JUDGMENT S.P. TALUKDAR, J. 1. The present application is directed against the judgment dated 17th June, 2002 passed by the Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 8506 (W) of 1998. 2. Appellant, Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Base Sciences, was respondent no. 1 in the said writ application. It is a society registered under the West Bengal Societies Regulation Act, 1961. 3. Grievances of the petitioner in the writ application i.e. W.P. No. 8506 (W) of 1998 may briefly be stated as follows:- Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, hereinafter referred and to as the Centre, was established to conduct research and to foster encourage and promote the growth of advance studies in selected branches of Basic Sciences. It is controlled and funded by the Central Government and it comes within the scope and ambit of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 4. In response to an advertisement published on 9th January, 1993, the petitioner applied and was selected for the post of Administrative Officer and he joined on 10th February, 1995. He accepted the conditions of service and was accordingly kept on probation for the 1st year of service. In course of discharge of his duties, he found certain irregularities in the administration and made several representations to the Director of the Centre. By letter dated 20th November, 1995, he was informed that his performance was not satisfactory. Apprehending other retaliatory action, the petitioner filed a writ application being C.O. No. 20775 (W) of 1995 on 28th November, 1995 praying for appropriate order relating to investigation of the matter. He also sought for relief so that his service could not be terminated for highlighting the irregularities. Hon'ble High Court by order dated 5th December, 1995 directed Deputy Commissioner, Detective Department to take charge of all relevant papers. On 10th January, 1996, respondent no. 3, Director of the Centre, intimated the petitioner that his confirmation would be considered in due course of time. Subsequently, the probationary period was extended for a further period of six months in the meeting of the governing body held on 11th March, 1996. As the period of probation expired on 9th February, 1996, its extension for a period of six months with effect from 10th February, 1996 was nullity. Subsequently, the probationary period was extended for a further period of six months in the meeting of the governing body held on 11th March, 1996. As the period of probation expired on 9th February, 1996, its extension for a period of six months with effect from 10th February, 1996 was nullity. A writ application being C.O. No. 20617 (W) of 1996 was filed but it was decided that the extension of the petitioner's service on probation till 9th January, 1997 was justified. In connection with the earlier writ application an order was passed wherein direction was given for enquiry of the irregularities by a committee which was again directed to submit a report of its investigation before the Court. 5. Be that as it may, the service of the petitioner as a probationer was extended from time to time. Such extensions, except on one occasion, were made by the respondent no. 3 in his personal capacity. Last such extension was given till 9th April, 1998. The petitioner's service was, thereafter, terminated by the Director by letter dated 7th April, 1998 with effect from 9th April, 1998. Such termination was made on the ground that the performance of the petitioner was unsatisfactory and unsuitable for confirmation. Petitioner was not served with any show cause notice nor any enquiry was made. 6. It had been alleged by the petitioner that such order of termination is bad, illegal and reflects colourable exercise of power. It was claimed that byelaws for the purpose of governing the service became effective from 10th July, 1995 and those were not given any retrospective effect. The petitioner was allowed to work on probation for a considerable period of time even after expiry of one year. It had been claimed that such order of termination was issued by way of punishment and it was without jurisdiction and in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. According to the petitioner, it was a stigmatic termination. Petitioner challenged the said order of termination by filing a writ application and prayed for with drawal and/or cancellation of such order of termination dated 7th April, 1998 as well as other incidental reliefs. 7. As against this, the present appellant, as respondent, contested the case. It was stated that an appointment on probation required assessment of the conduct, performance ability and capacity of the concerned employee. 7. As against this, the present appellant, as respondent, contested the case. It was stated that an appointment on probation required assessment of the conduct, performance ability and capacity of the concerned employee. It was within the competence of the authority to terminate the service of a probationer if his performance is not to the satisfaction of the said authority. Action taken in the way of terminating the services of the petitioner/ probationer on the basis of the decision taken by the Governing Body was neither illegal nor arbitrary and could not be said to be mala fide. It was further stated that the services of the petitioner were extended from time to time in order to give opportunity to improve performance. 8. Learned Judge after taking into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances allowed the writ application and set aside/quashed the order of termination. Learned Judge further directed reinstatement of the petitioner and the respondent before the learned Single Judge was directed to pay back wages to the applicant from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. 9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment dated 17.6.2002, the Centre preferred the instant appeal. 10. It is the case of the appellant that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the present respondent no. 1 was appointed as an Administrative Officer of S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences on probation without any stipulation for confirmation or even deemed confirmation. There was no maximum period of probation stipulated in the appointment letter. The purported right of the petitioner flows from the private contract between the writ petitioner and the Centre and the conditions of service are not controlled by any statutory provision and the impugned action of the Centre has no public law character. The Centre is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitioner was afforded several opportunities to improve his aptitude and his failure to respond to the challenge resulted in termination of his service. The writ petitioner was never enjoying the status of a permanent employee. The period of probation of the service of the writ petitioner automatically ceased on 9th April, 1998 on expiry of the extended period of probation when he was found to be unsuitable for confirmation. The writ petitioner was never enjoying the status of a permanent employee. The period of probation of the service of the writ petitioner automatically ceased on 9th April, 1998 on expiry of the extended period of probation when he was found to be unsuitable for confirmation. The order of termination of service of the writ petitioner was a termination simpliciter without casting any stigma and as such, no prior hearing was necessary. There has been failure in appreciation of the fact that the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee was clearly not applicable in the present case as in that case the termination order itself refers to three other letters. One of which explicitly refers to misconduct on the part of the employee and also refers to an Enquiry Committee's report, which report, in its turn, had found that the employee was guilty of misconduct. There are references to past correspondences in the order of termination but those are mere recitals of the process of consideration of the performance of the writ petitioner during his tenure as probationer and no misconduct was ever alleged or found to be proved by holding any enquiry. The appellant has, in such circumstances, prayed for setting aside of the judgment of the learned Single Bench. 11. Mr. Arunava Ghosh, learned Counsel for the appellant at the very outset challenged the maintainability of the writ application on the ground that the petitioner's service could not be enforced by a writ of mandamus. Referring to the decision in the case Anupam Ghosh vs. Union of India & other, 1991(II) CHN 451 , it was submitted by Mr. Ghosh that the impugned action of termination of service was not made in contravention of any statutory provision and it could not be held that the employment and corresponding duties related to matters of public law character. According to Mr. Ghosh, the service of the writ petitioner and conditions thereof flow from private contract between the parties and the impugned action of termination of service is not amenable to writ jurisdiction even if it is held that the Centre comes within the meaning of State, as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Ghosh, the service of the writ petitioner and conditions thereof flow from private contract between the parties and the impugned action of termination of service is not amenable to writ jurisdiction even if it is held that the Centre comes within the meaning of State, as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. Reference was made to the decision in the case of Raj Kumar Sardar vs. Union of India & other, 1999(I) CLJ 125, in support of the contention that even assuming that the Government of India has some financial and administrative control, the Centre does not come within the scope and ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution. 12. Such view has been echoed by learned Counsel Mr. P. Sengupta, appearing for proforma respondent. 13. According to learned Counsel Mr. S. Mukherjee, appearing for respondent no. 1, the decision reported in 1991(II) CHN page-451 has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The said decision relates to an appeal filed by Finance Director of Andrew Yule and Company which is not a State and as such, no writ lies against it. It was submitted that the substantial financial aid given by the Central Government at the initial stage for proper functioning of the Company was credited to the accounts of the Company as loan repayable with interest and no public duty was imposed on such non-statutory body in relation to its obligation to the employees. It had also been submitted that the decision in the case of Director, Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Jadavpur & other vs. Ashok Kumar Roy & other, 1992(1) CLJ 319 , does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the Division Bench of this Court held that Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science is not an instrumentality of the State. Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation vs. United Labour Union & other, AIR 1997 SC 645 , in support of his contention that the public law remedy given by Article 226 of the Constitution is to issue not only the prerogative writs provided therein but also any order or direction to enforce any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose. The Apex Court in connection with the said case held that the distinction between public law and private law remedy by judicial adjudication gradually marginalized and became obliterated. Our attention was also drawn to the decision in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey & other, AIR 1999 SC 753 , wherein it had been held that "The language of Article 226 does not admit of any limitation on the powers of High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder though by various decisions of this Court with varying and divergent views it has been held that jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised only when body or authority, decision of which is complained, was exercising its power in the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law remedy." 14. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences was established in June 1986 as a registered society functioning under the umbrella of the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. It clearly appears from the various correspondences, Notifications, Orders and Office Memorandum which were referred to by learned Counsel Mr. Mukherjee that the Government of India has effective control, not only in respect of financial matters but even in administrative matters of such Centre. The decision in the case of Pradip Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & other, 2002(5) SCC 111 , clearly lays down that the question in each case would be whether in the light of cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found, then the body is a State within Article 12. It is significant to note that the S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences was entangled in a case filed by Dipti Prakash Banerjee. In fact, the decision in the said case, reported in (1999) 3 SCC page 60, was referred to by learned Counsel for both the parties and learned Single Bench also placed reliance on the observations made in the said judgment. The status and position of the Centre and how far writ remedy lies against the said authority did not find any significant mention in the said judgment. The status and position of the Centre and how far writ remedy lies against the said authority did not find any significant mention in the said judgment. This goes a long way to suggest that the authority of the Centre as one of the public authority was not at all in controversy. We don't think that there can be any rational justification for raising such controversy at this stage. As observed earlier, the nature and character of the Centre, its formation and function, its discharge of administrative and financial obligations leave no further scope for controversy in this regard. Following the observations made by Lord Denning (Ref: The Closing Chapter, 1st Indian reprint, 1993) it can be said that a public authority must function with certain principles as formulated by Courts from time to time i.e. the duty to inquire fairly and impartially, the duty to decide in accordance with law, the duty to exercise a discretion reasonably and the duty to come to a reasonable decision. 15. Considering all such facts and circumstances and having regard to the discussion as made above, we are of the view that there is no merit in the grievance that learned Trial Judge was not justified in exercising writ jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 16. Mr. Arunava Ghosh, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that learned Single Judge did not consider that respondent no. 1 being an Administrative Officer appointed on probationary basis was found to be unsuitable by the Centre on consideration of overall assessment of his performance as a probationer. According to him, the Centre as an employer of the respondent no. 1, during his probationary period of service has every right to test and judge his ability for the post. Mr. Ghosh also stated that the rules/bye-laws of the Centre do not give any right to the probationer/respondent no. 1 for automatic confirmation. According to him, probationary period of service of the respondent no. 1 was extended on several occasions and from time to time on the ground of unsuitability for the post and the respondent no. 1 was given several opportunities to improve his aptitude. The service of the respondent no. 1 during the probationary period could not be equated with that of a permanent employee. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the respondent no. 1 was given several opportunities to improve his aptitude. The service of the respondent no. 1 during the probationary period could not be equated with that of a permanent employee. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the respondent no. 1 having accepted the extension of the probationary period of service on the ground of unsuitability and/or non-satisfactory performance was estopped from challenging the termination order. According to learned Counsel, Mr. Ghosh, the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the order of termination of service of the writ petitioner was a termination simpliciter without casting any stigma during probationary period and as such, no prior hearing was necessary. Referring to the decision in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, reported in (1999) 3 SCC page 60, it was argued that the facts and circumstances of the said case are clearly distinguishable from those of the present case. Mr. Ghosh then submitted that the learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate this significant aspect in its proper perspective and this led to miscarriage of justice. 17. Mr. P. Sengupta, appearing for the proforma respondent sought to further strengthen the argument advanced by Mr. Ghosh. 18. On the other hand, Mr. S. Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent no. 1 categorically asserted that learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in placing reliance on the decision in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee. 19. Before proceeding further it is perhaps necessary to refer to the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998. Few other letters issued by the concerned authority have found mention in such letter of termination. Besides, such letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 contains observations which are as follows:- "Your performance, ability and capacity during the period of probation have been examined and your service during the period of probation is found to be unsatisfactory and hence you are considered unsuitable for the post you have been appointed to. The Governing Body is of the view that your performance was unsatisfactory and you are unsuitable for confirmation." 20. The letters as referred to in the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 may now be examined one after another. The Governing Body is of the view that your performance was unsatisfactory and you are unsuitable for confirmation." 20. The letters as referred to in the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 may now be examined one after another. The letter dated 9th January, 1997 contains the following observations:- "We hope that you would try to improve your performance by cutting down irregular attendance, showing drive and initiative and willingness to work, behaving properly and decently with the academic and non-academic staff in a manner acceptable in an educational institution and increasing overall efficiency." 21. Letter dated 13th March, 1997 contains the following observations:- "You have not been truthful about the location of files of the Centre (e.g. the FC file and the personal file of the Director). Your attitude to work remains unsatisfactory. Your disrespectful behavior towards the academic staff is not acceptable, and this needs a thorough change." 22. Letter dated 9th April, 1997 concludes with the following paragraph:- "We hope that in this period you would try to improve your performance by cutting down irregular attendance, and showing drive and willingness to work. Your attitude of insubordination to superior officers must change. Your language and behaviour should conform to standards acceptable in an educational institution." 23. Letter dated 9th June, 1997 contains the following observations:- ''Your inspection of the site and the building is deplorable the broken green house and trees had to be looked after by the Director and the white ant trails and broken windows by other staff members." ''Your attitude of insubordination has not changed (the letters and notes that you write to Professors and the Director are written in a language unacceptable in an educational institution, e.g. your arrogant and false statement about recovery of book S.N. Bose: The Man and His Work.'' 24. While extending the probationary period once again by letter dated 8th July, 1997 the writ petitioner was asked to cut down irregular attendance, attend to your work promptly and carry out the assigned jobs efficiently. Your general behavior and attitude must confirm to standards acceptable in an educational institution. 25. In the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998, reference was made to the review made on 26th August, 1997 and it was noted that your poor attendance and lack of attention to administrative matters relating to academic work continued. Your general behavior and attitude must confirm to standards acceptable in an educational institution. 25. In the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998, reference was made to the review made on 26th August, 1997 and it was noted that your poor attendance and lack of attention to administrative matters relating to academic work continued. You did not prepare the budget papers, the agenda papers of the Governing Body and did not call the meeting of the Building Committee. It was found that you did not settle your unpaid dues to the Income Tax Department. 26. Probationary period of service of the writ petitioner was again extended till December 9, 1997 by letter dated 9th September, 1997 in order to enable him to improve his performance 27. There is further reference in the letter of termination of the review made in November, 1997 and by letter dated 12th November, 1997 it was pointed out that the petitioner had not got the Annual Report (1996-97) (English and Hindi) prepared in time and had not paid attention to the comments of the Statutory Auditor. The petitioner did not pay attention to the urgent demands of the D.S.T. about the performance budget and revised budget estimates for the 5th Pay Commission required on October 6, 1997. It was further observed in the said letter that mostly you were away from the office in the preceding week. 28. The letter of termination further mentions as follows:- "The Centre's academic work was suffering because of your unhelpful attitude and the academic staff and the Director had to spend substantial time to do things that you should. Your deficiencies were pointed out and you could not be confirmed but were given one more chance by an extension of probationary period to April 9, 1998 by letter No. SNB/PER 1401/DO-136 dated 09.12.1997." 29. The letter of termination contains the following two paragraphs as well:- "A detailed list of deficiencies was pointed out in the review in February, 1998 by letter No. SNB/PER 1401/DO-180 dated 20.2.1998. They included irregular attendance, inattention to regular office work, such as getting Annual Report and Audit Report printed, no preparation of minutes of the G.B. Meeting and lack of attention to follow up the work required after the G.B. Meetings you still lacked drive, promptness, initiative and a sense of belonging to the organization you work for. They included irregular attendance, inattention to regular office work, such as getting Annual Report and Audit Report printed, no preparation of minutes of the G.B. Meeting and lack of attention to follow up the work required after the G.B. Meetings you still lacked drive, promptness, initiative and a sense of belonging to the organization you work for. You were apathetic to the suggestions given to you. In letter No. SNB/PER 1401/DO-195 dated 27.3.1998, it was pointed out that the Audit Report (Hindi) was not ready. You took leave when the Finance Committee papers were to be made ready and what little you did was poorly prepared. You had not followed up G.B's instruction to do necessary work for implementing the Government reservation policies for SC/ST/OBC." 30. Referring to all such correspondences in general and the letter of termination in particular, it was submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that the termination could not be said to be a punitive one. According to him, termination of the service of the writ petitioner was termination simpliciter. Referring to the decision in the case of Sumati P. Shere vs. Union of India & other, 1989(2) SLR 422, it was submitted that the employee the should be made aware of the defect in his work and deficiency in his performance. Defects or deficiencies, indifference or indiscretion may be with the employee by inadvertence and not by incapacity to work. Timely communication of the assessment of work in such cases may put the employee on the right track. Without any such communication, in our opinion, it would be arbitrary to give a movement order to the employee on the ground of unsuitability. 31. Where an employee was holding a temporary service and was on probation, an order of termination simpliciter passed without attaching any stigma and on the basis of the service records which were found unsatisfactory was not held arbitrary and capricious. In the case reported in (1995) 6 SCC page 534, it was held that in the aforesaid facts, we do not think that in reality an order of punishment has been passed against the petitioner in the cloak or pretence of termination simpliciter without holding any departmental proceeding thereby violating Article 311 of the Constitution. 32. Admittedly, the respondent no. lithe writ petitioner was given appointment to the post of Administrative Officer in the Centre by letter dated 7th October, 1994. 32. Admittedly, the respondent no. lithe writ petitioner was given appointment to the post of Administrative Officer in the Centre by letter dated 7th October, 1994. The writ petitioner joined in service on 10th February, 1995 and he was undergoing probationary period for one year. Long before expiry of the said period of probation, the writ petitioner was served with letter dated 20th November, 1995 whereby he was requested to improve his performance. By letter dated 10th January, 1996, the writ petitioner was intimated that his confirmation would be considered in due course of time. By letter dated 9th February, 1996 the probationary period was extended for six months with effect from 10th February, 1996. His performance was found to be unsatisfactory. The petitioner was asked to pay more attention to his duties and try to improve his efficiency and general performance by letter 14th May, 1996. This was practically repeated by letter dated 10th July, 1996. The probationary period was thereafter further extended for two months from 10th August, 1996. The writ petitioner was, thereafter, intimated about his continued poor performance of duties by letter dated 9th September, 1996. This was followed by further extension of the period of probation for three months from 10th October, 1996. Writ petitioner's attention was, thereafter, drawn to his dismal performance by letter dated 20th December, 1996. Accordingly, probationary period was extended for three months with effect from 10th January, 1997. The writ petitioner was, thereafter, intimated about certain deficiencies in his performance by letter dated 13th March, 1997. By letter dated 9th April, 1997, the probationary period was again extended till 9th July, 1997. Another letter dated 9th June, 1997 was given to the writ petitioner in the form of suggestions for improving performance. This was again followed by letter dated 5th July, 1997. By letter dated 8th July, 1997, probationary period was again extended till 9th September, 1997. Deficiencies in the performance of duties were again brought to the notice of writ petitioner by letter dated 26th August, 1997. Probationary period was, thereafter, extended till 9th December, 1997. Review of the performance of the writ petitioner was brought to his notice by letter dated 12th November, 1997. While extending the period of probation till 9th April, 1998 by letter dated 9th December, 1997, the petitioner was told that one more chance was thereby given to him for improving his performance. Review of the performance of the writ petitioner was brought to his notice by letter dated 12th November, 1997. While extending the period of probation till 9th April, 1998 by letter dated 9th December, 1997, the petitioner was told that one more chance was thereby given to him for improving his performance. His performance was again reviewed and it was brought to his notice by letter dated 20th February, 1998. Suggestion for improvement was again given to the writ petitioner by letter dated 27th March, 1998. Thereafter by letter dated 7th April, 1998, the service of the writ petitioner was terminated and in the said letter references were made to certain other correspondences, as mentioned earlier. 33. There can be no denial of the fact that though service of the writ petitioner was terminated by letter dated 7th April, 1998, the other correspondences, as referred to therein, must also be taken into consideration to find out as to whether such termination was termination simpliciter or punitive. 34. Learned Counsel, Mr. Arunabha Ghosh, categorically pointed out that it was the moral duty on the part of the concerned authority to intimate him about the authority's time to time assessment of his performance. This, according to Mr. Ghosh, was in order to instruct and encourage the writ petitioner. Clause 5.2 of the bye-laws clearly laid down that the Appointing Authority at its discretion may extend the probationary period, but not beyond 4 years. Having regard to the date of joining of service of the writ petitioner, question of expiry of the maximum permissible period of probation could hardly arise. Now, the crux of the entire controversy is how far the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 together with the letters as mentioned therein, can be termed as termination simpliciter. 35. In the case of Chief General Manager, State Bank of India & another vs. Bijoy Kumar Mitra, 1997(7) SCC 550 , it was held that whether the service rules permitted continuance in service as a probationer beyond a certain period, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post and the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the specified period of probation is not sufficient to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed in the post by implication. The decision in the case of State of Punjab vs. Dharma Singh, reported in AIR 1968 SC page 1210, had also been referred to. Here, of course, question of the writ petitioner's continuing in service beyond the maximum permissible amount of probationary period does not arise. Naturally, question of deemed confirmation does not arise at all. There can be no dispute as to the fact that during the period of probation, the authorities are entitled to assess the suitability of the candidates and if it is found that the candidate is not suitable to remain in service they are entitled to record a finding of unsatisfactory performance of the work and duties. In case of unsatisfactory service, the authorities are also entitled to terminate the service. [Ref: (1997) 2 SCC page 191] 36. The facts and circumstances of the present case perhaps demand and deserve detailed reference to the case of P.N. Verma vs. Sanjoy Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & another, 2002(1) SCC 520 , wherein it was observed by the Apex Court that since the decision in Parashotam Lal Dingra's Case, AIR 1958 SC 36 , Courts have had to perform a balancing act between denying a probationer right to continue in service while at the same time granting him the right to challenge the termination of his service when the termination is a way of punishment. The law has developed along apparently illogical lines in demanding when the termination of a temporary appointee or probationer's services amounts to punishment. It was further observed that some Courts have upheld an order of termination of a probationer's services on the ground that the enquiry held prior to the termination was preliminary and yet other Courts have struck down as illegal a similarly worded termination order because an enquiry had been held. Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable concepts like motive and foundation and terminations founded on a probationer's misconduct have been held to be illegal while terminations motivated by the probationer's misconduct have been upheld. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents. 37. The Apex Court further observed that one of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was:- (a) A full scale enquiry. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents. 37. The Apex Court further observed that one of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was:- (a) A full scale enquiry. (b) Into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which. (c) Culminated in finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of termination order. Conversely if anyone of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 38. Learned Counsel of the respondent no. 1 pointed out that the termination order under consideration in this case cannot survive the test of stigma or the form test. He submitted that form of the letter of termination jeopardises the writ petitioner's right to future employment. He also contended the termination order should not go beyond the observation like unsuitable for the job. It was his further contention that the writ petitioner was also not given any notice of enquiry and the termination order both in substance as well as in form is punitive in nature. 39. Observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & other, 2000(5) SCC 152 , are extremely relevant in the present case. The Apex Court observed that Entire case-law on termination is based on peculiar facts of each individual case and it is wrong to say that decisions have been swinging like a pendulam-right, the order is valid left the order is invalid. It has been urged before the Supreme Court more than once that there is conflict of decisions to determine whether termination is simpliciter or punitive but every time the Court rejected this contention and held that apparent conflict was on account of different facts of different cases, requiring principles already laid down in various decisions to be applied to different situations. The concept of motive and foundation was, however, always kept in view. The concept of motive and foundation was, however, always kept in view. Important principles which are deducible on the concept of motive and foundation concerning a probationer are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his services, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the services is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against him. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of motive. 40. Much was argued referring to the decision in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, 1999(3) SCC 60 . In the said case, the termination order itself referred to three other letters. In one of those letters, there was reference to misconduct on the part of the employee as well as to an Enquiry Committee's report. The employee was found to be guilty of misconduct in such report. The termination was held to stigmatic and set aside. 41. In the case of Rabindra Kumar Mishra vs. Uttar Pradesh State Handloom Corporation Limited & another, AIR 1987 SC 2408 , it was held that "It may also be necessary to find out whether the officer should be tried for some more time on temporary basis. The termination was held to stigmatic and set aside. 41. In the case of Rabindra Kumar Mishra vs. Uttar Pradesh State Handloom Corporation Limited & another, AIR 1987 SC 2408 , it was held that "It may also be necessary to find out whether the officer should be tried for some more time on temporary basis. Since both in regard to a temporary employee or an officiating employee in a higher post such an assessment would be necessary merely because the appropriate authority proceeds to make an assessment and leaves a record of its views, the same would not be available to be utilised to make the order of termination following such assessment punitive in character. In a large democracy administration is bound to be impersonal and in regard to public officers whether in Government or Public Corporations, assessments have got to be in writing for purposes of record. There is no justification in the contention of the appellant that once such an assessment is recorded the order of termination made soon thereafter must take the punitive character." 42. Referring to the decision in the case of O.N.G.C. & other vs. Md. S. Iskender Ali, 1980(3) SCC 428, it was submitted by the appellant that the observations made in the letter of termination and the remarks therein were not intended to cast any stigma. Learned Counsel for all the parties placed reliance on the principle of tearing the veil. In this context, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that in absence of direct nexus between charge revealed and action taken, merely making of some observations against the probationer for assessment of his overall performance cannot vitiate the simple order of termination on ground of being punitive. 43. The decision in the case of Governing Council of Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology vs. P. Godwalkar & another, 1992(4) SCC 719 , was referred to. 44. Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 emphatically added that the letter of termination served upon the writ petitioner would definitely frustrate the possibility of his future employment. According to him, such letter of termination cannot be sustained as it reflects calculated and conscious bias against the writ petitioner. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the proforma respondent Mr. P. Sengupta submitted that there could be no justification in attempting to read more than what meets the eyes. According to him, such letter of termination cannot be sustained as it reflects calculated and conscious bias against the writ petitioner. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the proforma respondent Mr. P. Sengupta submitted that there could be no justification in attempting to read more than what meets the eyes. It was his further submission that the concerned authority was perfectly justified in giving repeated opportunities to the writ petitioner to improve his performance. He added that the failure of the writ petitioner in responding to such challenge left the concerned authority with no option but to terminate his service in the way of not extending the probationary period any further. 45. It cannot be said that the service jurisprudence commands that Head the employee wins, tail the authority loses. 46. After taking into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances and following the observations made by the Supreme Court in different cases from time to time, we are or the view that the legal position is rather clear. The apparent conflicts in the views as reflected in various judgments are in the nature of non-antagonistic contradictions. It is necessary to evaluate the merit of each case in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. Interest of justice does not necessarily demand application of a particular formula with mathematical precision. But the principles of natural justice need always be followed. 47. In the present case, the respondent no. 1 after his appointment as an Administrative Officer on probation for a period of one year was quite obviously under the observation of the authority. The fact that he was being informed from time to time the views regarding his performance cannot be grudged. It appears that he was given repeated opportunities to improve his performance and the probationary period of his services was extended from time to time. The fact that the authority did not find him fit for confirmation was also brought to his notice time and again. There is nothing to show that there had been any conscious effort on the part of the writ petitioner to challenge such assessment of the authority on the ground that it was based on bias or, that all such assessments, as made from time to time were motivated. True, the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 is unfortunately unduly wrong. True, the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 is unfortunately unduly wrong. Brevity is the soul of wit but it is unfortunately rare. On a scrutiny of such letter of termination, we do not find any reason to hold that it was punitive in nature and it would in any manner adversely affect the future career of the writ petitioner. Detailed references to certain other correspondences were perhaps not necessary but it does not reflect any malice or bias. In the present case there was no full-scale enquiry into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct. It cannot be denied that there is always an element of stigma implicit in a letter of termination. As observed by the Apex Court in the decision in the case of P.N. Verma vs. Sanjoy Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & another, 2002(1) SCC 520 , as referred to earlier, a termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. 48. In our opinion, the letter of termination dated 7th April, 1998 is not stigmatic. We are unable to share the views of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order dated 17th June, 2002 passed in W.P. No. 8506 (W) of 1998 be set aside. 49. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 50. There is no order as to costs. Xerox certified copy be given to the parties, if applied for, on payment of requisite fees. I agree. Appeal allowed. Later:- Prayer is made by respondent no. 3 for staying of operation of this judgment. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the points of law involved, we grant stay of operation of this judgment for a period of six weeks from this date. Stay of operation granted.