ORDER : This Civil Revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code is directed against the order dated 7-7-1999, passed by Additional District Judge, Shujalpur, in Regular Civil Suit No. 42-A/95, whereby the Trial Court decided the preliminary issue "whether the present suit is maintainable, in view of the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code." 2. The brief facts of the case are that about 35 years' ago at Shujalpur Mandi near 'Ganda Nala' the plaintiff constructed two rooms with the oral permission of the officers. In one room plaintiff No. 1 was residing and in another room plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 were residing. Defendant No. 1 was trying to remove the plaintiffs from the aforesaid place and for that firstly he tried to evict them through Nagar Palika, Shujalpur and, thereafter, he filed an application under section 133, Criminal Procedure Code before the S.D.M. Shujalpur on 27-4-1991. By the order of the S.D.M. the plaintiffs' house was demolished and they were removed. Even prior to this date on 23-4-1991 the applicant started demolishing the structure with the help of his brother and servants and, thereafter, on 26-4-1991 they removed the goods and demolished the house and dispossessed the plaintiffs. Thereafter, on 15-10-1991, the non-applicants/plaintiffs filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against the present applicant and others and in this earlier suit he has only claimed restoration of possession, and thereafter on 19-4-1994 they have filed another suit for damages claiming compensation for illegal demolishion of their house and also for cost of the goods. In the second suit applicant-defendant raised an objection about its maintainability and submitted that the second suit is barred on the principle of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. 3. The trial Court by the impugned order decided this issue against the applicant-defendant holding therein that the suit under section 6 is a special nature of suit for restoration of possession, and the second suit has been filed under Section 7 of the Act for damages as the plaintiff is not legally permitted to claim damages in the earlier suit for possession, therefore, the second suit is not barred and rejected the application. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. The submission of Shri Kutumble, learned counsel for the applicant is that both the suits have been filed arising out of the same incident, therefore, the second suit is not maintainable and barred. He relied on two decisions reported in the case of Ajujir Rehman vs. Fakhruddin, 1980 MPLJ S. Note 15 and in the case of P. C. Rajput vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997(1) MPLJ 102 but both the decisions are not helpful to him. The case of Ajujir Rehman (supra) relates to the eviction suit and the case of P. C. Rajput (supra) related to arbitration matter in which it has been held that second claim petition is not maintainable for left over claims under M. P. Madhyasthan Adhikaran Adhiniyam, as earlier petition was filed about the termination of contract and certain claims were not included in that regarding illegal seizure of material and in that context it was held that subsequent reference petition under section 7 claiming damages for illegal seizure of material was barred. Here in this case the facts of the present dispute are quite different. The plaintiff has filed two suits, one is under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act claiming possession; and another suit under section 7 of the Specific Relief Act for claiming damages. Therefore, the aforesaid cases cited by learned counsel for applicant/defendant are not helpful to him. 6. The trial Court has clearly observed in its impugned order that the suit filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is of a summary nature suit and is a suit of special category in which only question of illegal dispossession can be examined and the suit under section 7 is for claiming damages through both the suits arise out of the same cause of action are maintainable. To appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to examine the scope of the suits filed under sections 6 and 7 of the Specific Relief Act. To appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to examine the scope of the suits filed under sections 6 and 7 of the Specific Relief Act. It is true that under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act a suit can be filed in special circumstances when any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law and it has been further provided that no suit under this section shall be brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession and no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. Sub-section (4) of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act clearly provides that nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. The object behind this provision is to provide a summary, cheap and useful remedy to a person dispossessed of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 620 , that :- "The word trespass" in Section 326 would include forcible entry and dispossession by the landlord. A Landlord does commit trespass when he forcibly enters on land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (old Act) it is well settled that question of title is irrelevant in a suit under that section. As the structure of section 326 of Qanoon Mal, read with Section 163 of Qanoon Ryotwari, is similar to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, there is no reason why section 326 should be interpreted differently. The view that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee is not correct. AIR 1957 MB 79 , Reversed; AIR 1955 Cal 601 , overruled; AIR 1924 PC 144 and AIR 1959 All 1 and AIR 1954 Bom. AIR 1957 MB 79 , Reversed; AIR 1955 Cal 601 , overruled; AIR 1924 PC 144 and AIR 1959 All 1 and AIR 1954 Bom. 358 , Approved; (1911) 13 BLR 1200. Distinguished. 7. It has been held by the various High Courts that in a suit for recovery of possession under Section 6 decree for mesne profits cannot be granted and even the claim for the damages ought not to be joined with claim for possession under Section 9 (old Act) where such claim is joined and decree is passed in suit, such decree is appealable. It has been further held in the case of Anantia and others vs. Khinklu, reported in 1955 NUC Himachal Pradesh 4854, that :- "In a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, (old Act), mesne profits or damages cannot be awarded. A separate suit for mesne profits would not be barred by the principles of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code because the right to possess immovable property and the right to enjoy the profits thereof are distinct causes of action, so that a person who has been dispossessed of immovable property, is entitled to sue for its possession under section 9, Specific Relief Act, and to leave the question of mesne profits for another suit. That would depend on title, a matter which cannot be gone into a suit under Section 9 Specific Relief Act." 8. It has been held in the case of AIR 1918 Allahabad 12 (DB); AIR 1917 Nag. 19, AIR 1922 Bombay 216, that subsequent suit for damages and mesne profits for removal of crops is maintainable. The question of possession alone would be res judicata in the subsequent suit and not the question of title. It has to be seen that under a special provision in such a suit right of appeal has not been provided and special limitation has also been provided; whereas for the other suits like damages, mesne profits, separately larger period of limitation and right of regular appeal has also been provided. The scope of enquiry for the suits filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is also very limited. Only summary enquiry is required for deciding such suits and the Court has to only see the possession of the plaintiff and the question of title has been considered as irrelevant. 9. The scope of enquiry for the suits filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is also very limited. Only summary enquiry is required for deciding such suits and the Court has to only see the possession of the plaintiff and the question of title has been considered as irrelevant. 9. Section 7 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that a person entitled to the possession of specific movable property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Explanation 2 added to this Section 7 provides that a special or temporary right to the present possession of movable property is sufficient to support a suit under this section. 10. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that both the provisions are separate and if a suit is filed under Section 6 for restoration of possession within a period of six months, than a second suit filed for claiming damages or mesne profits is neither barred by the principle of Order 11 Rule 2 and nor barred on the principle of res judicata because the scope of two suits are quite different, under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act a special kind of remedy has been provided under the law to the plaintiff to claim possession under special circumstances when he is dispossessed without following the due process of law. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly held that the second suit for damages is not barred on the principle of Order 11 Rule 2 of the Code and has rightly rejected the objections raised by the defendant. 11. Though under Order 11, Rule 2 of the Code all causes of action should be joined in one suit but this general provision of law is not applicable in a case where two separate suits have been filed for possession under Section 6 and for claiming damages under section 7 of the Specific Relief Act looking to the special nature of the suits. 12. Consequently, under the facts and circumstances of the facts of the case, I am also of the view that the second suit filed by the plaintiff for claiming damages is not barred under the provisions of Order 11, Rule 2 of the Code. Accordingly this Civil Revision fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.