JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, A.C.J. - This is a petition for quashing orders dated 18.6.1982, 1.11.2000 and 23.5.2001 passed by the Assistant Estate Officer; Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh, exercising the powers of the Chief Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh (hereinafter described as the Appellate Authority) and Advisor to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh under the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (for short, the Act). 2. For the purpose of deciding the issues raised in the petition, we may notice the facts which are borne out from the record of this case and C.W.P. No. 16382 of 2001 - Satya Pal v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others, decided on 5.8.2002. 3. The Chandigarh Administration allotted plot No. 95-96-97, Sector 17-D to Dr. Gopal Singh some time in 1966 subject to the terms and conditions contained in allotment letter No. 1760/CP-1665 dated 25.9.1966. After constructing the building, Dr. Gopal Singh leased out a portion thereof to the Directorate of Primary Education, Punjab without obtaining occupation certificate. On coming to know of this, Estate Officer, Chandigarh issued notice dated 19.3.1969 to the Director, Public Instructions, Punjab to show cause as to why he may not be prosecuted under Section 15 of the Act for violation of Rule 18 of the Punjab Capital (Development and Regulation) Building Rules, 1952 (for short, the Building Rules). He then filed a complaint which was registered as State v. G.L. Bakshi, D.P.I., Punjab. Later on, the District Magistrate, Union Territory, Chandigarh decided to withdraw the notice apparently because Dr. Gopal Singh succeeded in convincing him that there was no violation of the Building Rules. 4. It appears that after having got clean chit from the Chandigarh Administration, Dr. Gopal Singh transferred the building to Ajit Singh, Resham Singh and others, who leased out different portions thereof to different parties. In 1980, the Estate Officer, Chandigarh initiated proceedings under Section 8-A of the Act for resumption of the site on the ground that the construction had been made in violation of Rule 5 of the Building Rules. Gopal Singh transferred the building to Ajit Singh, Resham Singh and others, who leased out different portions thereof to different parties. In 1980, the Estate Officer, Chandigarh initiated proceedings under Section 8-A of the Act for resumption of the site on the ground that the construction had been made in violation of Rule 5 of the Building Rules. The Estate Officer issued notice dated 4.9.1980 to the transferees, namely, Ajit Singh, Resham Singh Lally (respondent No. 4) and others and the occupiers of the building, namely, M/s Blue Star Tailor, M/s Banarsi Pan, M/s Cute Cloths, M/s Ram Chander, M/s Cute Cloth Atul Emporium, M/s Sainik Tea Stall, A.G. Office at IInd Floor and D.P.I., Punjab to show cause as to why the site may not be resumed in view of the following violations of the building rules :- 1. Constructed partition in the shop-cum-office; 2. Constructed five floors instead of four floors; 3. Show window on the rear side has been converted into booth and tea stall is running. 5. Neither the owners nor the occupiers contested the notice and no one appeared on their behalf at the time of hearing. Therefore, by taking the allegation of violation of the Building Rules as correct, the Assistant Estate Officer passed order dated 18.6.1982 for resumption of the site and forfeiture of 10% of the price. Appeal Nos. 356 of 1997 - Satpal Singh v. Estate Officer, U.T., Chandigarh; 99 of 1996 - Director Public Instructions (S), Punjab, Chandigarh v. Estate of U.T., Chandigarh and 218 of 1995 - M/s. Trend Shoppe and others v. Estate Officer, U.T., Chandigarh filed against the order of resumption were dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 1.11.2000. The relevant extracts of that order reads as under :- "Sh. Ram Saran Dass & Sh. Ravinder Singh, Advocates and Sh. Surmukh Singh appearing on behalf of DPI(S) argued that the appellants were not party to the building violations. The violations were committed by the transferees/landlords and were rented out to different tenants to earn more income. They further submitted that the present appellants being not party to the violations cannot be made to suffer because of the defaults of the landlords. They submitted that the site may be restored to the original landlords and they be allowed to continue in the said building. They further submitted that the present appellants being not party to the violations cannot be made to suffer because of the defaults of the landlords. They submitted that the site may be restored to the original landlords and they be allowed to continue in the said building. On the other hand, Smt. Seema Handa argued that these appeals have been filed after the expiry of 15-14-13 years respectively from the passing of the impugned orders. No explanation for delay has been given by the appellants. Smt. Handa further argued that building violations in the building have been increased by the transferees/occupiers after resumption. She has placed on record latest inspection report dated 1.11.2000 which indicates following violations :- 1. Partition made in the SCO. 2. Show window on the rear side has been converted site booth. 3. Constructed five floor instead of 4th floor. 4. Cabins are made at upper floor. She further argued that the present appellants being tenants will not be in a position to rectify violations nor would they be able to deposit composite fee for the extra 5 floor. She further submitted that the appeals are without merit and may be dismissed. The undersigned has considered the arguments put forth by both the parties. The appeals have been filed after expiry of a period of 15-14-13 years respectively and no proper explanation has been given for the delay in filing these appeals. It is also not disputed that the violations in the building have increased after the date of resumption. The appellants when specifically asked whether or not they would be able to rectify all the building violations and also ready to deposit the composite fee for the extra fifth floor, the appellants submitted that they would not be able to rectify the building violations since they are tenants in some separate parts of the building. They also stated that they will not be able to deposit any composite fee on behalf of the transferees/landlords. The undersigned, therefore, finds no merit in the appeals and the same are hereby dismissed." (Underlining is ours) 6. They also stated that they will not be able to deposit any composite fee on behalf of the transferees/landlords. The undersigned, therefore, finds no merit in the appeals and the same are hereby dismissed." (Underlining is ours) 6. The revision petitions filed by petitioners, M/s Banarsi Pan House, M/s Sainik Tea Stall and Satya Pal was dismissed by the Advisor to the Administrator vide order dated 23.5.2001, by recording the following reasons :- "After hearing the parties and going through the submissions made, I find that the site in question was resumed by an order of the Estate Officer dated 18.6.1982 on the ground of violations of Rule 5 of the Punjab Capital (Development and Regulation) Building Rules, 1952. The owner of the premises has neither come up in appeal nor in revision before the undersigned. The tenants who have come up in revision, are unable to remove the violations, on the basis of which the site was resumed by the Estate Officer, I also do not find any force in the representation of the tenants in the premises and as such reject the same. Since there is no scope for setting the building in a position so as to conform to the aforesaid Building Rules of 1952, I am left with no other option except to decline the prayer of the petitioners, who are tenants in the premises, for the restoration of the site. Petitions preferred by the Director Public Instruction (School), Punjab, Chandigarh as also by M/s Trend Shoppe and others are, therefore, dismissed." 7. The petitioners have challenged the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer and the appellate as well as revisional orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Advisor to the Administrator on the following grounds :- (a) The proceedings of resumption initiated under Section 8-A of the Act against Ajit Singh and others were without jurisdiction because similar proceedings initiated against the original allottee had been dropped after accepting his explanation on the issue of violation of the Building Rules. (b) The order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer is vitiated due to the violation of the rules of natural justice because notice and opportunity of hearing were not given to the occupants. (b) The order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer is vitiated due to the violation of the rules of natural justice because notice and opportunity of hearing were not given to the occupants. (c) As per the policy decision taken by the Chandigarh Administration, the violations found by the Assistant Estate Officer and the Chief Administration can be compounded and they are prepared to pay the compounding fee. 8. Shri I.K. Mehta, Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that the very initiation of proceedings for resumption of the site on the ground of violation of the Building Rules should be declared illegal because similar proceedings initiated against the original allottee, namely, Dr. Gopal Singh had been dropped in the year 1969 by accepting his plea that the building had been constructed in accordance with the Building Rules. He further argued that the order of resumption should be declared void and quashed because no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to either of the petitioners. In the end, he argued that the respondents should be directed to regularise the construction by accepting the compounding fee prescribed by the Chandigarh Administration. In support of his arguments, Shri Mehta relied on the following decisions :- (1) Brij Mohan v. The Chief Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh and others, 1980 P.L.J. 380; (2) Raghubir Singh and Chatter Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, 1993 H.R.R. 621; (3) Dr. Vinod Kumar Sethi v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, 1994 P.L.J. 329; (4) M/s Rajinder Kumar & Sons v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2000(2) P.L.J. 465 ; and (5) Prem Kumar v. Chandigarh Administration and others, 2001(2) P.L.J. 99. 9. Shri Ajay Tiwari, counsel for Chandigarh Administration argued that the petitioners cannot be heard to make a grievance against the resumption of the site because they were neither the owners nor the occupiers of the building at the time of the initiation of resumption proceedings or the date of resumption i.e. 18.6.1982. He further argued that after 18.6.1982, Ajit Singh and others did not have the authority to induct the petitioners as tenants because with the passing of resumption order, the Chandigarh Administration had become its owner. He further argued that after 18.6.1982, Ajit Singh and others did not have the authority to induct the petitioners as tenants because with the passing of resumption order, the Chandigarh Administration had become its owner. Shri Tiwari controverted the argument of Shri Mehta that the petitioners were not given opportunity of hearing and submitted that no notice was required to be given to them because they were not occupying any portion of the building at the time of initiation of proceedings for resumption. Shri Tiwari pointed out that the petitioners have not controverted the factum of violations having been found by the officers of the Estate Office, Chandigarh and, therefore, they cannot seek invalidation of the order of resumption on the ground that on an earlier occasion, the proceedings initiated against the occupiers under Section 15 of the Act had been dropped by accepting the explanation given by Dr. Gopal Singh. On the question of regularisation of the construction, Shri Tiwari submitted that the petitioners cannot seek a direction in that respect because no legal relationship had ever existed between them and the Chandigarh Administration. 10. We have given serious thought to the respective arguments and perused the record. In our opinion, the resumption proceedings initiated by the Chandigarh Administration and the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer cannot be declared as without jurisdiction and the resumption of the site cannot be voided at the instance of the petitioners because no jural relationship had come into existence between them and the Chandigarh Administration till the passing of order dated 18.6.1982. It is not the petitioners case that the plot in question had been allotted to them or that they had been inducted as tenants in a portion of the building with the consent of the Chandigarh Administration. Rather, the averments contained in paragraph 6 of the petition show that petitioner No. 1 had occupied 1/2 portion of the ground floor w.e.f. 10.4.1987 i.e. almost five years after the resumption of the plot. Rather, the averments contained in paragraph 6 of the petition show that petitioner No. 1 had occupied 1/2 portion of the ground floor w.e.f. 10.4.1987 i.e. almost five years after the resumption of the plot. The date on which petitioner No. 2 is said tot have become tenant of Ajit Singh and others has not been disclosed in the petition, but it was also not been averred that the said petitioner had become a tenant of a portion of the building before 4.9.1980, i.e. the date on which notice was issued by the Estate Officer or 18.6.1982 i.e. the date of resumption of the site. Therefore, they do not have the locus standi to contended that the proceedings initiated by the Chandigarh Administration under Section 8-A of the Act are without jurisdiction. 11. We are further of the view that the decision of the then District Magistrate, Chandigarh to drop the proceedings initiated against the Director of Public Instructions, Punjab under Section 15 of the Act cannot operate as estoppel against initiation of proceedings on the ground of violation of Building Rules. A conjoint reading of Annexures P10 and P11 shows that the Estate Officer, Chandigarh had issued notice dated 19.6.1969 to Dr. G.L. Bakshi, the then Director, Public Instructions, Punjab to show cause as to why he may not be prosecuted for having occupied the building in violation of Rule 18 of the Building Rules. In other words, he was accused of having occupied the building before issuance of occupation certificate. Those proceedings were withdrawn because Dr. Gopal Singh succeeded in satisfying the District Magistrate, Chandigarh that no illegality was committed in leasing out a portion of the building to the Director of Public Instructions. However, there is nothing in the two documents from which it can be inferred that the proceedings had been initiated against Dr. Gopal Singh for raising construction in violation of Rule 5 of the Building Rules and the same were dropped on the ground that no violation had, in fact, been made. Therefore, the Chandigarh Administration was not estopped from taking action against Ajit Singh and others for gross violation of the building Rules found by the Estate Office, more-so because during the pendency of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority, the transferees and their lessees had made additional constructions in contravention of the Building Rules. 12. Therefore, the Chandigarh Administration was not estopped from taking action against Ajit Singh and others for gross violation of the building Rules found by the Estate Office, more-so because during the pendency of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority, the transferees and their lessees had made additional constructions in contravention of the Building Rules. 12. The petitioners prayer for quashing the impugned orders on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice deserves to be rejected because, as mentioned above, they were neither the owners nor they were occupying the building on the date of initiation of the proceedings under Section 8-A of the Act or the date of resumption. 13. The judgments relied upon by Shri Mehta do not, in any manner, help the cause of the petitioners. In Brij Mohan v. Chief Administrator (supra), a Full Bench of this Court interpreted Section 2(k) of the Act and held that the word "transferee" includes a lessee. The Full Bench further held that a tenant of the building is entitled to be heard before an order of resumption is passed under Section 8-A of the read with Rule 9 of the Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Building) Rules, 1960. A careful reading of the judgment shows that the Full Bench had dealt with reference made in Letters Patent Appeals No. 101 of 1977. The facts of L.P.A. No. 101 of 1977 were that the appellant-tenant was furnished with a copy of show cause notice sent to his landlord-Faquir Chand requiring him to prefer his objection, if any. The Estate Officer resumed the building on the ground of mis-user. The appellant did not challenge the order of resumption by filing an appeal, but filed writ petition when proceedings under the 1971 Act were initiated for his eviction. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that he had no right to be heard before passing of the order of resumption and that having failed to avail the alternative remedy, he was not entitled to any relief in view of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. In the second Appeal (L.P.A. No. 102 of 1977), the appellant-tenant was furnished with a copy of show cause notice issued to his landlord. He challenged the order of resumption by filing an appeal and contended that he was entitled to be heard. In the second Appeal (L.P.A. No. 102 of 1977), the appellant-tenant was furnished with a copy of show cause notice issued to his landlord. He challenged the order of resumption by filing an appeal and contended that he was entitled to be heard. The appellate authority rejected his contention and upheld the order of resumption. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by holding that the tenant did not have the right to challenge the order of resumption. This view was not approved by the Full Bench. 14. In Dr. Vinod Kumar Sethis case (supra), a learned Single Judge held that before specifying the amount of composition fee, the Chandigarh Administration should give an opportunity of hearing to the owner. This case has no bearing on the question raised before us. 15. In State Bank of India v. Chandigarh Administration and others, C.W.P. No. 10305 of 2001, decided on 26.7.2002, this Court considered a question similar to the one raised by the petitioners and held as under :- "Section 8-A of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (for short, the 1952 Act), which provides for resumption of the site and forfeiture of whole or part of the premium on account of breach of conditions of transfer, envisages giving of notice to the transferee. Likewise, Rule 12(3) of the Rules envisages issuance of notice to the lessee. Rule 20 of the Rules empowers the Assistant Estate Officer to cancel the lease and forfeit the whole or part of the premium after giving notice in writing about the default, breach or non-compliance of any of the terms and conditions of the lease. None of these provisions contemplates issuance of notice to the tenant/occupier of the allotted premises about whom the transferee has not given any notice to the competent authority of Chandigarh Administration." 16. None of these provisions contemplates issuance of notice to the tenant/occupier of the allotted premises about whom the transferee has not given any notice to the competent authority of Chandigarh Administration." 16. The Court then referred to the judgments of Full Benches in Brij Mohan v. Chief Administrator, (supra); Ram Puri v. Chief Commissioner, 1982 P.L.R. 388 and of Division Benches in M/s International Publishers v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others, 2000(2) Revenue Law Reporter 114 and M/s Naresh Departmental Chandigarh v. The Chandigarh Administration and others, 2001(1) PLR 314 and distinguished the same by observing that in none of those cases, the Court had the occasion to deal with a case in which Chandigarh Administration had not been informed about the induction of the petitioner as tenant. The Court further held that a tenant of the site/building allotted/leased out by Chandigarh Administration cannot seek nullification of resumption proceedings on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice unless it is proved that he or the allottee/lessee had given due notice to the concerned authority of Chandigarh Administration about the tenancy. 17. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the order of resumption is not vitiated due to violation of the rule of hearing. 18. The question which remains to be considered is whether the violations noticed by the Assistant Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority can be compounded/regularised by accepting the prescribed fee from the petitioners. In our opinion, this question must be answered in the negative because no legal relationship had ever come into existence between the petitioners and the Chandigarh Administration and the mere fact that they had come to occupy different portions of the building after passing of the order of resumption cannot entitle them to seek regularisation of the violations because acceptance of their claim would amount to creation of a new relationship between them and the Chandigarh Administration. 19. The judgments of this Court in M/s Rajinder Kumar & Sons v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (supra) and Prem Kumar v. Chandigarh Administration and others (supra) are of little help to the petitioners because in both the cases, the Court had found that the petitioners were lawfully inducted as tenants of the transferees and the latter had deliberately avoided compounding of violations. 20. 20. The order passed by the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh and Chattar Singhs case (supra) is of no help to the petitioners because the violations noted in those cases were found by the Supreme Court to be technical in nature and the appellants had shown their willingness to pay the compounding fee. In the present case, the petitioners have not shown his readiness to pay the compounding fee prescribed by Chandigarh Administration. Therefore, they cannot derive any benefit from the order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Raghubir Singh and others. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is dismissed. 21. Before parting with the case, we deem if necessary to observe that the Chandigarh Administration should not ordinarily entertain any request by respondent No. 4-Resham Singh Lally and others, who are said to have purchased the building from Dr. Gopal Singh, for restoration of the site. Any such decision by the authorities would be construed as a part of the conspiracy hatched by respondent No. 4 and others to get the building vacated from the tenants by adopting dubious means. If, despite these observations, the authorities concerned decide to restore the site to respondent No. 4 and others on account of political, bureaucratic or other pressure, then the petitioners shall be free to file an application in this case for consideration of their request for restoration of their tenancy over different portions of the building. Petition dismissed.