JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - None appears for the Appellant. Mr. D.K. Mohapatra, Learned Counsel for the Respondent is present. He files a memo stating that he has received a printed intimation card regarding the death of the Respondent. Mr. Mohapatra states that besides that he has no further instruction to file any affidavit in support of that contention. Under such circumstance, in the absence of any affidavit, this Court is not inclined to accept that card as the proof of death of the Respondent. 2. This appeal is pending since the year 1987. No useful purpose will be served by suo motu adjourning the case because of non appearance of the Appellant or due to the above memo of the Respondent. 3. Perused the appeal memo and the impugned judgment. 4. Respondent was the accused in 2 (c) C.C. No. 178 of 1982 in the Court of S.D.J.M., Puri. He was prosecuted for the offence u/s 14(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short 'the Act'). It was alleged by the prosecution that in spite of maintaining an establishment which is covered by the E.S.I Scheme and in spite of issue of demand notices as well show-cause notice, Respondent did not deposit the demanded amount towards the provident fund and Family Pension Scheme and therefore, he committed the offence u/s 14 (2) of the Act. To substantiate said plea, prosecution" examined one witness i.e., Sri Kailash Chandra Ray, Assistant Commissioner of Provident Fund and relied on investigation report (Ext.1), show-cause notice (Ext.3), Reminder Notice (Ext. 4), Assessment Order (Ext. 5), Notice of Admission (Ext.6) and Sanction Order (Ext.8) in proof of the charge. While denying the liability and accusation, Respondent examined one witness, viz., Nabakishore Prusty (D.W. No. 1) and relied on a Register of Employees (Ext.A). Trial Court on assessment of such evidence and perusal of provision of law granted an order of acquittal to the Respondent on the ground of breach of any provision of the Act and apart from that finding the complaint having been lodged beyond the period one year from the date of detection of the alleged offence and therefore the cognizance being barred by law of Limitation as provided in Section 468(2) (b) Code of Criminal Procedure 5. In the appeal memo, Appellant has challenged the order of acquittal, on the grounds of improper assessment of evidence of P.W. No. 1 and D.W. No. 1 read with the documentary evidence the contention that such oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution and has advanced the contention that such oral and documentary evidence from the side of Appellant as P.W.1 read with Exts. 1 to 5 clearly proving the offence against the Respondent. So far as it relates to the delay, Appellant has stated that the contents in Exts. 1 to 5 being disclosing continuity of the offence that should have been treated as sufficient explanation for the delay. 6. Section 14(2) of the Act reads as quoted below: Subject to the provisions of this Act the Family Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme may provide that any person who contravenes or makes default in complying with any of the provisions thereof shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to four thousand rupees, or with both. 7. It is clear from the above quoted provision of law that to punish a person the prosecution must prove contravention of any provision by the accused or he making default in complying with any of the provisions thereof. In this case, the evidence of P.W. No. l, which appears on record does not go to show as to who were the employees, whether they were permanent, temporary or casual and in the absence of proof of such factum the view taken by the trial Court is found to be not unreasonable or illegal in support of the order of acquittal. Though the trial Court has committed a mistake in the impugned judgment by stating that the maximum punishment as provided for the offence u/s 14(2) of the Act is fine of Rs. 1,000/- or imprisonment for six months, the above quoted provision makes it clear that a higher punishment has been provided. Be that as it may even if the delay is explained on the ground of continuing of the offence, in the absence of proof of the above noted aspect, the finding in support of the acquittal should not be interfered with when that stands to reason. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed