JUDGMENT - PATIL NARESH H., J.:---This writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order passed by the Divisional Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Dairy), Nashik Region, Nashik dated 25th January, 2002 annexed at Exh. K and the order passed by the Honourable Minister in Revision No. 2/2002 dated 8-4-2002 annexed at Exh. O to this petition. 2. In brief, the petitioner's contention is that he is the Chief Promoter of the proposed Parner Taluka Doodh Vyavasaik Va Prakriya Sangh Ltd., Supa, taluka Parner, District Ahemdnagar. Five proposals for formation of Taluka Doodh Sangh were filed before the Divisional Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Dairy), Nashik Region, Nashik (hereinafter referred to as the D.D.R. Nashik). The petitioner Sangh had filed its proposal on 17-12-1997. In view of the Interim order passed by the High Court, the proposals were not screened as the Government's policy decision to establish Taluka Doodh Sangh was subject-matter for adjudication before the High Court. The High Court had finally heard the Writ Petition No. 949/1999 wherein the Government Resolution dated 6-1-1990 was under challenge. After hearing all the parties, the High Court passed a common order in Writ Petition No. 949/1999 and in other connected petitions. The High Court had issued certain directions for implementation of the Government policy by an order dated 3rd March, 2000. By virtue of the said order, the D.D.R. Nashik was directed to hear all the pending proposals seeking registration of Taluka Doodh Sangh within a period of two months and thereafter, the State Government was directed to take a policy decision within further period of two months. The petitioner contends that as far as Parner Taluka is concerned, five proposals were filed. They were:- 1) The proposal filed by the petitioner on 17-12-1997. 2) The proposal filed by the respondent No. 5 on 7-2-2000. 3) The proposal filed by Shri Sabaji Mahadu Gaikwad on 28-7-1995. 4) The proposal filed by Shri Jaisingh Shivram Davbhat on 10-2-2000. 5) The proposal filed by Shri Ramchandra Jaiwantrao Mondage on 21-3-2000. 3. The D.D.R. Nashik had submitted the initial feasibility report on 26-4-2000 to the State Government. 2) The proposal filed by the respondent No. 5 on 7-2-2000. 3) The proposal filed by Shri Sabaji Mahadu Gaikwad on 28-7-1995. 4) The proposal filed by Shri Jaisingh Shivram Davbhat on 10-2-2000. 5) The proposal filed by Shri Ramchandra Jaiwantrao Mondage on 21-3-2000. 3. The D.D.R. Nashik had submitted the initial feasibility report on 26-4-2000 to the State Government. As the State Government failed to take a policy decision for permitting registration of Taluka Doodh Sangh in Parner Taluka, the respondent No. 5 had filed Writ Petition No. 714/2001 on 13-2-2001 seeking directions from the High Court to grant permission to open Bank account and to collect milk on the basis of the reports submitted by the D.D.R. Nashik on 26-4-2000. The present petitioner was not a party respondent to the said writ petition. The High Court had disposed of the said writ petition with certain directions on 29-3-2001. It was made clear by the High Court in its order in paragraph 4 that the authorities (respondent No. 1 and 3 therein) shall not take anything into consideration, which has happened in the matter of Parner after the date of the report i.e. 26-4-2000. It was directed to the D.D.R. Nashik to issue further orders in accordance with the provisions of law within thirty days from the date of the order. The petitioner contends that all the parties were heard and their evidence was considered in the feasibility report which was submitted to the Government of Maharashtra on 26-4-2000. The D.D.R. Nashik passed an order dated 11-5-2001 granting permission to open bank account and to collect milk in favour of the petitioner's proposed Sangh. The respondent No. 5 had preferred Appeal No. 3/2001 before the Joint Registrar (Dairy), Maharashtra State, Worli, Mumbai (For short, the Joint Registrar). The Joint Registrar had allowed the appeal on 7-6-2001 in favour of the respondent No. 5 Sangh by quashing and setting aside the order passed on 11-5-2001 by the D.D.R. Nashik. The petitioner had thereafter, preferred Revision under section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1960). The Honourable Minister (Dairy) had allowed Revision No. 37/2001 and upheld the order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik on 11-5-2001. The order passed by the Joint Registrar was set aside and the petitioner was permitted to open Bank account and collect milk. The Honourable Minister (Dairy) had allowed Revision No. 37/2001 and upheld the order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik on 11-5-2001. The order passed by the Joint Registrar was set aside and the petitioner was permitted to open Bank account and collect milk. The respondent No. 5 then preferred Writ Petition No. 2872/2001 being aggrieved by the order passed by the Minister in revision. The writ petition was rejected by a speaking order on 4-8-2001 by this Court. The respondent No. 5 thereafter, filed Letters Patent Appeal to the Division Bench against the order passed by the Single Judge. The said Letters Patent Appeal was bearing No. 59/2001. The Division Bench had disposed of it by an order dated 4-10-2001. The order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik dated 11-5-2001 was set aside by the Division Bench and he was directed to held fresh inquiry as per the directions given by the High Court. The order passed by the Joint Registrar and the Minister were also set aside. The Letters Patent appeal was, therefore, allowed. 4. The petitioner further submits that all the five proposals were considered afresh by the D.D.R. Nashik, as per the directions issued by the High Court in the L.P.A. The primary co-operative milk societies (hereinafter referred to as the primary societies') were allowed to submit their evidence. In case of the petitioner, 136 Resolutions and thereafter, other Resolutions of 36 societies were submitted in support of the petitioner Sangh. In all there were 172 village level societies who had submitted resolutions and had supported the proposal of the petitioner's Sangh. The evidence was led to show that the petitioner's Sangh is competent to collect 90,000 to 95,000 ltrs. of milk per day. In Parner taluka, there were 260 societies which were registered, and the petitioner Sangh alone enjoys support of 172 societies, amongst them. The proposals of the petitioner Sangh were in compliance with the conditions enunciated under sections 4, 6, 8 and 9 of the Act of 1960. The D.D.R. Nashik had, in the submission of the petitioner, incorrectly and erroneously, selected the proposal of the respondent No. 5 and permitted the respondent No. 5 to open bank account and collect milk. The petitioner had filed an Appeal No. 2/2002 before the Joint Registrar. The D.D.R. Nashik had, in the submission of the petitioner, incorrectly and erroneously, selected the proposal of the respondent No. 5 and permitted the respondent No. 5 to open bank account and collect milk. The petitioner had filed an Appeal No. 2/2002 before the Joint Registrar. The Joint Registrar, by his judgment and order passed on 26-2-2002, decided the issue in favour of the petitioner and permitted the petitioner Sangh to collect milk and open bank account. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Joint Registrar, the respondent No. 5 had preferred Revision No. 2/2002 under section 154 of the Act of 1960 before the Honourable Minister (Dairy). The petitioner alleges that the proposal of the respondent No. 5 was supported by local sitting M.L.A. from Parner Legislative Constituency who belongs to the Indian Nationalist Congress Party which is a ruling party in the State. The Honourable Minister had allowed the revision filed by the respondent No. 5 by permitting him to open Bank account and collect milk. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister in Revision No. 2/2002, the present writ petition is preferred by the petitioner Sangh. The writ petition was admitted by this Court and interim relief was granted in terms of prayer Clauses (C) and (D) of this petition by passing a speaking order. 5. The respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had filed affidavit-in-reply in this petition. 6. Shri Dhorde, learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that the petitioner was not afforded with a fair opportunity and treatment by the Honourable Minister (Dairy). The Minister even did not grant ten days protection after the adverse order was passed against the petitioner. The petitioner's proposal was in tune with the requirements of the provisions of sections 4, 6, 8 of the Act of 1960. This being the second round of litigation, it was pointed out that the previous order passed by the Minister concerned was in favour of the petitioner. The Minister's order was assailed on the ground that it is an erroneous order. The Minister had illegally exercised the jurisdiction by arriving at the perverse findings. The admissible evidence was neglected. There was error apparent on the face of record. The approach of the Minister was political and lacked bona fides. The Minister's order was assailed on the ground that it is an erroneous order. The Minister had illegally exercised the jurisdiction by arriving at the perverse findings. The admissible evidence was neglected. There was error apparent on the face of record. The approach of the Minister was political and lacked bona fides. The Minister had passed impugned order on the assumptions and presumptions, more particularly, on the point of competency of the respondent No. 5 to supply 1.50 lacs ltrs. of milk per day. The Minister's observation regarding the capacity of the respondent No. 5 to supply sufficient milk than the petitioner's Sangh was based on guesswork and was full of surmises. Both, the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister, though mentioned that they were following the directions issued by the High Court in the L.P.A., committed an error in following the said directions in its true spirit. The resignation aspect of the Chief Promoter of the petitioner Sangh Mr. Zaware was highlighted unnecessarily in spite of the directions issued by the Division Bench in the L.P.A. that all the five proposals should be considered afresh and all the primary societies and the five proposed Taluka Doodh Sanghs were permitted to lead evidence, to establish their case. The order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister were full of non-application of mind, contrary to the policy of the Government and the directions of the High Court issued while disposing of L.P.A. The judgment and order passed by the Joint Registrar ought to have been confirmed by the Minister. The Joint Registrar had passed a reasoned order by taking correct and reasonable view of the issues involved in the matter. The order passed by the Joint Registrar is based on fresh recording of evidence by the D.D.R. which was in tune with the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. As regards the proposal of Mr. Mandage, it was submitted that the D.D.R. had refused the proposal submitted by Mr. Mandage for consideration. Mr. Mandage was substituted as promoter after the petitioner Mr. Zaware resigned as Chief Promoter of the petitioner Sangh. It was vehemently contended that the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister ought to have considered that the support of the primary societies was not to a particular person but, was in favour of the petitioner Sangh. Mandage for consideration. Mr. Mandage was substituted as promoter after the petitioner Mr. Zaware resigned as Chief Promoter of the petitioner Sangh. It was vehemently contended that the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister ought to have considered that the support of the primary societies was not to a particular person but, was in favour of the petitioner Sangh. Change in the name of the Chief Promoter and other promoters of the petitioner Sangh permitted on 6th April, 2000 was wrongly considered to be a sole ground to practically reject the case of the petitioner Sangh from the zone of consideration. 7. The learned Counsel had further argued that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Honourable Minister is vitiated on the ground of non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the Business Rules and Instructions framed by the Governor of Maharashtra in exercise of the powers conferred by Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Minister was not expressed in the name of the Governor. There was no legal authentication of the impugned judgment and order passed by the Minister. The impugned order is non est on the said count and deserves to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. 8. Shri Dhorde, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions on the point of compliance of Article 166 of the Constitution of India: 1) (Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar)1, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2131. 2) (Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another)2, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 309. 3) (Km. Neelima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others)3, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1402. 4) (Mohansingh Tanwani and another v. State of Maharashtra and others)4, 2001(3) Bom.C.R. (A.B.)285 : 2001(3) Mh.L.J. 339 . 5) Order passed in (Writ Petition No. 2254/01)5, 6) (S.R. Bommai v. Union of India)6, 1994(3) S.C.C. 1 . 7) (R.K. Jain v. Union of India)7, 1993(4) S.C.C. 119 . 8) (State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty)8, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 331. 9) (Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab)9, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 220. 10) (State of Karnataka v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 68. 11) (Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab)11, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 395. 7) (R.K. Jain v. Union of India)7, 1993(4) S.C.C. 119 . 8) (State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty)8, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 331. 9) (Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab)9, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 220. 10) (State of Karnataka v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 68. 11) (Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab)11, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 395. 12) (Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay)12, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1762. Regarding powers of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the following cases were cited:- 1) (Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and others)13, 1997(5) S.C.C. 76 . 2) (Rahimatulla Rahiman Sarguru v. Bapu Hari Mane and another)14, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1326. 3) (Shri Hanuman Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Sanstha Ltd., and another v. The State of Maharashtra and others)15, 1990 C.T.J. 115. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if it is assumed that the Honourable Minister was discharging a quasi judicial function while disposing of the revision under section 154 of the Act of 1960, the said Act is not wholly judicial. The Minister exercises jurisdiction under his executive power. Placing reliance on the view of this Court expressed by the Division Bench and the Single Bench in cases (supra), it was contended that the compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India is mandatory in nature and its violation vitiates the order. 10. Shri Hon, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 5 contended that the order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister (Dairy) are correct, reasonable and based on evidence on record. The Joint Registrar has wrongly and illegally allowed the appeal, by relying on arithmetical calculations of support by the primary societies in favour of the petitioner. The judgment and order passed by the Joint Registrar lacked application of mind. The said order is not a reasoned one. There is no error of jurisdiction in the passing of order by the Minister concerned. The authorities had granted permission in favour of the respondent No. 5 to open bank account and collect milk only. The said permission is not final one. The said order is not a reasoned one. There is no error of jurisdiction in the passing of order by the Minister concerned. The authorities had granted permission in favour of the respondent No. 5 to open bank account and collect milk only. The said permission is not final one. At the time of registration of the taluka Doodh Sangh issue will be decided again and in case, the respondent No. 5 fulfills the conditions laid down by the D.D.R. Nashik, after hearing the necessary parties, the respondent No. 5 will be registered as Taluka Sangh, the proposal of the petitioner deserves to be discarded as it violates compliance of section 8 of the Act of 1960. In view of the fact that permission granted to the respondent No. 5 is conditional one, at this stage, on prejudice would be caused to the petitioner in case the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister have arrived at the conclusion in favour of the respondent No. 5. It was contended that the respondent No. 5 had practically started collecting milk. The petitioner did not challenge the report dated 26-4-2000 filed by the D.D.R. Nashik. 11. Shri Hon further contended that while examining the more meritorious proposal for getting permission to open Bank account, one need not weigh the same by counting the number of supporting village level societies in one's favour. It is possible in a given case that one primary society may be in a position to supply milk more than what ten primary societies could supply collectively. The assessment has to be on the basis of overall merit of the proposal, which should include compliance of the Government guidelines, the provisions of the Act of 1960, the Rules made thereunder, the feasibility aspect, capacity to collect milk. The Joint Registrar has relied mainly on the basis of support extended to the petitioner by the primary societies without touching the other aspects of the matter which are essential for a just decision of issue involved. 12. Shri Hon further submitted that the power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India while examining the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate or revisional authority, is limited. The High Court does not reappreciate the facts of the case. 12. Shri Hon further submitted that the power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India while examining the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate or revisional authority, is limited. The High Court does not reappreciate the facts of the case. An erroneous order on facts, in the given case, need not be disturbed while the High Court exercises its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has raised disputed questions of facts. On this point, the learned Counsel cited the following cases : 1) (Union of India v. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd.)16, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 831. 2) (M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. etc. v. State of Gujarat and others)17, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1608. 13. While dealing with the issue arising out of application of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 5 that the policy of the State Government as enunciated by issuance of Government Resolution dated 6th January, 1990 is expressed in the name of the Governor of the State. It is sufficient and substantial compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. On this aspect, the following cases were relied upon : 1) (Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and others)18, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 181. 2) (P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin)19, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 160. 3. (Smt. Kavita v. The State of Maharashtra and others)20, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1641. 4) (Idul Hasan v. Rajindra Kumar Jain)21, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 679. 14. It was further contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 that whatever support the petitioner had from the primary societies, was extended to the proposal of Mr. Mandage. After withdrawal of resignation of Mr. Zaware, Chief Promoter of the petitioner's proposed Sangh, he did not get the same support from the primary societies which was given to the proposal of Mr. Mandage. After the resignation of Mr. Zaware as Chief Promoter of the petitioner's proposed Sangh, his proposal was not in existence at all. Hence, the D.D.R. Nashik was justified in treating the proposal of the petitioner as non-existent. 15. Mandage. After the resignation of Mr. Zaware as Chief Promoter of the petitioner's proposed Sangh, his proposal was not in existence at all. Hence, the D.D.R. Nashik was justified in treating the proposal of the petitioner as non-existent. 15. Shri Sapkal, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India raising a ground that the orders passed by the D.D.R. and the Minister are erroneous one. The petitioner raises disputed questions of facts. By relying on paragraphs 7, 20, 44, 45 and 46 of the petition, it was contended that the petitioner's challenge to the impugned order is based on the ground that it is erroneous one. An erroneous order passed by the lower authority on facts of an individual case need not be interfered under writ jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. He supported the order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister. Allowing the petition would be reversing the finding of fact which is arrived at by the Minister after examining the appellate order passed by the Joint Registrar. There is no error of jurisdiction pointed out by the petitioner in exercise of jurisdiction in disposal of revision by the Minister. No interference is thus, called for by this Court. To substantiate his argument, Mr. Sapkal, the learned A.G.P. placed reliance on the following decisions : 1) (Waryam Singh v. Amarnath)22, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 215. 2) (Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals)23, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398. 3) (Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and another)24, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297. 4) (Labhkuwar Bhagwani Shaha and others v. Janardhan Madadeo)25, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 535. 5) (Chandavarkar Sita Ratnaa Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram)26, 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 304 16. On the issue of application of Article 166 of the Constitution of India to the facts of the present case, it was submitted by Shri Sapkal, learned A.G.P. that there is no foundation in the pleadings of the petitioner which would allow the petitioner to raise the issue of non compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution by the Minister. It is not enough to allege such a non-compliance orally. There has to be good pleadings to substantiate the allegations. It is not enough to allege such a non-compliance orally. There has to be good pleadings to substantiate the allegations. The petitioner is, therefore, estopped from raising the issue of application of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Shri Sapkal, vehemently contended that assuming the order of Minister was not expressed in the name of the Governor, Rule 12 of the Business Rules and was not properly authenticated, still the order passed by the Minister will not be vitiated as the said judgment and order is not an executive order passed by the State and the Minister concerned was not discharging executive function of the State. The orders which are passed while discharging quasi judicial function by the Minister, need not be authenticated in the manner as provided in Rules 12 and 13, of the Business Rules framed by the Governor of the State. He further submitted that application of Article 166 of the Constitution is not mandatory. Instead, it is directory in nature. While distinguishing the case relied upon by the petitioner reported in (Gulabrao Keshvrao Patil and others v. State of Gujarat and others)27, 1996(2) S.C.C. 26 , it was submitted that on facts the said case is not applicable to the present case. In the case of Gulabrao Keshvrao Patil (supra), the Minister was not discharging quasi judicial function but, in the present case, the Minister was discharging his duty while disposing of the revision petition filed under section 154 of the Act of 1960. The Minister had heard the contesting parties and had to decide the rival claims of the parties by passing a reasoned judgment and order. It was submitted that even the judgment delivered by the larger Bench ought to be distinguished based on facts of the said case. It was proposed that Article 166 of the Constitution is not applicable to the quasi judicial cases. Even if it is concluded that there was no compliance of Article 166 of the Constitution, in the present case, still the order of the Minister will not be vitiated on the said count. On these lines, the following case law was cited : 1) M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. etc. v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1608. 2) Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and others, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 181. 3) P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore Cochin, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 160. On these lines, the following case law was cited : 1) M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. etc. v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1608. 2) Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and others, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 181. 3) P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore Cochin, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 160. 4) (L.G. Chaudhari v. The Secretary, L.S.G. Dept., Government of Bihar)28, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 383. 5) (Chandrakant Sakharam Karkhanis v. State of Maharashtra)29, A.I.R. 1977 Bombay 193. 6) (The State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi)30, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2547. 7) (Daleep Singh and others v. State of Maharashtra)31, A.I.R. 1983 Bombay 356. 8) (Sheikh Mohamed Fatemohamed v. Raisuddin Azimuddin Katil)32, 2000(Supp.) Bom.C.R. (A.B.)(F.B.)373. 9) (Padmasundara Rao (dead) and others v. State of T.N. and others)33, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 1334. 17. While disposing of the Writ Petition No. 941/99 along with the connected writ petitions by judgment and order dated 3-3-2000, the Division Bench of this Court had issued directions to the State authorities by framing Clauses (i) to (v). Clause (iii) reads as under : "The applications pending with the Registrar shall be heard and decided as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of two months from today. The Government of Maharashtra shall, in turn, after the Registrar has recorded his findings, take a policy decision as contemplated by the Resolution dated 2nd February, 1990 within a period of two months thereafter and in the meanwhile status quo as on today shall continue. The State Government may also hear the financial institutions as well as the Union of employees of the Zilla Sangh so as to take a policy decision." 18. The respondent No. 5 had preferred a writ petition in this Court (Writ Petition No. 714/2001). While disposing of the said writ petition along with other two writ petitions, the Division Bench of this Court on 29th March, 2001, had observed in paragraph No. 4, thus. "4. It is further made clear that the Government-respondent No. 1, as also respondent No. 3 shall not take anything into consideration, which has happened, in the matter of Parner after the date of the report i.e. 26-4-2000 i.e. in Writ Petition No. 714 of 2001 and in the matter of Karjat after the date of the report i.e. 2-5-2000 i.e. in Writ Petition Nos. 748 and 858 of 2001, till such order is passed in those matters." 19. The Letters Patent Appeal No. 59/2001 in Writ Petition No. 2872/2001 was allowed by an order dated 4-10-2001. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the order passed in L.P.A. by this Court are relevant for consideration of the issue involved in this writ petition and are thus, reproduced as below : "20. In the given circumstances, the Divisional Deputy Registrar will have to be directed to hold inquiry afresh with respect to the five proposals which were submitted and to which reference as made in the report dated 26-4-2000 should be reconsidered after giving opportunity to all concerned. It has to be noted that certain village level Milk Societies have come up after the report dated 26-4-2000 and they also must be given an opportunity of being heard. 21. So far as the directions issued in Writ Petition No. 714/2001, it is sufficient to say that only those proposals, which are there in the report dated 26-4-2000 are to be considered on the basis of whatever submissions made in those proposals and whatever the documents and other material submitted along with those proposals should be considered and the persons making the proposals cannot supplement any document or any evidence other than that which was already supplied along with the proposals. However, all those proposers can bring on record evidence in support to their proposals or in rebuttal of the evidence brought on record by the other proposers. The primary societies of village level in Parner Taluka also will have to be given an opportunity with respect to the rival proposers which are referred to in the report dated 26-4-2000. Such primary societies may bring on record any evidence in support of their contentions and that will have to be taken into consideration by the Divisional Deputy Registrar before passing the order. However, no fresh proposals should be taken into consideration." 20. The afore mentioned judgments and orders passed from time to time are the guiding factors for the authorities while deciding the issue regarding sanctioning a proposal of Taluka Doodh Sangh for opening bank account and for collection of milk. The order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik refers to the orders passed in Writ Petition No. 941/1999. Writ Petition No. 714/2001 and the orders passed in L.P.A. No. 59/2001. The order passed by the D.D.R. Nashik refers to the orders passed in Writ Petition No. 941/1999. Writ Petition No. 714/2001 and the orders passed in L.P.A. No. 59/2001. The D.D.R. Nashik has arrived at a finding that the proposal filed by Mr. Zanware, the petitioner is not in existence and hence, it is out of the zone of consideration. Mr. Zanware had tendered his resignation as the Chief Promoter of the petitioner Sangh. As two separate proceedings were filed regarding the meeting held on 12th April, 2000, the withdrawal of resignation by Mr. Zanware was not considered. It is observed that the proposal of Mr. Ramchandra Mandage was already rejected by the D.D.R. Nashik and as Mr. Zanware had tendered his resignation, hence no proposal of the petitioner was in existence for its consideration by the D.D.R. Nashik. 21. The thrust of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 941/1999, Writ Petition No. 714/2001 and the L.P.A. No. 59/2001 clearly indicates that all the existing five proposals were directed to be reconsidered after giving opportunity to all the concerned. By arriving at a finding that the petitioner's proposal was not in existence, the D.D.R. had committed an error. On this aspect, the D.D.R. Nahik had failed to follow the orders passed by this Court from time to time in its true spirit. 22. The Honourable Minister (Dairy) had also referred to the orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 941/1000 and L.P.A. No. 59/2001. The Minister has observed that the Joint Registrar had taken into consideration the number of supporters in the case of the petitioner and the respondent No. 5. But, failed to take into account their capacity to supply milk. It has been observed that the respondent No. 5 had shown preparedness to supply 1.50 lakh 1trs. of milk per day whereas, the petitioner herein had shown preparedness to supply 1 lakh 1trs. of milk per day. The proposal submitted by the respondent No. 5 was supported by resolution of 109 primary societies whereas, the proposal of the petitioner is backed by 13 resolutions along with a list of 136 primary societies. The list of 136 societies did not mention their capacity to supply milk. of milk per day. The proposal submitted by the respondent No. 5 was supported by resolution of 109 primary societies whereas, the proposal of the petitioner is backed by 13 resolutions along with a list of 136 primary societies. The list of 136 societies did not mention their capacity to supply milk. It is thereafter, observed that even if the petitioner's proposal assumes support of more number of primary societies, but the petitioner has failed to substantiate the said support by means of submission of evidence to that effect. The respondent No. 5 had mentioned the capacity of each of the primary societies while submitting the proposal. Hence, the preparedness of the proposal of respondent No. 5 to supply milk was based on realistic assessment. The figures mentioned in petitioner's proposal regarding supply of milk was not considered to be based on realistic assessment. 23. The Minister thereafter considers the issue of resignation of Mr. Zanware as the Chief Promoter and arrives at the conclusion that at the time of passing of the order in Writ Petition No. 941/1999 by this Court on 3-3-2000. Mr. Zanware had ceased to be the Chief Promoter of the petitioner proposed Sangh. Saying so, the Minister further observes that as it was directed by the High Court in L.P.A. No. 59/2001 to consider five proposals, the proposal filed by Mr. Zanware is being considered. The conclusion drawn by the Minister that the proposal filed by Mr. Zanware was not in existence goes contrary to the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 59/2001. In a way, the Honourable Minister has also discarded the petitioner's proposal from the zone of consideration as was done by the D.D.R. Nashik. 24. The Joint Registrar in its order had referred to the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 59/2001 which specifically directs the authorities to hold inquiry afresh with respect to the five proposals. All those proposers were permitted to bring on record evidence in support of their proposals or in rebuttal of the evidence brought on record by the other proposers. The primary societies were also directed to be given an opportunity with respect to the five proposers which were referred to in the report dated 26-4-2000. All those proposers were permitted to bring on record evidence in support of their proposals or in rebuttal of the evidence brought on record by the other proposers. The primary societies were also directed to be given an opportunity with respect to the five proposers which were referred to in the report dated 26-4-2000. Such primary societies were permitted to bring on record any evidence in support of their contentions and that will have to be taken into consideration by the D.D.R. Nashik. The order passed by the Joint Registrar in its appellate jurisdiction refers to recording of statement/evidence regarding support from the primary societies in favour of the five proposers. It has been categorically recorded that there were 260 primary societies, out of which 184 primary societies have come forward and recorded their statements. At the time of hearing, these 184 societies had submitted resolutions passed by them, the proceedings through their authorised persons like Secretary or Chairman. The Joint Registrar had thereafter, recorded a finding that out of 184 such primary societies, 181 primary societies had supported the proposal of the petitioner by submitting evidence to that effect and by recording their statements orally. As against this, the three primary societies came forward to record their statements/evidence in favour of the respondent No. 5. The order passed by the Minister does not deal with this vital aspect of the matter. Based on the recording of fresh evidence as per the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 59/2001, the Joint Registrar had arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner's proposal enjoys support of more than 60% of the primary societies and fulfills the conditions of collection of milk accordingly. 25. The order passed by the Minister (Dairy) is not in conformity with the orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 941/1999, Writ Petition No. 714/2001 and L.P.A. No. 59/2001. There is thus, an error apparent on the face of record in the order passed by the Minister (Dairy), Government of Maharashtra. The order passed by the Minister is apparently an unreasonable order. The issue of capacity to supply milk was considered in favour of the respondent No. 5 by the Minister, which was based on inferences and presumptions. The order of the Minister is thus, perverse. 26. The order passed by the Minister is apparently an unreasonable order. The issue of capacity to supply milk was considered in favour of the respondent No. 5 by the Minister, which was based on inferences and presumptions. The order of the Minister is thus, perverse. 26. Both, the D.D.R. Nashik and the Minister failed to consider the proposal by discussing their overall assessment of its merits. The D.D.R. Nashik had excluded the petitioner's case from the zone of consideration at the same time considered the arithmetical calculations regarding who enjoys the majority support by the primary societies. The Minister's order heavily rests on the preparedness of the respondent No. 5 to supply 1.50 lakh 1trs. milk per day. It would be more appropriate to incorporate some of the observations of the Honourable Minister appearing in the impugned order, as below : ^^vtZnkj ;kaP;k izLrkokpk fopkj dsyk vlrk vls fnlrs dh] vtZnkjkus R;kaP;k izLrkok lkscr fdrh nq/kkus mRiknu d: 'kdsy ;kpk vankt fnysyk vkgs- vtZnkjkP;k izLrkokizek.ks vtZnkj gk izfrnhu 1-50 yk[k fyVlZ nq/k mRiknu d: 'kdsy ;kpk vankt orZfoysyk vkgs- izfroknh dzekad 3 ;kauh R;kaP;k izLrkok lkscr 1-00 yk[k fyVlZ izfrnhu nq/k {kerspk vankt fnysyk vkgs-^^ ^^ R;keqGs izfroknh dzekad 3 ;kauh tjh R;kauk tkLr la[;kpk ikfBack vkgs vlk vankt O;Dr dsysyk vlyk rjh R;k lanHkkZr rs 'kkchr gksm 'kdsy vlk iqjkok lknj dsysyk fnlr ukgh- ;k myV vtZnkjkus R;kaP;k izLrkoke/ks lHkklnkaP;k ;knhe/;s izkFkehd laLFkkP;k mRiknu {kersps vkdMs ueqn vkgs- R;keqGs R;kauh orZfoysyk vankt gk oLrq fLFkrh n'kZd vkgs vls eyk okVrs-^^ ^^Eg.ktsp ;kfpdk dzekad 941@99 e/khy vkns'kizek.ks QDr izyachr izLrkokpk fopkj dj.ksp ca/kudkjd vlY;kus o Jh- uandqekj >kojs ;kauh fnukad 03 03 2000 iwohZp jkthukek fnyk vlY;kus R;kapk izLrko izyachr gksrks vls Eg.krk ;s.kkj ukgh- R;keqGs lnj izLrkokpk fopkj dj.;kph vko';drk ukgh-^^ 27. The second aspect of the matter is regarding the application of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India to the facts of this case. In a reported decision in the case of Gulabrao Keshvrao Patil (supra), the Supreme Court had observed that if the action of the Government and the order is duly authenticated as per Article 166(2) and the Business Rule conclusive and irrebuttable presumption arises that decision was duly taken according to Rules. In a reported decision in the case of Gulabrao Keshvrao Patil (supra), the Supreme Court had observed that if the action of the Government and the order is duly authenticated as per Article 166(2) and the Business Rule conclusive and irrebuttable presumption arises that decision was duly taken according to Rules. The decision of the Minister under the Business Rules is not final or conclusive until the requirements in terms of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are complied with. In a reported decision in the case of Bachhittar Singh (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the order passed by the Minister must be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by Clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. The Minister is no more than an adviser and as the head of the State, the Governor or Rajpramukh has to act with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. One conclusion could be drawn from the authoritative pronouncements of the larger Benches of the Apex Court that any non-compliance with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution, may not invalidate the order or vitiate the same, but it precludes the drawing of any irrebuttable presumption regarding such order. This view is further expressed in reported decision in the case of Major E.G. Barsay (supra). It has been observed in a reported decision in the case of Gullapalli Nageshwara Rao and others (supra), as follows: "The concept of a quasi judicial act implies that an act is not wholly judicial. It describes only the duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power. The procedural rules made by the Governor for the convenient transaction of business of the State Government apply also to quasi judicial acts provided those Rules conform to the principles of judicial procedure." 28. It was argued on behalf of the respondent No. 5 and the State that there is no foundation of pleadings in the petition filed by the petitioner which would entitle him to raise an issue of application of provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution. In absence of there being any whisper in the petition regarding application of Article 166 of the Constitution, the petitioner is estopped from arguing the said point. In absence of there being any whisper in the petition regarding application of Article 166 of the Constitution, the petitioner is estopped from arguing the said point. Placing reliance on a reported decision in the case of M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. etc. v. State of Gujarat and others, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1608, it was argued on behalf of the State that as there are no pleadings in the petition regarding non-compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the argument on the alleged non compliance need not be entertained. In the case of M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (supra), the notification issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was challenged on the ground of want of consent of the State Government. There was no allegation in the petitions that Rule 3 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 was not complied with. Neither there were particulars as to non-compliance of Rule 4. It was, therefore, observed that no issue can be raised on a plea, foundation of which is lacking. On facts, the decision in the case of M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (supra), cannot be made applicable to the issue involved in this case, regarding compliance of the constitutional provisions. 29. The issue of Article 166 of the Constitution is of vital importance. When it is seen by the Court or it is brought to the notice of the writ Court that certain order impugned in the petition is not in compliance with the constitutional provisions of Article 166, then in such circumstances, the Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Constitution of India, cannot refuse to look into it merely on the basis that the issue is not pleaded in the petition by the petitioner. It assumes mere significance when the State Government fails to satisfy the Court that in fact, there was a compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution. In this case, it was argued on behalf of the State Government that passing an order by the Honourable Minister (Dairy) after hearing the parties concerned is itself substantial compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution. In this case, it was argued on behalf of the State Government that passing an order by the Honourable Minister (Dairy) after hearing the parties concerned is itself substantial compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution. In view of Business Rules framed by the Governor of Maharashtra, the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution and the views expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Gulabrao Keshavrao Patil (supra), I do not find that the State Government has complied with the requirements under Article 166 of the Constitution. 30. The impugned order passed by the Minister on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India alone, may not be vitiated, it could not be termed to be nullity, but it is certainly not final and conclusive. 31. The learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 and the learned A.G.P. appearing for the State Government had contended that his Court, exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, had certain restrictions on it as defined from time to time by the Apex Court. Several authorities were cited on the point. In this case, on the given facts and circumstances, more particularly, in view of the judgments and orders passed in Writ Petition No. 941/1999, Writ Petition No. 714/2001 and L.P.A. No. 59/2001, I find the order passed by the Honourable Minister (Dairy) not in confirmity of the orders passed by this Court as referred above. An error is thus, apparent on the face of record. 32. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Honourable Minister (Dairy) in Revision No. 2 of 2002 dated 8-4-2002 is quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Dairy), Mumbai in Appeal No. 2/2002 dated 26-2-2002 is restored. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to cots. Authenticated copy of this judgment and order be supplied to the contesting parties on priority, if applied for, as per the Rules. Writ petition allowed. -----