JUDGMENT : L. Mohapatra, J. - Plaintiff No. 1 is the appellant before this Court against a reversing judgment. The Suit was filed for declaration of plaintiffs title and possession over the suit schedule property and for declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to take possession of the suit schedule lands from the receiver appointed by the Executive Magistrate. Originally the present appellant had filed this suit and later on by order dated 8.4.1980 the mother of the appellant was added as plaintiff No. 2. 2. Case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff No. 1 is the owner in possession of the suit schedule property and the plaintiff No. 2 as the mother of plaintiff No. 1 had gifted the suit schedule property to her in the year 1975. After execution of the gift deed the plaintiff No. 1 raised crops over the suit lands but the defendants threatened to remove paddy crops for which the plaintiff No. 1 initiated a proceeding u/s 144, Cr.P.C. in the Court of the Executive Magistrate which was subsequently converted to a proceeding u/s 146, Cr.P.C. and the land was attached. After attachment of the land the Executive Magistrate directed the parties to establish their rights over the suit land in the Civil Court and appointed a receiver. In view of the above, the plaintiff No. 1 had to initially file the suit for reliefs claimed. 3. Case of the defendant is that the plaintiff No. 1 is the daughter of P. Kalidas, the first husband of plaintiff No. 2. Defendant is the son of plaintiff No. 2 through her second husband E. Pentaya. Plaintiff No. 2 accepted the second husband after death of her first husband and the second husband was working at Assam and used to send money to the plaintiff No. 2. Plaintiff No. 2 with that money purchased the suit schedule land and after death of her husband E. Pentaya, the defendant has been in possession of the suit schedule land in his own right for more than 15 years and is paying land revenues and water tax, etc. Further case of the defendant is that he had once mortgaged the land to a Cooperative Society and borrowed fertilizers and seeds, etc. and during last settlement the land has been recorded in the name of defendant. Further case of the defendant is that he had once mortgaged the land to a Cooperative Society and borrowed fertilizers and seeds, etc. and during last settlement the land has been recorded in the name of defendant. Plaintiff No. 1 exercising undue influence got the gift executed in her favour, but however the delivery of possession could not be given to the plaintiff No. 1. It is also stated in the written statement that though plaintiff No. 2 was living separately the defendant was paying 12 putties of paddy towards the maintenance and the suit schedule property being the property of the family of the defendants, the plaintiff No. 1 has no claim over the same. As an alternative plea the defendant also pleaded that having remained in possession of the suit schedule land for more than the statutory period, he had perfected his title by adverse possession. 4. Learned Munsif, Parlakhemundi on pleadings of the parties framed six issues. Issue No. 1 is whether the plaintiff No. 2 purchased the lands covered under the sale deeds dated 18.2.52 and 25.3.52 out of her stridhan funds. Issue No. 2 relates to the legality of the gift deed executed by the plaintiff No. 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 1. Issue Nos. A and B relate to possession of the parties on the suit land and Issue No. 3 relates to claim of adverse possession advanced by the defendant. While answering issue No. 1 the learned Munsif held that the plaintiff No. 2 had purchased the suit property out of her Stridhan. While answering issue No. A the learned Munsif held that though D.W. 1 was in physical possession of the suit land the legal possession was with the plaintiff No. 2 who is the original owner of the suit schedule land. So far as the gift deed is concerned, while answering issue No. 2 the learned Munsif held the same to be invalid and not binding on the defendant. So far as claim of adverse possession is concerned, while answering issue No. 3 the learned Munsif held that since the defendant was cultivating the land on behalf of the plaintiff No. 2 his possession was permissive and can never be treated as adverse possession. So far as claim of adverse possession is concerned, while answering issue No. 3 the learned Munsif held that since the defendant was cultivating the land on behalf of the plaintiff No. 2 his possession was permissive and can never be treated as adverse possession. On the above findings, the learned Munsif decreed the suit so far as the claim of plaintiff No. 2 is concerned and dismissed the claim of the plaintiff No. 1 with regard to title claimed on the basis of gift deed. Challenging the said judgment and decree the defendant No. 1 preferred appeal before the Subordinate Judge, Parlakhemundi. The lower appellate Court on consideration of evidence on record found that the plaintiff No. 2 failed to prove her sources of income for payment of consideration in respect of the aforesaid two sale deeds and further held that the suit schedule properties were purchased from out of the money given by the husband of plaintiff No. 2. With the above findings the lower appellate Court reversed the findings of the learned Munsif to the effect that the suit schedule properties were purchased from out of Stridhan of plaintiff No. 2. The lower appellate Court further held that the suit schedule properties had been purchased benami and in view of such transaction there cannot be any possibility of claim of title by way of adverse possession. With the above finding, the appeal having been allowed, the plaintiff No. 1 is before this Court in this Second Appeal. 5. At the time of admission this Court formulated the following substantial questions of law to be adjudicated at the time of hearing of the appeal. "Whether the entire suit is likely to be dismissed in the facts and circumstances of the case." 6. Referring to the substantial question of law formulated by this Court at the time of hearing of the appeal. The learned counsel appearing for both parties also raised other substantial questions of law involved in this appeal and therefore this appeal is also required to be adjudicated on the following substantial questions of law. (i) Whether the property purchased by plaintiff No. 2 from out of the money given to her by her husband for maintenance can be treated as Stridhan of plaintiff No. 2 ? (i) Whether the property purchased by plaintiff No. 2 from out of the money given to her by her husband for maintenance can be treated as Stridhan of plaintiff No. 2 ? (ii) Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in ignoring the additional evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant stating therein that willnama had been executed in her favour by the plaintiff No. 2 in respect of the suit schedule property ? 7. Referring to the aforesaid substantial questions of law Sri Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the sale deed under which the plaintiff No. 2 had purchased the lands cannot be treated as benami transaction as in a benami transaction one buys property in the name of another and such ingredient is absent in the present case. According to Sri Rao, admittedly the property was purchased by the plaintiff No. 2 in her name and therefore the question of benami transaction does not arise at all. Apart from the amount of money paid by the husband of plaintiff No. 2 the evidence having been led to the extent that the plaintiff No. 2 had also invested money for purchasing the suit schedule land from out of the sale proceeds of gold given to her by her mother, the lower appellate Court committed error of record by holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the sources of income apart from the money received from the husband for purchasing the suit schedule property. Referring to Mulla Hindu Law, 14th Edition Sri Rao submitted that the property acquired from the money sent by the husband being Stridhan property there was no reason for the lower appellate Court to take a contrary view. Sri Rao further contended that a female is not a member of the coparcenary nor is a member of joint family and the property held by her can only be accepted as her property and in reference to the said contention the learned counsel also referred to Mulla Hindu Law, 14th Edition. He also contended that willnama executed by the plaintiff No. 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 should have been considered by the lower appellate Court as the same had been tendered by way of additional evidence and being a subsequent event there was not reason for the lower appellate Court to ignore the same. He also contended that willnama executed by the plaintiff No. 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 should have been considered by the lower appellate Court as the same had been tendered by way of additional evidence and being a subsequent event there was not reason for the lower appellate Court to ignore the same. Miss Sanju Panda, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 who was the contesting defendant submitted that whether the transaction is benami or not is dependent on the fact as to who paid the consideration. Between husband and wife if husband has paid consideration money and the property is purchased by wife the same can be termed to be a benami transaction. So far as the present case is concerned, according to Miss Panda, admittedly husband of plaintiff No. 2 was sending money to her for her maintenance and from out of such money the suit property having been purchased it can safely be said that the consideration money paid for purchasing land belonged to the husband of plaintiff No. 2. So far as additional evidence is concerned, it was submitted by Miss Panda that a petition was filed before the lower appellate Court for adducing additional evidence without making any changes in the pleadings and therefore, it was rightly not considered by the lower appellate Court. 8. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for both parties. It is required to look into the pleadings of the parties. The present appellant is the plaintiff No. 1 and had initially filed the suit alone and came out with a case that the suit schedule property was given to her by way of gift by her mother under registered gift deed dated 8.10.75. She came into possession of the suit schedule property in terms of gift deed and remained in exclusive possession thereof in her own right. Only when a proceeding u/s 144, Cr.P.C., later on converted to a proceeding u/s 146, Cr.P.C., a receiver was appointed and the parties were directed to establish their title in a competent civil Court, the suit had been filed. From the record it appears that by way of amendment dated 8.4.80 mother of the plaintiff No. 1 was added as plaintiff No. 2. From the record it appears that by way of amendment dated 8.4.80 mother of the plaintiff No. 1 was added as plaintiff No. 2. It further appears from the record that the plaint was filed on 29.6.1977 and amendment petition was filed on 6.8.1979 taking additional grounds in the plaint that the plaintiff No. 2 had purchased the suit schedule land by selling her gold ornaments. The contesting defendant's specific plea is that after his birth his father Pentayya (husband of plaintiff No. 2) had gone to Assam to work in a Tea Garden and used to send money to the plaintiff No. 2 (mother of the defendant) and with that money only the suit schedule properties were purchased by the plaintiff No. 2 in her name. Further case of the defendant is that he is in khas possession of the land on his own right for more than 15 years and is paying the land revenue as son of plaintiff No. 2. 9. Question that arise now for consideration is whether the suit schedule properties purchased by the plaintiff No. 2 can be considered as Stridhan on it was a benami transaction in favour of plaintiff No. 2 when consideration amount was paid by husband of plaintiff No. 2. From the pleadings as aforesaid it is admitted by both parties that after birth of defendant the second husband of plaintiff No. 2 i.e. father of defendant was staying in Assam was working in a Tea Garden. Further admitted case is that he was sending money to the plaintiff No. 2 for maintenance. Though it is the case of the defendant that the suit schedule properties were purchased from out of the said money, it is the case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff No. 2 had also sold away gold ornaments received by her from her mother to purchase the suit schedule properties. Though it is the case of the defendant that the suit schedule properties were purchased from out of the said money, it is the case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff No. 2 had also sold away gold ornaments received by her from her mother to purchase the suit schedule properties. In para 115 of Hindu Law by Mulla, 14th Edition, "Stridhan" has been defined by Vijnaneswara in the Mitakshara in the following manner : "That which was given by the father, by the mother, by the husband, or by a brother; and that which was presented by the maternal uncles and the rest at the time of wedding before the nuptial fire; and a gift on a second marriage or graduity on account of supersession P, and, as indicated by the word adya (and rest), (1) inheritance; (2) purchase; (3) partition; (4) seizure, e.g., adverse possession(a); (5) finding; and this is stridhan according to Manu and the rest." The Apex Court in the case of Pratibha Rani v. Surai Kumat and Anr., reported in AIR 1995 SC 628 observed as follows : Article 126 in Mulla's Hindu Law, Fifteenth Edition, describing what constitutes stridhana reads : "Property given on bequeathed to a Hindu female whether during maidenhood, coverture or widowhood by her parents and their relations or by her husband and his relations is stridhana according to all schools except that the Dayabhaga does not recognise immovable property given or bequeathed by husband to his wife as stridhana." Though Miss Panda, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 may be right in saying that the consideration money paid for purchasing the suit schedule properties had been advanced by husband of plaintiff No. 2, it cannot be accepted that the money belonged to husband of plaintiff No. 2. Admittedly, husband of plaintiff No. 2 was sending money from Assam for maintenance of plaintiff No. 2 and from out of said money she had purchased the land in dispute. Therefore, in the light of the views expressed and quoted above by the Apex Court as well as in the authoritative book Hindu Law by Mulla, I am of the view it can safely be said that the money paid for purchasing the land in dispute is Stridhan and by no stretch of imagination it can be termed as benami. Therefore, in the light of the views expressed and quoted above by the Apex Court as well as in the authoritative book Hindu Law by Mulla, I am of the view it can safely be said that the money paid for purchasing the land in dispute is Stridhan and by no stretch of imagination it can be termed as benami. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record or pleadings of the defendant that for purchasing the land the husband of plaintiff No. 2 had advanced money and in absence of any such pleading or evidence the concept of benami transaction brought into the case by the learned counsel for the respondent is not acceptable. In view of the above finding consequent conclusion is that the plaintiff No. 2 was the owner of the suit schedule properties. 10. So far as the plaintiff No. 1 is concerned, her case is that she had received the property by way of gift. The said gift was not accepted by the learned Munsif and prayer for declaration on the basis of such gift deed was turned down by the trial Court. The plaintiff did not file any appeal against the said part of the decree. Having not filed any appeal challenging the said decree, it is no more open for her to claim title on the basis of the gift deed before this Court. Therefore, plaintiff's prayer for declaration of her title over the suit schedule properties on the basis of the gift deed cannot be entertained in this appeal. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant facing with such a situation based his claim on willnama which was tendered before the lower appellate Court by way of additional evidence. There is no pleading in the plaint with regard to willnama and obviously the defendant has been deprived of opportunity of challenging the same or adducing evidence challenging the willnama. Even at the lower appellate Court stage the plaintiff No. 1 did not file any application for amendment of the plaint and before this Court also no such application is filed. Since a complete new case is sought to be introduced by way of additional evidence, I am not inclined to entertain the same. Even at the lower appellate Court stage the plaintiff No. 1 did not file any application for amendment of the plaint and before this Court also no such application is filed. Since a complete new case is sought to be introduced by way of additional evidence, I am not inclined to entertain the same. The plaintiff No. 1 who is the appellant before this Court has failed to prove her title over the suit schedule properties by virtue of gift deed which is already declared to be invalid and the wiilnama on the basis of which claim is made at present cannot be entertained in view of the reasons stated above. It is open for the plaintiff to seek for remedies in a separate proceeding claiming title by way of the said willnama. The defendant's claim also considers no merit. The plaintiff No. 2 (now dead) having acquired the property out of stridhan, it could not be treated as a property belonging to the family and therefore mere possession of defendant on behalf of the deceased-plaintiff No. 2 cannot be treated as adverse to that of plaintiff No. 2. After death of plaintiff No. 2, whether defendant shall be entitled to a share therein or not cannot be decided in this suit. 11. In view of the findings arrived at the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. The plaintiff No. 2 having died in the meantime the decree of the trial Court declaring title of plaintiff No. 2 cannot also be sustained. It shall be open for the parties to seek for appropriate remedy on the basis of their respective claims in separate proceeding. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.