JUDGMENT Malay Kumar Basu, J. This revisional application is directed against the G.R. case No. 2550 of 1992 (T.R. 344 of 1992) under sections 419/420 of the IPC pending before the 12th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta challenging the order dt. 9.6.1998 passed by the learned 12th Metropolitan Magistrate in that case. The case of the petitioner in brief is that he is employed under the CBI as stenographer Gr. D since 25th May, 1973 and he got this appointment through the Employment Exchange, Calcutta wherein his name was registered as Scheduled Cast candidate on his own declaration. At the time of his .appointment he has not instructed by his employer to produce any Scheduled Cast Certificate. After appointment to the said post on 20.5.1973 the petitioner was asked to fill up the Attestation Form at Column No. 9B he declared himself as Scheduled Cast, sub-cast being Poundra and this Attestation Form was sent to the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas(S) at Alipur for verification who returned who returned the same with attestation to the C.B.I., Calcutta, categorically stating, that there is no objection to the appointment of the candidate. On the basis of this report of the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas(S), the petitioner was confirmed in his service and became a prominent Government servant. Subsequently a pseudonymous complain was received by his appoint authority to the effect that the petitioner did not belong to the Scheduled Cast as declared by him and in view of this complaint an enquiry was held by the departmental authority and ultimately a departmental proceeding was initiated by his disciplinary authority in Feb. 1988. The allegations against him were that he committed gross misconduct on 28.6.1973 when he falsely declared-in his attestation form that he belonged to the Scheduled Cast being a member of this sub-cast Poundra and this declaration was made by him only to justify his act of obtaining employment of false declaration as to his cast since the post in which he was appointed was deserved for Scheduled Cast candidate. During the Departmental Enquiry four witnesses were cited by the prosecuting officer and out of them only two were examined. After the said enquiry was completed the Enquiry Officer submitted an enquiry report dt. 5.1.1989 to the effect that the charge levelled against the petitioner had not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. During the Departmental Enquiry four witnesses were cited by the prosecuting officer and out of them only two were examined. After the said enquiry was completed the Enquiry Officer submitted an enquiry report dt. 5.1.1989 to the effect that the charge levelled against the petitioner had not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. But despite such a report of the Enquiry Officer the CBI authorities started the instant police case in the year 1992 on the selfsame allegation and that case has been registered as G.R. Case No. 2550/92 under sections 419/420 of the IPC which is still pending before the said Court of Metropolitan Magistrate. After completion of investigation in that case the prosecuting agency of the CBI submitted charge-sheet on 2.7.1992 and the copies of the document relied upon by them were supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner after perusing such copies came to understand that the prosecuting agency had deliberately suppressed certain documents which could have revealed the truth, namely, (a) Enquiry Report and finding of the Enquiry Officer along with its enclosures and (b) depositions of the PW.1 Netai Ch. Ghosh Katu (since deceased). On 21.1.1997 the petitioner filed a petition praying for an order discharging him from this case and the learned Metropolitan Magistrate after hearing both sides rejected the prayer by his order dated 9.6.1998. Being aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied with the continuance of the said proceedings of G.R. Case No. 2550 of 1992 (T.R. 344/92) and also the said order of the Magistrate dt. 9.6.1998 he has preferred this revisional application challenging the order as illegal and erroneous and praying for an order setting aside the same and quashing the entire proceeding itself for the reason that the same is an abuse of the process of the court and is harassive in nature. The grounds on which such a relief has been sought by the petitioner are that the allegations which have given rise to the present proceedings also laid to the institution of the Departmental Enquiry mentioned above and since in that Departmental Enquiry, the Enquiry Officer has after holding the enquiry found that the allegations against the petitioner had not been established, the proceedings pending before this court and based upon the self-same materials will therefore be for the same reason incapable of being substantiated. Secondly, the proceedings being protracted is going to deprive the petitioner of his right to speedy trial as has been guaranteed by the Constitution of India through Article 21 the same are liable to be quashed on that score alone. Thirdly, in view of the decision reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 897 (P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar) since the charges in the departmental proceedings have not been established and the criminal proceedings in question being instituted on the selfsame allegations and since the standard of prove required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of prove required to establish the guilt in a departmental proceeding, the question of furnishing prove of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will be a far cry. 2. Mr. Milan Mukherjee, the learned Advocate, for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the Central Bureau of Investigation is a creature of the statute and has come into being on the basis of the Delhi police Special Establishment Act, 1946 as an independent Investigating Agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Govt. of India and in the charge-sheet an averment has been made that the petitioner had allegedly created the Central Bureau of Investigation and in view of such a charge it becomes pertinent to question whether a juristic personality can at all be cheated. Mr. Mukherjee draws my attention to the definition given in the section 415 of the IPC of the offence of cheating as follows. "Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act and/or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'. According to Mr. Mukherjee, from a perusal of this section it becomes apparent that the person cheated or deceived has been described as "he", the word "he" has left no room for doubt that the victim of offence of cheating is one who can be referred to as 'he'. Mr. According to Mr. Mukherjee, from a perusal of this section it becomes apparent that the person cheated or deceived has been described as "he", the word "he" has left no room for doubt that the victim of offence of cheating is one who can be referred to as 'he'. Mr. Mukherjee further contends that section 8 of the IPC defines the word "gender" by laying down that the person 'he' and its derivatives are used of any person whether male or female. Further, section 11 of the IPC defines the term 'person' as follows. "The word 'person' includes any company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or not". Mr. Mukherjee contends that thus it is apparent that though the pronoun 'he' is included within the ambit of 'person' as provided under section 11 of the Indian Penal Code, a company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not cannot come within the definition of 'gender’, even though the same comes under the definition of the term 'person'. His further contention is that the term 'person' is illustrative and not exhaustive as provided under section 11 of the IPC, but by no stretch of imagination can the terms 'person' and 'gender' be equated to be the same and while the term 'gender' is included in the term 'person', a company or association, though included within the term 'person', cannot be included within the term 'he'. The long and short of the above argument boils down to the position, according to Mr. Mukherjee, that the Central Bureau of Investigation which is a juristic personality cannot be described with the term 'he' and as such cannot be treated as a victim of the offence of cheating in view of the term 'he' having been used in section 415 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Mukherjee argues that the person to be cheated under section 415/420 of the IPC must be such as one who can be 'induced' that is persuaded and it is sheer common sense that only a living being, if not only a human being, can be subject of or subjected to inducement or persuasion and in order to deceive or to be deceived the deceiver or the deceived must also be a living creature, if not only a human being, who can be misled or be subjected to misrepresentation resulting in deception and consequential cheating. 3. 3. But, I am afraid, I am not impressed by the above train of reasoning advanced by Mr. Mukherjee. To say that the word 'person' cannot go beyond the pronoun 'he' or 'she' would be far-fetched and going beyond the intention of the makers of the law. As has been pertinently argued by Mr. Ranjan Roy, the learned Advocate, for the CBI, the definition given of the word 'person' in section 11 of the IPC or in sub-section (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to the effect, "person includes any Company or Association or body of individuals whether incorporate or not." is an inclusive definition and the term 'includes' is interpreted in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the word or phrase and it cannot limit itself to simply Companies, Associations or bodies of persons, but it is bound to include within its fold all other pronouns like it, they, he, she, etc. Mr. Roy has rightly contended that had it been the intention of the legislature to limit the definition of the term 'person' in such a fashion, that is, to 'he' and 'she', then it would have been provided in clear language in the statute that 'person' means 'he' or 'she', but that is not the case in the definition. So such a meaning or interpretation cannot be incorporated, informed or imposed. 4. The next contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the FIR was lodged by 'source' and the Superintendent of Police registered the case and the date of occurrence as given in the FIR was 1973, but there was no explanation for the delay of about 18 years in registering the case. Mr. 4. The next contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the FIR was lodged by 'source' and the Superintendent of Police registered the case and the date of occurrence as given in the FIR was 1973, but there was no explanation for the delay of about 18 years in registering the case. Mr. Mukherjee contends that the S. P. was not a competent officer to register the FIR, neither he could handover the same to the Inspector, CBI in view of the provisions of section 154 of the Cr.P.C. which runs as follows: "Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and he read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence." 5. According to Mr. Mukheljee, under this section the Officer-in-Charge of a police station is the only competent officer who can register a case and who can reduce the same into writing and even though the Superintendent of Police is a superior officer in view of section 36 of the Cr.P.C., in view of judgment-law, that section 36 of the Code has no manner of application and the same can only be attracted after the case is registered by the Officer-in-Charge of a police station. As against this, the contention of Mr. Roy, is that in view of sub-section (3) of section 2 and sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Delhi Special police Establishment Act, 1946 members of t:1e police establishment of the above rank of Sub-Inspector were empowered to exercise the power of the Officer-in-Charge of a police station in the area in which they are appointed and when exercising such power they shall be deemed to be the Officer-in-Charge of the police stations discharging the functions of such an officer within the limits of its station and by virtue of such power a Superintendent of police who is above the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police as the Officer-in-Charge was empowered to register the crime and entrust the same with any other officer above the rank of Sub-Inspector to investigate and such officer while conducting the investigation enjoys of the powers of investigation including filing of charge-sheet or police report within the meaning of section 173 and section 190 of the Code. According to Mr. Roy, there was neither any irregularity nor any illegality in the Superintendent of police registering the crime arid making over the case to the Inspector of police to conduct the investigation. Mr. Mukherjee does not give any reply to this submission of Mr. Roy and I do not find it totally unworthy of reliance. Be that as it may, my view is that even if there is any such irregularity of formal nature, even then that should not be treated as incurable. 6. The other part of the above contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the FIR has been drawn up showing 'source' as the complainant in the instant case. According to him, a 'source' is a nameless creature whose whereabouts cannot be ascertained and in the event the investigation ends in a final report, whereby the accused person may be discharged, the trial court will be placed in a quandary, because that court is required to send a notice to the complainant for his appearance, but since the complainant is a nameless person, such a complaint cannot be acted upon and from that point of view also the prosecution cannot be maintainable under the law and must be quashed. Under section 125 of the Evidence Act no Magistrate or a police officer shall be compelled to say wherefrom he got information as to the commission of any offence. Mr. Roy contends that 'source' as a 'source' for information to enable the Investigating Agency to register the crime and to investigate is not a concept strange to the criminal law, nor such a course can be termed as impermissible under the law. In my view the word 'source' having occurred in the FIR it will not be appropriate to say that it is meant to be the complainant. The complainant for all practical purposes will be the Superintendent of Police. Mr. R.C. Arora who registered the case and entrusted the same to the Inspector, C.B.I. for investigation. Simply because in the relevant column meant for the name of the complainant the word 'source' has been written inadvertently, it will be absurd to take such an abstract idea as the author of the complaint. 7. Still another contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that in the Departmental Enquiry the allegations against this employee and he having been exonerated of all the charges the continuance of this criminal case against him would place him under the double jeopardy and from that point of view this criminal prosecution is untenable under the law. 8. But this argument is without any force. The question of double jeopardy can arise only when there are two criminal proceedings on the self-same allegation or in other words the accused is subjected to prosecution for the second time in respect of the same allegations against him. Article 20(2) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once or the provisions of section 300 of the Cr. P.C. which provides that once a person is tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence, shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which the different charge from the one made against him, might have been made or for which he might have been convicted. Thus, as argued by Mr. Thus, as argued by Mr. Roy, in order to constitute double jeopardy in the sense in which the above safeguards of the law have been indicated it is required that there must be a prosecution, irrespective of whether it ends in or not punishment for the same offence twice carried on before a court of competent jurisdiction. The prosecution in a departmental proceeding for misconduct which ended in the department failing to bring home the charge and a criminal prosecution conducted by police in which a charge-sheet has been submitted are different in nature. In the departmental proceeding the question before the Enquiry Officer was whether there was misconduct on the part of the employee concerned, but in the criminal proceeding, it is a question whether the accused-petitioner has committed the offence of cheating by personation, an offence under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the petitioner cannot be subjected to both departmental proceeding and the criminal prosecution for the same alleged acts is of no avail. 9. Mr. Roy has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector, Customs, Bombay & Anr. vs. L.R. Melwani & Anr., reported in AIR 1970 SC 962 , wherein it has been laid down that in order to claim benefit of section 300 or Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India it would be necessary for the accused to establish that he had been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and he has convicted or acquitted of that offence and the said conviction or acquittal is in force and if that much is established, it can be contended that he is not liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts or enable to offence for which a different charge for the one made against him might have made for which he might have been convicted. It has been further held herein that adjudication before a Collector of Customs is not a prosecution, nor the Collector of Custom is a court and, inasmuch as, the proceeding before the Collector of Customs was not a criminal trial, his verdict was not one of acquittal to claim for quashing of criminal prosecution. It has been further held herein that adjudication before a Collector of Customs is not a prosecution, nor the Collector of Custom is a court and, inasmuch as, the proceeding before the Collector of Customs was not a criminal trial, his verdict was not one of acquittal to claim for quashing of criminal prosecution. It has been further observed that it was required of the accused to establish that in a previous lawful trial before a competent court he had score a verdict of acquittal which was binding on the prosecutor. Mr. Roy argues that the decision before the Enquiry Officer on the question of misconduct might be binding between the parties to the said proceedings, but in no case could it be said that it entitled the petitioner to claim for a discharge and at best it could be a defence to be adopted at the trial and nothing more. The Enquiry Officer not being a court of competent jurisdiction the benefit of Article 20(2) of the Constitution nor of section 300 of the Cr.P.C. could be available to the petitioner. It is needless to point out that I have absolutely nothing to differ with this salutary verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of such principles being well settled the contention of Mr. Mukherjee is absolutely without any force. 10. As regards the judgment reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 897 (P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar) it is the reply of Mr. Roy that those findings will not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In view of the discussion made above and also in view of the further reason that charge of misconduct being enquired into by the departmental authority of the CBI and the charge of an offence under the IPC, namely, cheating by personation etc. being investigated into by police constitute two different and distinct and parallel set up. The CBI had initiated investigation on the basis of information and on the basis of materials collected, charge-sheet had been submitted and the materials so collected by the CBI were distinct from those of the departmental proceedings. 11. The last argument of Mr. being investigated into by police constitute two different and distinct and parallel set up. The CBI had initiated investigation on the basis of information and on the basis of materials collected, charge-sheet had been submitted and the materials so collected by the CBI were distinct from those of the departmental proceedings. 11. The last argument of Mr. Mukherjee is that there has been inordinate delay in the matter of filing of the criminal case and there has been no explanation for such a delay and on this court the criminal prosecution should be nipped in the bud. In this connection Mr. Roy had relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 962 which lays down that a complaint cannot be thrown out on the sole ground of delay and the question of delay in filing of the complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at a final verdict, but by itself it affords no ground for dismissing the complaint. Mr. Roy also relies upon, in this respect, another ruling reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 175. In my view such a question whether prosecution should be disbelieved for the delay in filing of the complaint is a mixed question of fact and law and without holding the trial this point cannot be determined and it will be pre-judging, if before the trial in respect of case is commenced and before the versions of both the parties are taken on this question, the whole prosecution is thrown away by an order of quashment. 12. In view of the entire discussion made above, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee cannot be accepted and as a result I find no merit in this revisional application and accordingly, the same be dismissed. 13. All interim orders, if any, be vacated. 14. The office is directed to communicate this judgment and order to the court below forthwith. 15. Xerox certified copies, if applied for by any party, may be supplied without delay. Revisional application dismissed.