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2002 DIGILAW 752 (PNJ)

Sachdeva Rice Mills v. Raj Anand

2002-08-05

G.S.SINGHVI, M.M.KUMAR

body2002
Judgment M. M. Kumar, J. 1. By this order, we are disposing of Letters Patent Appeal Nos.33 to 36 of 1987, Letters Patent Appeal Nos.837 and 838 of 1986 along with Cross? objection No.3 in Letters Patent Appeal no.837 of 1986, Letters Patent Appeal nos.10 to 13 of 1987 along with Cross objection No.9 in Letters Patent Appeal no.10 of 1987 which are directed against judgment dated 25.8.1986 of the learned single Judge vide which he enhanced the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gurdaspur (for brevity, ?the Tribunal? ). The Tribunal had awarded total compensation amounting to rs.1,93,000 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The learned single Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs.3,00,000 but maintained the rate of interest specified in the award of the Tribunal. For the sake of convenience, the appeals and cross?objections can be divided into the following three groups? (a) L. P. A. Nos.837 and 838 of 1986 have been filed by Sachdeva Rice Mills and its partners who are owners of the truck which was involved in the accident. In L. P. A. No.837 Cross?objection no.3 of 1988 has also been preferred by jatinder Gupta, son of deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta and Vidya Wati Gupta, mother of deceased Mohinder Partap gupta. (b) L. P. A. No.10 of 1987 has been filed by the claimants, namely, Raj Anand, widow of Mohinder Partap Gupta and mamta Rani, daughter of Mohinder partap Gupta. In L. P. A. No.10 Cross objection No.9 of 1988 has been preferred by Jatinder Gupta, son of the deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta and vidya Wati Gupta, mother of the deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta. (c) L. P. A. Nos.33 to 36 of 1987 have been filed by United India Insurance co. Ltd. , challenging the enhancement of compensation and directing it to pay compensation jointly and severally. 2. We may now notice the facts relevant to the decision of the appeals? in an accident which had occurred on 15.8.1981 involving bus No. PUG 3720 belonging to Punjab Roadways and truck no. PBN 778 at the crossing of Amrtisar?gurdaspur Road near outskirts of Batala, mohinder Partap Gupta, who was a passenger in the said bus, was killed on the spot. His widow Raj Anand, daughter Mamta rani and son Jatinder Gupta filed petition for award of compensation. PBN 778 at the crossing of Amrtisar?gurdaspur Road near outskirts of Batala, mohinder Partap Gupta, who was a passenger in the said bus, was killed on the spot. His widow Raj Anand, daughter Mamta rani and son Jatinder Gupta filed petition for award of compensation. Vidya Watigupta filed separate petition in her personal capacity as also guardian of Jatinder Gupta. The claimants had averred that the deceased had been killed due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicles involved in the accident. They gave out the age of late Mohinder Partap Gupta as 45 years and averred that while working as Sub?divisional Engineer in the Public Works department, he was drawing salary at the rate of Rs.2,100 per month. 3. The appellants and others contested the claim petitions and pleaded that they were not liable to pay compensation. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed the following issues? " (1) Whether claimants Raj Anand, mamta Rani, Jatinder Gupta and Vidya Wati are the legal representatives of deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta? OPA (2) Whether Mohinder Partap Gupta died in an accident due to rash and negligent driving of Santokh Singh, the respondent No.1, driver of truck No. PBN 778, or Sajjan Singh, respondent no.10, driver of Punjab Roadways, depot Pathankot bus No.3720 or the deceased died due to rash and negligent driving of both the respondent Nos.1 and 10 drivers of the respective offending vehicles? OPR (3) To what amount of compensation, if any, the claimants are entitled and from whom? OPA (4) Whether respondent Nos.1 and 10 drivers of vehicles did not possess a valid licence? OPR?12 (5) Relief. " 5. After considering the evidence of the parties, the Tribunal held that the accident had been caused due to rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles. It, however, rejected the plea of the insurance company that the driver of the truck was not having valid driving licence. On the question of sharing the liability, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that both the drivers were joint tortfeasors and held that both of them were jointly and severally liable. It, however, rejected the plea of the insurance company that the driver of the truck was not having valid driving licence. On the question of sharing the liability, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that both the drivers were joint tortfeasors and held that both of them were jointly and severally liable. It was further held that Sajjan Singh the driver of the bus was an employee of the State of punjab and at the time of accident he was discharging his official duty and, therefore, his employer, i. e. , State of Punjab was vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The Tribunal also held the appellant and its partners liable on the ground that Santokh Singh, driver of the truck was its employee. Still further, the tribunal held that as the truck was covered by a comprehensive insurance policy with a limited liability of Rs.50,000, insurance company was held liable to pay compensation up to the limit of Rs.50,000. 6. The award of the Claims Tribunal was challenged by the insurance company, the owner of the truck and the claimants. Learned single Judge enhanced compensation and also accepted the claim of the widow and daughter. Learned single Judge affirmed the award of the Tribunal with regard to the negligence of both the drivers by referring to regulations 6 and 7 of the tenth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for brevity ?1939 Act?) and apportioned the liability of the bus and the truck to the extent of two?third and one?third. The reason recorded by the learned single judge for recording the afore?mentioned conclusions read as under? "the accident itself took place in the middle of the crossing. The photographs taken soon after the occurrence clearly bring out the fact that it was the front side of the bus that hit into the left hand side of the truck and, what is more, the truck can be seen lying off the road in a ditch. This situation is indicative of the fact that the truck must have come to the crossing before the bus reached there and also that the bus must have been travelling at a fairly fast speed. According to AW 8, Kartar Singh, the only eyewitness to be examined other than the two drivers, the bus was coming at a very fast speed when it rammed into the body of the truck. According to AW 8, Kartar Singh, the only eyewitness to be examined other than the two drivers, the bus was coming at a very fast speed when it rammed into the body of the truck. The breach of the provisions of the regulation 6 of the tenth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act is thus writ large on the part of the drivers of both the vehicles and, as regards the bus driver, of those of regulation 7 too. A similar situation arose in piara Singh V/s. Gian Kaur, 1985 ACJ 758 (Pandh ). There it was observed that where the accident occurs at a road intersection with one of the vehicles involved therein coming on to it from the right side of the other, both regulation 6 as also regulation 7 of the Tenth schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act stand attracted thereto. A duty is cast on the driver of the motor vehicle by the provisions of regulation 6 to slow down while approaching a road intersection and to enter it only in the knowledge that he can do so without endangering the safety of the persons thereon. Such persons included the driver of the vehicle himself and any other person who may be travelling in the vehicle. Regulation 7 casts a further duty on such driver on entering the intersection to give way to the traffic proceeding on the road, if any, designated as the main road and, in other cases, to that approaching the intersection from his right hand side. It was accordingly held that where an accident occurs at a crossing the negligence of the driver who contravenes both regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act would be two?thirds as compared to one?third that of the driver who disregards the requirements of regulation 6 only. Following this precedent, the finding on the issue of negligence as recorded by the Tribunal is accordingly modified to the extent that the negligence of the bus driver shall be apportioned at two?thirds and that of the truck driver at one?third. " 7. On the basis of Full Bench judgment of this court in the case of Lachman Singhv. Gurmit Kaur, 1979 ACJ 170 (Pandh), thelearned single Judge also reached the conclusion that a multiplier of 16 in the facts and circumstances was appropriate multiplier. " 7. On the basis of Full Bench judgment of this court in the case of Lachman Singhv. Gurmit Kaur, 1979 ACJ 170 (Pandh), thelearned single Judge also reached the conclusion that a multiplier of 16 in the facts and circumstances was appropriate multiplier. It also found that the emoluments of deceased at the time of his death were a little over Rs.2,100 per month. In this regard, it observed as under? "mohinder Partap Gupta was a Sub?divisional Engineer with the Punjab p. W. D. but at the time of this accident he was on deputation with the Punjab water Supply and Sewerage Board, chandigarh. The total emoluments of the deceased at the time of his death were a little over Rs.2,100 per month, as is borne out by his last pay certificate, exh. AW 9/1. As regards the dependency of the claimants, after making due allowance for the amount that the deceased would have spent upon himself had he lived and the various other imponderables as set forth in Lachman Singh V/s. Gurmit Kaur, 1979 acj 170 (Pandh), it would be fair and just to assess it at around Rs.1,500 per month or Rs.18,000 per annum. Computed at this rate, the compensation payable to the claimants would work out to rs.2,88,000 which may be rounded off to Rs.3,00,000 (rupees three lakh ). " 8. On the question of awarding compensation to the widow, daughter, namely, raj Anand and Mamta Gupta, the learned single Judge found that the deceased was under obligation to maintain both of them by virtue of provisions of sec. 22 of the hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The observations of the learned single Judge read as under? "it is no doubt true that no amount was being paid by Mohinder Partap Gupta to his wife or daughter for their maintenance or otherwise. It has to be borne in mind, however, that both the wife and the daughter had a right to claim maintenance from the deceased both under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance act, 1956, as also under sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has to be borne in mind, however, that both the wife and the daughter had a right to claim maintenance from the deceased both under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance act, 1956, as also under sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, it is well settled that the father is under a legal obligation to maintain his child and the husband to maintain his wife and that the onus lies on him to allege and prove that his wife and the child are not entitled to the maintenance claimed. Not only this, sec. 22 of the Hindu adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, specifically provides that the liability for maintenance can be enforced against the estate of the deceased in the hands of his heirs. This being so, it must be held that there was a subsisting right in raj Anand and her daughter to claim maintenance from the deceased during his lifetime and further by virtue of being his heirs they were also entitled to succeed to his estate in their own right. It cannot, therefore, be said that they are not entitled to any compensation. It may be mentioned here that the opposing counsel could point to no material on record to suggest that Raj Anand or her daughter had in any manner disentitled themselves to maintenance or to succeed to the property left behind by Mohinder partap Gupta. " 9. The learned single Judge had further determined the compensation payable to various claimants and in this regard observations of the learned single Judge read as under? "as for the computation of compensation payable to Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand, the appropriate yardstick to be applied here would be the amount which they could have received as maintenance from Mohinder partap Gupta during his lifetime. In this behalf it is pertinent to note that Raj anand is employed as a teacher at a salary of Rs.800 per month while salary of the deceased was over Rs.2,100 per month, meaning thereby that the combined income of the husband and the wife was around Rs.3,000 per month. In this behalf it is pertinent to note that Raj anand is employed as a teacher at a salary of Rs.800 per month while salary of the deceased was over Rs.2,100 per month, meaning thereby that the combined income of the husband and the wife was around Rs.3,000 per month. It would be fair to put the father and the son on one side and the mother and the daughter on the other, somewhat at par financially, meaning thereby that if maintenance had been claimed from the deceased during his lifetime he could have been called upon to pay his wife and daughter about Rs.500 per month. It is on this basis, therefore, that the compensation payable to Raj Anand and her daughter deserves to be apportioned. This would have left a balance of over rs.1,600 per month for father and son. Splitting up the compensation payable to claimants on this basis, Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand would thus be held entitled to Rs.1,00,000, the balance of Rs.2,00,000 being payable to the mother and the son of the deceased. The sum of Rs.1,00,000 payable to Raj anand and Mamta Anand shall be shared by them equally while, in the other case, the son shall receive Rs.1,75,000 and the balance of Rs.25,000 shall be payable to the mother of the deceased. The claimants shall in addition be entitled to interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application to the date of payment of the amount. The amounts payable to the minor claimants shall be paid to them in such manner as the Tribunal may deem to be in their best interest. " 10. Mr. L. M. Suri, learned senior counsel, argued that no portion of liability could be fastened on the owner of the truck as the truck was being driven in accordance with rules. According to the learned counsel, the whole liability has to be shouldered by the bus driver or its owner because the conditions of the vehicle reveal a telltale story as the bus has struck the left hand side of the truck. According to the learned counsel, the whole liability has to be shouldered by the bus driver or its owner because the conditions of the vehicle reveal a telltale story as the bus has struck the left hand side of the truck. He referred to the observations of the learned single Judge in this regard which are to the effect that the photographs taken soon after the occurrence clearly bring out the fact that it was the front side of the bus that hit into the left side of the truck. The learned counsel pointed out that the person on the right side has the right of way and, therefore, it must be concluded that the bus was being driven in violation of rule as it had no right of way from the left side of truck. Learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of lajwanti V/s. Keshav Prasad Soni, 1984 acj 664 (MP) and also on a judgment of delhi High Court in the case of Usha mehra V/s. Naresh Chand, 1985 ACJ 752 (Delhi ). Referring to Lajwanti?s case, the learned counsel submitted that the factual situation in that case was almost similar because in that case also the vehicle which had first entered the intersection of the road was not fastened with any liability as it was considered the duty of the vehicle which had entered the intersection later to slow down. Learned counsel also submitted that in the present case it would be even more appropriate to follow that principle because the truck was absolutely visible to the bus driver and with little vigilance the bus driver could have visualised that his negligence is likely to result into disastrous consequences and the bus driver neither followed the principle of driving to the right of the truck nor he slowed down the bus. Learned counsel further submitted that the bus driver was required to exercise due care and a duty was enjoined upon him not to enter the intersection till he had taken stock of the situation, slow down the bus and should have driven the same on the right side of the truck. Learned counsel also placed reliance on regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act. Learned counsel also placed reliance on regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act. In support of his contention, the learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of this court in the case of Oriental Fire and Genl,ins. Co. Ltd. V/s. Kewal Kumar, 1983 ACJ 497 (Pandh ). 11. Mr. Vibhav Jain, learned counsel for the widow and daughter argued that in the matters of motor accident not only the daughter and the widow would be entitled to the grant of compensation but even the brother has been held entitled to maintain the claim petition. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. V/s. Ramanbhai prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC ). The learned counsel submitted that the amount of compensation payable to the widow and the daughter should have been increased instead of putting the widow and daughter on one side and the mother and son on the other side and awarding them equal shares. According to the learned counsel, once the relationship of husband?wife exists and the petition of the husband filed under section 10 of 1955 Act for judicial separation has been dismissed, then full compensation should have been given by treating the status of the claimants as widow and the daughter. He further argued that the income of the wife could not be clubbed with the income of the deceased in order to apportion the same between the widow and the daughter on the one side and mother and the son on the other side. The learned counsel submitted that learned single Judge committed grave error in law by adopting that formula and, therefore, the findings recorded by the learned single Judge are liable to be set aside. 12. Mr. Rajesh Garg, learned counsel for the son and the mother of deceased mohinder Partap Gupta argued that the widow and the daughter are not, at all, entitled to any part of the compensation because the widow has been living separately and was not being paid any maintenance by deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta. According to the learned counsel, the view taken by the Tribunal is liable to be restored, inasmuch as, it held that affluence of the widow and maintenance of the daughter by her were sufficient factors to conclude that they were not dependent on the deceased. According to the learned counsel, the view taken by the Tribunal is liable to be restored, inasmuch as, it held that affluence of the widow and maintenance of the daughter by her were sufficient factors to conclude that they were not dependent on the deceased. The learned counsel argued that the whole amount of compensation should have been given to the son as well as the mother of the deceased. 13. Mr. Munishwar Puri appearing for united India Insurance Co. Ltd. argued that rate of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum awarded by the learned single judge is unsustainable in law. According to the learned counsel, the rate of interest has been slashed by the Reserve Bank of India to 9 per cent per annum. In this regard, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum V/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , 2001 ACJ 428 (SC ). 14. We have thoughtfully considered the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the award and the judgment of the learned single judge. A reference to the regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act would be essential to determine as to whether any liability could be fastened on the owner or on the driver of the truck. These regulations have been framed under sections 77 and 78 of 1939 Act which deal with the subject of the main roads and the duty of the drivers to obey traffic signs. Both the regulations read as under? "6. The driver of a motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction or a road corner, and shall not enter any such intersection or junction until he had become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons there on.7. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, on entering a road intersection, if the road entered is a main road designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that road, and in any other case given way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand. " 15. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, on entering a road intersection, if the road entered is a main road designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that road, and in any other case given way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand. " 15. A reading of the regulations quoted above shows that it is incumbent upon the driver of the motor vehicle to slow down his vehicle when approaching a road intersection, a road junction and also to give way to the vehicle approaching the intersection on his right side. 16. The argument that the driver of the bus failed in both of his obligations, namely, to drive the bus on the right side of the truck and also to slow down before entering on the crossing has been substantiated because the truck has been damaged on its middle left side which would indicate that the bus driver was not driving on the right side of the truck. It is further clear that the speed of the bus was so high that it took ?it turn facing the road from which it had come. It also threw away the truck into the ditches of the side road. In this regard, reliance on the Division Bench judgment in Lajwanti?s case, 1984 ACJ 664 (MP), would be relevant which is almost in similar facts and circumstances and the observations read as under? ". . . It is also proved that on account of the impact, the Tempo took a complete turn so as to face the same direction of the road from which it had entered the intersection. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, one cannot escape concluding that while the Tempo had already entered and reached in the middle of the intersection, the truck must have entered the intersection later and dashed the front portion of the Tempo so violently that the deceased was thrown on the ground and the Tempo took a complete turn. The defence version does not fit in the probabilities of the case. It is, therefore, obvious that the driver of the truck even though had seen that the Tempo already entered the intersection, continued to drive the truck in great speed. It was the duty of the truck driver to have slowed down his truck and avert the dash. The defence version does not fit in the probabilities of the case. It is, therefore, obvious that the driver of the truck even though had seen that the Tempo already entered the intersection, continued to drive the truck in great speed. It was the duty of the truck driver to have slowed down his truck and avert the dash. Since the truck driver was not produced, an inference of negligence against the driver of the truck has been drawn. [see Liyakat Hussain V/s. M. P. State Road Trans. Corpn. , 1976 acj 25 (MP); Suman V/s. General Manager, M. P. State Road Trans. , 1970 ACJ 280 (MP) and Jamnibai V/s. Chhotekhan, 1981 ACJ 90 (MP)]. The driver of the truck was required to exercise due care and was enjoined upon not to enter into the intersection until he had been able to take stock of the situation. [see Maya Mukherjee V/s. Orissa Co?op. Ins. Societyltd. , 1978 ACJ 292 (Orissa) and M. P. State Road Trans. Corpn. V/s. Yasin, 1974 acj 358 (MP)]. " 17. By applying the ratio of the aforementioned decision to the facts of these cases, we hold that the whole liability has to be shouldered by the bus driver or its owner and the judgment of the learned single Judge to the extent is liable to be set aside. 18. The claim of the widow and the daughter requires to be examined in the light of the principles of matrimonial law and the status attached to a valid marriage. Under sec. 41 of the Indian Evidence act, 1872 (for brevity, ?1872 Act?) a judgment rendered by the matrimonial court is a judgment in rem and is binding on the whole world. The declaration given in such judgments conferring a status or taking it away is a conclusive proof of that legal character. Sec.41 of 1872 Act reads as under? "41. Relevancy of certain judgments, in probate, etc. The declaration given in such judgments conferring a status or taking it away is a conclusive proof of that legal character. Sec.41 of 1872 Act reads as under? "41. Relevancy of certain judgments, in probate, etc. , jurisdiction.-A final judgment, order or decree of a competent court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof-that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree, declared that it had ceased or should cease. And that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property. " 19. Therefore, it is obvious that the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge dated 22.4.1974, Exh. A?13, refusing to pass a decree for judicial separation under sec. 10 of 1955 Act would demonstrate that the status of the claimant being the wife was not even remotely affected. The deceased was not even granted judicial separation and, therefore, Rajanand continued to be the legally wedded wife. 20. It is further clear that no doubt could be raised with regard to the paternity of mamta Gupta the daughter of deceased because sec. 112 of 1872 Act provides that a birth of child during marriage would be a conclusive proof of her legitimacy. 21. It is settled law that the judgment of the matrimonial court is a judgment in rem and conclusive not against the party to the proceeding but against the whole world. 112 of 1872 Act provides that a birth of child during marriage would be a conclusive proof of her legitimacy. 21. It is settled law that the judgment of the matrimonial court is a judgment in rem and conclusive not against the party to the proceeding but against the whole world. This view is supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Satya V/s. Teja Singh, AIR 1975 SC 85, which are extracted below? ". . . Sec.41 of the Indian Evidence Act provides, to the extent material, that a final judgment of a competent court in the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction conclusive proof that the legal character which it confers or takes away accrued or ceased at the time declared in the judgment for that purpose. But the judgment has to be of a ?competent court?, that is, a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject?matter. " 22. Therefore, the status of the claimant widow would continue to be that of wife on the date of accident. 23. The status of the daughter would also continue to be intact because section 112 of 1872 Act provides that birth of child during continuation of marriage is a conclusive proof of legitimacy. Once it is accepted that the child is born during the subsistence of the marriage a conclusive proof arises to the paternity of the child. This has been repeatedly held by the Apex court that the whole burden of proving is on the person who asserts illegitimacy. For this proposition, reliance can be placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Chilukari Venkateswarlu V/s. Chilukari Venkatanarayana, AIR 1954 SC 176; Perumal Nadar V/s. Ponnuswami, (1970) 1 SCC 605 and Goutam Kundu V/s. State of West Bengal, AIR 1993 SC 2295. The view taken in the judgment of the apex Court in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. V/s. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 acj 561 (SC), is that in Indian situation even the brother of one who is killed in a motor accident can claim compensation. Referring to the scheme and objects of 1939 Act and the Fatal Accidents Act,1855, their Lordships of the Apex Court concluded as under? ". . . Corpn. V/s. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 acj 561 (SC), is that in Indian situation even the brother of one who is killed in a motor accident can claim compensation. Referring to the scheme and objects of 1939 Act and the Fatal Accidents Act,1855, their Lordships of the Apex Court concluded as under? ". . . Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by secs. 110?a to 110?f of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of Torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in sec. 110?b of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by sec. 110?b of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under sec. 110?a of the Act have to be done in accordance with well?known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers? children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira V/s. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, 1977 ACJ 253 (Gujarat) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under sec. 110?a of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased. " 24. On basis of principles enunciated in the statutes and the judgments referred in the paras above, it can be safely concluded that the widow as well as the daughter are entitled to the payment of compensation. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the argument of Mr. " 24. On basis of principles enunciated in the statutes and the judgments referred in the paras above, it can be safely concluded that the widow as well as the daughter are entitled to the payment of compensation. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the argument of Mr. Rajesh Garg, the learned counsel representing the mother and son of the deceased Mohinder Partap Gupta. 25. The argument of Mr. Munishwar puri with regard to payment of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum would also not merit any serious consideration because the judgment in Kaushnuma Begum?s case, 2001 ACJ 428 (SC), is based on the change in the rate of interest introduced by the Reserve Bank of India and the. rate of interest has been lowered. However, in the present case, the accident had taken place on 15.8.1981 and the award of the Tribunal was announced on 5.11.1982. Learned single Judge rendered his judgment on 25.8.1986. Therefore, we do not find any justification to invoke the ratio of the judgment in Kaushnuma Begum?s case (supra ). Moreover, sec. 110?cc of 1939 Act confers discretion on the court or Tribunal to issue direction that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest would also be paid. We are not inclined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge. Still further the judgment of Supreme Court in kaushnuma Begum?s case does not lay down any principle of law of general application that interest in every case should be 9 per cent per annum. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel on behalf of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. does not merit acceptance. 26. In the light of the above discussion, we dispose of the appeals and the cross?objections in the following manner? (1) The owner of the truck is absolved of any liability because the truck did not contribute by his negligence to the accident. It is held that the whole liability is that of the Punjab Roadways as the accident had been caused by the negligence of the driver of the bus who had driven the bus rashly and negligently and more particularly in violation of regulations 6 and 7 of Tenth Schedule of 1939 Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned single judge holding the owner and driver of the truck liable to the extent of one?third is set aside. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned single judge holding the owner and driver of the truck liable to the extent of one?third is set aside. (2) The multiplier of 16 applied by the learned single Judge is upheld in view of the fact that multiplier of 16 has been held applicable in most of the cases by the Apex court like the case of General Manager, kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. V/s. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC ). (3) The computation of compensation worked out between Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand and mother and son of the deceased is also upheld. (4) The rate of interest of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application till the date of realisation of the amount is also upheld. The appeals are disposed of in the above?mentioned terms. Appeal allowed.