the defendant against order dated 17.4.2000 of the III Civil Judge, Class II, Satna in Civil Suit No. 188A of 1999 (instituted in the year 1984) by which his application under section 151, CPC stating therein that the suit has abated, has been rejected. 2. The suit for eviction was instituted in the year 1984 by plaintiffs Gulabchand and his son Anand Kumar. The eviction has been claimed under section 12(1) (c), (f), (i) and (k) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as per allegations in the plaint. The suit accommodation is Shop No.3 of House No. 396, Ward No. 15, Satna. So far as the ground for eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act is concerned, it was pleaded that plaintiff No. 2 Anand Kumar was running the business of printing press in Shop No.2 and the space in that shop is not sufficient and therefore he bona fide requires the adjacent Shop No. 3 in occupation of the defendant for his business. Anand Kumar died and his legal representatives have been brought on record in the year 1997 and the plaint has been amended and it has been pleaded tht now Smt. Anjana Jain, widow of Anand Kumar Jain is carrying on the business of the printing press and requires the suit shop for that business so that she may earn her livelihood for herself and for her two children who are minors and who have also been impleaded as the legal representatives of their father. 3. It has been argued on behalf of the defendant in this revision that the suit has abated and the decision of this Court in Narayandas v. Smt. Shakuntala 1998 (II) MPJR 323 has been cited in support of this argument. This argument is not acceptable. The suit is not only under section 12 (1) (f) but under other sub-sections of section 12(1) and, therefore, the suit as a whole cannot abate. It does not abate even in respect of the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As pleaded in the plaint, plaintiff No.2 Anand Kumar Jain was already running the business of printing press in Shop No.2 and he required the suit shop for this business as the space in Shop No. 2 was not sufficient. It does not abate even in respect of the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As pleaded in the plaint, plaintiff No.2 Anand Kumar Jain was already running the business of printing press in Shop No.2 and he required the suit shop for this business as the space in Shop No. 2 was not sufficient. Now after his death, his business has been taken over by his widow and she is carrying on the business for herself and for her sons. This was not the fact situation in the case of Narayandas cited by the learned counsel for the defendant and therefore that case is distinguishable on facts. In the present case, the cause of action survives and the widow can establish her need for the suit accommodation for her existing business left by her husband. She need not be driven to file a separate suit for that purpose. In the case of Narayandas, the shop was needed for starting a new business and not for the existing business left by the deceased plaintiff. 4. The Court can take note of subsequent events as held by the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders (1975) 1 sec 770. It has been ruled that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cogniance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed. In Hasmat Ra; v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 , it has been held that if landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied by such events, the suit for eviction can be dismissed as such a requirement must subsist till the final decision of the lis. The ratio of these cases is that the subsequent events both in favour of and against the tenant should be considered. The need may perish or it may become more acute. In Kamleshwar Prasad v. Padumanju Agarwal (1997) 4 SCC 413 , it has been ruled that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the suit. The ratio of these cases is that the subsequent events both in favour of and against the tenant should be considered. The need may perish or it may become more acute. In Kamleshwar Prasad v. Padumanju Agarwal (1997) 4 SCC 413 , it has been ruled that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the suit. It has been observed: "even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business ;n question can be carried on by his widow or any other son (emphasis supplied). This decision has been referred by the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava 2001 (2) MPU 1 (SC) and it has been held in para 12 that even the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the bona fide need established by him earlier. This dictum of the Supreme Court overrules to a large extent the decision in Narayandas's case on this point. 5. In Ansuyaben Kantilal Bhatt v. Rashiklal Manilal Shah ( AIR 1997 SC 2510 ) also the Supreme Court in effect held that the need of the original person can be substituted by the need of the son and directions were issued for that purpose. 6. The decision of the Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji (1999) 8 SCC 1 must be noticed. In that case also, the plaintiff filed the suit on the ground of his bona fide requirment and he died during the pendency of the suit. His heirs were broughton record. They filed an application for amendment under Order 6 rule 17, CPC and the same was allowed (as has happened in the present case). One of the legal representatives pleaded that the premises was required for himself for starting a grocery business. It was held by the Supreme Court that the amendment could be allowed and the heirs could not be driven to a fresh suit after 13 years. This decision is on all fours to the' present case. It is a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. If there is any contrary view in the case of Narayandas referred above, it must be held to have been overruled. This decision is on all fours to the' present case. It is a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. If there is any contrary view in the case of Narayandas referred above, it must be held to have been overruled. The present suit was filed in 1984 and since then 17 years have passed. The legal representative of the original plaintiff has amended the plaint with the permission of the Court and she cannot be driven to a fresh suit. The question of her bona fide requirement can be decided in this very suit. As discussed above, the present case stands on a better footing as according to the amended plaint, the widow of the original plaintiff is carrying on the existing business of her late husband and she needs the suit accommodation for that purpose as the' accommodation with her is insufficient. 7. The revision is dismissed. As mentioned above, 17 years have already passed since the date of institution of the present suit. The trial Court is directed to decide it within six months of the date of this order and report compliance to this Court.