Judgment S.N.Jha, J. 1. The petitioner has been detained under preventive custody under Section 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (in short the Act) by the District Magistrate, Madhepura vide his memo no. 1246 dated 31.8.2001. He seeks quashing of the said order. He also seeks quashing of the order dated 7.9.2001 by which the State Government has approved the detention in terms of Section 12(3) of the Act, and the order dated 31.10.2001 by which the State Government has confirmed the detention upto 3.9.2002 in terms of Section 21(1) read with Section 22 of the Act. 2. The facts of the case so far as necessary for the purpose of this case are that the detention order and the grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on 4.9.2001. On 24.9.2001 he made representation to the State Government challenging the detention. On 4.10.2001 the petitioner was informed about the rejection had of his representation. Earlier reference had been made to the Advisory Board which opined in favour of the detention. 3. Shri Narmadeshwar Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly, submitted that there was inordinate delay in disposal of the representation and the detention is fit to be struck down on this, ground alone. He placed reliance on Sunil Khatik @ Sunil Prasad @ Sunil Bihari V/s. State of Bihar, 1999(2) PLJR 744 and Rajammal V/s. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1999 SC 684 . The relevant facts in this regard are as follows. The petitioner made representation on 24.9.2001.It was received by the Government on the same day. On the next day i.e. 25.9.2001 the comments of the detaining authority was sought. On 28.9.2001 the comments was received. On 3.10.2001 the representation was rejected. On 4.10.2001 the rejection was communicated. Thus, it took 9 days in all to dispose of the representation. 4. In Rajammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), the decision cited on behalf of the petitioner, the Supreme Court observed that though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for decision on the representation, the words "as soon as may be" in Clause (5) of Article22 convey the message that the representation should be considered and disposed of at the earliest. But that does not mean that the authority is preempted from explaining any delay in the disposal of the representation. But that does not mean that the authority is preempted from explaining any delay in the disposal of the representation. The court can certainly consider whether the delay was occasioned due to premissible or unavoidable reasons. If the delay was caused on account of any indifference or laches in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. Thus,it may not be enough to say that delay was short. Even longer delay can be explained. It is therefore, not the duration or range of delay but how it is explained by the authority concerned. Having said so, while considering the facts of the case, the Court noted that the Dy. Secretary Incharge submitted the file to the Minister who received it while he was on tour. After five days the Minister passed the order. The Court rejected the explanation that as the Minister was on tour, he could not pass order earlier. 5. In Sunil Khatik vs. State of Bihar (supra) another decision relied upon on behalf of the petitioner, the detenu had filed representation on 3.12.98 which was received in the office of the District Magistrate on 7.12.98. The matter remained pending there until 15.12.98 as the District Magistrate was on leave. This period between 7.12.98 and 15.12.98 was held to be unexplained. Another period which was held to be unexplained was between 22.12.98 and 7.1.99 during which no action was taken on receipt of representation in the Home Department. In the facts of the case, therefore, the Court held that there was undue delay in disposal of the representation and detention was quashed. 6. In the instant case, as noted above, on the very next day of receipt of representation the comments was called for from the detaining authority. Within 3 days the comment was received. Within 5 days of the receipt of the comments, the representation was rejected. If 30.9.2001 being Sunday and 2.10.2001 also being a holiday are excluded, that was within three days. This Court thus does not find there was any delay muchless inordinate delay in disposing of the representation. 7. Within 3 days the comment was received. Within 5 days of the receipt of the comments, the representation was rejected. If 30.9.2001 being Sunday and 2.10.2001 also being a holiday are excluded, that was within three days. This Court thus does not find there was any delay muchless inordinate delay in disposing of the representation. 7. It was next contended that the basis of satisfaction of the District Magistrate is said to be Muriiganj P.S. Case No. 143/99, Muriiganj P.S. Case No. 21/2000 and Muriiganj P.S. Case No. 163/98 and two Sanha entries at the Muriiganj Police Station being Sanha No. 396 dated 20.6.2000 and Sanha No. 503 dated 25.6.2000. So far as the substantive cases namely, Muriiganj P.S. Case Nos. 143/99, 21/2000 and 163/98 are concerned, the petitioner has been granted bail, while in the Sanhas he is not named. The Sanhas at least should be treated as irrelevant. As the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on irrelevant facts, the detention should be set aside. It was also submitted that there is distinction between public order and law and order. The alleged occurrences fall within the domain of law and order and cannot be treated as grounds of detention as being prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Lalan Singh V/s. State of Bihar, 1988 PLJR 64 and Pappu Yadav alias Rajesh Ranjan Yadav alias Rajesh Kumar Ranjan V/s. State of Bihar 1987 PLJR 58 (NOC). It may be stated that counsel made reference to certain other cases also, citations of which turned out to be wrong. 8. So far as the distinction between public order and law and order is concerned, in Gulab Mehra V/s. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 2332 the distinction was pointed out by the Supreme Court in these words, "It is evident that an act whether amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of public order solely depends on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of public order." 9. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of public order." 9. Coming to the facts of the present case it wilt appear that on 18.12.99 the petitioner along with his associates had made demand of Rs. 25 thousand as Rangdari tax (extortion money) from the proprietor of Gulab Theatre while the show was going on and threatened to kill. His intimidatory acts set in commotion. On receipt of information police reached but none was ready to lodge the case. After much pursuasion the proprietor Banarsi Bhagat lodged report on the basis of which Muliganj P.S. Case No.143/99 was instituted under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code. On 20.3.2000 on the eve of Holi festival at 3.30 p.m. the petitioner along with his associates forcibly attacked the house of Anmol Yadav and brutally assaulted him. They damaged the furniture and looted the articles. These acts created an atmosphere of terror. This gave rise to Murliganj RS. Case No. 21/2000. Earlier on 22.12.98 at 11.30 a.m. the petitioner along with his associates forcibly entered the Murliganj Branch of Central Bank of India and started searching the Branch Manager in order to kill him. When the Branch Manager could not be found, he gave threat to the employees to kill each of them. These acts created terror at the place. After great pursuasion the Dy. Manager of the Bank lodged written report on the basis of which Murliganj RS. case no. 163/96 was instituted. The fourth occurrence dated 20.6.2000 giving rise to Sanha no. 396 relates to assault of the Executive Engineer and Junior Engineer of Koshi Division for non-payment of extortion money. Sanha no. 503 relates to occurrence of 25.6.2000 when the petitioner demanded extortion money from the traders and for non-payment thereof abused them creating terror in the locality. As regards the submission that the petitioner is not named in Sanha nos. 396 relates to assault of the Executive Engineer and Junior Engineer of Koshi Division for non-payment of extortion money. Sanha no. 503 relates to occurrence of 25.6.2000 when the petitioner demanded extortion money from the traders and for non-payment thereof abused them creating terror in the locality. As regards the submission that the petitioner is not named in Sanha nos. 396 and 503 and therefore satisfaction of the detaining authority should be held to be vitiated as being based on irrelevant facts, I got the facts verified from the records and it transpired that the petitioner is very much named in the said two sanhas. 10. It would thus appear that the petitioner committed acts at public places such as theatres, market, bank, govt, offices etc. which cannot be said to be limited to individuals in their sweep and impact. These acts are such as to create sense of fear amongst the people and disturb the even tempo of life. In these premises, the detention of the petitioner for committing acts prejudicial to public order within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act cannot be said to be outside the scope of preventive detention. In this proceeding we are not concerned with the nature of the case-whether registered as a substantive case or as Sanha-we have to consider the nature of the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner. Being named in the sanhas as, indeed, in the written reports which are the basis of substantive cases, referred to above, if the detaining authority based his satisfaction on the fact stated and brought to his notice, the satisfaction cannot be said to be vitiated as to warrant any interference by this Court. The petitioner is said to have committed acts at public places in broad day light and within public view. If the District Magistrate based his satisfaction on these acts, the satisfaction cannot be said to be vitiated. It is well settled that this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction does not sit as a Court of appeal. Whether the grounds are true or false cannot be seen nor the adequacy thereof can be gone into. 11. In the result I do not find any merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. Tarkeshwar Pd.Singh, J. 12 I agree.