DALAVA SUBRAHMANYAM, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioners, who are the appellants in L. G. A. No. 4 of 1997, filed the present writ petition challenging the judgement and decree passed in L. G. A. No. 4 of 1997 on the file of the Special Court constituted under A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter called the Special Court ) wherein the appeal was dismissed confirming the judgement and decree in L. G. O. P. No. 103 of 1989 declaring the appellants as land grabbers and directed them to deliver the vacant possession and also pay mesne profits. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are as follows: the petitioners in L. G. O. P. No. 103 of 1989 on the file of the Special Tribunal filed a petition praying to declare the respondents as land grabbers and directing them to deliver the petition schedule property to them and they also claimed mesne profits. The petitioners contended that they purchased the petition schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 18. 9. 1981 together with a thatched house. The respondents 1 and 2, who are now the writ petitioners, requested the petitioners to allow them to live in the thatched house during the time when the terraced building was being constructed by the petitioners. The petitioners agreed for the said request and allowed them to live in the thatched house and subsequently they raised RCC terraced building and at the fag end, the respondents forcibly occupied the constructed building and also appropriated the building material worth Rs. 6,500/ -. The respondents further created an agreement of sale deed dated 16. 8. 1986 in respect of the petition schedule property and thereupon they filed the suit. The 1st respondent filed counter which was adopted by the 2nd respondent. The respondents contended that they purchased the petition schedule land and thereupon the house was constructed by them. The petitioner borrowed amounts from the 1st respondent on different dates and the petitioners could not repay the amounts borrowed and therefore they decided to sell the unfinished building during August, 1986 and entered into an agreement of sale and the balance of sale consideration was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the said property and that the respondents are not the grabbers and hence the petition is not maintainable. ( 3 ) ON the above said pleadings, the Special Tribunal framed the following issues. 1. Whether the petitioners have title to the schedule site of Ac. 0. 7 1/2 cents in R. S. No. 534/3 of Gollapudi village of Vijayawada Urban Agglomoration? 2. Whether the permissive possession set up in the petition is true? 3. Whether the respondents can be termed as land grabbers? 4. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the possession of the petition schedule site? 5. To what relief? ( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioners Pws 1 to 5 were examined and Ex. A1 to A39 were marked. On behalf of the respondents Rws 1 to 3 were examined and no documents were marked. The Special Tribunal after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence allowed the petition declaring respondents as land grabbers and directed them to deliver the vacant possession and also awarded mesne profits. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED against the judgment, the writ petitioners filed L. G. A. No. 4 of 1997 before the Special Court at Hyderabad and the Special Court after hearing dismissed the appeal confirming the judgement in L. G. O. P. No. 103 of 1989. Aggrieved by the judgement, the writ petitioners filed the above writ petition contending that the Special Court failed to consider that the writ petitioners were in permissive possession of the thatched house and hence they can not be the land grabbers. It is also contended that the remedy for the respondents is only before the Civil Court since the Special Court has no jurisdiction to decide the disputes with regard to the buildings. The lower Court failed to appreciate that the writ petitioners are in possession of the petition schedule property in pursuance of an agreement of sale dated 16. 8. 1986 and the Land Grabbing Court cannot decide the validity of the said agreement of sale. The Special Court failed to take note that at the inception the possession was permissive and therefore the writ petitioners cannot be termed as land grabbers. It is contended that the dispute is with regard to the house and therefore all disputes with regard to the house have to be decided in Civil Court and not by the Special Court. For the above said reasons, the judgement of the lower appellate Special Court may be set aside. It is contended that the dispute is with regard to the house and therefore all disputes with regard to the house have to be decided in Civil Court and not by the Special Court. For the above said reasons, the judgement of the lower appellate Special Court may be set aside. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners argued that the petition is not maintainable since the dispute is with regard to a house but not with regard to land and therefore the Special Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The land is defined under Section 2 ( c) of A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short the Act ), which is as follows:" ( c) "land" includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land, and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. " ( 7 ) AS per the definition, "land" includes buildings and structures. The dispute is with regard to the buildings and the land. In view of the definition under Section 2 (c ) of the Act, it is clear that the Special Court has jurisdiction with regard to the disputes relating to buildings. Hence the argument of the learned Advocate for the writ petitioners cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) THE next point that was argued by the Advocate for the writ petitioners is that the Special Court cannot decide with regard to the agreement of sale entered into between the parties. It is significant to note that so far the writ petitioners have not produced the original agreement of sale. In fact the writ petitioners have filed a civil suit in O. S. No. 178 of 1994 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada for specific performance of agreement of sale and the said suit was dismissed and no appeal has been filed so far. The Civil Court found that the alleged agreement of sale is not true and genuine. For the above said reasons, it is evident that the writ petitioners have fabricated an agreement of sale to justify their possession. The Civil Court found that the alleged agreement of sale is not true and genuine. For the above said reasons, it is evident that the writ petitioners have fabricated an agreement of sale to justify their possession. The Courts below have recorded a finding that the writ petitioners unauthorisedly grabbed the property of the respondents and they are in illegal possession and therefore the lower Courts have not committed any error in recording a finding that the writ petitioners are land grabbers within the definition of the Act. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellants further argued that the writ petitioners entered the premises as lessee and therefore they are not land grabbers and he also relied on a decision reported in 2000 (1) ALD 575 (DB) [pithana Nanda Kumar and others v. Kostu Eswara Rao]. The facts in the said case are different and they are not applicable to the facts in the present case. The permission was only to live in the thatched shed but the petitioners were never permitted to stay in the RCC buildings which were recently constructed. In view of the fact that the writ petitioners were never permitted to stay in the petition schedule premises, their possession cannot be termed as permissive since they high-handedly occupied the premises. Hence, the Special Court rightly recorded a finding that they are the land grabbers. For the above said reasons, the Special Court has not committed any error and there are no merits in the writ petition and it is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.