JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Heard Mr. Maqsood Khan for the petitioner and Ms. A.R. Kamat, learned A.P.P., for the State. 2. The detention order in this case is under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act ("COFEPOSA Act"). It is dated 29-1-2002. The said order is challenged by the detenu on number of grounds. However, Mr. Maqsood Khan restricted himself to the amended ground 4(xi) amended vide application dated 11-7-2002, ground No. 1 which is about delay in passing the detention order, and ground No. 4(ix). 3. Ground No. 4(xi) is as under : "The petitioner says and submits that the Detaining Authority has not recorded her reaction and rejection of the retraction of the detenu dated 9-4-2001 in the grounds of detention which has rendered the impugned order or detention null and void on the vice of non-application of mind." In this regard it was contended by Mr. Khan that in the list of documents supplied to the detenu as per Annexure 'C' the documents at Sr. Nos. 14 and 15 i.e. application for statement of retraction dated 9-4-2001 and application for rebuttal of retraction dated 23-4-2001 respectively were not considered by the Detaining Authority and no awareness is shown about these two documents in the order of detention. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in J.T. 1992(3) S.C. 129 (K.T.M.S. Mohd. another v. Union of India)1, and particularly paragraph 33 of the said judgment. In that case the appellants were convicted by the trial Court under the provisions of Indian Penal Code and Income Tax Act. The judgment of the trial Court was confirmed by the lower Appellate Court. The appellants therefore preferred Revisions to the High Court. The High Court dismissed those Revisions and therefore the matter went to the Supreme Court in the form of Criminal Appeal Nos. 631 of 1990 and 632 of 1990. It will therefore be clear that the accused had faced the trial and in which their statements under section 108 of the Customs Act and the similar provisions under section 40 of the FERA Act were involved. The Supreme Court was therefore considering those documents in a criminal trial and in that background of the matter, observations in paragraph 33 came to be made. The Supreme Court was therefore considering those documents in a criminal trial and in that background of the matter, observations in paragraph 33 came to be made. In our opinion this authority is of no use to the detenu because this is a case of the detention. 4. As against this, the learned A.P.P. relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 723 (State of Gujarat v. Sunil Fulchand Shaha and another)2, which was a matter arising out of detention under the COFEPOSA Act, wherein in paragraph 9 it is held that it is not necessary to mention in the grounds the reaction of the Detaining Authority in relation to every piece of evidence separately. The documents referred to at Sr. Nos. 14 and 15 were supplied to the detenu and very same documents were before the Detaining Authority and therefore in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, referred to above, we do not find that any illegality is committed by the Detaining Authority in not specifically making mention of those two documents. 5. The next contention which was in fact a major thrust of objection of Mr. Khan was that the detention order in this case was passed by one Smt. Ranjana Sinha who was the Detaining Authority. However the representation of the detenu was not considered by Smt. Ranjana Sinha but by some other officer and therefore this is in contravention of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1995(3) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)69 (Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India others)3. The reply of the learned A.P.P. was that Smt. Ranjana Sinha ceases to be a Detaining Authority by virtue of notification of the Government of Maharashtra dated 22-4-2002 and in her place one Mr. Tripathi was appointed as a Detaining Authority and therefore Smt. Ranjana Sinha was incompetent to decide the representation. The learned A.P.P. pointed out that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamleshkumar's case is given in different background and no question was involved before the Supreme Court in that case as to whether officer after ceasing to be the Detaining Authority still has powers to decide the representation. She contended that if after appointment of Mr. Tripathi as Detaining Authority and after Smt. Ranjana Sinha ceases to be a Detaining Authority she had considered the representation that would have been a grave illegality. She contended that if after appointment of Mr. Tripathi as Detaining Authority and after Smt. Ranjana Sinha ceases to be a Detaining Authority she had considered the representation that would have been a grave illegality. She contended that question that was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Kamleshkumar was totally different and therefore judgment of the Supreme Court in that case will have no application to the facts of the present case. 6. As against this Mr. Khan pointed out that in para 2 of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court the question that was before the Supreme Court was as under : "When an order for preventive detention is passed by an officer especially empowered to do so by the Central Government or the State Government, is the said Officer required to consider the representation submitted by the detenu?" 7. From para 3 of the aforesaid judgment it is clear that there was divergence in the decision of the Supreme Court on the relevant question in (Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and others)4, 1991(4) S.C.C. 39 , it was held that wherein an Officer of the State Government or the Central Government has passed any detention order and on receipt of the representation he is convinced that the detention needs to be revoked he can do so. Wherein in case of (State of Maharashtra v. Smt. Sushila Mafatlal Shah and others)5, 1988(4) Bom.C.R. 441 (S.C.) it was held that if an order of detention is made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government or a State Government the representation of the detenue is required to be considered only by the Central Government or the State Government and it is not required to be considered by the officer who had made the order. 8. We find considerable force in the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. The issue involved before the Supreme Court in this case was totally different. Supreme Court was not considering whether an officer after he ceases to be a Detaining Authority and some one else is appointed in his place is still required to consider the representation. 9. Our attention was repeatedly drawn by Mr. Supreme Court was not considering whether an officer after he ceases to be a Detaining Authority and some one else is appointed in his place is still required to consider the representation. 9. Our attention was repeatedly drawn by Mr. Khan to para 34 in Kamleshkumar's case, wherein the Supreme Court has held: "Since the detention of the person detained draws its legal sanction from the order passed by such officer, the officer is the Detaining Authority in respect of the said person. He continues to be the Detaining Authority so long as the order of detention remains operative." This observation of the Supreme Court, in our opinion, cannot be pressed into service to the benefit of the detenu because an officer gets power to act as a Detaining Authority by the notification of the Government specially empowering him to do so but when in his place some other officer is appointed as Detaining Authority then the earlier officer is stripped of his powers to act as Detaining Authority and therefore in that situation the said Officer cannot be called upon to consider the representation. It would otherwise amount to consideration of representation by person who is not all acting as Detaining Authority. The judgment in Kamleshkumar's case would not therefore be of any help to the detenu because in the instant case Smt. Ranjana Sinha ceases to be a Detaining Authority by virtue of notification dated 24-2-2002. 10. The learned A.P.P. also pointed out that representation of the detenu was received by authority on 26-4-2002 and Mr. Tripathi was appointed as Detaining Authority by notification dated 22-4-2002 and therefore it was Mr. Tripathi who was empowered to deal with the representation which was received by him four days after his appointment and therefore we do not find any merit in the objection raised by Mr. Khan in this regard. 11. The learned A.P.P. also pointed out that in (Suresh Vadilal Vyas v. Union of India and others)6, 1997(2) Bom.C.R. 488 the representation was specifically addressed to Mr. Verma the Detaining Authority who proceeded on short casual leave and therefore in that background of the matter the Division Bench of this Court held that it was only Mr. Verma who should have considered the representation and not any other officer like Sikander Khan, Joint Secretary. Verma the Detaining Authority who proceeded on short casual leave and therefore in that background of the matter the Division Bench of this Court held that it was only Mr. Verma who should have considered the representation and not any other officer like Sikander Khan, Joint Secretary. The learned A.P.P. pointed out that in the present case the representation was not addressed to Smt. Ranjana Sinha but it was addressed to Detaining Authority, therefore judgment of the Division Bench reported in 1997 I.L.J. 361 is not applicable in the present case. 12. The third point that was raised by Mr. Khan was about delay. According to him the activities of the detenu were an individual activities, there were no allegations that the detenu was indulging in smuggling with the help of syndicate or a gang. The incident of smuggling gold worth Rs. 72 lacs took place on 7-4-2001 and the investigation was completed on that day itself. However, the detention order was passed on 29-1-2002 and therefore the live link in which the activities of the detenu and the detention order were snapped and therefore the detention order is liable to be set aside on account of delay. 13. As against this, the learned A.P.P. relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and others)7, A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 1255 wherein the Supreme Court has held that viewed from this perspective, we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the COFEPOSA Act and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. In cases under COFEPOSA Act, courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are "stale" or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are "stale" or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Further in paragraph 12 the Supreme Court held that even though there was no explanation for the delay between 2nd February and 28th May, 1987 it could not give rise to a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was not genuine. Supreme Court further held that any mechanical test by counting the months of the interval was not sound. In view of this clear cut judgment of the Supreme Court wherein issue or delay is considered at length, we do not find that there is any delay and that the delay vitiates the order of detention. 14. We have no reason to disagree with the submissions of the learned A.P.P. Firstly because Smt. Ranjana Sinha ceases to be the Detaining Authority, in her place Mr. Tripathi was appointed as the Detaining Authority by notification dated 22-4-2002. Secondly representation was received by the Detaining Authority on 26-4-2002, and thirdly the representation was addressed to the Detaining Authority in general and not to Smt. Ranjana Sinha in particular and therefore for these reasons, all the contentions of Mr. Khan are required to be rejected. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the petition. Rule discharged. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----