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2002 DIGILAW 758 (RAJ)

Ram Niwas v. State of Rajasthan

2002-04-11

HARBANS LAL

body2002
JUDGMENT 1. 1. This petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code has been filed by the petitioners against the order dated 2.3.2002 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st (lass, Degana in criminal regular case No. 203/99, whereby, the application filed on behalf of the petitioners for closing the prosecution evidence has been rejected. 2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are that the petitioners are facing trial in the aforesaid criminal case before the learned lower court, wherein, charges were framed against them on 17.7.99 and both sides i.e. the complainant as well as the petitioners filed revision petitions against the said order of framing charges before the learned Sessions Judge, Merta which were dismissed on 20.1.2001. It is stated that the statements of only four witnesses could be recorded upto the filing of the application on 21.2.2002 before the trial court for closing the prosecution evidence in pursuance of the judgment in Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1999 Cr.L.R. (S.C.) 613 but the same was dismissed on 2.3.2002 and hence this petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. Learned counsel for the petitioners, at the time of arguments, candidly stated that revision petitions filed by the complainant as well as petitioners remained pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Merta for a period of one year three months and in case the Court is of the view that this period is to be excluded then the period prescribed for completion of the prosecution evidence as per Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) has yet not expired but if that period is not excluded then the period of two years prescribed for the completion of the evidence has expired and learned lower court has wrongly dismissed the application for closing of the prosecution evidence. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the period during which the revision petitions remained pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Merta will have to be excluded because the file was summoned by the Sessions Court and this was not the fault of the prosecution. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the period during which the revision petitions remained pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Merta will have to be excluded because the file was summoned by the Sessions Court and this was not the fault of the prosecution. According to him, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma's Case (supra) has dearly propounded that in the cases which were pending on 22.9.1999, the date on which the judgment in case of Raj Deo Sharma's case was pronounced, the court shall have further period of one year to complete the prosecution evidence. The charges were framed in the present case on 17.7.99 and though the exact date of filing of revision petitions has not been given but revision petitions filed by the parties were decided on 20.1.2001 and during which period the file of the trial court was summoned by the learned Sessions Judge, Merta and the revisions were decided on 20.1.2001. Thus, period of about one year and three months will have to be excluded in view of the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) that the period of suspension of judgment may be excluded and the earlier directions were modified to that effect. Thus, admittedly the order passed by the learned trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and it is not in violation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this petition does not have any merit and substance. 5. However, it also cannot be disputed that the concept of speedy trial is now read into Article 21 of the Constitution as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved therein. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon to show the actual prejudice caused to him by the delay of disposal of the case. The court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay. The court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay. Taking this into account, I deem it just and proper to direct the learned trial court to take up the case from day to day and to complete the trial of the case within a maximum period of three months. 6. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. However, the trial court is directed to summon all the witnesses by fixing appropriate dates and to take up the case from day to day until all the witnesses are examined in the case and try to dispose of the case within a period of three months at the maximum.Petition dismissed. *******