G. P. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal act, 1987, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 17. 1. 2002 of the claims Tribunal by which the claim petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 6 was allowed and respondent No. 1 was awarded rs. 1,50,000 and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were awarded Rs. 50,000 each as compensation on account of death of Ramesh chandra Srivastava in a train accident. ( 2 ) THE claimant-respondent No. 1 is the widow and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are the minor children of Ramesh Chandra Srivastava who was working as fitter grade I in North-Eastern Railway and was posted at Ballia Railway Station. On 7. 2. 1994 he was going from Gorakhpur to Ballia and at 21. 10 hours while alighting from 511-Up train at Indara Railway Station, he slipped and fell down from the train. His leg was amputated as the train ran over him. The station staff rescued him and sent him to Mau Railway Station for treatment but when he reached the hospital he was declared dead. The claimants-respondents preferred a claim petition which has been allowed by the impugned order. ( 3 ) MR. Lalji Sinha, the learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted that the deceased, Ramesh Chandra Srivastava, committed suicide and, therefore, his dependants cannot claim compensation. He has also submitted that Ramesh Chandra srivastava died on 7. 2. 1994, which is prior to the enforcement of the amendment of the Railways Act by the Railways (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 28 of 1994), which came into force on 28. 4. 1994 and, therefore, the claimants wefe not entitled to any compensation. ( 4 ) BEFORE examining the contentions raised, it will be useful to notice the relevant statutory provisions. Chapter XIII of the Railways Act deals with liability of railway administration for death and injury to passengers due to accidents. 4. 1994 and, therefore, the claimants wefe not entitled to any compensation. ( 4 ) BEFORE examining the contentions raised, it will be useful to notice the relevant statutory provisions. Chapter XIII of the Railways Act deals with liability of railway administration for death and injury to passengers due to accidents. By the Railway (Amendment) Act, 1994, subsection (c) in section 123, relating to definitions, and a new section 124-A were added and the relevant provisions thereof are being reproduced below:"123 (c) untoward incident means: (1) (i) the commission of a terrorist act within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987); or (II) the making of a violent attack or the commission of robbery or dacoity; or (III) the indulging in rioting, shoot-out or arson, by any person in or on any train carrying passengers, or in a waiting hall, cloakroom or reservation or booking office or on any platform or in any other place within the precincts of a railway station; or (2) the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers. 124 A. Compensation on account of untoward incident. When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident:provided that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to (A) suicide or attempted suicide by him; (b) self-inflicted injury; (c) his own criminal act; (d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity; (e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by said untoward incident. Explanation. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, passenger includes (i) a railway servant on duty; and (ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for travelling, by a train carrying passengers, on any date or a valid platform ticket and becomes a victim of an untoward incident. " ( 5 ) PROVISO (a) to section 124-A of the railways Act lays down that no compensation shall be payable if passenger dies due to suicide. In the written statement filed before the Tribunal, the appellant took a plea that the deceased was not a bonafide passenger and he committed suicide. The material on record shows that Ramesh chandra Srivastava was posted as fitter grade I at Ballia Station and 7. 2. 1994 was the day of his rest. He had gone to Gorakhpur from where he started in the evening by 511-Up passenger train for joining his duty at Ballia. He had to change the train at Indara Railway Station and, therefore, he alighted there at 21. 10 hours. He slipped at the platform and the train ran over him due to which his leg was amputated. At the time of post-mortem of the body, a valid duty pass was found in the pocket of his clothes. The appellant filed an affidavit of d. C. Tiwari, Law Assistant, wherein it was averred that the deceased committed suicide. Admittedly, D. C. Tiwari was not an eyewitness of the incident nor the appellant examined any other person who may have seen the deceased deliberately and consciously jumping before the train. It is unfortunate that the appellant took such a dishonest plea to deprive the widow and the minor children of the deceased, who was their own employee, from getting any compensation. The sequence of the events clearly show that on weekly rest day-he had gone to Gorakhpur and was returning back to Ballia to join duty. There was no earthly reason why he would commit suicide when he had a wife and five minor children. Normally, a person wanting to commit suicide does not do so at the platform of a railway station where a large number of persons are present who may physically stop him and the train is either stationary or crawling at a slow speed. He would do it at a lonely, far-off place from a railway station where the train is moving at a fast speed. He would do it at a lonely, far-off place from a railway station where the train is moving at a fast speed. We are of the opinion that on the material on record it is not possible to take any other view than that the deceased accidentally slipped and fell down from the platform while he was alighting from the train. ( 6 ) MR. Lalji Sinha has next contended that expression untoward incident, which includes the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers, was inserted by the Railways (Amendment)act, 1994 on 28. 4. 1994 and as the accident took place on 7. 2. 1994 the claimants were not entitled to compensation under section 124-A of the Act. He has also submitted that initially the claimants had filed a claim petition before the Workmens Compensation Commissioner but the same was transferred by him to the Railway Claims tribunal which he had no authority to do and, therefore, the award of the sation made in favour of the claimants is illegal. ( 7 ) THE claimants initially filed a claim petition before the Labour Commissioner (Workmens Compensation Commission-er), Mau, on 29. 9. 94. The appellant filed a written statement where no such plea was taken that the labour court had no jurisdic-tion to try the case. The claimants subse-quently moved an application on 13. 3. 1999 through another counsel, wherein it was pleaded that the claim petition had wrong-ly been moved under the Workmens Com-pensation Act before the labour court and the case should be transferred to the Rail-way Claims Tribunal, Gorakhpur, under section 24 of the Railway Claims Tribunal act, 1987. Thereafter, the labour court passed an order of transfer on 24. 4. 1999 transferring the case to the Claims Tribu-nal. It may be noted here that the period of limitation for filing a claim petition be-fore the Claims Tribunal under the Railway claims Tribunal Act is one year as the case is covered by section 17 (1) (b) of the said act. Section 17 (2) provides that an appli-cation may be entertained by the Tribunal even after one year if the applicant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, the Claims Tribu-nal can, for sufficient cause, entertain an application even after expiry of period of limitation. Here, the accident took place on 7. 2. Therefore, the Claims Tribu-nal can, for sufficient cause, entertain an application even after expiry of period of limitation. Here, the accident took place on 7. 2. 1994 and the claim petition was filed within the period of limitation on 29. 9. 94. The only objection taken by the appellant is that the labour court could not have transferred the claim petition to the Claims tribunal as under section 24 only a suit, claim or other legal proceeding pending in any court, Claims Commissioner or other authority immediately before the appointed day would stand transferred to the Claims tribunal and the appointed day being 8. 11. 1989, the claim petition filed by the compenrespondents could not have been transferred. In our opinion, the contention raised is a wholly technical one. In view of section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal act, the claim petition had to be presented before the Claims Tribunal and not before the labour court. In such a situation, the labour court instead of transferring the case to the Claims Tribunal, could have returned the claim petition for being presented before the Tribunal having jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that the claimants had filed the claim petition much before the expiry of the period of limitation of one year and even after return of the petition they could have filed the same before the Claims Tribunal which had the jurisdiction to condone the delay and entertain the same even after expiry of the period of limitation in view of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. As the claimants were pursuing their petition before the labour court, which had no jurisdiction to hear the matter, there was good and sufficient ground to condone the delay and to entertain the petition. It is also noteworthy that the order passed by the labour court on 24. 4. 1999 transferring the case to the Railway Claims Tribunal became final and was not challenged by the appellants at that stage. On the contrary, they participated in the proceedings before the Claims tribunal and adduced evidence. Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned judgment and order of the Claims Tribunal cannot be set aside on the ground that the labour court had no authority to transfer the case to the tribunal. ( 8 ) MR. On the contrary, they participated in the proceedings before the Claims tribunal and adduced evidence. Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned judgment and order of the Claims Tribunal cannot be set aside on the ground that the labour court had no authority to transfer the case to the tribunal. ( 8 ) MR. Lalji Sinha has next contended that the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers which is included in the definition of untoward incident as given in section 123 (c) (2) of the Railways Act came on the statute book on 28,4. 1994, which is subsequent to the accident which took place on 7. 2. 1994 and, therefore, the claimants are not entitled to any compensation. It is true that the expression untoward incident was not on the statute book when the accident took place. However, there is nothing in the language of section 124-A of the Railways act to suggest that the liability of the Railways to pay compensation to the dependants of the passenger is restricted one and they are liable to pay compensation only if the accident occurs after the enforcement of the amending Act on 28. 4. 94. The normal period prescribed under section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act for filing a claim petition is one year and, therefore, even without making out any case for condonation of delay by 7. 2. 1995, the amending Act came in between on 28. 4. 1994. The language used in section 124-A of the act is couched in a very wide and general terms and is not restricted to take within its embrace only such accidents wherein a passenger has been injured or killed subsequent to that date. ( 9 ) SOME of the provisions of the Railways (Amendment) Act, 1994 are beneficial in nature. The provisions of section 124-A of the Act, wherein compensation is provided to a passenger who has been injured or the dependants of a passenger who has been killed in an untoward incident, are made for the benefit of the persons who are travelling in the Railways and have been injured or for the benefit of the dependants of a person who has been killed in an untoward incident. The legislature may have thought that there was a lacuna in the Act and if someone travelling in the train was injured or was killed as a result of commission of terrorist act or commission of robbery or dacoity or riot, compensation should be awarded to the injured or to the dependants of the deceased. It was with that object in view that the amendment was made by inserting sub-section (c) in section 123 and also section 124-A in the railways Act. Such a beneficial piece of legislation should receive a liberal construction. We do not see any reason why such beneficial piece of legislation should be interpreted in a manner the effect of which would be to curtail the benefit conferred by it and to restrict the area of its operation. ( 10 ) IN Dayawati v. Inderjit, (1966) 3 scr 275 , it has been held as follows:"if the new law speaks in language which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. "claim petition, we are clearly of the opinion that the benefit of the definition of the expression untoward incident given in section 123 (c) of the Act must be extended to them. We are supported in our view by a Division Bench judgment of Kerala high Court in Vijayasankar v. Union of india, 1996 ACJ 923 (Kerala), where Justice K. T. Thomas (as his Lordship then was) held that the benefit of section 124-A would be available even where the accident had taken place on 26. 7. 1988, which was long before the amending Act had come into operation. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed summarily at the admission stage. ( 12 ) THE amendment having been effected even before the claimants had filed the Appeal dismissed. .