JUDGMENT PRADIP MOHANTY, J. — The petitioner, in this writ application as¬sails the orders dated the 11th January, 1989, in Annexure-3 passed by the Managing Director, Orissa Forest Development Corpo¬ration, in discharging the petitioner from service pursuant to a disciplinary proceeding. 2. The petitioner’s case, in short is that, while he was working as U.D. Assistant, a departmental proceeding was initiat¬ed against him. In the charge-sheet it was alleged that the petitioner was serving as Cashier under the Divisional Manager, Angul (T) Division and being in custody of Cheque Book, forged the signature of the Divisional Manager in Cheque No. 644278 on or before 8.1.1985. It was further alleged that the petitioner had withdrawn cash amounting to Rs. 20,000/- (rupees twenty thousand) from the State Bank of India, Angul through that forged cheque and misappropriated the same. On the basis of this allega¬tion, it was alleged that he had misappropriated the money of the Corporation and committed misconduct and forgery. The petitioner had submitted the explanation denying the allegations. The petitioner specifically denied his complicity with the alleged forgery and misappropriation. The petitioner had specifically alleged that the departmental enquiry was con¬ducted behind his back. In other words, the petitioner contends that an ex parte hearing was conducted, inasmuch as, the witness¬es were examined behind the back of the petitioner. The petition¬er was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Therefore, there has been violation of the principle of Natural Justice. The further case of the petitioner is that, for the self-same allegation a criminal case was instituted against him for commission of offences under Sections 409, 420/468 of the Indian Penal Code in G.R.Case No. 173 of 1985 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Angul. The petitioner was acquitted from the charges under Sections 409/420, IPC, but was convicted under Section 468, IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. This conviction under Section 468, IPC was also set aside by the Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal, in Crl. Appeal No. 146 of 1988. After the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal proceeding he has made a representation to the Chairman of the Corporation which having been rejected, he has approached the portals of this Court. 3. The opposite parties have filed a return justifying the order of discharge. Appeal No. 146 of 1988. After the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal proceeding he has made a representation to the Chairman of the Corporation which having been rejected, he has approached the portals of this Court. 3. The opposite parties have filed a return justifying the order of discharge. It was stated in the counter that, several notices were issued by the Enquiring Officer requiring the peti¬tioner to appear in the enquiry. But he did not turn up for which the enquiry was concluded. 4. Shri Dora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the departmental proceeding and the Criminal proceeding were initiated on identical facts. The peti¬tioner having been acquitted from the criminal charges, he should have been exonerated from the departmental proceeding. The next submission of Shri Dora is that, due to non-payment of subsist¬ence allowance during the period of suspension, the departmental proceeding itself is liable to be vitiated. Finally, the learned counsel submits that the enquiry having been conducted ex parte, the petitioner was deprived of a reasonable opportunity of hear¬ing. According to him, on this score alone, the impugned order of discharge is bad in law. Shri S. K. Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the Corpo¬ration, submits that there is no bar for initiating a criminal proceeding and a departmental proceeding simultaneously. So far as the enquiry is concerned, Shri Patnaik submits that the En¬quiring Officer has given adequate notice to the petitioner to appear and participate in the enquiry. Since the petitioner deliberately avoided to attend the enquiry, there was no other alternative on the part of the Enquiry Officer than to conclude the enquiry. He also submits that due to the non-availability of the petitioner at the headquarters station, the subsistence allowance could not be paid. 5. The law relating to simultaneous initiation of both the criminal as well as the departmental proceeding on self-same allegations is no more res integra. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Jairam Panda vrs. D.V. Raiyani and others, 1988 (II) OLR 3, has held that, merely because the delinquent is acquitted from the charges in criminal case, initiation of the departmental proceeding on the self-same charges is not a bar. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Jairam Panda vrs. D.V. Raiyani and others, 1988 (II) OLR 3, has held that, merely because the delinquent is acquitted from the charges in criminal case, initiation of the departmental proceeding on the self-same charges is not a bar. It is for the departmental authorities to consider on the facts and circum¬stances of each case whether the enquiry is to be continued on the self-same charges from which delinquent has been acquitted. In the said case it has been observed by this Court that, there is no constitutional, statutory or legal bar on the basis of which it can be held that a departmental enquiry is bad in view of the order of acquittal recorded by a Criminal Court. Once the cardinal difference between the criminal proceeding and a disci¬plinary proceeding is kept in mind, there would be no scope for any confusion on this account. The dominant purpose of a criminal proceeding is “to achieve the protection of the public” while that in the disciplinary proceeding is “purity and efficiency of public service” Obviously, therefore, the fields of operation of the two proceedings are quite different and independent. In a disciplinary proceeding the strict rules of evidence and the standards of proof are also not required as in a criminal trial. In view of this authoritative pronouncement in Jairam (supra), we are of the considered view that no illegality has been committed by the authorities in initiating both departmental as well as criminal proceeding. 6. In order to examine the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner relating to ex parte enquiry, we had asked Shri Patnaik to produce the file relating to the departmen¬tal proceeding initiated against the petitioner. Accordingly, Shri Patnaik has produced the file. We have perused the same. It appears from the file produced before us that, although several notices were sent to the petitioner, but the same were not served on him. From the order-sheet maintained by the Enquiry Officer, it appears notices were sent on several occasions but all the notices were returned unserved. No effort has been made by the Enquiry Officer to serve the notice on the delinquent/petitioner. Since we have found from record that no notice of enquiry was ever served upon the delinquent/petitioner, we would hold that the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity of hearing. No effort has been made by the Enquiry Officer to serve the notice on the delinquent/petitioner. Since we have found from record that no notice of enquiry was ever served upon the delinquent/petitioner, we would hold that the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity of hearing. Therefore, we quash the impugned order under Annexure-3. 7. Since we have quashed the order of discharge due to non-service of notice of enquiry on the petitioner, normally we would have remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to enquire into the matter afresh. But from the record it appears that the petitioner was placed under suspension in the year 1985 and the charge-sheet was issued in the year 1987. The petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal charges. In the meantime, sixteen years has been elapsed and the petitioner is undergone mental agony for such a long period. Regard being had to the peculiar circumstances of the case, were are not inclined to give liberty to the authorities to continue the proceeding afresh. Therefore, the petitioner should be reinstated forthwith, but the petitioner shall be paid 50% (fifty per cent) of the back wages from the date of discharge till today and pay and allowances for the period of suspension in accordance with the Rules of the Forest Development Corporation. The current salary will be paid forthwith and the arrear dues will be paid within a period of six months from today. A. K. PATNAIK, J. — I have perused the judgment of my learned counsel Judge, Pradip Mohanty, J.,and I agree with him that the impugned order of discharge be quashed, and the petitioner be reinstated forthwith, and be paid 50% of the back wages from the date of discharge till toady and the pay and allowances for the suspension period according to the Rules of the Orissa Forest Development Corporation. But in addition to the reasons given by my learned brother Judge Pradip Mohanty, J., I would like to give some more reasons for the aforesaid conclusion. I need not repeat the facts of the case as the same have been stated in the judg¬ment of my learned brother. 9. Mr. But in addition to the reasons given by my learned brother Judge Pradip Mohanty, J., I would like to give some more reasons for the aforesaid conclusion. I need not repeat the facts of the case as the same have been stated in the judg¬ment of my learned brother. 9. Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from 6.3.1985 on account of the criminal case and was being paid his subsistence allowances upto June, 1985, but was not paid subsistence allowance thereafter from 1.7.1985. He cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ghansh¬yam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 1183 , Fakirbhai Fulbhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer and another, AIR 1986 SC 1168 , and Cpt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another, AIR 1999 SC 1416 for the proposition that where a delinquent employee is unable to participate in the enquiry on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance, the disciplinary proceeding and the order of punishment stood vitiated. 10. A specific ground has been taken in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that the petitioner received subsistence allowance only upto July, 1985 and on account of non-participation of the petitioner due to non-payment of the subsistence allowance, the enquiry and the consequential orders in the disciplinary proceed¬ings stood vitiated. The only reply in paragraph 16 of the counter-affidavit is that the non-payment of the subsistence allowance of the petitioner was entirely due to his own fault as he never attended the headquarters to receive the same. In paragraph-7 of the rejoinder affidavit filled by the petitioner it is stated that the petitioner collected subsistence allowance regularly in March, April, May and June, 1985 and thereafter, whenever the petitioner went to the office, the payment was denied on some plea or other and the petitioner was ultimately told that the subsistence allowance would not be paid but would be adjusted to¬wards the alleged loss. In the said paragraph-7 of the rejoinder-affidavit,the petitioner has also stated that he was always present at the headquarters. 11. In the said paragraph-7 of the rejoinder-affidavit,the petitioner has also stated that he was always present at the headquarters. 11. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner, who was serving as an U. D. Assistant under the Orissa Forest Development Corporation would not report to his headquarters for receiving the subsistence allowance from July, 1985 because without the subsistence allowance an U.D. Assistant can hardly support his family. In any case, nothing prevented the authorities of the Orissa Forest Development Corporation to remit the subsistence allowance to the petitioner at his village address i.e. At/P.O. Julasarichuan, District Cuttack in the same manner in which different letters were addressed to the petitioner to the said village address by the Corporation as indicated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties. An employee of the status of U.D. Assistant who has not received subsistence allowance for about three years cannot be expected to participate in the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings. As per the deci¬sions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ghansam and Fakirbhai and Cpt. M. Paul Anthony (supra), the enquiry and the order of punishment imposed on the petitioner pursuant to such enquiry stood vitiated on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner during the period of suspension. 12. Mr.Dora, learned counsel for the petitioner, further submitted that a reading of the enquiry report would show that the findings of guilt against the petitioner were not based on any evidence but on surmises and conjectures. On the other hand, the petitioner has been acquitted of the charges in the criminal case on the self-same facts.Mr. Dora relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cpt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) wherein the Supreme Court quashed an order of punishment based on an ex parte enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employee had been acquitted in the criminal case on the self-same facts. Mr. S. K. Patnaik, learned counsel for the opp. parties, on the other hand, submitted that there was sufficient circum¬stantial evidence to show that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. He further submitted that in the criminal case, there was clear evidence that the handwriting on the back of the Cheque (Ext. 19/2) was that of the petitioner and yet the appellate Court acquitted the petitioner of the charges. 13. He further submitted that in the criminal case, there was clear evidence that the handwriting on the back of the Cheque (Ext. 19/2) was that of the petitioner and yet the appellate Court acquitted the petitioner of the charges. 13. We are not sitting in revision or in appeal against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal, in Cri. Appeal, No. 146 of the 1988. Therefore, it is not for us to go into the correctness of the said judgment of the learned Ses¬sions Judge, Dhenkanal, in the criminal appeal,but we are examin¬ing the legality of the order of discharge passed by the disci¬plinary authority on the basis of the enquiry report and a read¬ing of the enquiry report, a copy of which has been annexed to the rejoinder filed by the petitioner as Annexure-10 shows that there is no direct evidence to prove the charges against the petitioner that he had forged the signature of the Divisional Manager in Cheque No. 644278 and that he had withdrawn the amount of Rs. 20,000/- from the State Bank of India, Angul through the forged cheque and had misappropriated the amount. Though several witnesses have been examined, no witness appears to have seen the petitioner writing the said cheque or putting a forged signature on the said cheque or has seen him withdrawing the sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the Bank, and the witnesses have stated that they were of the opinion that the petitioner who was the custodian of the Cheque Book of the Divisional Manager must have forged the signature of the Divisional Manager on the said cheque, and thereafter, withdrawn a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and misappropriated the same. Since no one had seen the petitioner writing the cheque or forging the signature of the Divisional Manager on the cheque or withdrawing the amount from the Bank, the only way to prove the charges against the petitioner was to examine a Hand¬writing Expert in the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings on the handwriting and signature put on the said cheque, both on its front side and its back side. But no such Handwriting Expert has been examined in the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings. But no such Handwriting Expert has been examined in the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings. The finding of the enquiring officer is based on opinions of surmises or conjectures of different witnesses that the petitioner who was the custodian of the Cheque Book must have forged the signature of the Divisional Manager and withdrawn a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the State Bank of India, Angul. The findings recorded against the petitioner in the enquiry report are thus not based on any evidence but on surmises, conjectures and opinions of different witnesses and the enquiry report and the order of dis¬charge based on such enquiry report are liable to be quashed. 14. Mr.Patnaik, learned counsel for the opp. parties vehe¬mently submitted that the appeal of the petitioner against the order of discharge was rejected on 10.12.1991 while the petition¬er approached the Court in 1993. There was, therefore, delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court. The peti¬tioner was discharged from service at a young age and when now he has several years of service left if he is reinstated in service. Hence, it will not be just and proper for this Court to dismiss this writ petitioner on the ground of delay and ends of justice will be served if part of the financial benefits is withheld from the petitioner for filing the writ petition late. For this reason, my learned brother Pradip Mohanty, J. has awarded 50% of the back wages for the period the petitioner has remained out of service on account of the impugned order of discharge and with¬held the remaining 50% of the back wages. 15. Thus, the writ petitioner is allowed, the impugned order of discharge is quashed and the opp. parties are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner will be paid 50% back wages for the period he remained out of service on account of the impugned order of discharge. The petitioner will also be paid pay and allowances in accordance with the Rules of the Orissa Forest Development Corporation for the period of suspension. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, but there will be no order as to cost. Petition allowed.