JUDGMENT Satish Kumar Mittal, J. - When thousands of landless persons are seeking their claims to be settled on surplus land, certain big land owners are making their persistent efforts to retain the surplus land and to defeat the very purpose and object of the Land Reforms legislation. Present case is one of such example, where a big land owner had endeavoured to save his surplus land from the declaration by accepting dubious means. 2. Ram Partap, petitioner herein, who was a big land owner has questioned the order dated 19.10.2000 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Financial Commissioner, Haryana, respondent No. 3, herein, who by invoking the suo moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Haryana ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1972), set aside the order dated 13.7.1979 (Annexure P-1) of the Prescribed Authority, Dabwali, vide which the benefit of two units was given to the petitioner, one for himself and the other for his alleged adopted son. The petitioner filed declaration form on 16.8.1976 to the Prescribed Authority, Dabwali in terms of Section 9 of the Act of 1972, in which he claimed a separate unit for one Vishnu, alleging him to be his adopted son. In support of his averment, he filed the registered adoption deed dated 9.1.1979. In the form, age of the said adopted son was shown as 26 years, but his date of birth ws not mentioned. The Prescribed Authority, vide his order dated 13.7.1979 (Annexure P-1) granted him the benefit of two units of permissible area equivalent to 68.74 ordinary acres of command area and the remaining 20.17 ordinary acres of command area was declared surplus. Subsequently, it came to the notice of the department that a fraud was played upon the Government by a big land owner, as the benefit of second unit was wrongly granted to him on account of alleged adoption by him. It was brought to the knowledge of respondent No. 1 that the Prescribed Authority, without properly verifying the facts stated by the land owner in the declaration form gave the benefit of two units to him. A fraud was played upon the department by the petitioner by showing Vishnu as his adopted son, when actually he was never adopted nor he was adult on the appointed day i.e. 24.1.1971.
A fraud was played upon the department by the petitioner by showing Vishnu as his adopted son, when actually he was never adopted nor he was adult on the appointed day i.e. 24.1.1971. When these facts were brought to the notice of respondent No. 1, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner in exercise of suo moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act of 1972 for setting aside the illegal and fraudulent order of the Prescribed Authority. Petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1 and contested the suo moto reference. After hearing the petitioner and the State counsel, vide order dated 19.10.2000 (Annexure P-3), respondent No. 1 set aside the order dated 13.7.1979 (Annexure P-1), passed by the Prescribed Authority and remanded the matter to him for redetermining the surplus area of the petitioner. It was found that the alleged adoption was fake. The adoption deed was alleged to be executed on 9.1.1979, which was after the appointed day i.e. 24.1.1971. The adoption deed was got executed just few months prior to the passing of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. Secondly, it was found that Vishnu, the alleged adopted son of the petitioner, was not major on the appointed day, therefore, he was not entitled for a separate unit. As per the school certificate of said Vishnu, which is available on the record, his date of birth has been shown as 15.12.1954. It this date is taken into consideration, then he was not major on the appointed day. Regarding the objections of the petitioner for invoking suo moto power after lapse of 20 years, it was held that there is no limitation for invoking suo moto power under Section 18(6) of the Act of 1972, particularly when a fraud was committed upon the department by a big land owner. The aforesaid order dated 19.10.2000 (Annexure P-3) has been challenged in the present writ petition. 3.
The aforesaid order dated 19.10.2000 (Annexure P-3) has been challenged in the present writ petition. 3. Shri L.N. Verma, Advocate, for the petitioner, while relying upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Loku Ram v. State of Haryana and others, 1999(1) PLJ 1 and decision of this Court in Diwan Hira Lal Kapoor and others v. The State of Haryana and others, 2002(1) PLJ 28, submitted that the Financial Commissioner cannot exercise his suo moto power under Section 18(6) of the Act of 1972, after inordinate delay of 20 years, for setting aside an order passed by the Prescribed Authority, which became final and against which no appeal or revision was filed by the department. Regarding the factual finding given in the impugned order, Mr. Verma could not submit much. He mainly pressed his argument only on the point of limitation for exercising the suo moto power by the Financial Commissioner. 4. On the other hand, Shri Sanjay Vashisht, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, submitted that the suo moto power under Section 18(6) of the Act of 1972 can be exercised at any time and there is no limitation for the same, particularly when a fraud had been played by a big land owner to defeat the very purpose and object of the Act of 1972. He relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court, dated 19.5.2000, passed in Naib Singh v. State of Haryana and others (Civil Writ Petition No. 10656 of 1999), in which it was held that in case of fraud, suo moto power can be exercised at any time, and where the decision of the Honble Supreme Court, in Loku Ram v. State of Haryana and others 14(supra) was distinguished. 5. We have considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties. It has been observed in Loku Rams case (supra) and Diwan Hira Lals case (supra) that as per Section 18(6) of the Act of 1972, the Financial Commissioner may exercise his suo moto power at any time but the word any time cannot be indefinite and such time has to be exercised within a reasonable time. The length of reasonable time must be determined by keeping in view the facts of each case and not of the order which is being revised. We have examined the facts of the present case.
The length of reasonable time must be determined by keeping in view the facts of each case and not of the order which is being revised. We have examined the facts of the present case. In our opinion, respondent No. 1 was fully justified in setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, while exercising his suo moto powers even after expiry of 20 years of the passing of said order. In the present case, a complete fraud was played by the petitioner on the department by filing wrong declaration claiming benefit of a separate unit on account of adoption, when neither there was any adoption nor the alleged adopted son was major on the appointed day i.e. 24.1.1971. The findings of fact to this effect have been recorded by respondent No. 1 after hearing the parties which cannot be gone into the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner, who was a big land owner, had taken undue and unjust benefit of a separate unit on account of the alleged adoption and thereby defeated the very purpose and object of the legislation. Such kind of conduct cannot be allowed to be perpetrated only on account of technical plea of limitation. The judgments cited by counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable as in none of these judgments, there was an allegation of fraud. In the present case, since the petitioner deliberately and fraudulently made wrong declaration and submitted wrong documents before the Prescribed Authority, he cannot be allowed to retain the benefit of separate unit in any circumstance. With the aforesaid observations, we find no merit in the present writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.