Judgment Ravi S.Dhavan, J. 1. A petition was received at the High Court by post under the expectation by the person who had sought to move the Court, one Rajdhari Singh, a writ would be issued. The writ petition was processed on the administrative side for certification on court fees limitation, etc. The Stamp Reporter has made a report that the petitioner be required to pay two sets of court fees, one for seeking a relief under Article 226 and the other for seeking a relief under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The issue which was before the High Court was whether a citizen invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court in seeking extraordinary remedies as prerogative writs under the Constitution of India be obliged to pay not one court fees but a set of court fees regard being had to the circumstances that the relief sought may come under Article 226 and Article 227 both. The Court formulated the issues by its order of 29 August, 2001 which is reproduced below : "A. A writ petition was received at the High Court by post. On the administrative side it was directed that the petitioner should append court-fee. The matter was, accordingly, sent to the stamp reporter. The High Court intimated the petitioner that if he desires that this matter be considered then he would need to pay court-fee on the petition. The report of the stamp reporter on the petition is relevant. It is reproduced : "The stamp reporter proposed to file court-fee of Rs. 250/- under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, a letter vide memo no. 4122 dated 2.8.2001 was sent to the petitioner intimating him regarding institution of writ petition as P.I.L. case, and he was also required to pay the Court-fee of Rs. 250/- under Article 226 of Rs. 500/- for Article 227. The petitioner was given two weeks time for paying the courtfee. Accordingly, the petitioner paid the court-fee of Rs. 250/- on 14.8.2001 within the time fixed for that. The Courtfee of Rs. 250/- was supplied by the petitioner. The Court-fee of course was paid on the petition. 250/- under Article 226 of Rs. 500/- for Article 227. The petitioner was given two weeks time for paying the courtfee. Accordingly, the petitioner paid the court-fee of Rs. 250/- on 14.8.2001 within the time fixed for that. The Courtfee of Rs. 250/- was supplied by the petitioner. The Court-fee of course was paid on the petition. The Court finds that if a petition is to be filed before the Patna High Court and should a citizen or his lawyer may mention that the petition is being filed under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, then, the court-fee would need be paid against reference to Article 226 being Rs. 250/- and another set of Rs. 250/- for making reference to Article 227. It is nobodys case that the courtfee may not be charged if a petition is presented under Article 226 or for that matter under Article 227 but, if consequentially action or direction may need be taken on the cause whether the petition is under Article 226 or under Article 227 it would inevitably be a writ of the High Court. Under given circumstances, if a writ were to issue to a subordinate court or a tribunal it will partake the nature of a writ of prohibition. The examination of the record would be under a writ of certiorari and if a direction were to be given, then, it would only be appropriate, regard being had to the circumstances that the High Court would be exercising extraordinary remedies, which a prerogative writ jurisdiction is, a writ of prohibition may replace a writ of mandamus in the case of a subordinate court or a tribunal. The Court is of the opinion that requiring a citizen to pay double set of court-fee only because a petition will refer to Article 226 along with Article 227, prima facie seems to be arbitrary. In the circumstances, in so far as entry (3) to sub-clause (c) of item 1 to Schedule II of the Court-Fees Act, 1870 as amended by the Bihar Act 7 of 1996 is concerned this matter needs to be examined. If this entry were to stand it acts as a deterrent to a citizen to move the Court and this may amount to an impediment in his liberty in availing the prerogative writ jurisdiction of the Court which is a right conferred by the Constitution. If this entry were to stand it acts as a deterrent to a citizen to move the Court and this may amount to an impediment in his liberty in availing the prerogative writ jurisdiction of the Court which is a right conferred by the Constitution. Ultimately, what decision the Court may take on the cause is another matter. In the circumstances, let a copy of this order in formality be delivered to the Advocate General, Bihar, as a notice. Notice on this context has already been received by the State counsel Mr. R.K. Dutta, S.C. 4. He prays that the State of Bihar be given one months time to respond to the notice. Put up immediately after one month on the supplementary list. B. In so far as the petition is concerned having been filed in formality and the High Court having communicated to the petitioner that he may append the court-fee, the petitioner cannot be given that much latitude that he can mail a petition to the High Court and not appear at the Bar. The Court is not inclined to act on this petition in the absence of the petitioner. Thus, the record of the petition is consigned. C. The other aspect, that is, the matter on the report of the stamp reporter dated 28 August 2001 will become a separate matter on which the registry will enter a separate number so that any matter on the merit of the petition as was presented is not mixed up with the notices which have been issued and accepted by the State counsel today. The cause will be registered as : In the matter of Court-fees re. Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India." 3. Notice on this petition was given to the three Bar Associations by an order of the Court dated 3 October, 2001. In the meantime, when the matter was placed on 7 November, 2001, the State filed its counter affidavit. The Court gave indulgences to the three Bar Associations on 8 November, 2001, 10 December, 2001 and 11 December, 2001. to adjourn the matter in case they desire to address the Court. 4. As of date there has been no serious address to the Court by any of the Bar Associations. The Court gave indulgences to the three Bar Associations on 8 November, 2001, 10 December, 2001 and 11 December, 2001. to adjourn the matter in case they desire to address the Court. 4. As of date there has been no serious address to the Court by any of the Bar Associations. However, today at the Bar notwithstanding the fact that the Associations were not sufficiently interested to place any serious argument though an opportunity was provided, two members of the Bar have addressed the Court. They are Dr. R. Usha and Mr. A.K. Tripathi. Reply has also been given on behalf of the State by State Counsel (4) Mr. R.K. Dutta. 5. The contention on behalf of the counsel who have addressed the Court is, to the effect, that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is a remedy provided to a citizen against a State action; this is not a rich mans remedy but for any citizen who may feel the need to seek the protection of the High Court for a relief which may be provided under the High Courts writ jurisdiction which could be Article 226 and also Article 227. The submission was not developed. 6. It was further submitted that if it were a corporate body then the question of any person being aggrieved by court fees would not arise as the corporate body would have the capacity to pay any court fees. Yet, if the remedy was invoked by an indigent person then a question will arise whether a set of court fees merely is to be paid. Given the circumstances, this may happen because a lawyer may advise that one relief may partake the nature of being provided under Article 226 and the other under Article 227. Both the Articles compliment each other. It is not the intention of the Constitution that a constitutional remedy providing extraordinary remedies should become an excuse and recourse to a revenue earning exercise. 7. On behalf of the State, learned counsel submitted, firstly, by accepting that there is an element of commonness when High Court issues writs whether under Article 226 and one of the writs mentioned in Article 226 may be a writ which is utilised by the High Court under Article 227 under its supervisory jurisdiction on the inferior courts or Tribunals. On behalf of the State, learned counsel submitted, firstly, by accepting that there is an element of commonness when High Court issues writs whether under Article 226 and one of the writs mentioned in Article 226 may be a writ which is utilised by the High Court under Article 227 under its supervisory jurisdiction on the inferior courts or Tribunals. It was contended that the power of the State to provide for taxing such petitions by court fees is sanctioned by the Constitution under List II, the State List, Entry 3. The contention was that the State has committed no arbitrary act in legislating that separate court fees will need to be paid for a relief sought under Article 227 and Article 226. Further, it was contended that there is no occasion for the High Court to examine the matter of amendment which has provided for the payment of separate court fees when a relief is sought under Articles 227 and 226. 8. It was stressed that no person aggrieved is before the Court. It was further contended that even though the Court had given indulgences to the three Bar Associations to address the Court no sufficient interest has been indicated at the Bar by the three Lawyers Association at the High Court to address the Court. Learned counsel submitted, in the circumstances, that if there is no sufficient interest on the issue before the Court, then, why should the Court go to the ultimate in examining the matter whether the levy of a separate court fees in the same proceeding, under Article 227 and Article 226, be considered for being declared ultra vires. Impliedly, the contention was that should an objection be presented then that may be the occasion when the Court may consider that issue. 9. Learned counsel for the State cited two decisions of the Supreme Court. These are in the matters of Hari Vishnu V/s. Ahmad Ishaque ( AIR 1955 S.C. 233 ) and State of Gujarat V/s. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1481 ). In the matter of Hari Vishnu V/s. Ahmad Ishaque learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 20. These are in the matters of Hari Vishnu V/s. Ahmad Ishaque ( AIR 1955 S.C. 233 ) and State of Gujarat V/s. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1481 ). In the matter of Hari Vishnu V/s. Ahmad Ishaque learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 20. The Courts attention was being drawn to the observation of the Supreme Court that, in context, it was observed that while in a writ of certiorari under Article 226 the High Court can only annul the decision of the Tribunal, it can, under Article 227, do that, and also issue further directions in the matter. In the matter of State of Gujarat V/s. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela reliance was placed in the observations in paragraph 14 by submitting that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court contained in Article 227 is always there and whether resort to a prerogative writ is made or not made a writ petition would still be sustained for the purpose of revising the decision of the Tribunal and that the High Court could in any case annul the decision of the Tribunal and also issue further directions in the matter. The cases cited to do not meet the point to charge two courts fees on the same writ petition if the petitioner makes reference to Articles 226 and 227 by addressing a common jurisdiction of the High Court and seeks consequential reliefs resting on prerogative writs arising out of the same cause. 10. The issue is not one of technicalities. The fact is that now there is less debate on what is the genesis and context of the 5 prerogative writs which are mentioned in Article 226 by name, as writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari, or any of them. 11. The insertion of name of the 5 prerogative writs under Article 226 and also retaining the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over the inferior Tribunals is the result of the Constitution of India. The Government of India Act, 1935 had not provided for the issue of prerogative writs. It could not. The Act was for governance by an alien authority, then of an Empire and the suzerainty of an Empire could not have its decision declared ultra vires. Certiorari is the domain of superior courts of record in a republic, not under colonial rule. It could not. The Act was for governance by an alien authority, then of an Empire and the suzerainty of an Empire could not have its decision declared ultra vires. Certiorari is the domain of superior courts of record in a republic, not under colonial rule. Because if it were then the very foundation of a colonial empire could be questioned by a subject under subjugation. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court, except of Habeas Corpus provided under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was not available. Thus, there was no writ of certiorari, no writ of mandamus, no writ of quo warranto and no writ of prohibition. What today is Article 227, it was not there. In Section 224 of Government of India Act, 1935 as reserving the administrative function of the High Court as opposed to under Article 227 of Constitution, Section 224 is reproduced below : "224. (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts in India for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction, and may do any of the following things, that is to say, (a) call for returns; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts; and (d) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff, attorneys, and all clerks and officers of courts : Provided that such rules, forms and tables shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision." 12. There is a basic difference. Under Article 227 there is a power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. This is different from the administrative function of the High Court as under the Government of India Act, 1935. Then subclause (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 does not confer on the High Court any jurisdiction to question a judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. This clause has not been repeated in Article 227. Then subclause (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 does not confer on the High Court any jurisdiction to question a judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. This clause has not been repeated in Article 227. Instead, sub-clause (4) of Article 227 of Constitution of India says that nothing in this Article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court power of superintendence over any court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to Armed Forces. This is an exception to keep administrative or quasi judicial proceedings of the military away from superintendence. But a decision of a military tribunal is subject to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution has brought a fundamental change for the citizen. The only reservation is that the supervisory jurisdiction will not extend to any Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to Armed forces. But it is not that the proceedings, which are under the Armed Forces Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1950 and Navy Act, 1950, are not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. In its supervisory jurisdiction if interference is occasioned by the High Court the resort will be to two modalities. A writ of certiorari to bring forth the record to proceed on a certificate action. Thereafter, a writ of prohibition to forebear an inferior tribunal or court to not to do or do a certain thing. If the writ was to judge an executive action for a direction a writ of mandamus would be resorted to. 13. In the matter under consideration the academic question is that if more than one writ is being resorted to of the five mentioned in Article 226 notwithstanding that one may be taken recourse to under Article 227, would a citizen have to pay a set of court fees? The relevant aspect is that in the same proceeding on the same petition and by the same petitioner. Not noticed in the case cited is an observation of the Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Vishnu V/s. Ahmad Ishaque (supra) in paragraph 15. The relevant aspect is that in the same proceeding on the same petition and by the same petitioner. Not noticed in the case cited is an observation of the Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Vishnu V/s. Ahmad Ishaque (supra) in paragraph 15. The relevant portion is reproduced : "What is stated there is that both writs of prohibition and certiorari have for their object the restraining of inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction, and they could be issued not merely to courts but to all authorities exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. But there is one fundamental distinction between the two writs, and that is that is material for the present purpose. They are issued at different stages of the proceedings. When an inferior court takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom the proceedings are taken can move the superior court for a writ of prohibition, and on that, an order will issue forbidding the inferior court from continuing the proceedings. On the other hand, if the court hears that cause or matter and gives a decision, the party aggrieved would have to move the superior court for a writ of certiorari, and on that, an order will be made quashing the decision on the ground of want of jurisdiction." 14. It needs to be noticed with emphasis that the Supreme Court has observed that two writs whether certiorari or prohibition at times are issued at different stages but within the same proceeding. Again here the question is : would a citizen pay a double set of court fees.? 15. The question does arise as to what exactly is the dominant purpose for prescribing court fees to present a petition under the High Courts prerogative writ jurisdiction. The enactment known as the Court Fees Act is of 1870. Clearly, the purpose of this Act is to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. The High Courts writ jurisdiction for securing Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution may be a misplaced subject to earn revenues. Atleast this cannot be the dominant purpose. 16. But the important part is that even after indulgences by the Court to the three Bar Associations no sufficient interest was generated on the issue. The High Courts writ jurisdiction for securing Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution may be a misplaced subject to earn revenues. Atleast this cannot be the dominant purpose. 16. But the important part is that even after indulgences by the Court to the three Bar Associations no sufficient interest was generated on the issue. The fundamental question will remain for the State to consider whether the citizen be saddled with double court fees in the same proceeding on the same writ petition if a mention is made of Article 226 for seeking a writ of certiorari and Article 227 for a writ of prohibition? The Court will leave the question at this. The Court has been persuaded on the contention of learned counsel for the State that no sufficient interest having been shown at the Bar nor by any person aggrieved, the High Court why may not give a declaration that the amendments to the Court Fees Act, 1870 , in context, charging a set of court fees on the same petition be declared ultra vires. 17. So be it. Let the State of Bihar ponder over it, then in the meantime.