Nimar Textile Mills Ltd. v. Land Acquisition Officer
2002-08-09
BHAWANI SINGH, S.L.JAIN
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment ( 1. ) UNDAUNTED by the unsuccess before the Single Bench in Writ Petition No. 6879/2000 the appellant has filed this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenging the order dated 18-3-2002. ( 2. ) THE brief resume of facts required to be stated for the disposal of this appeal is that looking to the needs of general public, Municipal Corporation, Khandwa decided to construct a bus stand so as to enable the general public to get means of conveyance to a particular place. For this purpose, earlier the State Government issued a notification which was subject-matter of challenge before the High Court but as the proceedings of acquisition could not be completed within the statutory period, the proceedings initiated in furtherance with the notification dated 2-6-95 were dropped. ( 3. ) AGAIN on 12-9-2000 the Municipal Corporation, Khandwa passed a resolution for the construction of bus stand. Thereafter, on 20-9-2000 the Collector wrote to the Commissioner tor involving an urgency clause keeping in view of the need for construction of the bus stand. The Commissioner being satisfied that there is a need to take recourse to urgency provision, vide letter dated 23-10-2000 granted permission to take recourse to urgency clause under Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the act) ( 4. ) A notification under Sections 4 and 17 of the Act was published in the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra dated 10-11-2000. The notification also published in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality in the regional language, i. e. , nav Bharat, dated 6-11-2000 and dainik Bhaskar, dated 8-11-2000, as required by law, declaring that the land in question, is likely to be needed for construction of bus stand. ( 5. ) THE appellant challenged the aforesaid notification in Writ Petition No. 6879/2000 on the following grounds :- (1) The permission was granted by the Commissioner by applying Section 17 (1) of the Act without application of mind, (2) A very big area of 11. 5 acres of land is being acquisitioned. Such a big area will not be required for the bus stand. Even in the big cities of the State the bus stands are not constructed in such a big area and this shows the malafides of the authorities.
5 acres of land is being acquisitioned. Such a big area will not be required for the bus stand. Even in the big cities of the State the bus stands are not constructed in such a big area and this shows the malafides of the authorities. (3) The land of the appellant is in the industrial area and appellant-Company is intending to re-start its production. (4) Adjacent to the land, in question, there is Government land and there was no justification for depriving the appellant of its valuable land and further the appellant has been deprived of its valuable right to object to the intended land acquisition. The use of urgency clause is malafide, colourable and a device to deprive the appellant from raising the objections. (5) The approval for urgency clause under Section 17 (1) of the Act was given by the Deputy Commissioner who was not a competent authority. (6) Under the Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960 the Chief Planner reserved the land, in question, for installation of heavy and medium industries. This Act (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act) was repealed by M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to repealing Act ). The scheme which was framed under the provisions of the Repealed Act would continue to be the scheme for the purpose of Repealing Act. Therefore, the land use cannot be changed and the land reserved for installation of heavy and medium industries cannot be acquired for the purpose of construction of bus stand. ( 6. ) THE respondents combated the claim of the appellant, stating that keeping in view the urgent need for construction of the bus stand urgency clause under Section 17 (1) of the Act of 1894 was invoked. The permission to take recourse to urgency clause was given by the Commissioner and not by the Deputy Commissioner as is being posed by the appellant. According to them, the entire proceedings are perfectly just and proper in accordance with the provisions of law. In the absence of any material allegations regarding the malafides the same cannot be permitted to be raised. ( 7.
According to them, the entire proceedings are perfectly just and proper in accordance with the provisions of law. In the absence of any material allegations regarding the malafides the same cannot be permitted to be raised. ( 7. ) LEARNED Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that invocation of urgency clause was proper, establishment of bus stand has been approved by the competent authority under the Repealing Act and the State Government has sanctioned the acquisition, therefore, the acquisition will prevail over the scheme. Invocation to urgency clause is a matter of subjective satisfaction and it cannot be said to be malafide. ( 8. ) WE have heard Shri R. K. Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant at the admission stage. All the contentions which have been raised before the learned Single Judge and which are enumerated in Paragraph 5 above, have been reiterated before us. ( 9. ) SHRI Gupta submitted that while granting permission to invoke urgency clause, the Commissioner did not apply his mind and the approval of urgency clause was given by the Deputy Commissioner who was not a competent authority. Shri Gupta also submitted that adjacent to the land in question there is Government land and there was no justification for depriving the appellant of its valuable land. The use of urgency clause has deprived it of its right to raise such an important objection. There is no material to contend that use of urgency clause is malafide, colourable and a device to deprive the appellant from raising the objections. The finding of learned Single Judge in this regard cannot be said to be assailable. ( 10. ) A person seeking to invalidate an administrative order on the charge of malafides has to establish charge of bad faith by furnishing necessary particulars. What the party in such a case has to prove is not malice in its legal sense, but he has to prove malus animus indicating that the State or the authority was actuated either by spite or ill-will against him or by indirect or improper motive. Malafide must be shown by cogent material on record.
What the party in such a case has to prove is not malice in its legal sense, but he has to prove malus animus indicating that the State or the authority was actuated either by spite or ill-will against him or by indirect or improper motive. Malafide must be shown by cogent material on record. We cannot be oblivious that there has been a steady decline of public standards or public morals and where such situations cry out we should not and cannot remain moot and dumb but here the appellant could not show any material on the basis of which it can be said that the Commissioner did not exercise the powers reasonably and lawfully. It cannot be said that the authority has acted contrary to the reason. ( 11. ) IT appears that copy of the order of the Commissioner has not been filed by the appellant. Invocation of urgency clause is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the authority on the consideration of the purpose which is involved in the case, as has been held in Bhagat Singh etc. v. State of U. P. and Ors. ( AIR 1999 SC 436 ). No material has been placed on record to substantiate that the order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner and not by the Commissioner. It can not be said that the Commissioner did not apply his mind to the need and urgency of the purpose. ( 12. ) SHRI Gupta submitted that a very big area of 11. 5 acres of land is being acquisitioned. Khandwa is District Headquarter and a very big town. While constructing bus stand the future need might have also been kept in view. If the Municipal Corporation has sufficient means and it desires to construct a model bus stand even superior to what are existing in other big cities of the State, no malafide on the part of Municipal authorities can be attributed. ( 13. ) SHRI Gupta also strenuously urged that under the Repealed Act the planner reserved the land in question for installation of heavy and medium industries and because of the saving clause in the Repealing Act the scheme which was framed under the provisions of Repealed Act would continue to be a scheme for the purpose of Repealing Act.
( 13. ) SHRI Gupta also strenuously urged that under the Repealed Act the planner reserved the land in question for installation of heavy and medium industries and because of the saving clause in the Repealing Act the scheme which was framed under the provisions of Repealed Act would continue to be a scheme for the purpose of Repealing Act. It was also submitted that the land use cannot be changed by construction of bus stand on the land which is reserved for the installation of heavy and medium industries and for that purpose the land in question cannot be acquired. There is no law that the area reserved for installation of industries, cannot be used for construction of bus stand. In fact, construction of bus stand near the industrial area will add to the utility of the industrial area. By construction of bus stand the land use is not being changed from industrial to cither residential or green belt. ( 14. ) EVEN otherwise, the Letter No. 569/2000, dated 12-9-2000, addressed to the Collector and Land Acquisition Officer, Khandwa, clearly mentions that the scheme of construction of bus stand has been approved by the town and country planning authorities. According to the provisions of Section 24 of Repealing Act, the State Government has power to develop and use the land subject to its control. The over all control of development and use of land in the planning area shall vest in the Director. When the authorities have approved the construction of bus stand, it cannot be said that land use cannot be changed. Under Section 28 of the Repealing Act there is special provision regarding development by local authorities which includes Municipal Corporation. ( 15. ) SHRI Gupta lastly submitted that the Land Acquisition Act is essentially concerned with the acquisition of a land as an immovable property. The Government cannot acquire a business or industry and say that it is mainly an acquisition of a land and incidentally of the business or industry. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (AIR 1988 Bombay 183 ). This point was canvassed before the learned Single Judge also. The contention of the learned Counsel is fallacious.
Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (AIR 1988 Bombay 183 ). This point was canvassed before the learned Single Judge also. The contention of the learned Counsel is fallacious. In the case cited by Shri Gupta, a theatre was acquisi-tioned as an out let for the films of the State Government and thus commercial undertaking was acquisitioned for releasing the pictures of State Government. Essentially, it was an acquisition of a running concern and not the acquisition of a land or movable property attached to the land. ( 16. ) IN the case, in hand, the position is not that the State Government has acquisitioned the factory of the appellant to start its own production activities. Simply because certain commercial activities will be undertaken on the bus stand to cater the needs of the passengers, it cannot be said that a running industry or any commercial undertaking is being acquired in the garb of acquisition of the land. In fact, it is an acquisition of land with superstructure thereon for which the appellant shall be entitled to adequate compensation. The dominant purpose is construction of bus stand and not to establish commercial venture. ( 17. ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the findings of the learned Single Judge are unassailable. We do not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly, it is dismissed in limine.