JUDGMENT B. PANIGRAHI, J. — The unsuccessful appellant was the divorced wife of the opp. party Sk. Abdul Samim. The ‘Nikah’ between both the parties had taken place on 5.7.1987. It is stated by the petitioner that at that time her father gave Rs. 8,000/- as marriage presentation, besides, gold and silver ornaments and other house-hold articles. They continued their happy marital life for some years but, thereafter, their relationship became embittered followed by dissensions, discord and quarrel resulting in unhappiness in their family. It is alleged by the petitioner that finally on 1.12.1990 the husband-opp. party assaulted the petitioner and drove her out from the house. She approached the village committee and as per the decision of the village committee the husband again took her back to the matrimonial house, but after some time he continued his old habits of ill-treating and torturing her. He did not give sufficient food and clothings as a result of which she was forced to quit her hus¬band’s house on 10.4.1996 and, thereafter, she lodged a report at the police station alleging dowry torture against her husband. Accordingly, G.R.Case No. 223 of 1996 was initiated against the opp. party-husband. Since the husband-opp.party did not pay her maintenance the petitioner-wife has filed this case. The opp. party-husband is working as a Constable and was getting about Rs. 3,500/- per month at the time of the filing of the case. 2. The opp. party-husband controverted all the allegations of the petitioner and submitted that their relationship was not cordial inasmuch as the petitioner was frequently going away to her parent’s house without even informing him. Therefore, he approached the President of Amala Committee who took many at¬tempts to reconcile between them, but it did not materialise. Thus, he was forced to give ‘Talak’ to the petitioner which was noted by the Kazi in the Register maintained by the Justice Department. After ‘Talak’ being granted by the husband-opp. party, he has no obligation to pay maintenance to a divorcee Muslim lady. 3. Both the parties led evidence before the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. On a careful consideration of the evidence the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack came to the conclusion that since there was a valid divorce granted by the husband-opp.party, therefore, he has no legal and/or moral obligation to pay maintenance beyond iddat period. 4. An amount of Rs. 3. Both the parties led evidence before the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. On a careful consideration of the evidence the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack came to the conclusion that since there was a valid divorce granted by the husband-opp.party, therefore, he has no legal and/or moral obligation to pay maintenance beyond iddat period. 4. An amount of Rs. 10,500/- was fixed by the Village Committee towards maintenance of the petitioner-wife which has already been deposited by the husband-opp.party. 5. Mr. Aziz, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-wife has contended that in this case the trial Court has factual¬ly and legally erred in coming to the conclusion that there was a valid divorce granted by the husband-opp.party inasmuch as from Exts. A to C, the Proceedings of the Village Committee do not reveal that there was divorce granted by the husband-opp.party to the petitioner-wife. Even assuming that there was a divorce granted under Muslim Law, then also under Sections 3 and 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 the husband-opp. party is liable to pay further maintenance beyond iddat period. It appears that the learned Judge, Family Court was oblivious to the said provisions and had wrongfully dismissed the claim of the petitioner by refusing to grant her maintenance. 5. Mr. Nanda, the learned counsel appearing for the hus¬band-opp. party has submitted that immediately after divorce being granted, the husband-opp. party has paid maintenance for the iddat period which was fixed at Rs. 10,500/- by the Village Committee. It is therefore, open to the petitioner-wife to re¬ceive the said amount from the Village Committee. After iddat period, the husband-opp. party cannot be saddled to pay any further maintenance under Mahomedan Law. 6. The first question that should be addressed by us is whether there was a valid divorce under the Mahomedan Law. There are three modes of ‘Talak’ as contemplated in Section 311 of the Mahomedan Law which is quoted below : (1) Talak ahsan - This consists of a single pronouncement of divorce made during a tuhr (period between menstruations) fol¬lowed by abstinence from sexual intercourse for the period of iddat. (2) Talak hasan - This consists of three pronouncements made during successive tuhrs, no intercourse taking place during any of the three tuhrs. (2) Talak hasan - This consists of three pronouncements made during successive tuhrs, no intercourse taking place during any of the three tuhrs. (3) Talak-ul-bidaat or talak-i-badai - This consists of - (i) three pronouncements made during a single tuhr either in one sentence, e.g., “I divorce thee “thrice, - or in separate sen¬tences e.g., I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee” (x) or, (ii) a single pronouncement made during tuhr clearly indicating an intention irrevocably to dissolve the marriage (y), e.g., I divorce thee irrevocably.” In this case the husband-opp. party claimed that he has uttered “talak” thrice which was noted by the Kazi in the marriage Regis¬ter maintained by the Justice Department. ‘Talak’ was not only uttered by him but it was communicated through the Village Com¬mittee. In that view of the matter, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that there was absence of ‘talak’. We found sub¬stantial force in the submission of Mr. Nanda. Therefore, in this background we also approve the findings of the learned Judge, Family Court that there was a valid “talak” granted by the hus¬band-opp. party to the wife communicated through the Village Committee. The divorcee Muslim wife who is the petitioner here can take the said amount of Rs. 10,500/- which is lying with the Village Committee. 7. The next question arises for our consideration is as to whether the husband-opp. party shall be absolved from providing further maintenance to the wife after the iddat period or not. Divergent opinion of different High Courts was there on this point. Some High Courts are of the opinion that a Muslim husband after granting “talak” has no legal or moral obligation to pro¬vide maintenance to the divorcee wife after the iddat period. But while interpreting the scope of Sections 3 and 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Supreme Today 2001 (8) SC 218, in the case of Danial Latifi and another v. Union of India has taken a broader and expansive view by holding that the Muslim husband is not absolved from his obligation to make a reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife, which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such reasonable and fair provision shall extend beyond the iddat period which must be made by the husband after the iddat period in terms of Section 3 (1)(a) of the Act. The divorced Muslim woman shall forfeit her right immediately after her re-marriage or economi¬cally otherwise settled. So long as such provision has not been made, the divorced wife, however, cannot be precluded from get¬ting reasonable and fair maintenance from her husband. 8. It is admitted by both parties that opp.party-husband is working as a Constable and getting more than Rs. 5,000/- per month. The petitioner-wife has claimed Rs. 500/- towards monthly maintenance. Accordingly, we direct the husband-opp. party to pay Rs. 500/- per month from the date of application filed by the petitioner-wife for maintenance. The payment of such maintenance @ Rs. 500/- per month for the month of December, 2002 shall be paid on or before 10th of December, 2002 and he shall go on paying the said amount for the subsequent months within 10th of each succeeding month. The arrear maintenance upto October, 2002 shall be paid within a period of one year by four quarterly instalments. 9. It is needless to mention here that in case the peti¬tioner so desired, she can approach the Court below for enhance¬ment of the maintenance in future. With the above observation, the revision is allowed. CH. P. K. MISRA, J. I agree. Revision allowed.