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2002 DIGILAW 712 (ORI)

BRAHMIN NIJOG v. BADU NIJOG

2002-11-01

L.MOHAPATRA

body2002
L. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) ALL three appeals have been filed against a reversing judgment. In second Appeal No. 260 of 2002 the appellant and the respondent No. 10 are the plaintiffs who had filed Title Suit No. 166/91 (1) subsequently re-numbered as Title Suit No. 262/95. Respondents Nos. 7 and 8 in Second Appeal No. 255/2002 who are appellants in Second Appeal No. 268/2002 had filed Title Suit No. 314/91 in the Court of the learned Sub-Judge, Bhubaneswar. Title Suit No. 166/91 by order of this Court was transferred to the Court of the Subjudge, Bhubaneswar to be heard along with title Suit No. 314/91 in Civil Revision No. 272/92 and accordingly the said suit was re-numbered as Title Suit No. 262/95 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar. Both the suits were heard together and in a common judgment the suits were decreed in part. Challenging the same defendant Badu Nijog filed two Title appeals and both the appeals having been allowed in a common judgment the aforesaid three Second Appeals have been filed. ( 2 ) TITLE, Suit No. 166/91 (subsequently re-numbered as Title Suit No. 262/95) had been filed in a representative capacity on behalf of Brahmana Nijog Samiti who are sevakas of Lord Lingaraj at Bhubaneswar. The suit had been filed in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), bhubaneswar praying for permanent injunction against the respondents from implementing resolution dated 11-11-1991 of the board of Trustees of the temple of Lord lingaraj thereby resuscitating decree dated 18-1-1951 passed on compromise by the learned Sub-Judge, Purl in O. S. No. 84 of 1949. Title Suit No. 314/91 was filed by pujapanda Sevayat Samiti against Badu nijog in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar for declaration that the compromise decree is illegal, invalid, in-operative and is not binding against them and that Trust Board has no right to interfere in sevapuja of Lord lingaraj. It was further prayed for a declaration that the Trust Board has no right to introduce the ticket system and collect money from the pilgrims and the Trust board should be restrained permanently from implementing its resolution dated 11-11-91 and the compromise decree passed in O. S. No. 84 of 1949. It was further prayed for a declaration that the Trust Board has no right to introduce the ticket system and collect money from the pilgrims and the Trust board should be restrained permanently from implementing its resolution dated 11-11-91 and the compromise decree passed in O. S. No. 84 of 1949. From the record it further appears that in O. S. No. 314/91 prayer for injunction having been refused, the matter was carried to this Court in Civil revision No. 272/92 and while disposing of the said revision on 12-3-1993 this Court found that both the suits have more or less similar prayers and accordingly directed transfer of O. S. No. 166/91 from the file of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), bhubaneswar to the Court of learned Civil judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar and for analogous hearing of both the suits by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), bhubaneswar. Accordingly, both the suits were heard together and disposed of in a common judgment. ( 3 ) CASE of the plaintiff in both the suits is that temple of Lord Lingaraj was established by the rulers of Keshari Dynasty who had arranged 36 kinds of Seva pujas of Lord lingaraj by appointing different types of sevaks. The rituals in the temple and the rights of sevaks inter se, vis-a-vis the Lord lingaraj, are regulated by custom and tradition having the force of law. The Sevaks of lord Lingaraj are broadly divided into two categories, i. e. Brahmin Sevakas including pujapandas and the non-brahmin sevaks like Badu Nijog. The Brahmin sevaks excluding the Pujapandas have formed Brahman nijog and the Pujapanda Sevaks have formed pujapanda Nijog and non-Brahmin sevakas have their respective Nijog , one of which is badu Nijog. Pujapandas perform all kinds of worships, beginning from Alati to the final rituals of offering food stuff which is technically called Eadasinghara. These services offered by or at the instance of the worshippers or pilgrims come within the sweep of services rendered by the Brahmin sevakas. The services rendered to the Lord lingaraj are of 36 kinds of which the Brahmin Nijog Samiti renders 18 types of services and accordingly it receives remuneration from out of the "kotha BHOGA" from the temple fund and this remuneration is known as "khei". The services rendered to the Lord lingaraj are of 36 kinds of which the Brahmin Nijog Samiti renders 18 types of services and accordingly it receives remuneration from out of the "kotha BHOGA" from the temple fund and this remuneration is known as "khei". The Brahmin sevakas get remuneration from the persons at whose instruction the services are offered and this remuneration is technically known as "dakhina". The members of Brahman Nijog have been enjoying this right to appropriate dakhina by rendering various services as stated above exclusively to the exclusion of lord Lingaraj and thus have acquired indefeasable right to perform the aforesaid sevapuja of Lord Lingaraj. Pujapanda sevaks are the only sevaks who perform the puja of lord Lingaraj in the temple and also when the deity comes outside the temple in festive days. According to the Pujapanda sevaks though Lord Lingaraj has different sevakas such as Badu, Supakar etc. , no sevak has any right to perform puja of the deity except the members of the said Samiti. Each of the pujapandas has his monthly turn by right of inheritance and accordingly performs the duty of Pujapanda. The Pujapandas are enjoying homestead and agricultural land and are also getting Chanda. Khei and Dahlna for performing puja for the pilgrims. The badu Nijpg are larger in number and they had filed a civil suit before the Munsif, Purl against the Trust Board of Lord Llngaraj in which both the Brahman Nijog and pujapanda Nijog were parties. Subsequently, the Badu Nijog deleted the names of pujapanda Nijpg and Brahman Nijog from the plaint before their appearance and refiled the suit vide O. S. No. 84 of 1949 before the sub-Judge, Purl and entered into an agreement with the Trust Board behind the back of Pujapanda Nijog and Brahman Nijog and obtained a compromise decree in which it was mentioned that Badu Nijog will receive half of the Vetis and the Trust Board will receive other half of the Vetis. As per the compromise in the said suit every pilgrim who goes to the temple will have to first deposit money before the temple authority as per chart showing different amounts for different pujas and get receipts and only thereafter perform the puja through the sevaks. As per the compromise in the said suit every pilgrim who goes to the temple will have to first deposit money before the temple authority as per chart showing different amounts for different pujas and get receipts and only thereafter perform the puja through the sevaks. Though such a decree was passed in the year 1951, only on 11-11-91 the Trust Board passed a resolution to implement the compromise decree passed in the said suit. According to the plaintiffs, the ticket system was never in vague since the inception of the temple and was introduced basing on the compromise decree in O. S. No. 84 of 1949 affecting the interest of other types of sevaks of Lord Lingaraj. Passing of such a resolution with intention to give effect to the compromise decree passed in the said suit gave rise to the cause of action for filing the suits. ( 4 ) THE contesting defendants are the trust Board of Lord Lingaraj and the Badu nijog. They have filed separate written statements challenging the maintainability of the suits on different grounds. Badu Sevaks have claimed in their written statement that earlier they had exclusive right to take the entire Vetis offered at the alter of the deity as of right traditionally and by custom as they were performing important functions of Lord Lingaraj as sevayatas, and that other sevaks like Brahman sevaks and Pujapanda sevaks have no right over this Vetis. Further case of the contesting defendants is that the decree passed in O. S. No. 84 of 1949 was neither illegal nor invalid and is binding on the parties having been entered into lawfully. It is pleaded that even though the pujapanda Nijog and Brahman, Nijog were impleaded as parties in the suit fied by Badu nijog against the Trust Board their names were deleted as they had no claim over the vetis which is offered to the! deity Lord lingaraj on the alter. Since they have no claim over the Vetis which is offered to the deity Lord Lingaraj on the alter they were no necessary parties. The dispute was between the Badu Nijog and the Trust Board with regard to apportionment of the Vetis even though the Badu Nijog is entitled to the entire Vetis, the compromise was entered into between the Badu Nijog and the Trust board to share the same half and half. The dispute was between the Badu Nijog and the Trust Board with regard to apportionment of the Vetis even though the Badu Nijog is entitled to the entire Vetis, the compromise was entered into between the Badu Nijog and the Trust board to share the same half and half. Since the sevaks have no right over the Vetis they are neither affected by the compromise decree nor the resolution date 11-11-91 passed by the Trust Board. It is also pleaded in the written statement that the Brahman nijog and other Nijogs have members in the trust Board and the resolution dated 11-11-91 was passed in their presence by the trust Board and as such is binding on the said Nijogs. The contesting defendants further pleaded that Lord Lingaraj Temple and its endowments are governed by a scheme framed under the Orissa Hindu Religious endowment Act and the Trudt: Board has passed resolution dated 11-11-91 under the scheme framed by the Endowment Commissioner and therefore the suits are not maintainable 5 On the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), bhubaneswar framed six issues which are quoted below : (1) Is the suit maintainable as framed? (2) Have the plaintiffs any cause of action to file the suit? (3) Is the suit barred by limitation? (4) Whether thd compromise decree in O. S. No. 84/1949 passed by thetiearned Subjudge, Purl is valid and binding on the parties including the tntervenor, defendant No. (5) Whether the resolution dated 11-11-91 passed by the Trustee Board of Lord lingaraj basing on the decree in O. S- No. 84/49 is valid binding on the parties including the intervenor, defendant No. 8? 67 (6) To what other relief or reliefs, if any, the plaintiffs are entitled to? ( 5 ) THE learned Civil Judge while answering issue Nos. 4 and 5 held that compromise decree passed in O. S. No. 84/1949 dividing the Vetis equally amongst Badu nijog and the Trust Board after deleting the names of Brahman Nijog and Pujapanda nijog in the suit is bad in law and is not valid one and not binding on other Nijogs which are npt parties to the suit. Having held so, the learned Civil Judge further held that the resolution passed by the Trust Board on 11-11-91 basing on that compromise decree is also not valid and binding on the parties. Having held so, the learned Civil Judge further held that the resolution passed by the Trust Board on 11-11-91 basing on that compromise decree is also not valid and binding on the parties. While answering issue No. 3 with regard to limitation, the learned Civil Judge held that the cause of action having taken place on 11 -11-91 when the resolution was passed by the Trust Board, the suit is not barred by limitation. While answering issue nos. 1, 2 and 6, learned Civil Judge held that the suits are maintainable and the plaintiffs therein are entitled. to the reliefs decreed but the Seva puja rights and other allied rights which come under the jurisdiction df Endowment Commissioner, may be decided by the Commissioner of Endowment if approached by the parties. The appeals filed by Badu Nijog were allowed on the following findings : (1) The plaintiffs have no right to get share of the veta and therefore they cannot compel the deity to that effect nor can the deity be restrained in appropriating the VETA in the manner he desires. Therefore, the relief to that extent cannot be allowed; (2) The Civil court Jurisdiction is ousted as the dispute between the parties squarely come within the jurisdiction of the Endowment Commissioner under the provisions of the Orissa hindu Religious Endowment Act. ( 6 ) AT the time of admission this Court formulated the following substantial questions of law ^n Second Appeal No. 255/2002 and in Second Appeal No. 260/2002 for adjudication. (1) Is thejlower appellate Court justified in refusing to grant the relief as prayed for in the suit, after categorically holding that the plaintiffs are not parties to that suit and therefore, they can simply avoid the decree of O. S. No. 84 of 1949 and there is no need to file a case that it is not binding on them? (2) Is the lower appellate Court correct to hold that the suit is hit by Section 73 of the orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act in view of Section 41 (l) (a) of the Act, especially when there is no prayer for any declaration in order to attract Section 41 (1) (e) and the court was only called upon to answer the effectiveness of previous compromise decree and decide the inter se dispute between the groups of Sevaks? though the aforesaid two second appeals are admitted on the substantial questions of law as mentioned above, in course of hearing of the appeals some other substantial questions of law are also raised and accordingly the aforesaid two appeals were to be decided on the following substantial questions of law: (I) Whether the suit is hit under Section 73 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act? (II) Whether non-service of notice on the commissioner of Endowment as prescribed under Section 69 of the Act affects maintainability of the suit? (III) Whether the civil Court is incompetent to decide the points in the suit in view of Section 41{e) of the Act? (IV) Whether Section 41 of the Specific relief Act puts a bar for grant of injunction in the facts and circumstances of this case? (V) Whether compromise decree passed in the suit of 1949 is binding on the appellants and whether such decree can be put to execution by way of resolution passed by the Trust Board?since the Second Appeal No. 268 of 2002 also arises out of the same judgment, it was heard along with the aforesaid two Second appeals and is admitted on the above substantial questions of law. ( 7 ) SRI S. S. Das and Sri B. H. Mohanty, advocates appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that Badu Nijog had filed o. S. No. 344 of 1945 in the Court of the munsif, Purl impleading Brahmin Nijog and pujapanda Nijog as defendants. During pendency of that suit names of Brahmin nijog and Pujapanda Nijog were deleted before their appearance arid subsequently the suit was withdrawn from the Court of the munsif and was refiled in the court of Subordinate Judge, Puri which was registered as O. S. No. 84 of 1949. In the said suit filed before the learned Subordinate Judge the trust Board of Lord Lingaraj was only impleaded as party and Brahman Nijpg and pujapanda Nijog were not made parties In the said suit compromise was arrived at between the Badu Nijog and the Trust Board and the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. In the said suit filed before the learned Subordinate Judge the trust Board of Lord Lingaraj was only impleaded as party and Brahman Nijpg and pujapanda Nijog were not made parties In the said suit compromise was arrived at between the Badu Nijog and the Trust Board and the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the temple of Lord Lingaraj is admittedly a public temple wherein 36 types of Sevas are being performed by different sevaks and claim of one particular group of sevaks cannot be entertained and decided in absence of other sevaks. Therefore, the terms on which compromise decree was passed are not binding either on the Brahman Nijog or on Pujapanda Nijog. It was further contended that in O. S. No. 84 of 1949 a direction was issued by the Court to issue notice under Order 1, Rule 8, C. P. C. which was not complied with and therefore the suit was incompetent and no decree could have been passed even on compromise. Learned Counsel also contended that so far as temple of lord Lingaraj is concerned, no record of rights have been prepared defining the rights and duties of different groups of sevaks individually or collectively. Therefore, if one group of Sevaks claim any part of the offerings made to the deity, it is really a relief not only against the deity who is represented by the Board of Trustees but also against the interest of other Sevaks of deity who might have claimed the whole or portion of the offerings made to the deity. Further contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the compromise decree dated 23-1-1951 was not given effect to for a long period of more than 40 years and suddenly by resolution dated 11-11-91 the Board decided to implement the terms of the compromise decree which gave rise to the cause of action for the Brahman Nijog and pujapanda Nijog to file the suits. They also contended that the learned Subordinate judge while deciding the suits referred to purna Chandra Oriya Ehasakosh and other authoritative texts and held that Badu sevaks are not Brahmins and cannot offer puja to Lord Lingaraj and therefore their only duty is to supply Bela leaves and other materials for the purpose of puja of the deity. They also contended that the learned Subordinate judge while deciding the suits referred to purna Chandra Oriya Ehasakosh and other authoritative texts and held that Badu sevaks are not Brahmins and cannot offer puja to Lord Lingaraj and therefore their only duty is to supply Bela leaves and other materials for the purpose of puja of the deity. It is also contended that the Badu Nijog in its evidence admitted that they perform puja of Lord Lingaraj by engaging other Brahmin sevaks and therefore they have no legal right to claim a share out of the offerings made to the deity at the time, of puja puja and accordingly the terms of Compromise decree are contrary to, such practice. Finding of the lower appellate Court were challenged by the learned Counsel for the appellants on the ground that the dispute for adjudication in the suit is essentially between/ different groups of Sevaks which doesbnot come within the purview of Section 4j. (J) (e) of the orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act and therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted by virtue of Section 73 of the said Act. Section 41 (l) (e) empowers the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments to decide as to whether any person is entitled to by custom or otherwise to any honour, emolument, perquisite in any religious institution and established usage of a religious institution is in regard to any other matter. It does not embrace the right claimed by the present appellants and therefore! Section 73 of the Act should not stand on the way in deciding the suit. Shri S. S. Das learned counsel appearing for the appellants in two appeals specifically contended, that Section 52 of the Endowment Act, 1939; prescribes that consent of the Commissioner of Endowments was necessary before filing of the suit and such consent having not been obtained from the Commissioner of Endowments before filing O. S. No. 84 of 1949-the learned munsif could not have entertained the suit at all. Learned Counsel for the appellants submit that the learned Subordinate Judge having taken all the relevant points into consideration had rightly allowed the suit, but the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit solely on ground of bar of jurisdiction under Section 73 of the Orissa Hindu Religious endowment Act which has no application in the present case. Learned Counsel for the appellants submit that the learned Subordinate Judge having taken all the relevant points into consideration had rightly allowed the suit, but the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit solely on ground of bar of jurisdiction under Section 73 of the Orissa Hindu Religious endowment Act which has no application in the present case. ( 8 ) SHRI S. Mishra-2, learned Counsel appearing for the Badu Nijog contended that submission of the appellants that they had no knowledge abput Such ascompromise decree is negatived by looking into the pleadings in O. S. No. 47 of 1968 (Ex 4) and therefore the present suit is grossly barred by time and should have been dismissed on the ground alone. He further submitted that as per Section 69 of the Orissa Hindu Religious endowment Act, notice was required to be served the suit could not have been entertained. Referring to certain decisions of this court Sri Mishra also submitted that - secilon 73 of the Act operates as a bar in entertaining the suit. So far as rights of Sevaks are concerned, Sri Mishra contended that members of Badu Nijog are the largest in number and they keep themselves engaged in Seva of Lord Lingaraj almost throughout the day. According to Sri Mishra, the members of Badu Nijog bring pilgrims to the temple, cause darshan and puja and as such are entitled to a share in the offering made to the deity. This right of the members of the Badu Nijog which had been ignored for a long time was recognised by the Trust board arid the Trust Board in O. S. No. 84 of 1949 agreed to give 50% of the said offering to the members of Badu Nijog. Sri Mishra further contended that even if the compromise decree was passed without impleading the Brahman Nijog and Pujapanda Nijog as parties, it te open for them to avoid the decree but they have no right to challenge the same as held by the lower appellate Court. The cause 6f action for filing suit arose when the appellants came to know about existence of such a decree in the year 1968 and the resolution dated 11-11-91 was only a confirmation of the decree passed in O. S. No; 84 of 1949 and accordingly the said resolution cannot give rise to a cause of action for filing the suits. ( 9 ) SRI A. R. Dash, learned Counsel appearing for the Trust Board submitted that under the provisions of the Specific Relief act prayers made by the plaintiffs-appellants cannot be allowed and therefore the trial court committed illegality in granting relief of injunction in favour of the appellants. He further submitted that the offerings made to the deity are the properties of the deity which is represented by the Trust Board and it is open for the Trust Board to part with said offerings in favour of any one of the nijogs as it pleases and no other Nijogs had any right to claim a portion of offerings made to the deity at the alter. He further submitted that due to huge misappropriation by the members of different Nijogs the Trust board thought it appropriate to introduce ticket system and after introducing such a system, the income increased and in support of the same he also filed accounts of the income showing steady increase every year. ( 10 ) CONSIDERING the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties as indicated above, it is desirable to refer to the prayers made in the suits. In O. S. No. 314/91 the Pujapanda sevayat Samitee prayed for declaration that the compromise decree in O. S. No. 84 of 1949 passed by the learned Subordinate judge, Purl is illegal, invalid, inoperative and not binding on them and for further declaration that the resolution passed by the trust Board dated 11-11-91 basing on the said compromise decree is also illegal and invalid. Further prayer was also made to declare that the Trust Board has no right to interfere in the sevapuja of Lord Lingaraj and also has no right to introduce the ticket system and collect money from the pilgrims on the basis of such compromise decree. The bramhan Nijog which had filed O. S. No. 262/95 in representative capacity has prayed for permanent injunction against the trust Bpard and the Badu Nijog from implementing resolution dated 11-11-91. In the light of the prayers made in both the suits certain provisions in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 may be referred to. The bramhan Nijog which had filed O. S. No. 262/95 in representative capacity has prayed for permanent injunction against the trust Bpard and the Badu Nijog from implementing resolution dated 11-11-91. In the light of the prayers made in both the suits certain provisions in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 may be referred to. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act prescribes that any person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiffs need not in such suit ask for any further relief. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with perpetual injunctions and the said section is quoted below :"perpetual injunctions when granted (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter ii. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiffs right to, or enjoyment of property the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely : (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused or, likely to be caused, by the invasion; (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. "section 41 of the Act prescribes the circumstances when injunction is to be refused. "section 41 of the Act prescribes the circumstances when injunction is to be refused. Said section is quoted below :"an injunction cannot be granted (a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings; (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; (c) to restrain any person from applying to any legislative body; (d) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in criminal matter; (e) to prevent the breach of contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced; (f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance; (g) to prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acqulescend; (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust; (i) when the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to assistance of the Court; (j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. "shri A. R. Dash, learned Counsel appearing for the Trust Board contended that the plaintiffs-appellants have absolutely no interest in the offerings made to the deity Lord lingaraj at the alter and since they have no interest in the said offerings and the offering is exclusive property of the deity, the learned Subordinate Judge could not have granted an order of injunction in view of section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that rights of sevaks which have not been defined in this case are to be considered only in the light of the age-old custom prevailing in the administration of temple. According to the age-old custom, it is the members of the Brahmin Nijog and the Pujapanda Nijog who perform puja of the deity and were getting a share out of the offerings made to the deity. They,were also getting Dakhina from pilgrims for performing such puja. Members of Badu Nijog are only supposed to collect Bela leaves and flowers and offer the same to Brahmin for performing puja. They,were also getting Dakhina from pilgrims for performing such puja. Members of Badu Nijog are only supposed to collect Bela leaves and flowers and offer the same to Brahmin for performing puja. In view of suph age-old custom it cannot be said that the, members of Brahmin Nijog and Pujapanda Nijog have no right over the offerings made, to the deity and therefore Section 41 (j) will not stand on the way of the civil Court in granting an order of injunction. In this connection, Sri dash has referred to a decision of the Apex court in the case of Sri Jagannath Temple puri Management Committee v. Chintamani khuntia, AIR 1997 SC 3839 . Relying on the said decision Sri Dash submitted that right of temple attendance (Sevaks) to get portion of the offerings made to the deity in the temple is not a religious right. Before answering the question raised by the learned Counsel Sri Dash, it is necessary to look into the distinctive feature in the reported case and the present case. So far as the Lord jagannath Temple is concerned, the State has enacted Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act, 1952. The Apex Court in para 8 of the Judgment referring to the provisions of the Act observed that pursuant to the provisions of this Act, a Special Officer has been appointed. The Record-of-Rights as envisaged by the Act was prepared by the special Officer in which various duties and functions relating to the persons including the pujaris, Sevaks and other servants of the temple were enumerated of which many of the activities like collection and division of the monies and other offerings by and between the various Sevaks were of secular nature. The Recorid of Rights is not a collection of religious rites to be observed inside the temple. The object of the Act of 1952 was to curb the atrocities being committed by the Sevaks. In para 11 of the judgment the Apex Court also observed that the Act also provided for appointment of - administrator ant!officers to assist him and the administrator was empowered to decide disputes relating the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings and other receipts in cash or in kind received from the members of the public. In para 11 of the judgment the Apex Court also observed that the Act also provided for appointment of - administrator ant!officers to assist him and the administrator was empowered to decide disputes relating the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings and other receipts in cash or in kind received from the members of the public. He is also empowered to decide the disputes relating to the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, office holders and servants in respect of sevapuja and nitis, whether ordinary or special in nature. Admittedly, so far as the Lord Lingaraj is concerned, neither any such Act nor any provision is made. Rights of the servants having not been defined, the claim of different groups of sevaks has not been decided by any authorities. In absence of the same the Court has to only look into the age old custom and find out whether thie plaintiffs in both the suits who were sevaks were receiving any portion of the offerings made or not. I am, therefore, of the view that the aforesaid decision has no application to the present case and the suit is not hit by Section 41 (j) of the Specific relief Act. ( 11 ) NEXT question relates to bar of suits as prescribed under Section 73 of the Orissa hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951. Said section provides that no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration of areligious institution or in respect of any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of the Act. It was contended on behalf of Sri A. R. Dash and Sri S. Mlshra2, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that the dispute basically relates to rights of the parties in apportionment of the offerings made to the deity Lord Lingaraj and the said question relates to administration of religious Institution and therefore the civil Court had no Jurisdiction to entertain the suits. In this connection, again prayer in the) suits are to be referred to. In this connection, again prayer in the) suits are to be referred to. In both the suits prayer is that the compromise decree arrived at between the Badu nijpg and the,trust Board in the suit of 1949 is not binding and that the resolution dated 11-11-91 passed by the Trust Board to give effect to the said compromise is also not binding on the parties. The aforesaid prayers in both the suits clearly indicate that they have got nothing to do with the administra tion of the temple and therefore I am of the view that Section 73 of the Orissa Hindu religious Endowment Act will not stand on the way of the civil Court to entertain the suits. In view of the reasons stated above, Section 69 of the Act has also no application in the case and no notice is required to be served on the Commissioner of Endowment. However, Sri B. H. Mohanty, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in one of the appeals has filed a memo stating that notice as required under Section 69 of the act had in fact been served on the Commissioner of Endowment. I have not gone into the question as to whether such a notice has been served or not since I am of the view that considering the nature of dispute and the relief claimed, no notice under Section 69 of the Act was required to be served on the Commissioner of Endowment. ( 12 ) NOW the sole question that requires to be determined is whether the compromise decree passed in the suit of 1949 is legal and binding on the parties and whether by resolution dated 11-11-91 the Trust Board can give effect to such compromise decree. Prayer in the suit of 1949 is for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff Badu sevaks have the exclusive right to offer flower, bela leaves and water to Sri Lingaraj Mahaprabhu of Bhubaneswar as well as to cause Darshan of the deity to the pilgrims and to enjoy the consequent emoluments and the defendants sevaks have got no right to make such offerings to the said deity at any time whatsoever either for themselves as Hindu public or for their pilgrims. From the above, it is clear that the declaration sought for is to the effect that Badu sevaks have an exclusive right to offer flowers, bela leaves and water to the deity as well as cause Darshan of the deity so far as the pilgrims are concerned and to enjoy the consequent emoluments In the compromise the Badu sevaks and the Trust Board agreed to the following (A) Each pilgrim for offering flower, Bela leaves and water to the deity should pay one anna three pie; (B) Each pilgrim for Abhiseka (bathing of deity) should pay one rupee four annas; (C) Each pilgrim for offering panchamruta, cocoanut and other fruits together with bathing should pay two rupees eight annas; (D) Each pilgrim for Panchopachara puja should pay two rupees eight annas; (E) Each pilgrim for Sodaseopachra puja should pay two rupees eight annas; (F) Each pilgrim for bathing the deity with ganga water should pay one rupee four annas; (G) For presents made to the deity in cash or kind, gold or silver or metals and presents of cotton and silk clothing which are placed on the Shakti by the pilgrims and worshippers should be dealt with the matter stated below :"all the above income would first be credited entirely to the temple account. At the end of each month, the Badu sevaks would get half and the remaining half would remain with the trustees on behalf of the deity. Out of the fruit offered to the deity by the pilgrims half was to come to the temple and the other half would go to the Panda of the pilgrims. "if a comparison is made between the terms of compromise and the reliefs claimed in the suit, it would appear that the terms of compromise were beyond the pleadings in the suits. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Bhaja Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei reported in AIR 1980 Orissa 107. This Court in the said decision held that rejection of compromise petition merely because the petition included matters which did not relate to the suit was invalid. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Bhaja Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei reported in AIR 1980 Orissa 107. This Court in the said decision held that rejection of compromise petition merely because the petition included matters which did not relate to the suit was invalid. In such a case proper course for the Court was to recite the compromise as a whole in the decree or in the form of a schedule to the decree for the purposes of references, but to restrict the operative portion of the decree to the subject-matter which related to the suit. In the case of Chandrasekhar Patel v. Ukiabati patel, AIR 1977 Orissa 82, this Court held as follows :"according to Order 23, Rule 3, C. P. C. it is the adjustment or compromise of the suit before the Court that has to be recorded and a decree has to be passed according to it. Any reference in the compromise to matters extraneous to the suit would be an agreement and not a compromise in the suit and the proper thing for the parties in such circumstances is to enforce the agreement by a separate suit. Thus, where the terms of compromise regarding partition of the movable and immovable properties of the defendant did not relate to the suit, such terms can only be enforced by a separate suit and. not by execution. "in view of the above decisions, only course open for the Badu Sevaks or the Trust Board to give effect to the compromise decree is by way of filing a suit and not by passing a resolution as has been done in this case. The principles laid down in the aforesaid two decisions are squarely applicable to the present cases. The terms of compromise in the suit of the year 1949 are outside the purview of the suit as is evident from the pleadings and prayer made in the suit. Therefore, I am in agreement with the learned Counsel Sri Mohanty arid Sri Dash that such compromise decree could not be given effect to by way of resolution and separate civil suit should be filed by either of the parties to the compromise to give effect to the same. Therefore, I am in agreement with the learned Counsel Sri Mohanty arid Sri Dash that such compromise decree could not be given effect to by way of resolution and separate civil suit should be filed by either of the parties to the compromise to give effect to the same. In view of the above it can safely be said that attempt of the Trust Board to give effect to the compromise decree by way of passing a resolution dated 11-11-91 is illegal and inoperative. ( 13 ) THERE is no dispute at the Bar that the rights of the parties as claimed can only be decided by the competent authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments act and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the cases. Reference may also be made, in this connection, to a decision of this Court in the case of Brundaban samartha v. Shiba Saartha reported in (1999) 88 Cut 87 : (AIR 1999 Orissa 185 ). In the aforesaid decision, the dispute relates to the right to sell of "ghee Dipa" of Lingaraj temple. This Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute and direction was issued to move the appropriate forum. Since it is the competent authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious endowments Act which can decide the inter se claim of the parties with regard to apportionment of the offerings made to Lord lingaraj, I have neither entered into the respective rights of the parties argued at length nor I have expressed any opinion with regard to their rights. It is open for the parties to approach the appropriate forum to establish their rights. ( 14 ) HAVING held that the suit is not hit by Section 73 of the Orissa Hindu Religious endowments Act and is maintainable and having further held that the Trust Board had no legal authority to implement the- compromise decree by way of a resolution and that the resolution dated 11-11-91 is illegal and inoperative, all the appeals succeed. I, therefore, allow all the appeals, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court and confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Appeals allowed.