JUDGMENT Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is present. None appears on behalf of the opposite party. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner at length. 2. This is an application under Sections 401, 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash the criminal proceeding being No. C/301/94 under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code pending before the Court of 7th Metropolitan Magistrate, Bankshall Court, Calcutta. 3. The facts leading to the present revisional application may be summerised as follows:- The respondent No.2, Paritosh Dubey, filed one petition of complaint before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 19th January, 1994 against Asoke Kumar for having committed an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate after holding initial enquiry upon examination of witnesses including the complainant issued process against the accused-petitioner, Asoke Kumar to appear before the concerned Court to answer the charges under Section 500 I.P.C. 4. The accused-petitioner, consequently appeared before the concerned L Court of learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate permitted him to be represented by his lawyer in Court as contemplated under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been alleged by the petitioner that he is, at present, the Regional Manager (South Region) of Steel Authority of India and the present criminal proceeding under Section 500 I.P.C. has only been filed to harass and humiliate the accused-petitioner and the facts disclosed in the application does not come within the mischief of Section 500 I.P.C. nor does it come within the orbit of definition as contemplated under Section 500, I.P.C. Hence, the petitioner has come up with this revisional application seeking to quash the aforesaid proceeding. 5. The instant application has been filed by the petitioner Asoke Kumar seeking to quash the aforesaid proceeding alleging mainly that the allegations, even taken on their face value, do not constitute any offence as alleged and as such initiation of the present proceeding would be a mere abuse of the process of the Court and to prevent the miscarriage of Justice, the Court should come forward for quashing of the aforesaid proceeding. 6. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner drawing my attention to some of the paragraphs of the complaint petition, specially, Paragraph-23 of the complaint petition and drawing my attention to the word 'kingpin' used in that paragraph has submitted before me that the plain dictionary meaning of the aforesaid word qualifies an essential or a leading person and that does not in any way become defamatory and in this connection, citing a decision in the case of (1) Hridaya Ranjan Pd. Verma & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2341 has submitted before me that it has also been held by the Apex Court that in appropriate circumstances, the Court should look into the relevant materials available before it to assess as to whether the continuation of the proceeding should be a mere abuse of the process of the Court or not. 7. Looking into the aforesaid decision referred to above, I find that in the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has fixed up certain guidelines and it was held :- "In the case of (2) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 AIR SCW 237 : AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cr LJ 527 this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter-XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, making it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to my riad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised- (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted a allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence, but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of Magistrate as' contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations in the FIR or complaint are so abused and inherently improbable on, the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted, to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 8. Viewing the present matter in the light of the aforesaid guidelines of the Supreme Court and reading the petition of complaint and reading the allegations levelled in the petition of complaint, as they are I find that there are prima facie materials to proceed against the present petitioner in respect of the offence as alleged against him. 9. It is true that the word 'kingpin' alone cannot be termed to be a defamatory word, but if upon reading the whole context used in relation to the aforesaid word, it is found to the Court that the word itself is used in a defamatory sense, in that event, it can really be termed to be a defamatory word. 9. It is true that the word 'kingpin' alone cannot be termed to be a defamatory word, but if upon reading the whole context used in relation to the aforesaid word, it is found to the Court that the word itself is used in a defamatory sense, in that event, it can really be termed to be a defamatory word. Be that as it may, on the basis of the materials available before me and reading the complaint petition, as a whole, I find that there are prima facie sufficient materials to proceed against accused-petitioner in respect of the charge as alleged against him. So, upon scrutiny of materials available before me and viewing the matter in the light of the aforesaid decision, I find there is no sufficient merit in the present proceeding and as such, I hold that the aforesaid revisional application is devoid of any merit. 10. I n that view of the fact, the revisional application is liable to be dismissed and in fact, it is being dismissed. 11. The revisional application is, thus, disposed of. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Court below for information and necessary compliance with a direction to proceed with the case as expeditiously as possible.