JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J. :- This revision petition arises out of the orders of learned District Judge. Chamba dated November 29. 2001 in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 18 of 2001. 2. Plaintiffs and defendants are the owners of adjacent properties, situated in the town of Chamba. Property of the plaintiff is stuate on Khasra number 3688 which measures 117 sq. yds. 5 sq.ft. The adjoining property of the defendants comprising in various khasra numbers measures 601 sq. ft and 5 q ft. The defendants are constructing reconstructing their building on their land. Plaintiffs filed a suit before the learned trial court for permanent prohibitory injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from raising any construction in front of the residential house/hotel of the plaintiffs and also for mandatory injunction for the demolition of the fourth floor of the building under construction by the defendants. 3. The case of the plaintiffs as disclosed in the plaint was: The plaintiffs have their residential house in the building in question. This house was converted into a hotel known as "Hotel GS" and the hotel is being run for the last more than seven years. The plaintiffs after taking loans from the Banks and friends, spent huge amount on the construction of their hotel "GS". The defendants are now raising the construction on their property. They have raised construction upto three storeys and the fourth storey is under construction. This construction, plead plaintiffs, was approved by the Department of Town and Country Planning. Chamba upto the height of 9.45 mtrs. but the defendants are raising the pillars of the fourth storey and have laid lintel for the same which is in front of the hotel/residence of the plaintiffs. The fourth storey being raised by the defendants is in! violation of the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act. It I is the allegation of the plaintiffs that the defendants have raised their construction upto 13.30 meters in height against the height of 9.45 meters as approved by the Municipal Council and the Department of Town and Country Planning. It is alleged that no space has been left as contemplated under the relevant law. The height of the construction has been raised in excess by 3.55 meters. According to the plaintiffs, the construction of the fourth floor is being raised in a manner that "front view of the hotel GS. It is alleged that no space has been left as contemplated under the relevant law. The height of the construction has been raised in excess by 3.55 meters. According to the plaintiffs, the construction of the fourth floor is being raised in a manner that "front view of the hotel GS. of the plaintiffs, has been completely eclipsed. There is hardly any light and air of the house/hotel of the plaintiffs which has been enjoyed by the plaintiffs as an easement and as of right, the same liave been completely affected". It is the case of the plaintiffs that the building is "quite old". Previously, their existed three storeyed house and that house was converted into a hotel which is "having natural light and air". Plaintiffs, it is pleaded, "having acquired a right of air and light through prescription and easement of necessity over the suit land as disscribed above as the residential house of the plaintiffs is existing on the suit land since 1950". According to the plaintiffs, a notice was served on the defendants by Municipal Council. Chamba on June 23. 2001 regarding violation of the approved plan. Even the Municipal Engineer (Inspection) found that the defendants were carrying on the construction of the fourth floor but defendants did not "heed to the notice and other correspondence of the Municipal Council. Chamba". 4. Along with the suit, an application under Order 39.rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed repeating the allegations in the plaint. It was prayed that the defendants may be restrained from raising the construction of fourth storey of the building and further they be also restrained from raising any kind of construction of"fourth storey till the pendency of the suit". 5. Both the suit and the application for interim relief were resisted by the defendants. The allegations were controverted. Maintainability of the suit was disputed. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs acquired the building by way of gift from one Chhaju Ram on June 28. 1995 and thereafter" raised new construction for hotel purpose and changed the entire building". It is specifically pleaded that earlier, the property of the plaintiffs consisted of three storeys residential house which has been converted into five storeys without getting any approval from the Town and Country Planning Department or the Municipal Council of Chamba. 1995 and thereafter" raised new construction for hotel purpose and changed the entire building". It is specifically pleaded that earlier, the property of the plaintiffs consisted of three storeys residential house which has been converted into five storeys without getting any approval from the Town and Country Planning Department or the Municipal Council of Chamba. On merits, it was pleaded that the hotel "GS" is being run by the plaintiffs only w.e.f. April 26. 1999 on which date, it was registered with the Tourism Department and not for seven years as alleged by the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, the construction being raised by the defendants was approved both by the Town and Country Planning Department as well as Municipal Council. It is denied that pillars were being raised for the fourth storey or any lintel has been laid or intended to be laid for the fourth storey. According to the defendants, the land in question is sloppy and in steps, therefore instead of removing the huge debris from the site, the defendants put first slab on the natural earth and the excavation work was only done for the erection of the RCC columns. It is stated that the construction being raise by the defendants is adjacent to the passage four feet in which on the one side and five feet width on the other side. The plaintiffs themselves have raised construction of their hotel 8.5 feet above the ground level. The defendants maintain that the construction being raised by them is 2.20 mtrs. away from the building of the plaintiffs on one side and 1.60 mtrs. on the other side. It is denied that any light or air has been blocked or curtailed due to the construction by the defendants. The claim of the plaintiffs for easementary rights of light and air is disputed. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs attained the property from Chhaju Ram in gift and in the gift deed, there is no mention about the acquisition of easementary rights over the land of the defendants nor such easementary rights were ever claimed by the predecessor-interest of the plaintiffs. 6. The defendants admitted that notice was received by them from the Municipal Council. 6. The defendants admitted that notice was received by them from the Municipal Council. Chamba which was replied and spot was inspected by the Municipal Engineer of the Municipal Council and thereafter, the defendants were permitted to proceed with their construction work subject to furnishing affidavit to the effect that the defendants will not remove the earth below the RCC slab and will not convert the same into a basement storey and further that the height of the third storey shall be maintained at three meters and the defendants shall put a slopping roof. 7. In reply to the application, defendants maintained that the plaintiffs have not approached the Court with clean hard. The allegations that defendants are raising the fourth floor are incorrect. The construction being raised by the defendants is 2.20 mtrs. away from the building of the plaintiffs and therefore, there is no question of blockade of the air and light to the building of the plaintiffs. The suit, it is submitted, has been filed to harass the defendants. The plaintiffs, it is pleaded, have neither a prima facie case nor the balance of convenience is in their favour. The plaintiffs, it is alleged, got the notice issued from the Municipal Council by their influence but after spot inspection, the Municipal Engineer found the allegations to be false. There were minor variation in the height for which the defendants have already applied for composition at the instance of the Municipal Council. 8. Learned trial Court by his order dated August 13.2001. after noticing the pleadings of the parties, took a view that "no doubt, the respondents have denied the claim of the applicants, but at this stage, it cannot be decided, whether the applicants have acquired the right of light and air by way of prescription and easement of necessary over the suit land. The allegations of the parties cannot be decided at this stage...."The Court observed that no loss shall be caused to the defendants if they are directed to maintain status quo with regard to the new construction being raised by them and. accordingly, directed the respondents to maintain status quo with regard to the construction being raised by them in front of the hotel "GS" till the disposal of the suit. 9. Dis-satisfied. the defendants approached the District Judge in appeal. accordingly, directed the respondents to maintain status quo with regard to the construction being raised by them in front of the hotel "GS" till the disposal of the suit. 9. Dis-satisfied. the defendants approached the District Judge in appeal. The District Judge by his impugned orders maintained the orders of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the plaintiffs have raised " a serious question of fact which needs determination on merit" and the plaintiffs have promptly approached the Court for the redressal of their grievances. Learned District Judge also observed that in case defendants were not restrained from carrying out the construction, which is in violation of the approved plan and the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act and the bye-laws, the plaintiffs who have claimed their easement of light and air will suffer irreparable loss. 10. I have heard Mr. Anand Sharma. learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. N.K. Thakur learned counsel for the respondents. I have also taken through the record by the learned counsel. 11. The first contention of Mr. Sharma is that both the trial Court and the District Judge passed the orders mechanically without going into the plea raised by the defendants and without realizing the "harm such orders will cause to the other side". It is the contention of Mr. Sharma that no foundation for the grant of the relief was laid in the pleading by the plaintiffs. 12. It may be noticed that case of the plaintiffs rests on: (a) the construction being raised by the defendants was in violation to the approved plan by the Department of Town and Country Planning and the Municipal Council as also rules of these Departments governing such construction: (b) the construction being raised by the defendants "in such a manner that front view of the hotel GS of the plaintiffs has been completely eclipsed" and (c) there is hardly any light and air as a result of this construction of the defendants and the light and air of the house/hotel of the plaintiffs which has been enjoyed by the plaintiffs as an easement and as of right has been "completely affected". 13. So far the Easement Rights of the plaintiffs over the land of the defendant is concerned, section 4 of the Indian Easements Act. 13. So far the Easement Rights of the plaintiffs over the land of the defendant is concerned, section 4 of the Indian Easements Act. 1882 defines the easement to be a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do or continue to do something, or to prevent or continue to prevent something being done, in or upon, or in respect of certain other land not his own. The land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists is called the "dominant heritage" and the owner or occupier thereof the "dominant owner", the land on which the liability is imposed is called the servient heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the servient owner. Section 7 stipulates that easements are in the nature of restrictions to the exclusive right of even owner of the immovable property to enjoy and dispose of the same without disturbance by another. Illustration (d) to Section 7 clearly lays down that right of even owner of land to light and air is only to the extent as it pass vertically thereto. Clause (d) rears: "(d) The right of even owner of land is so much light and air as pass vertically thereto". 14. Section 13 provides for the easements of necessity and quasi- easements. Section 15 provide for acquisition of an easement by prescription. Relevant para of Section 15 reads : "When the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith, as an easement, without interruption, and for twenty years. " 15. Now. the plaintiff in his pleading has not laid any foundation either for the easementary rights either by necessity or by prescription. Easement of necessity, under Section 13 of the Act. arises only where by a transfer, bequest or partition, a single tenement is divided into two or more tenements and any of those is situated in a way that it cannot be enjoyed at all without certain privilege on other tenements. Thus the creation of an easement of necessity is an outcome of prior relationship between the tenements. In other words, it has to be pleaded and proved that both the dominant and the servient heritage had common owner and constituted one tenement. Thus the creation of an easement of necessity is an outcome of prior relationship between the tenements. In other words, it has to be pleaded and proved that both the dominant and the servient heritage had common owner and constituted one tenement. It must also be pleaded and established that after the .severance, the dominant tenement could not be used at all without the easement as claimed is absolutely necessary and not merely for reasonable and convenient enjoyment of the property. 16. As noticed earlier, such is not the pleading of the plaintiffs. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that this property for which the easement is claimed and the property of the defendants over which it is claimed, were single unit and after the severance into two units, the property in possession of the plaintiffs could not be used without the easement which is claimed by the plaintiffs over the property of the defendants. 17. So far the easementary rights by prescription is concerned, a bare reading of Section 15 of the Act shown that easement of light and air by prescription can only be claimed for a building which has been peaceably enjoyed with such building as the easement, without interruption and for twenty years. Such is not the case of the plaintiffs. What the plaintiffs state in the plaint is that the construction of the plaintiffs is quite old and raising of the fourth storey by the defendants would eclipse the front view of the hotel GS of the plaintiffs and "there is hardly any light and air as a result of this construction of the defendants".... "which has been enjoyed by the plaintiffs as an easement and as of right". Plaintiffs no where state that they have enjoyed this right of easement, without interruption, for twenty years though in para 11 of the plaint it is stated that" residential house of the plaintiffs is existing on the suit land since 1950". Nevertheless, the fact remains, as stated by the defendants in their written statement, that the property was gifted to the plaintiffs by one Chhaju Ram on June 26. 1995 by a registered gift deed on that, date and plaintiffs had never resided in the said house. It was only in the year 1999 that the residential house was converted into a hotel after adding two more storeys. 18. 1995 by a registered gift deed on that, date and plaintiffs had never resided in the said house. It was only in the year 1999 that the residential house was converted into a hotel after adding two more storeys. 18. In view of the facts noticed above, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that there is no foundation in the .pleadings for the acquisition of easementary right of light and air either by necessity or by prescription is well founded. 19. In Krishna Narayan Agarwal v. Carlton Hotel (P) Ltd.. AIR 1969 S.C. 1105. the Supreme court ruled that to establish the claim under Section 15 of the Easements Act. continuous user for 20 years as of right to do the act complained of in assertion of a title, peaceably and openly must be made out. Thus, the requirement to plead and prove of the easementary rights contemplated under Section 15 of the Act are the same as "nee precario". 20. In the absence of any foundation, in the pleadings, regarding the claim for easementary rights it cannot be said that plaintiffs have either a prima facie case or balance of convenience in their favour. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court erred in concluding that plaintiffs have a prima facie case in their favour. There was neither any foundation in the pleadings nor any material on record to warrant such conclusion. What weighed with the trial Court was according to the opinion of learned trial Judge, no loss shall be caused to the defendants if they are directed to maintain status quo. Similarly, the only reason with the District Judge to uphold the order of the trial Court was: "(a) there is a serious question of fact which needs determination on merits; (b) the plaintiffs have promptly approached the Court. 21. There is not even a whisper how prima facie case and balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs. Both the courts passed the impugned orders without application of mind. 22. This apart, the owner of the dominant tenement obtains a right to so much of it as will suffice for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business according to the ordinary notions of mankind, having regard to the locality and surroundings. Both the courts passed the impugned orders without application of mind. 22. This apart, the owner of the dominant tenement obtains a right to so much of it as will suffice for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business according to the ordinary notions of mankind, having regard to the locality and surroundings. A person claiming easementar rights under Section 15 cannot claim a right to all the light or air which he has enjoyed as pointed out in Bansidhar & Anr. v. Matru Mal & Ors.. AIR 1959 Patna 517. There is no infringement of light unless what is done amounts to nuisance. Lord Atkinson in Jolly v. Kine (1907) A.C.I referring to the decision in Coles v. Home and Colonial Stores 1904 A.C. 179. observed: "It would appear to me that case established the principle that there must be an invasion of the lead right of the owner of the dominant tenement sufficient to amount to a nuisance in order to give him a right of action, and that as long as he receives through the windows of his dwelling-house, or in the case of a particular room in his dwelling - house, through the windows of that room, an amount of light which its use the words of James. L.J.. in Kelk v. Pearson (4) is sufficient according to the ordinary notions of mankind for the comfortable use and enjoyment of his dwelling house, or of the room in it. as the case may be. no nuisances has as regards him been created, and no legal wrong has been inflicted upon him". 23. Observations in Jolly v. Kine were approved in P.C.E. Paul & Anr. v. W. Robson & Ors.. A.I.R. 1914 Privy council. 45. 24. There is material on record, apart from the pleadings of the defendants in terms of the approved plans of the defendants building, to show that the defenants have raised the construction after keeping set backs as reflected in the approved plan. According to the defendants, the construction being raised by them is 2.20 meters on the other side. It is important to note that the plaintiffs did not raise any objection when defendants started reconstruction of their building. According to the defendants, the construction being raised by them is 2.20 meters on the other side. It is important to note that the plaintiffs did not raise any objection when defendants started reconstruction of their building. It was only when the plaintiffs apprehended that the height of the building may obstruct the view of their hotel that the suit was filed alleging that the defendants are raising the fourth storey which will obstruct the view of their hotel, light and air. Had there been no set backs between the two buildings, the plaintiffs would have raised objections when the reconstruction commenced. There is no rebuttal to the assertion of the defendants that they have left a set back of 2.20 meters on one side of the building of the plaintiffs and 1.60 meters on the other side. There is also unrebutted assertion of the defendants that the house of the plaintiffs comprised of three storeys when it was gifted by Chhaju Ram to the plaintiffs but two additional stores were added by the plaintiffs after the gift of the building to them in the year 1955. It is the positive assertion of the defendants that these storeys were added by the plaintiffs without any permission of the Municipal Council or the Department of Town and Country Planning. As already noticed, the right of every owner of the land to light and air exists only as it passes vertically thereto. In view of the set backs between the two buildings, it is difficult to say. prima facie, that vertical passage of light and air has been blocked and this is not even the case of the plaintiffs as disclosed in the pleadings. 25. It is also not the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs will suffer a substantial injury or deprivation of their right to light and air sufficient to render the use and occupation of their building uncomfortable or inconvenient according to ordinary requirements of mankind. It is apparent on the analysis of Sections 28. 33 and 35 of the Act that it is not sufficient to allege that there has been a reduction or diminition in the quantum of the air and light by the acts complained of. It is apparent on the analysis of Sections 28. 33 and 35 of the Act that it is not sufficient to allege that there has been a reduction or diminition in the quantum of the air and light by the acts complained of. Plaintiffs must allege and prove that there rights have curtailed to such an extent as to render a comfortable use of their building impossible by ordinary notions of ordinary person. 26. Granting an injunction without going into the settled legal position as to the substantial injury which may be caused to the plaintiffs would amount to illegal exercise of the jurisdiction by the Courts below. I am supported for the view have taken by the ratio in Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Dand v. Purushottam. AIR 1971 Supreme court 1878. 27. Section 33 of the Act. it may be noticed provides that the owner of any interest in the dominant heritage, or the occupier of such heritage, may institute a suit for compensation for the disturbance of the easement or of any right accessory thereto, provided that the disturbance has actually caused substantial damage to the plaintiffs. Explanation II read with Explanation I to Section 33 clearly sows that where the disputes pertain to right of free passage of light and air no damage is substantial unless the interference alleged materially diminish the value of the dominant heritage and interferes with the physical comfort of the plaintiffs. 28. There is not a whisper in pleadings of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs have claimed the right of light and air over the property of the defendants as a prescriptive right having enjoyed it uninterruptedly for more than twenty years nor there is any allegation that construction reconstruction being done by the defendants would materially diminished the value of the property of the plaintiffs or would cause substantial damage within the meaning of Section 33 of the Act or it will materially interfere with the physical comforts of the plaintiffs. I have already noticed that the material on record prima facie show that there is a distance to the extent of 2.20 meters on one side and 1.60 meters on the other side between the building of the plaintiffs and the construction being raised by the defendants. It. I have already noticed that the material on record prima facie show that there is a distance to the extent of 2.20 meters on one side and 1.60 meters on the other side between the building of the plaintiffs and the construction being raised by the defendants. It. therefore, prima facie, cannot be said that the plaintiffs are totally deprived of the passage of air and light to their buildings as alleged by them. Apparent as it is. the balance of convenience is not in favour of the plaintiffs. The comparative mischief would be greater if the defendants are restrained from completing their construction after having spent huge amount. 29. In Smt. Bhulwati Devi & Anr. v. Munna Lal AIR 1982 Allahabad 20. after referring to the decisions in Ram Narayan Ram v. Ram Dhani Ram. 1973 ALL WR (HC) 173. Suraj Narain v. Kalyan Das AIR 1929 ALL. 430. Shambhu Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad AIR 1933 ALL. 493 and Chapsi Bhai Dhanji Bhai Dand v. Purshottam. AIR 1971 SC 1878. it was observed: "It is not enough to allege and prove that there has been a reduction in the quantum of air and light in the physical sense by the acts complained of by the plaintiffs. The plaintiff must further prove that the curtailment of right has been so substantial as to render a comfortable living or use of the residence of course judged by ordinary notions, impossible". 30. In Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Dand. the Apex Court in para 222 of the judgment observed: To constitute a actionable obstruction of free passage of light or air to the openings in a house it is not enough that the light or air is less than before. There must be a substantial privation of light, enough to render the occupation of the house uncomfortable, according to the ordinary notions of mankind. (See Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores. 1904 AC 179). 31. So far the grievance of the plaintiffs that reconstruction being raised by the defendants was in violation of the approved plan by the Department of Town and Country Planning is concerned, there is no material to warrant any such conclusion even prima facie. 32. It may be noticed that during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned trial Court, learned Senior Sub Judge. Chamba on July 30. 2001. at the request of the plaintiffs, appointed Municipal Engineer. Municipal Council. 32. It may be noticed that during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned trial Court, learned Senior Sub Judge. Chamba on July 30. 2001. at the request of the plaintiffs, appointed Municipal Engineer. Municipal Council. Chamba as Local Commissioner. He was directed to visit the site and to report about the extent and type of construction being carried out by the respondents. The Local Commissioner submitted his report on August 13. 2001. In this report, the Local Commissioner observed that the visited the spot along with the supervisor of the Municipal Council. Chamba. Narinder Mahajan. Ajay Mahajan and Shri Davinder Kumar on August 7. 2001 and August 9. 2001 when Executive Officer of the Municipal Council and Architect were also present. It was observed that the total length as per the approved plan of the building was 29.40 mtrs whereas, it was found to be 29.60 mtrs. at the site. Thus. 0.2 mtrs. in excess of the sanctioned plan. The height of the building in the approved drawing was 3 mtrs. in each floor whereas it was found to be 3.30 mtrs. between the slab to slab in one floor and 3.20 mtrs. in the other floor. It was also observed that the plan was sanctioned for three storeys but below the first slab, there was natural earth and the owner had excavated soil for erecting the R.C.C. column. The Local Commissioner observed that as per site condictions. the total number of storeys are three above the plinth level but the area below the plinth level slab can be converted into a basement storey by excavating the earth at any later stage for which preventive measures must be taken to avoid any misuse in the form of additional storey which can give birth to fourth storey lateron. It was found that the plinth level of the neighbourhood building was about six feet above the ground level. 33. There is on record a letter of the Municipal Council dated July 31. 2001. addressed to the defendants. By this letter. "the defendants were directed to file an undertaking that they will not remove the earth below the RCC slab of the first floor to convert it into a basement. 33. There is on record a letter of the Municipal Council dated July 31. 2001. addressed to the defendants. By this letter. "the defendants were directed to file an undertaking that they will not remove the earth below the RCC slab of the first floor to convert it into a basement. The defendants were further directed to maintain the height of the third storey to the three meters and thereafter the defendants were required to put slopping roof before starting the work of third store and so far the extra height in two storeys to the extent of 20 meters was concerned, the Municipal Council informed the defendants that the matter will be placed before the Municipal Council meeting and the defendants shall abide by the decision of the Municipal Council. The defendants were directed not to earn out any further construction until the affidavits were submitted to the Municipal Council. The record also shows that such affidavit? as directed by the Municipal Council, were filed by the defendants. The construction activity of the defendants, it may be noticed was, permitted to be carried on. the filing of the requisite affidavits. Neither the learned trial Court for the learned District Judge considered this important material placed on the record. Even assuming, though not borne from the record that unauthorized construction is being raised by the defendants it does not give any cause of action to the plaintiffs - owners of the adjoining property. 34. A Full Bench of Orissa High Court in Krushna Kishore Bal v. Sankarsan Samai & Ors. AIR 1974 Orissa 89. referring to by various authorities observed: "Law is thus well settled that mere violation of municipal rules or plan is not actionable per se unless an injury; real or apprehended, is established by the persons in whose interest and for whose protection the rules are framed. The act and the rules create an obligation in favour of the plaintiffs if they prove such injuries which would be determined according to the. facts and circumstances of each case", (emphasis supplied) 35. Learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that the defendants did not approach the Court with clean hands. They suppressed the material facts and made allegations which are not borne out of the record Mr. facts and circumstances of each case", (emphasis supplied) 35. Learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that the defendants did not approach the Court with clean hands. They suppressed the material facts and made allegations which are not borne out of the record Mr. Sharma pointed out that the plaintiffs suppressed the fact that they themselves have added two storey to their building after its gift to them in the year 1995. without any approval from the Municipal Council or the Department of the Town and Company Planning. They also made a false grievance that the defendants were raising the construction of the fourth storey which would block the air and light. In these circumstances, contended Mr. Sharma. the Courts will not grant equitable relief of temporary injunction. 36. The relief of injunction indeed is an equitable relief. The maxim of equity is "equity follows law". The plaintiffs themselves having added two storeys to their building without the approval of the Municipal Council and suppressing this material fact have not come to the court with clean hands. In these circumstances, they were not entitled to any equitable relief. The plaintiffs lacked Uberrima fides when they approached the Court for discretionary relief, the plaintiffs were bound to state all material facts. They not only suppressed the material facts but even misrepresented them to some extent and on this ground too. they were not entitled to the discretionary relief under order 39 rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. This court in Sukh Dev & Ors. v. State of H.P. & Ors. 1995(2) Sim. L.C. 381. observed that to get a discretionary relief, a person must show bonafides of his conduct. A person who does not come with clean hands before the Court of law. cannot be granted a discretionary relief. 37. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court failed to consider and assess the material placed on record. Both the Courts made a mere rhetoric that the plaintiffs had prima facie case and balance of conveience in their favour without referring to any material, on record in support of their conclusions. The phrases "prima facie case", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not phrases for incantation as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar & Anr. v. Prahlad Singh & Ors. 1992 Supreme Court Cases 719. The phrases "prima facie case", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not phrases for incantation as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar & Anr. v. Prahlad Singh & Ors. 1992 Supreme Court Cases 719. Their Lordships observed" "Phrases "prima facie case", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation but words of width and elasticity., to meet myriad situations presented by mens ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercises of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice". 38. In view of the facts and circumstances noticed above, there is neither prima facie case nor balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, in the event of success of there suit could be adequately compensated. 39. In the present case, interim injunctions were passed by the Courts below without application of mind and without taking into consideration the harm which would be caused to the opposite side. The Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper construction company- (P) Ltd & Anr. 1996 (4) Supreme Court Cases. 622 observed: "On this occasion, we must refer to the mechanical manner in which some of the courts have been granting interim orders- injunctions and stay orders without realizing the harm such mechanical order cause to the other side and in some cases to public interest. It is no answer to say that "let us make the order and if the other side is aggrieved, let it come and apply for vacating it". With respect, this is not a correct attitude. Before making the order, the Court must be satisfied that it is a case which calls for such an order". 40. Faced with this. learned counsel for the plaintiffs urged that this Court should not interfere with the orders of the Appellate Court even if such orders are erroneous. It is true that this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 227 of the Constitution will to normally disturb the interim orders passed by the Appellate Court. However, the High Court would be within its supervisory jurisdiction with material irregularity and the order passed by the Court, if allowed to stand, w ill cause failure of justice or irreparable injury to the part aggrieved. However, the High Court would be within its supervisory jurisdiction with material irregularity and the order passed by the Court, if allowed to stand, w ill cause failure of justice or irreparable injury to the part aggrieved. The High Court, in my view, if satisfied on the basis of the material placed before it that the impugned orders passed by the Court below would cause injustice to a parry, should not be reluctant to set-aside such orders to meet the ends of justice. The Apex Court Neelakantan & Ors. v. Mallika Begum. 2002(2) Supreme Court Cases 440 held that the High Court while considering the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction in second appeal or civil revision, would not normally reverse the findings of fact recorded by the Court below. Their Lordships held: "But it is not an absolute proposition. In a case where the finding is recorded without any legal evidence on the record, or on misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity, which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties or the finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view". 41. In the present case, as observed earlier, both the trial Court and the First Appellate court made their conclusion not only dehors the material on record but also failed to consider the factual matrix of the case and exercised their jurisdiction with material irregularity. It is intriguing to note that the plaintiffs had merely asked for restrain on the defendants from raising the construction of "fourth storey of the building being constructed by them", yet both the Courts made absolute orders and directed the parties to "maintain status quo". In other words, restrained the defendants absolutely in continuing with the reconstruction of their building even per the approved plan of three storeys. The Courts granted the interim relief to an extent which was not even sought by the plaintiffs. I say no more. 42. No other point is urged. 43. In result, the revision petition is allowed. Impugned orders of the learned District Judge and the trial Court dated 13.8.2001 are set-aside. The application of the plaintiffs under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. is dismissed. The stay orders stand vacated. 44. I say no more. 42. No other point is urged. 43. In result, the revision petition is allowed. Impugned orders of the learned District Judge and the trial Court dated 13.8.2001 are set-aside. The application of the plaintiffs under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. is dismissed. The stay orders stand vacated. 44. Any observations made herein above will not be construed to be an observation on the merits of the case. The trial Court shall decide the case uninfluenced by any observations made above. The plaintiffs shall pay costs to the defendants assessed at rupees 2000/-