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2002 DIGILAW 768 (AP)

Kudithi Lakshma Reddy v. Gantla Satti Reddy

2002-06-24

ELIPE DHARMA RAO

body2002
E. DHARMA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition is directed against the order dated 5-4-2002 passed in IA No. 82 of 2002 in IA No. 12 of 1999 in OS No. 1 of 1999 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Mahabubabad - Warangal District, dismissing the petition filed for seeking police aid in implementing the ad interim injunction order granted by the Court in IA No. 12 of 1999 on 27-1-1999. ( 2 ) IA No. 82 of 2002 was filed consequent upon the happening of an incident on 24-2-2002 when the respondents are alleged to have entered into the theatre, knocked out all the staff from the theatre, threatened the Manager with dire consequences, stopped him from exhibiting the film and closed the theatre; that the respondents occupied the Manager s room and did not allow the petitioner to run the theatre besides causing damage to the property. The petitioner is said to have approached the police officials and explained them with regard to the interim order in his favour, who are said to have refused to take any action against the respondents without there being any direction from the Court. In those circumstances, the petitioner came up with the instant petition. ( 3 ) THE respondent denied various averments made in the petition and contended that they never interfered with the Management of the suit property. It averred that the respondent is a partner in the petition and the Honourable Court while granting ex parte injunction observed that the respondent can inspect the account books and can ask the petitioner for the same. Thus the respondents contend that he went to see the account books only and, therefore, sought for dismissal of the petition. ( 4 ) THE Court below having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of Order 39, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that since the petition granting interim injunction was not disposed of within 30 days, the order dated 27-1-1999 granting ad-interim injunction, is non-est in law, and, therefore, there is no need to grant police aid. it is further observed by the Court below that since the main interlocutory application IA No. 12 of 1999 is also disposed of granting injunction in favour of the petitioner and restraining the respondents from interfering with the smooth management of the suit property and also with some directions, there is no need to grant police aid and thus dismissed the petition. ( 5 ) AGAINST the said order, the present civil revision petition is filed. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for revision petitioner contended that if once the ad interim injunction granted is not vacated, it has its own force and, therefore, the rejection to grant police aid for implementation of the order and protection of the petitioner is illegal and is liable to be set aside. ( 7 ) IT is apposite, in the context of rival contentions, to quote Order 39, Rule 3-A, which reads thus:"3-A. Court to dispose of application for injunction within thirty days :--Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and there it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. . . . . " ( 8 ) THUS this rule contemplates that if ad interim injunction is granted without giving notice to the opposite party, a duty is cast on the Court to dispose of the said application finally within thirty days from the date on which such injunction was granted and if the Court is not able so to do, it has to record its reasons for such inability. ( 9 ) IT is borne out from the facts and circumstances on record that after passing the interim injunction on 27-1-1999, neither any attempts were made to dispose of the interlocutory application finally within thirty days nor the learned Judge has recorded his inability to dispose of the same within the stipulated time, Thus the order is neither confirmed nor extended for further period. Therefore, it cannot be said to be non-est in the eye of law, but by afflux of time as contemplated under Rule 3-A, it has become inoperative. Therefore, it cannot be said to be non-est in the eye of law, but by afflux of time as contemplated under Rule 3-A, it has become inoperative. ( 10 ) THAT apart, the IA No. 12 of 1999 in which temporary injunction was ordered on 27-1-1999, was disposed of by the learned Senior Civil Judge granting injunction in favour of the petitioner and also with some directions to both the parties, therefore, that order merges with the final order passed in IA No. 12 of 1999. Therefore, the dismissal of IA No. 82 of 2002 is bad in law. ( 11 ) IT is appropriate hereto look at the objects and reasons of insertion of Rule 3-A to Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Rule 3-A was inserted by Amendment Act, 1976, based on the recommendation of the Committee that once an order for temporary injunction is obtained by a party, he does not show any anxiety to expedite the disposal of the suit and consequently, the injunction continues for an inordinate long period and such continuance of the injunction for a long period may not only cause hardship to the litigants but may also have the effect of holding up many of the welfare projects undertaken by the Government. Therefore, in the Bill, it was provided that a temporary injunction should not ordinarily remain in force for a period of more than thirty days, but the duration of the injunction could be extended to forty five days with the consent of the opposite party and that no extension beyond the period of forty five days will be permissible. The Committee also felt that it would be difficult to obtain the consent of the opposite party for the extension of the time limit as such the provision for such extension of the time limit with the consent of the opposite party does not appear to be practicable one. It is further observed by the Committee that the imposition of a rigid time limit may also lead to difficulties because occasion may arise when the Court may not, for want of time, be able to dispose of the application for temporary injunction before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the ad interim injunction was granted. It is further observed by the Committee that the imposition of a rigid time limit may also lead to difficulties because occasion may arise when the Court may not, for want of time, be able to dispose of the application for temporary injunction before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the ad interim injunction was granted. Therefore, the Committee felt that in order to avoid delay in disposal of the suits, it should be made obligatory on the part of the Court to dispose of the application for injunction within thirty days from the date on which the ad interim injunction was granted by it and where it is not practicable so to do, the Court should be required to record the reasons for such inability. ( 12 ) AS stated earlier, Rule 3-A was inserted to Order 39 of the Code, since the continuance of the injunctions ordered without notice to the other side for long periods may not only cause hardship to the litigants but also have an effect of holding up many of the welfare schemes taken up by the Government. The said rule, therefore, mandates that it shall be the endeavour of the Court to dispose of such applications within 30 days from the date on which such injunction is granted and where that is not possible for the Court to dispose of the same within 30 days, it shall record reasons for such inability. Obviously, the insertion of this rule is with a view to reduce the pendency of interim injunctions granted without notice. ( 13 ) IN the instant case, the Court below after passing the interim order on 29-1-1999, has neither disposed of the application nor has recorded any reasons for its inability to dispose of the same within the time stipulated under Rule 3-A. Thus by afflux of time the order, since it was neither set aside nor confirmed, has become inoperative in the eye of law. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the interim order passed on 29-1-1999 was in existence as on the date of passing order in IA No. 12 of 1999 and he is entitled to seek police aid cannot be countenanced. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the interim order passed on 29-1-1999 was in existence as on the date of passing order in IA No. 12 of 1999 and he is entitled to seek police aid cannot be countenanced. I am fortified in my view by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bacharaj Singhvi v. Hastimal Kothari, 1980 (2) ALT 472 , wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that Rule 3-A specifically provides that if an injunction was granted without notice, the Court shall endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted and if the Court is unable to do so, the Court shall record its reasons for such inability. We are concerned in the instant case with the rejection of application to provide police aid for implementation of injunction order passed in IA No. 812 of 1999 on 27-1-1999. As stated earlier, the order impugned in this revision petition has become inoperative in the eye of law due to afflux of time as a result of non-compliance of Rule 3-A to Order 39 CPC. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the non-disclosure of reasons for non-disposal of the application finally, as ordained by Rule 3-A, the order has become non-est in the eye of law, inasmuch miss rule does not contemplate as to what is the effect of such an order, after 30 days. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the reasoning given by the learned Judge that the order has become non-est in the eye of law. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, in view of the final disposal of IA No. 12 of 1999 giving some directions to both the parties, I am of the considered view that the dismissal of IA No. 82 of 2002 renders no illegality. However, if the respondents commit breach of the directions, the petitioner will have every opportunity to approach the Court for appropriate relief. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I do not see any reason to interfere with the orders passed by the Court below. The civil revision petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. No costs.