Judgment 1. One Mam Raj was owner in possession of agricultural land measuring 130 kanals 18 marlas, which is the subject matter in the present appeal. This land was ancestral property in his hand. He was having no male issue, but had only one daughter, namely Smt. Anguri Devi (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff-appellant). On 24-1-1957, he sold the land in dispute in favour of Moti Ram, Ramji Lal, Ram Saran, Lachhman and Jit (these persons or their LRs are the respondents in the present appeal) for a consideration of Rs.14,000.00 vide the registered sale deed. 2. The above said sale deed was challenged by Lala Ram, who was the real brother of vendor Mam Raj, claiming himself as reversioner under the customary law, on the ground that the sale deed was without legal necessity and since the entire land was ancestral property, therefore, the sale was not binding on the rights of the reversioners. Initially, that suit filed by Lala Ram was dismissed by the trial court while holding that the land was not found to be ancestral because part of the land was proved to be ancestral and the remaining non-ancestral. But in appeal, the suit of Lala Ram was decreed and the sale deed dated 24-1-1957 executed by Mam Raj was declared to be without legal necessity and not binding on the rights of the reversioners after the death of aliens (Mam Raj). The vendees Moti Ram and others filed RSA No. 285 of 1958, in this Court, which was decided on 17-3-1966. It was held by this Court that the land was ancestral in nature and the sale was without legal necessity. Thus, the same will not affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiff or the reversioners like him. A point was raised by the vendees (respondents herein) that the suit filed by a Lala Ram for setting aside the sale deed being reversioner is speculative one, because daughter of Mam Raj, namely, Smt. Anguri Devi (plaintiff-appellant herein), is alive and in her presence the suit filed by Lala Ram, the brother of Mam Raj, is not maintainable. On this point, raised by the vendees, this Court observed as under :- "The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that no declaration can be granted because that would be speculative because daughter of Mam Raj, who is the next heir, was alive. On this point, raised by the vendees, this Court observed as under :- "The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that no declaration can be granted because that would be speculative because daughter of Mam Raj, who is the next heir, was alive. No doubt, the daughter cannot take advantage of this decree, which will enure only for the benefit of the reversioners. There is, however, nothing to indicate whether the vendor cannot get another son either natural or adopted who may be able to take advantage of this declaratory decree. In any case, this declaratory decree will not harm the alienees till such time as there is a person who can take advantage of the decree and who happens to be the next heir after the demise of Mam Raj." 3 The above observations were made in judgment dated 17-3-1966, Ex. P6. The decree of even date, Ex. P7, reads as under :- "This appeal coming on for hearing on the 17th day of March, 1966 before Hon ble Mr. Justice Harbans Singh of the High Court of the State of Punjab at Chandigarh, in the presence of M/s. Balraj Bahal and H. L. Sarin, Advocate for the appellant defendant and of Shri Parkash Chand, Advocate for the plaintiff respondent and in the absence of the other respondent, it is ordered that the appeal be partly accepted and the decree of the Addl. District Judge Karnal dated the 2nd January 1958 reversing sing that of the Senior Sub Judge Karnal dated the 8/08/1957 as described be modified to the extent that the mortgages mentioned in the sale deed would stand at least till such time that they are set aside by an order of the competent court, and if these mortgage (sic) are paid the vendees, will stop into the shares of the mortgagees and except to the extent the sale will not affect the reversionary (sic) oughts of the plaintiff or the reversioners like him. It is further ordered that there will be no order as to costs." 4. After the death of Mam Raj, who died in January, 1979, reversioner Lala Ram, who got the decree for setting aside the sale by Mam Raj, did not file any suit for possession. It is further ordered that there will be no order as to costs." 4. After the death of Mam Raj, who died in January, 1979, reversioner Lala Ram, who got the decree for setting aside the sale by Mam Raj, did not file any suit for possession. However, the plaintiff-appellant, being daughter of deceased Mam Raj, filed the present suit for possession on the ground that she is his legal heir and after his death, she is entitled to inherit his property. Since sale made by her father was declared to be without legal necessity and the same is not binding on the right of the reversioners, she is entitled to take possession of the land in question as the decree passed in the declaratory suit filed by Lala Ram enure for the benefit of all the reversioners, whether male or female and she is legally entitled to succeed the property of her father Mam Raj as his sole heir. 5. On the other hand, the vendees (hereinafter referred to as the defendants-respondents) contested the suit on the ground that Smt. Anguri Devi has no locus standi to file the present suit, particularly in view of the observations made by this court in RSA No. 285 of 1958. It was contended that Smt. Anguri Devi had not been granted reversionary rights in respect of the suit land and she cannot derive any benefit from the decree passed on behest of the reversioner i.e. Lala Ram. 6. The trial court as well as the first appellate court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff -appellant, Smt. Anguri Devi, while holding that she has no locus standi to file the present suit as the judgment dated 17-3-1966, Ex. P6, (for short the earlier judgment Ex. P6) passed by this court in RSA No. 285 of 1958 would enure only for the benefit of the reversioners and she cannot take advantage thereof. Against those judgments and decrees, passed by the Courts below, the plaintiff-appellant has filed the present Regular Second Appeal. 7. P6, (for short the earlier judgment Ex. P6) passed by this court in RSA No. 285 of 1958 would enure only for the benefit of the reversioners and she cannot take advantage thereof. Against those judgments and decrees, passed by the Courts below, the plaintiff-appellant has filed the present Regular Second Appeal. 7. The following substantial questions of law arose in the present appeal : (i) Whether a declaratory decree obtained by a reversioner, who was competent at that time to challenge the sale and to get the same set aside on the ground of legal necessity, will enure in favour of all persons, who ultimately took the estate on the death of alienor irrespective of the fact whether such person was competent to file the suit or not? (ii) What is the effect of the observation made by this court in the earlier judgment Ex. P6 on the right of the appellant to inherit the estate of her father (Mam Raj)? 8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant argued before me that the decree Ex. P6 passed in RSA No. 285 of 1958 clearly indicates that the sale deed dated 24-1-1957 will not affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiff appellant or the reversioners like him. He submitted that though the plaintiff appellant was not competent under the customary law to challenge the sale made by her father, yet she is legally entitled to inherit the property of her father after his death being his sole heir. He submitted that the observations made in the judgment Ex. P6 by this court are of no consequence as the plaintiff appellant was not the party to that litigation and after the death of her father, she has independent legal right under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short the Act of 1956) to inherit the property of her father being his sole heir. Learned counsel submits that the observations of this Court in the earlier judgment against the plaintiff appellant will not effect her legal right which is flowing from the statute. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon Giani Ram V/s. Ramji Lal, AIR 1969 SC 1144, Teg Singh V/s. Charan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1699 and Autar Singh V/s. Kheta Singh, 1980 Rev LR 413 (PandH). 9. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon Giani Ram V/s. Ramji Lal, AIR 1969 SC 1144, Teg Singh V/s. Charan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1699 and Autar Singh V/s. Kheta Singh, 1980 Rev LR 413 (PandH). 9. On the other hand, Shri V. K. Jain, Senior Advocate, for the defendants-respondents contended that the plaintiff appellant having no locus standi to file the present suit, particularly in view of the observations made in judgment Ex. P6 to the effect that "the daughter (plaintiff-appellant herein) cannot take advantage of this decree, which will enure only for the benefit of the reversioners....... In any case, this declaratory decree will not harm the alienee till such time as there is a person who can take advantage of the decree and who happens to be the next heir after the demise of Mam Raj." Learned counsel further contended that the plaintiff appellant is bound by these observations and in view of this, she is not competent to file the present suit. It was contended that the present suit filed by the plaintiff appellant is just like execution of the earlier decree and there cannot be any execution beyond the term of the decree. It was further contended that the plaintiff-appellant has filed the present suit only on the basis of decree Ex. P7. If she wants to take benefit of that decree, then she is also bound by the adverse observations made against her in the earlier judgment Ex. P6. Learned counsel further contended that in the present litigation, this Court cannot go into the validity or correctness of the aforesaid observations made in the earlier judgment Ex. P6. These observations are to be taken as it is. The plaintiff-appellant did not challenge the observations made against her in the previous judgment Ex. P6 by filing any appeal etc. It was submitted that the previous judgment was a contingent decree and the observations made in this judgment will be binding on the plaintiff-appellant, irrespective of the fact whether those observations were erroneous or not. 10. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the authorities cited by counsel for the appellant. In my view, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the suit filed by the appellant for possession is to be decreed, for the reasons mentioned hereinafter. 11. The effect of earlier judgment Ex. 10. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the authorities cited by counsel for the appellant. In my view, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the suit filed by the appellant for possession is to be decreed, for the reasons mentioned hereinafter. 11. The effect of earlier judgment Ex. P6 was that the alienation made by Mam Raj could not enure beyond his lifetime. It means that after his death, the property would have become subject matter of inheritance to his legal heirs. Mam Raj died in January, 1979, leaving behind him the only surviving daughter (appellant). After his death, the appellant is his only legal heir under the Act of 1956, who can inherit his estate. Though, it is true that under the customary law a female heir cannot contest the alienation made by the vendor, but a declaratory decree obtained by a reversionary heir in an action to set aside the alienation of ancestral property will enure for the benefit of all persons who ultimately took the estate of deceased alienor. The object of a declaratory suit filed by a reversionary heir impeaching an alienation of ancestral estate was to remove a common apprehended injury in the interest of all the reversioners. The decree passed in such suit removes the obstacle to the right of the reversioners entitled to succeed when the succession is open. The earlier judgment Ex. P6 declared that after the death of Mam Raj, the sale made by him will not be binding on his heirs and the property will revert to his estate.The effect of that decree was merely to declare that by the sale interest conveyed in favour of the alienee was to enure during the lifetime of alienor. The net result, therefore, is inevitable that the property alienated reverted to the estate of Mam Raj at the point of his death and all persons who would have taken his estate will be entitled to inherit the same. The fact that the appellant was not competent to file the suit to contest the sale made by her father, being female, is of no consequence, because the alienee had no subsisting interest after the death of Mam Raj. In this regard, I am supported by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Giani Rams case (supra). The fact that the appellant was not competent to file the suit to contest the sale made by her father, being female, is of no consequence, because the alienee had no subsisting interest after the death of Mam Raj. In this regard, I am supported by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Giani Rams case (supra). In that case, one Jwala sold some ancestral land without legal necessity. The alienation made by him was challenged by one of his son Giani Ram under the customary law. His suit was decreed and the sale was declared to be without legal necessity and not binding on the right of the reversioners. Jwala died leaving behind him his widow, two daughters and three sons. After his death, all his legal heirs filed a suit for possession, on the basis of above said declaratory decree. Initially, the trial Court decreed the suit for half share qua three sons and suit for remaining half share qua widow and daughters was dismissed. In appeal, the first appellate Court decreed the entire suit in favour of three sons holding that only sons were entitled to the ancestral property alienated by Jwala, as the widow and daughters were not eligible to challenge the alienation made by him. In Regular Second Appeal, this High Court set aside the decree of first appellate court and restored the decree of trial court by observing that under the Act of 1956, the daughters and widow can inherit the estate of Jwala but they cannot take benefit of the declaratory decree obtained by one of the reversioners because under the customary law, female cannot contest the sale made by male owner. This Court also held that the widow and daughters have neither filed any appeal nor any cross-objection against the order of the trial court as well as first appellate court, therefore, qua them decree became final. The Hon ble Supreme Court modified the decree of this Court and a decree for possession of the suit land in favour of all the legal heirs of Jwala was passed. While allowing the appeal, the Hon ble Supreme Court observed as under : "The effect of the declaratory decree in suit No. 75 of 1920 was merely to declare that by the sale interest conveyed in favour of the alienee was to enure during the lifetime of the alienor. While allowing the appeal, the Hon ble Supreme Court observed as under : "The effect of the declaratory decree in suit No. 75 of 1920 was merely to declare that by the sale interest conveyed in favour of the alienee was to enure during the lifetime of the alienor. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the property alienated reverted to the estate of Jwala at the point of his death and all persons who would, but for the alienation, have taken the estate will be entited to inherit the same. If Jwala had died before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted the three sons would have taken the estate to the exclusion of the widow and the two daughters. After the enactment of the Hindu succession Act the estate devolved, by virtue of Ss. 2 and 4 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, upon the three sons, the widow and the two daughters. We are unable to agree with the High Court that because in the year 1920 the wife and the daughters of Jwala were incompetent to challenge the alienation of ancestral property by Jwala, they could not, after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, inherit his estate when succession opened after that Act came into force. The second ground on which the learned Judge has founded his judgment also does not appeal to us. The three sons, the two daughters and the widow of Jwala had filed the suit claiming possession of the entire property from the alienee. That suit was decreed by the Trial Court in favour of the sons only to the extent of a half share in the property alienated. The Court held that the widow and the daughters were not entitled to a share because "only those persons can bring a suit for possession on the death of Jwala who had the right to challenge the alienation made by Jwala". In appeal the District Court granted a decree for possession of the entire property on the view that the alienee had no subsisting interest after the death of Jwala. But the District Court granted a decree for possession of the entire property alienated only in favour of the three sons, because in the view of the Court the daughters and the widow of Jwala were not entitled to any share in the property. But the District Court granted a decree for possession of the entire property alienated only in favour of the three sons, because in the view of the Court the daughters and the widow of Jwala were not entitled to any share in the property. According to the High Court if the widow and the daughters were entitled to the share in the property, they had disentitled themselves to that right, because they had not preferred an appeal or filed cross objections to the decree appealed from. The sons, daughters and widow of Jwala filed a suit for a decree for possession of the entire property and their primary claim was that the alienee had no subsisting interest. The District Court accepted that claim and granted a decree in favour of the three sons for the entire property which was alienated. If the alienees are unable to convince the Court that they had any subsisting interest in the property in dispute after the death of Jwala the Court will be competent to adjust the rights between the sons, the daughters and the widow of Jwala in that property." 12. This judgment was further followed by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Teg Singh case (supra) by observing as under : The decision of this Court in Giani Ram V/s. Ramji Lal, (1969)3 SCR 944 : AIR 1969 SC 1144 may, with advantage, be referred to on this point. Under the customary law of the Punjab, the wife and daughters of a holder of ancestral property could not sue to obtain a declaration that the alienation of ancestral property will not bind the reversioners after the death of the alienor. But the reversioner who was entitled to challenge that alienation could obtain a declaratory decree that the alienation will not bind the reversioners after the alienors death. It was held by this court that such a declaratory decree had the effect of restoring the property alienated to the estate of the alienor and therefore, all persons, including the wife and the daughters of the deceased, were entitled to the benefit of that restoration. Since the property alienated had reverted to the estate of the alienor at the point of his death, the widow and daughters, who also became heirs along with the sons under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 were held entitled to obtain possession of the ancestral property. Mr. Since the property alienated had reverted to the estate of the alienor at the point of his death, the widow and daughters, who also became heirs along with the sons under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 were held entitled to obtain possession of the ancestral property. Mr. Juneja attempted to get over the effect of this decision by invoking the provisions of S. 8 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1 of 1920, which provides that when a person obtains a decree declaring that an alienation of ancestral immovable property is not binding on him according to custom, the decree shall enure for the benefit of all persons entitled to impeach the alienation. Counsel argues that since the respondent was not entitled to impeach the gift in favour of Bhagwati Devi, having been adopted after the date of the gift, the decree obtained by appellants 1 to 12 cannot enure for his benefit. The short answer to this contention is that the decree would enure for the benefit of all persons who are entitled to a share in the property of the deceased as it existed at the moment of his death. Since Mulas property stood freed from the encumbrance of the gift at the moment of his death, respondent as the adopted son would be entitled to the possession of the gifted property." 13. Both these above referred judgments have been followed by this court in Autar Singhs case (supra). In that case, Maghar Singh sold some ancestral land. His brother filed a declaratory suit under the custom that the sale having been made by him was without legal necessity and the same would not affect his reversionary rights. The suit was decreed and the declaration sought was granted. After the death of Maghar Singh, two sons and his daughter filed suit for possession. The suit was decreed by the trial Court but was dismissed by the first appellate court on the ground that the declaratory decree enures only for the benefit of reversioners and the plaintiffs, though heirs of Maghar Singh under the Act of 1956, are not reversioners under the custom, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of the said decree. The suit was decreed by the trial Court but was dismissed by the first appellate court on the ground that the declaratory decree enures only for the benefit of reversioners and the plaintiffs, though heirs of Maghar Singh under the Act of 1956, are not reversioners under the custom, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of the said decree. This Court, while allowing the appeal, relied upon the aforesaid two decisions of the Hon ble Supreme Court and held that the effect of declaratory decree is that by the sale interest conveyed in favour of the alienee is to enure during the lifetime of the alienor only and the property alienated reverts to the estate of the alienor at the point of his death. Consequently, all persons who would, but for the alienation, have taken the estate will be entitled to inherit the same. 14. In view of the aforesaid legal position, it has to be examined as to what is the effect of the observation made by this court in the earlier judgment Ex. P6 on the maintainability of the present suit. Both the Courts below have dismissed suit of the appellant on the ground that she cannot take the benefit of the earlier judgment Ex. P6, because in the said judgment, it was specifically mentioned that the daughter of Mam Raj will not take any benefit of the decree, which will enure only for the benefit of the reversioners. Counsel for the respondents also raised similar arguments in support of the decree passed by the Courts below. In my view, there is no substance in the abovesaid reasonings. The Courts below have ignored the very important fact that the appellant was not a party to the earlier suit and she is not bound by any observation made in the earlier judgment Ex. P6. The finding recorded or any observation made therein will not operate as res judicata under S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the appellant. Such observations will have no effect on the rights flowing to her under the Act of 1956 on the death of her father. The only effect of the earlier judgment Ex. P6 was to declare that the alienation made by Mam Raj would not be binding on the reversioners after his death. Whosoever reversioner is entitled to inherit the property of the deceased would inherit the same. The only effect of the earlier judgment Ex. P6 was to declare that the alienation made by Mam Raj would not be binding on the reversioners after his death. Whosoever reversioner is entitled to inherit the property of the deceased would inherit the same. In support of this view, taken by me, I am supported by the following observations of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Teg Singhs case (supra): .......... When a person obtains a decree declaring that an alienation of ancestral immovable property is not binding on him according to custom, the decree shall enure for the benefit of all persons entitled to impeach the alienation. Counsel argues that since the respondent was not entitled to impeach the gift in favour of Bhagwati Devi, having been adopted after the date of the gift, the decree obtained by appellants 1 to 12 cannot enure for his benefit. The short answer to this contention is that the decree would enure for the benefit of all persons who are entitled to a share in the property of the deceased as it existed at the moment of his death. Since Mulas property stood freed from the encumbrance of the gift at the moment of his death, respondent as the adopted son would be entitled to the possession of the gifted property". 15. I also do not find any force in the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the present suit filed by the appellant is like execution of the earlier decree and the same can be filed by only that person in whose favour the said decree was passed. Similarly, it cannot be accepted that the earlier decree was a conditional decree and the appellant is bound by the condition imposed in that decree. I have already discussed in detail about the effect of earlier decree. In view of that, there is no force in the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents. 16. In view of above, the appeal is accepted, impugned judgments and decrees, passed by both the courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff appellant for possession is decreed with no order as to costs.Order accordingly.