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2002 DIGILAW 726 (CAL)

Manowara Begum v. Sd. Bazle Kader Siddiki

2002-12-11

Malay Kumar Basu

body2002
JUDGMENT Malay Kumar Basu, J. These two revisional applications being between the same parties and involving common questions of law and fact have been heard analogously and taken up together for disposal. This single judgment will govern both of them. The C.R.R. 203/02 has been filed by Syed Bazle Kader Siddiki (hereinafter referred to as the Husband) against Manowara Begum. O.P. No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the Wife) and against the State of West Bengal, the O. P. No.2. The C. R. R. 306/02 has been filed by Manowara Begum the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the Wife) against Syed Bazle Kader Siddiki, the O. P. No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the Husband) and the State of West Bengal as O. P. No.2. In the C. R. R. 203/02 the case of the petitioner-Husband is that the Wife-Manowara Begum was married by him according to the Muslim Rites on 10th March, 1985 and at the time of the marriage the father of the Wife offered gold ornaments worth of Rs. 60,000/- together with the cash of Rs. 65,000/- and some gold rings and other articles to the Husband. The dower money was settled to the tune of Rs. 10,001/-. Since after the marriage the parties enjoyed their conjugal life for a certain period and the marriage was consummated, but due to some reasons he gave talak to the O. P. No.1-Wife and thus the marital tie between them was dissolved and thereafter the Wife filed an application under section 3(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 claiming compensation along with the dower money to the tune of Rs. 144,501/- coupled with a claim for reasonable and fair provisions of maintenance during the Iddat period as well as for the subsequent period. It was alleged by her in that application that this husband used to earn a sum of Rs. 7000/- per month and in addition to that he had earning to the tune of Rs. 3000/- per month from his agricultural land. Her further statement was that she had no income and she was being maintained by her father. The husband contested that application denying all the material allegations. 7000/- per month and in addition to that he had earning to the tune of Rs. 3000/- per month from his agricultural land. Her further statement was that she had no income and she was being maintained by her father. The husband contested that application denying all the material allegations. He also took the plea that the parents of the wife by practising fraud upon him gave this O. P. No.1 in marriage with him in stead of their another daughter with whom the proposal for marriage was actually made and from that point of view the registration of marriage became void since the wife did not accept or consent to that marriage with the petitioner-Husband. He gave money and ornaments to the wife as described in the schedule of his written objection and those were not returned by the wife to him and therefore, he took the plea that the said application of the wife under the said Act was liable to be dismissed with cost. According to him the learned Magistrate without property considering the evidence on record passed an order dated 22nd December, 2000 allowing the said Misc. case and wrongly directed him to return 20 to-llas of gold ornaments or its equivalent cash and to pay of Rs. 65,000/-. 2. Being aggrieved by that order of the learned Magistrate the husband preferred a revisional application before the Sessions Judge, Hooghly which was numbered as Criminal Motion No. 34/2001 and it was ultimately heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hooghly and he also dismissed the motion and affirmed the impugned order of the learned Magistrate with the modification that the wife would not be entitled to any allowance to the tune of Rs.1500/- per month since 25th July, 1989 till her remarriage. 3. Being aggrieved thereby again the husband has preferred this revisional application under sections 401/397 read with section 482 of the Cr. P. C. challenging the said order of the court below as erroneous, illegal, improper and liable to be set aside. 4. 3. Being aggrieved thereby again the husband has preferred this revisional application under sections 401/397 read with section 482 of the Cr. P. C. challenging the said order of the court below as erroneous, illegal, improper and liable to be set aside. 4. The wife on the other hand has also preferred a reivisional application being C. R. R. No. 306/02 against the said order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge her case is that as per section 3(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 the husband is to pay fair maintenance for the Iddat period and this petitioner-wife has been claiming such maintenance for the Iddat period when the O. P. -Husband is silent over that point. So the O. P.-Husband having not yet paid any fair amount by way of maintenance for the Iddat period is liable to pay the same to her since she has not yet remarried and she has stated that she has no income to maintain herself. From the evidence it was clear that the O. P. -Husband's father had ownership of two Petrol Pumps, two Oil Tankers and one Bus and thus the petitioner being a son of such a rich person has got sufficient means to pay the money due to her. Hence this petitioner-wife has filed this revisional application in order to get the impugned order of the court below modified to the extent that the said order should get effect from the date of application instead of from the date of order. 5. In C.R. R. 203/02 that is the revisional application filed by the husband, Mr. Basu, learned Counsel for the wife has argued that the petition being a second revision against the concurrent findings of the two courts below cannot be legally maintainable in view of section 397(3) Cr. P. C. According to him section 482 of the Code will not be applicable here. This section provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Mr. This section provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Mr. Basu contends that the expression "as may be necessary" occurring under this section is highly significant and in the first place, this tends to distinguish the provision of this section from those of section 397. Section 397 presents a positive law while section 482 is for all practical purposes a negative law. Secondly, this section is mainly preventive in nature and its object is to prevent the abuse the process of the court meaning thereby that it would apply when a proceeding is pending before a court and not when it is disposed of, an order having already been passed therein. Lastly, the question of applying the provisions of the section is a concern for the High Court only, when it will find it necessary to deal with the said provisions. In other words, when High Court will find that it is not permissible to go to revise any order under section 397, it will invoke its extraordinary power under section 482. That is to say, in order to apply these provisions the High Court has to exercise its extraordinary powers only when there is an emergency of an extraordinary nature and it is not meant to be exercised as an ordinary or automatic process of law. Mr. Basu further contends that section 399(3) of the Code specifically bars the filing of a second revision by providing that where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon on revision to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other court. According to Mr. Basu what is specifically prohibited under section 399(3) or for that matter, section 397(3) Cr. According to Mr. Basu what is specifically prohibited under section 399(3) or for that matter, section 397(3) Cr. P. C. cannot be done through back door by taking resort to the provisions of section 482 and in support of a petitioner under section 482 something more than scrutiny of legality or propriety is required to exist for the purpose of enabling the Court to entertain such an application. Because the positive assertion of power by High Court requires legal assertion which is correlated to the principles of justice and in this way section 482 cannot be taken as an universal panacea for covering all and sundry cases, but on the other hand, it is a law for the court and not a law for the party and it can never be substitute for section 397 Cr. P. C: Accordingly to Mr. Basu section 482 can be invoked only when the three eventualities as mentioned above take place and the prohibition under section 399(3) cannot be circumvented by taking recourse to section 482 which is not a procedural law. To be more specific, Mr. Basu argues, wrong appreciation of evidence cannot be remedied under section 482. He cites a good number of reported decisions in support of his contention. They are as follows: (1) 1986 Cal. Criminal Law Reporter (SC) 112 wherein it has been held; that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the questions of fact while dealing with a petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. (2) 1999 S. C. C. (Cri) 1118 wherein it has been held that where it appears to be grave miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of court, section 482 of the Code is attracted. (3) 1997 S. C. C. (Cri) 544 (paragraphs 7 & 8) wherein the Apex Court held that the High Court should exercise such a power under section 482 very sparingly and cautiously where failure of justice, failure of judicial mechanism or procedure and abuse of the process of court have taken place. It was further held that merely by filing a petition a party could not obtain an order from the High Court under this section and it cannot be claimed as a means of automatic exercise of right. It was further held that merely by filing a petition a party could not obtain an order from the High Court under this section and it cannot be claimed as a means of automatic exercise of right. (4) 1995 SCC (Cri) 634 wherein it has been held that a High Court cannot adjudicate on question of facts or invoke assessment off acts and unless there is a case that miscarriage of justice has taken place such petition is not tenable under this section. 6. According to Mr. Basu all the grounds adverted to by the petitioner-Husband in this revisional application under consideration relate to factual aspects and assessment of evidence which cannot be gone into by the High Court in a petition under section 482. Moreover, according to him, these grounds were not taken before the court below while the first revision was being heard and they are raising such grounds before this court in the second revision for the first time and this fact renders such a revisional application untenable in the eye of law. 7. Mr. Srivastava, learned Advocate for the petitioner-Husband in this case (C.R.R. 203/02) on the other hand has contended that the Apex Court has never ruled that there is any absolute bar against filing of a second revision under section 482 Cr. P. C. To prevent the abuse of the process of the court or miscarriage of justice the provisions of this section can very well be resorted to. Mr. _ Srivastava frankly admits that he cannot ask for re-appreciation of evidence in this application but he is fully at liberty to dwell upon the questions of law involved. According to him such a second revision is quite permissible under the law in order to remedy a glaring and gross mistake committed by the courts below in appreciating the evidence properly and also to provide a redress against the miscarriage of justice emanating from such errors committed by the courts below. In support of his contention he refers to a couple of judicial pronouncement as follows: (1) 1997 SCC (Cri) 544 wherein three Judges Bench of the Apex Court has held that a second revision is maintainable and there is no absolute bar against its institution and where the courts consider that there has been any miscarriage of justice or some flagrant error of law was committed, such a revision can be admitted. (2) 2002 AIR SCW 2657 wherein it has been held that second revision is maintainable, but however it has been enjoined there that it is the duty of the High Court to see if on merits it will be justified to depart from the view taken by both the courts below. 8. Giving careful thought and consideration to the arguments advanced by both and while appreciating the niceties and subtleties underlying the analysis that is made by Mr. Basu of the object and purport of section 482 Cr. P. C, I am constrained to hold that the latest trend in this regard has been set by a number of recent decisions of the Apex Court as discussed above [1999 SCC(Cri) 1118 and 1997 SCC (Cri) 544 and 1999 SCC (Cri) 77] to the effect that power under section 482 is not a substitute of section 397 Cr. P. C. which are to be invoked on certain set principles and there cannot be any absolute bar on the filing of a second revisional application before the High Court and such a second revision will be permissible in extraordinary circumstances where gross error of law or glaring perversity in the appreciation of evidence has taken place in order to prevent the abuse of the process of court or the miscarriage of justice. 9. Thus as per the latest settled position, " if a case falls within the fold of section 482, the prohibition under sections 397 and 399 will not be attracted and if an order is palpably an abuse of the process of the court or manifestly illegal, irregular or improper or perverse or without jurisdiction, then certainly it requires interference to secure the ends of justice and the provisions of section 482 can very well be invoked by the High Court in such a case where the petitioner's case has suffered dismissal in both the courts below." (Vide my judgment dated 3.12.02 pages 4 & 5 passed in C. R. R. 1875/2001 (Swapan Kumar Singha vs. Soua Rani Singha). 10. 10. From this point of view the questions raised in this revisional application indicating, as claimed by the petitioner, a gross miscarriage of justice emanating from the failure of both the courts below to properly appreciate the evidence on record and to come to a correct finding can, in my considered view, form a subject-matter of challenge before this court under the provisions of section 482 Cr. P. C., although the second revision under section 397 against such order may not be permissible. In other words, so far as the question of legal maintainability of this application under section 482 Cr. P. C. is concerned, I am of the considered opinion that the answer should be in the affirmative. This court has the competence to enter into the factual question in order to ascertain whether there has been any perversity in the conclusions drawn by the courts below. 11. So far as the merits of the matter are concerned, it is the contention of Mr. Srivastava that the case of the Wife that cash and gold ornaments were given to the Husband, but the same have not been returned to her by the Husband has not been established. According to Mr. Srivastava, as per the case made out by the Wife herself the Husband has no liability, inasmuch as, if the said things (cash and gold ornaments etc.) were given to the Husband as alleged, then there cannot be any question of her taking the same back from the Husband, because those things have been given to the Husband and were meant for him and not for the Wife. I do not find much substance in this contention. Whatever was given at the time of marriage by way of gift for the wife or by the relations of the Wife for all practical purposes belonged to the Wife. May be, the Husband being the male member and the Karta of the family such valuable articles were given not to the Wife straightaway but in the hands of the Husband as a representative of the Wife. This should not be interpreted to mean that those valuable articles or cash were actually intended to be given to the Husband. May be, the Husband being the male member and the Karta of the family such valuable articles were given not to the Wife straightaway but in the hands of the Husband as a representative of the Wife. This should not be interpreted to mean that those valuable articles or cash were actually intended to be given to the Husband. On the other hand for all intent and purpose those things were given for the enjoyment and well being of the Wife and the Husband was to be treated as a mere custodian of such properties. 12. The second contention of Mr. Srivastava is that the learned Magistrate as well as the 1st revisional court committed mistake by relying upon the contents of the letters (Ext. 4 series), inasmuch as it was the case of the Husband that his mother being illiterate could not write and these letters were not actually written by her and for the further reason that no explanation was forthcoming from the Wife as to how and wherefrom she got such letters, particularly when such letters were not posted but were received by her through some messenger. The further contention of Mr. Srivastava is that these letters having not been produced or shown before her mother when she was as a witness and her answer having not been taken on the question whether such letters had been written by herself, the value and weight to be attached to such letters have become practically nil and in view of violation of the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act these letters ought not to have been admitted into evidence and once they were admitted into evidence, they ought to have been expugned. 13. I am not impressed by these arguments of Mr. Srivastava. As per the provisions of the Evidence Act a written document is to be formally proved before being admitted into evidence exhibited. Such formal proof of the contents of the documents may be furnished by the writer of that document himself or by any other person who acquainted with the handwriting of the maker of this document. Here the letters some of which purporting to be in the handwriting of the mother of the Husband and some in the hand writing of the Husband himself have been formally proved by the P. W. I Manowara Begum, the petitioner-wife herself of Misc. Here the letters some of which purporting to be in the handwriting of the mother of the Husband and some in the hand writing of the Husband himself have been formally proved by the P. W. I Manowara Begum, the petitioner-wife herself of Misc. Case No. 117/89 on the plea that she knows the handwriting of her Husband and the other writers. Thus in her re-examination she has stated (Vide page 7 of her depositions) that the two letters (which have been marked as Ext. 4 & 4/2) was written by her mother-in-law to her father and the handwriting of the mother-in-law is known to her. Similarly in respect of the other letters (Ext. 4/1 to 4/6) she has stated that the Exts. 4/1 and 4/4 were written by Syed Manwar Hossain who was the brother-in-law of her Husband and she knew his handwriting. Similarly she has stated that the letters (Ext. 4/3, 4/5 and 4/6) were written by her Husband whose handwriting she knows. Coming to her cross-examination it is found that save and except certain mere suggestions to the contrary these statements of the P. W. 1 remained practically unshaken. She has stated that she knows the handwriting of the writers of these letters who are her Husband, her mother-in-law and her Husband's brother-in-law. It is not believable that she would not know the handwriting of such persons with whom she has been so close. It is suggested from the side of the O. P that her mother-in-law is an illiterate person and cannot sign which suggestion she has denied. When the circumstances are found to lend support to her (PW.1's) claim, a mere suggestion to the contrary cannot be taken to be sufficient for the purpose of discarding her positive evidence as unworthy of belief, particularly when no positive evidence from the side of the O. P. is forthcoming to show their allegation that the mother of the O. P was not the auther of these two letters Exts. 4 & 4/2 as she was an illiterate lady and could not write or sign. It has been argued 'by Mr. 4 & 4/2 as she was an illiterate lady and could not write or sign. It has been argued 'by Mr. Srivastava that even after such a suggestion was given to the P. W.1, the petitioner did not consider it necessary to place that letter before the said lady, Fazela Khatun, the mother-in-law of the petitioner, when she came to the witness box to depose on behalf of the O. P. (O.P.W. 2). In this connection Mr. Srivastava has argued with great vehemence that such contents of letters (Ext. 4 & 4/2) will have no evidentiary value because of the fact that those were not shown to her while she was being cross-examined and thereby the omission is hit by section 145 of the Evidence Act under which it is required that the witness must make a contrary statement to what he or she made earlier and it is only then that he would be confronted with his previous statement. The object is to give him a chance of explaining the discrepancy or inconsistency regarding a particular relovant point. But on a careful perusal of the statements made by this witness (O. P. W. 2), the mother of the husband, I find that she has only stated that it is not true that Manowara's father gave cash of Rs. 65,000/- and gold ornaments weighing 20 bharis at the time of marriage of Manowara, but she has never stated that she did not write any such letter to that person demanding from his such money or things. Unless she contradicts these contents of such letters, question of showing the letters to her or taking her views thereon does not arise, or, the provisions of section 145 are not attracted. If that be so, no question of discrepancy or contradiction is arising here. The documents in question, namely, four letters, were already admitted into evidence and marked exhibits on being formally proved and without any objection being raised from the side of the O. P. So it was for the O. P. to place this document before that witness for the purpose of taking her views thereon, and not for the petitioner to do so, the documents having already been marked Exts. on his behalf. But from the side of the O. P. no such attempt was made and as a result the said Exhibits. were not placed before that witness. on his behalf. But from the side of the O. P. no such attempt was made and as a result the said Exhibits. were not placed before that witness. It was for the O. P. to take any version or contrary opinion from the alleged writer of the letter as to the question whether the contents thereof were in her handwriting or in her signature. Section 145 of the Evidence Act would have been offended only if this O. P. W. 2 made statements contrary to the contents of the said letters. So the above contention of Mr. Srivastava rather should be directed against the O. P. himself instead of the petitioner. Moreover, these two letters allegedly written by the mother of the husband-O. P. appear from its very look to be genuine documents, the manner and style of writing bearing no trace of their being manufactured for the purpose of this or any other case and representing rather the expression of a natural flow of the mind of a would be mother-in-law trying to ensure the realisation of their dream, namely a Maruti car and 20 bharis of gold ornaments. Had they been manufactured, as alleged, then they would have been written in a more guarded way. For example, in these two letters she has not given her name at the end or anywhere in ,the letter, but she has finished by giving her identity as 'Bon' that is, "sister", Had it been created by the petitioner for the purpose of litigation, then it was most unlikely that such a scope of confusion would be left. Similarly, the letters written by the Husband's brother-in-law "Chotojamai" (Exbts. 4/1 & 4/A) appear to be free from any infirmity. That writer of these letters is not coming to the witness box at all. It is courious that the O. P. -husband has not examined this vital witness. In the absence of his coming to the dock and denying the handwriting of these two letters to be his, it does not lie in the mouth of the O. P. to question the genuineness of these documents. Another contention advanced by Mr. Srivastava against the aceptability of these letters as genuine is that the P.W.1 while producing these letters does not disclose the source from where she got these letters, when it is not claimed that her father got it from post office. Another contention advanced by Mr. Srivastava against the aceptability of these letters as genuine is that the P.W.1 while producing these letters does not disclose the source from where she got these letters, when it is not claimed that her father got it from post office. But this criticism pales into insignificance when it is considered that the alleged authors of these letters are not coming to deny the handwriting to be of them. 14. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the said argument of Mr. Srivastava that these letters should be expunged and should not have been admitted into evidence. . 15. The question before this Court is if the findings of the courts below on the factual points viz, whether the alleged payment of cash of Rs. 65,000/-, giving of gold ornaments worth Rs. 60,000/- and payment of Denmohor of Rs. 10,000/- by the wife's father to the Husband are based on correct appreciation of evidence or suffer from perversity. 16. It is the criticism of Mr. Srivastava that from the side of the petitioner no direct evidence is adduced in support of the alleged payment of cash of Rs. 65, 000/-. The P. W. 1 says that such money was paid, but she herself did not pay it. Payment was made by her father since deceased. Mr. Srivastava further contends that the P. W. 2 coming to support this story becomes defeated in his cross-examination when he admits that he was not present during such alleged payment and he only heard about the fact of such payment from the mother of the petitioner. But that mother also is not coming to the witness box. The most cogent evidence in this behalf would have been a written receipt, but that has not been filed. 17. It should not be forgotten that in such matters it is difficult to obtain receipts against such payments of money as dowry for obvious reasons. People generally would not allow keeping on record/proof of such unlawful taking of money. Circumstantial evidence in such an exigency would be of greater help. The petitioner has relied upon the contents of some letters (Ext. 4 series) written by the husband and the in-laws, particularly a letter dt. 11.7.1984 written by the husband's brother-in-law (Ext. 4/2) to the father of the wife prior to the taking place of the marriage when negotiations were going on. The petitioner has relied upon the contents of some letters (Ext. 4 series) written by the husband and the in-laws, particularly a letter dt. 11.7.1984 written by the husband's brother-in-law (Ext. 4/2) to the father of the wife prior to the taking place of the marriage when negotiations were going on. It was written therein that the value of a Maruti Car being Rs. 65,000/- would have to be paid to the Husband -O.P. by the addressee (petitioner's father) as per his own undertaking and if he was agreeable to pay this amount, then the marriage would be held within a period of 20 days, otherwise, not. Another letter written by the same person dt. 7.2.1985 (Exbt. 4/4) gives further support to the said letter. This one contains a sentence to the effect that if they were unable to wait for some time, it was better for them to stop going ahead and disperse after taking back the things which had been given by them. About the genuineness and Teliability of these documents I have made a discussion of my satisfaction in the foregoing paragraphs. The ld. Judicial Magistrate has rightly observed that witnesses may lie, but circumstances do not and from such averments and contents of these letters the payment of the money amounting to Rs. 65,000/- appears to have been unerringly proved. In our male-dominated society, as it is well known, taking advantage of the helpless condition of the bride's father the bridegroom party is not expected to grant receipts for the money or various dowries they may take or squeeze from the former wrongfully. It would be unjustified, therefore, to take the extreme view that in the absence of such written receipt such a story of payment of money would not be believed. Eye-witness also may not be available for the same reason. Under such. circumstances, the ld. Magistrate has not committed any error by relying upon the circumstances emerging from the contents of the said letters. Eye-witness also may not be available for the same reason. Under such. circumstances, the ld. Magistrate has not committed any error by relying upon the circumstances emerging from the contents of the said letters. The language of such contents signifies that the bride's parents had no way out, no alternative to such payment of the value of a Maruti Motor Car and this fact being combined with another fact that the marriage between these two was actually held within a short time after such a letter was received by the bride's parents, the conclusion is inescapable that such payment was made by them, otherwise, the marriage would not have taken place at all. (This letter is dt. 7.2.1985 and the marriage between the parties took place on 10.3.1985). Hence I do not find any perversity, any gross mistake on the part of the ld. Magistrate to arrive at his finding from these circumstances or on the part of the ld. Addl. Sessions Judge to accept such a finding as correct. 18. So far as the allegation of gift of gold ornaments worth Rs. 60,000/- is concerned, also the origin of such an agreement has been traced by the ld. Magistrate in the said letters, particularly the Exts. 4/2 and 4/4. The latter, i.e., the Ext. 4/4 goes a step forward and shows that the process of gifting had already been completed by the time, that is, 7th February, 1985, the date of writing of that letter. Regarding the question of payment of amount of Denmohor also there appears to be evidence in abundance. The petitioner-wife (P.W.1) herself says that Rs. 10,001/- was fixed as dower money and the same was paid to the O. P. at the time to marriage. This statement is corroborated by the contents of the Kabilnama (Ext. 5). Moreover, in his evidence the husband O.P. (O.P.W.1) while denying the dower money to be Rs. 10,001/- pleads his loss of memory as to how much was actually paid on this count. 19. So on all these questions of fact that fell for determination before the trial Court and also the Revisional Court below they have arrived at the correct findings and they have also assigned their reasons properly and I do not find any trace of perversity or glaring defect therein and no question of miscarriage of justice arises. 19. So on all these questions of fact that fell for determination before the trial Court and also the Revisional Court below they have arrived at the correct findings and they have also assigned their reasons properly and I do not find any trace of perversity or glaring defect therein and no question of miscarriage of justice arises. Hence there is no scope for this court in this second revision to exercise the extraordinary powers of section 482 Cr. P. C. and to set aside the impugned order. Hence, the impugned order of this revisional application No. 203/2002 will stand affirmed. 20. So far as the other revisional application filed by the Wife, namely, C. R. R. No. 306/02 is concerned, the contention of the Wife is that the order of the trial Court that she was entitled to get maintenance beyond the Iddat period in view of the provisions of section 125 Cr. P. C. ought to have been upheld by the first revisional Court below, but since the ld. Judge has set aside that part of the trial Court's order, the ld. Judge has fallen into grave errors of law. Mr. Basu has relied upon a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2002 Cal. Criminal Law Reporter (SC) 1 in this connection. In this Five-Judges-Bench judgment it has been held as follows: "As held in Shah Banus case the true position is that the divorced wife is able to maintain herself the husbands liability to provide maintenance for her ceased with the expiration of the period of Iddat but if she is unable to maintain herself after the period of Iddat she is entitled to have recourse to section 125 Cr. P. C. Thus it was held that there is no conflict between the provisions of section 125 Cr. P. C. and those of this Muslim Personal Law on this question of the Muslim husband's obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself." 21. A careful reading of the provisions of the Act would indicate that a divorced woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair provisions for maintenance. It has been stated that Parliament seems to intend that the divorced women gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce and therefore the provision indicates that something is provided in the advance for meeting some needs. It has been stated that Parliament seems to intend that the divorced women gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce and therefore the provision indicates that something is provided in the advance for meeting some needs. In other words, at the time of divorce this Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs. Reasonable and fair provision may include provision for the residence before her clothes and other articles. 22. A comparison of those provisions with section 125 Cr. P. C. will make it clear that the requirements provided in section 125 and the purpose, object and scope thereof are to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can do so to support those who are unable to support themselves who have a legitimate claim to support. 23. On a careful reading of the aforementioned judgment of the Apex Court I find that this judgment arose out of several Writ Petitions challenging the legal and Constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 while coming to the conclusion that the provisions of this Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships made certain observations by way of interpreting certain provisions of the Act, particularly the prevision of section 3(1)(a). Relevant portion of Their Lordships findings may be seen in paragraph 36 of the judgment whereunder the conclusions have been summed up. These are as follows: "Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are the principal sections which are under attack before us. Section 3 opens up with a non-obstante clause overriding all other laws and provides that a divorced woman shall be entitled to- (a) a reasonable and fair provisions and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the period of Iddat by her former husband; (b) where she maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable provisions and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children; (c) an amount equal to the sum of moher or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and . (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after the marriage by her relatives, friends, husband and any relatives of the husband or his friends." 24. Thus from these findings it is clear that it is not meant to be the law that whenever there is a petitioner under section 3(1)(a) of the said Act filed by a muslim lady who is divorced and who has not remarried will be entitled to get the benefits of section 125 Cr. P. C. automatically. What is ordained there by way of justification is that the liability of a Muslim-husband to his divorced wife arising under section 3(1) (a) of the said Act is not confined to the Iddat period and reasonable and fair provisions extending beyond the Iddat period must be made by the husband within the Iddat period. 25. In the instant petition under section 3(1)(a) of the said Act there is no specific prayer for any such relief as is available under section 125 Cr. P. C. Even the section 125 is not mentioned there and it is out and out a petition under section 3(1) (a) of the said Act. The ld. Magistrate took up the hearing of this matter but no point was framed for determination to the effect as to whether the benefits or the salutary provisions of section 125 Cr. P. C. will be admissible to his Muslim lady under this petition. No argument was advanced by the ld. Advocates of the parties, particularly the ld. Advocate for the O. P.-husband on this questions as to whether the provisions of section 125 Cr. P. C. were being found applicable to the petitioner of that petition by way of interpretation of section 3(1) (a) of the Act under which this petition was in the lines of the abovementioned judgment of the Apex Court. When this order was passed, that is 22nd December, 2000 this judgment of the Supreme Court did not come into existence. Therefore the findings which the ld. Magistrate arrived at were not only unfounded but also it suffered the infirmity by not being supported by any authority. When this order was passed, that is 22nd December, 2000 this judgment of the Supreme Court did not come into existence. Therefore the findings which the ld. Magistrate arrived at were not only unfounded but also it suffered the infirmity by not being supported by any authority. It is not the ruling of the Apex Court in the abovementioned reported judgment that whenever there is a petition under section 3(1)(a) of the said Act filed by a divorced Muslim woman not having remarried the provisions of section 125 Cr. P. C. would be straightaway applicable. Certainly that is not the position of law as per the abovementioned ruling. Under such circumstances the findings of the Trial Magistrate without being based upon either any evidence in support thereof or any legal principles lending support and strength to such a conclusion certainly not in accordance with law and in that view of the matter it should not be upheld and the ld. Addl. Sessions Judge by exercising his revisional powers rightly set aside that part of his findings. There having been no error of law in such a finding of the Court below I do not find any justification for interfering with' that order in exercise of my powers under section 482 Cr. P. C. Hence the revisional application being C. R. R. 306/ 2002 filed by the wife be dismissed and the impugned order of the revisional Court below be upheld. Similarly, in view of the foregoing reasons the revisional application being C. R. R. 203/2002 filed by the husband be also dismissed and the impugned order of the Revisional Court below be affirmed. 26. As the matter has become pretty old (the original petition for maintenance was filed before the Court of Magistrate as far back as on 25.7.1989), the O. P.-husband be directed to pay his dues, if any, to the wife within a reasonable period as may be fixed by the trial Court below. 27. Interim orders, if any, be vacated. 28. L. C. R. be sent down to the concerned Court below forthwith and office shall submit a compliance report before this court by 18th December, 2002. Both the revisional applications dismissed.