BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Writ petition has been filed seeking a declaration that section 499 and 500 of Indian Penal Code are arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires of constitutional limitations and violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE facts on the basis of which this Writ Petition has been filed are; the petitioner is a journalist and is Chief editor of some Telugu dailies. He claims that while working as Editor of Telugu daily Vaartha a news item was published titled "apuroopa Kala Khandalanu Videsalaku Taralistunna Kalanjali. " This news item carried a report on the alleged sale of certain artifacts by Kalanjali in the city. After publication of this article the petitioner received a notice dated 17-8-96 on behalf of Mr. Ramoji Rao and M/s Margadarshi Marketing Pvt. Ltd. The petitioner sent a reply in which it was said; "kalanjali has been resorting to back door methods on smuggling and that in fact the article only mentioned that an attempt by Kalanjali to export two metal idols had been detained by the customs authority. " This reply was given on 23/08/1996. After exchange of notices a complaint was filed by respondent No. 3 against the petitioner. The XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally tried the petitioner with others in C. C. No. 645/96 for the offences under section 500, 501 and 502 I. P. C. and the learned Magistrate found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six months and also fined Rs. 2,000 /- on various counts. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has challenged vires of section 499 and 500 of I. P. C. ( 3 ) MR. S. Ramachandra Rao, Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that, in view of the fact that the law of defamation was enacted about one half century back by colonial rulers and after freedom India having become republic governed by a Constitution this law cannot remain a part of statute. He contended that section 499 of I. P. C. is directly opposed to the freedom of expression which includes freedom of press and as such it cannot have any place in a democracy like ours. He contended that section 499 of I. P. C. is directly opposed to the freedom of expression which includes freedom of press and as such it cannot have any place in a democracy like ours. He futher contended that, if it is was not possible to strike down section 499 as a whole then the first exception to section 499 needs to be struck down partially. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate General who appeared for respondents submitted that, right of freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution and it includes freedom of press but freedom of speech by no means can include right to defame. The learned Advocate General was of the view that under Article 19 of the Constitution reasonable restrictions can be imposed on freedom of speech by competent legislations. The learned Advocate General was further of the view that freedom of press though sacred could not be higher than freedom of a citizen. ( 5 ) NOW, in the light of this basic premise in which the contending sides have placed their points of view before this Court, this Court would have to go into the elaborate arguments made. Before addressing to the arguments made it will be pertinent to reproduce section 499 of Indian Penal Code. "499 Defamation - Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation 1 - It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is entitled to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2 - It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3 - An imputation in the form an alternative or express ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 2 - It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3 - An imputation in the form an alternative or express ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4 - No imputation is said to harm a person s repution, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling,or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful. First exception - Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published - It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. Second Exception - Public conduct of public servants - It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Third Exception - Conduct of any person touching any public question - It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Fourth Exception - Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts - It is not defamation to publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings. Explanation - A Justice of the peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section. Explanation - A Justice of the peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section. Fifth Exception - Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witness and others concerned - It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case,or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Sixth Exception - Merits of public performance - It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further. Explanation - A performance may be submitted to the judgment of the public expressly or by acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public. Seventh Exception - Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another - It is not defamation of a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates. Eighth Exception - Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person - It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation. Ninth Exception - Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other s interests - It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of that person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. Tenth Exception - Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for the public good - It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good. " now, from the bare reading of section 499 it becomes clear that any person by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person is said to defame that person. Then there are four explanations as to what could be defamation. There are ten exceptions. ( 6 ) BEFORE going to the arguments and various judgments which have been pressed into service, let us on first principles see what conduct is made an offence under section 499 I. P. C. It is only the conduct of a person relating to a communication by words spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representation which may or which are intended to or for which there is a reason to believe that they would cause harm to the reputation of another person that has been made an offence under section 499 I. P. C. Now, coming to Article 19, true it guarantees to all the citizens of India freedom of speech and expression but clause (2) to Article 19 gives power to the State to have restrictions on rights to freedom. Laws with respect to libel and slander existing at the time of coming into force the Constitution of India were saved. Later on, by First amendment clause (2) was amended and certain new grounds of restrictions were introduced. Libel and Slander were substituted by word Defamation. So, from 1951 there is a constitutional protection to section 499 I. P. C. Therefore, it is not open at all to the petitioners to contend that section 499 is ultra vires to Articles 19 of the Constitution of India. Section 499 was in existence at the time of commencement of the Constitution and section 499 of I. P. C. is in chapter XXI which deals with of DEFAMATION . Section 499 was in existence at the time of commencement of the Constitution and section 499 of I. P. C. is in chapter XXI which deals with of DEFAMATION . The title under section 499 has been incorporated in I. P. C. as defamation . Therefore, in the absence of any challenge to the First Constitutional amendment of 1951 substituting the words Libel and Slander by Defamation it may not be possible by any stretch of imagination to hold that section 499 I. P. C. was ultra vires to Article 19. It appears that, Libel and Slander were substituted by Defamation because Libel and Slander were not defined in section 499 or any other provision of Indian Penal Code whereas Defamation had been defined very elaborately. ( 7 ) THE arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner can be summarized as below; (a) Article 19 (a) includes freedom of press. (b) Provisions of Constitution cannot remain static: (c) Restrictions to be imposed under Article 19 (2) are to be tested on the basis of reasonableness. (d) Right to be defended is an individual right whereas press freedom is a macro right. (e) Throughout the world there is a tendency to decriminalize the law of defamation with the media explosion and it is the duty of the press to make available information at large to the people which is in public interest. (f) Although truth is a defence but it is conditional. Even if section 499 I. P. C. is upheld truth should be defence without qualifications. The arguments made by the learned Senior Counsel have been narrated by us as (a) to (f) herein above. (a) to (e) are interlinked and we are taking them together. The argument enunciated as (f) shall be taken separately. ( 8 ) COMING to the arguments (a) to (f) Mr. S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has produced voluminous case law on the subject. They include judgments of various High Courts, Supreme Court and even foreign courts. He has referred to following cases; 1. (1919) 249 US 47 2. (1927) 274 US 357 3. (1935) 297 US 233 4. (1942) 319 US 624 5. (1966) 384 US 214 6. (1992) Queen s Bench 770 he has also referred to an article freedom of Press by Herold L. Nelson. He has referred to following cases; 1. (1919) 249 US 47 2. (1927) 274 US 357 3. (1935) 297 US 233 4. (1942) 319 US 624 5. (1966) 384 US 214 6. (1992) Queen s Bench 770 he has also referred to an article freedom of Press by Herold L. Nelson. The two principles which the learned Senior Advocate wanted to enunciate by referring to these judgments are that, (1) freedom of speech includes the freedom of press and (2) interpretation of provisions of Constitution would continue to changes with the change in times. He referred to number of judgments from the Apex Court as well. They are: 1. 1950 SCR 594 : ( AIR 1950 SC 124 ) 2. (1962) 3 SCR 842 : ( AIR 1962 SC 305 ) 3. AIR 1973 SC 106 4. (1985) 1 SCC 641 : (AIR 1986 SC 515) 5. AIR 1993 SC 171 6. (1994) 6 SCC 632 : ( AIR 1995 SC 264 ) 7. (1995) 2 SCC 161 : ( AIR 1995 SC 1236 ) 8. AIR 1962 SC 305 9. AIR 1957 SC 896 10. AIR 1986 SC 872 11. (1996) 6 SCC 466 12. AIR 1961 Andh Pra 190 we need not go into all these judgments because the law with regard to the scope of Article 19 is well settled in this country and freedom of expression has been held to include freedom of press as well with all its restrictions. ( 9 ) IT appears that the petitioner has been encouraged to file this Writ petition because of an observation made by Supreme Court in a judgment reported in R. Rajagopal v. State of T. N. (1994) 6 SCC 632 : ( AIR 1995 SC 264 ). The Court observed that the impact of Article 19 (1) (a) read with clause (2) thereof on section 499 and 500 of Indian Penal Code has not been gone into and that may have to wait for a proper case, and, according to Mr. Ramachandra Rao the present case is the proper case and therefore we should test the vires of section 499 and 500 of Indian Penal Code. According to him this question has been kept open by the Supreme Court. Ramachandra Rao the present case is the proper case and therefore we should test the vires of section 499 and 500 of Indian Penal Code. According to him this question has been kept open by the Supreme Court. ( 10 ) BEFORE going to this judgment it may be necessary to state that the ultimate question would be whether the right of privacy of an individual is part of right of speech. The Supreme Court in this case (supra) considered this aspect of the matter. In para-9 of the judgment the Supreme Court held;"9. The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept originated in the filed of Tort law, under which a new cause of action for damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognized. This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin- (1) the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional recognition given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. The first aspect of this right must be said to have been violated where, for example, a person s name or likeness is used, without his consent, for advertising - or non-advertising - purposes or for that matter, his life story is written - whether laudatory or otherwise- and published without his consent as explained hereinafter. In recent times, however, this right has acquired a constitutional status. We shall proceed to explain how? Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution but has been inferred from Article 21. The first decision of this Court dealing with this aspect is Kharak Singh v. State of U. P. , AIR 1963 SC 1295 . A more elaborate appraisal of this right took place in a later decision in Gobind v. State of M. P. , (1975) 2 SCC 148 wherein Mathew, J. speaking for himself, Krishna Iyer and Goswami, JJ. Traced the origins of this right and also pointed out how the said right has been dealt with by the United States Supreme Court in two of its well-known decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479 and Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 US 113. Traced the origins of this right and also pointed out how the said right has been dealt with by the United States Supreme Court in two of its well-known decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479 and Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 US 113. After referring to Kharak Singh and the said American decisions, the learned Judge stated the law in the following words; ". . . privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior. If the Court does find that a claimed right is entitled to protection as a fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it must satisfy the compelling State interest test. xxx xxx xxx xxx privacy primariy concerns the individual. It therefore relates to and overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of the rights and values. Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child-rearing. This catalogue approach to the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give analytical picture of the distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. xxx xxx xxx xxx as Ely says : there is nothing to prevent one from using the word privacy to mean the freedom to live one s life without governmental interference. But the Court obviously does not so use the term. Nor could it, for such a right is at stake in every case. There are two possible theories for protecting privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might be engaging in such activities and that such harm is not constitutionally protectable by the State. The second is that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from societal control. The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might be engaging in such activities and that such harm is not constitutionally protectable by the State. The second is that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than the realities of their natures. The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty,the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute. The Europe Convention on Human Rights, which came into force on 3-9-1953, represents a valiant attempt to tackle the new problem. Article 8 of the Convention is worth citing. 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well- being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. " since the right to privacy has been the subject- matter of several decisions in the United states, It would be appropriate to briefly refer to some of the important decisions in that country. " Then the Court discussed certain American judgments elaborately and then in para-21 it held; "21. The question is, how far the principles emerging from the United States and English decisions are relevant under our constitutional system. So far as the freedom of press is concerned, it flows from the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). The question is, how far the principles emerging from the United States and English decisions are relevant under our constitutional system. So far as the freedom of press is concerned, it flows from the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). But the said right is subject to reasonable restrictions placed thereon by an existing law or a law made after the commencement of the Constitution in the interests of or in relation to the several matters set out therein. Decency and defamation are two of the grounds mentioned in clause (2 ). Law of Torts providing for damages for invasion of the right to privacy and defamation and Sections 499/500 IPC are the existing laws saved under clause (2 ). But what is called for today - in the present times - is a proper balancing of the freedom of press and said laws consistent with the democratic way of life ordained by the Constitution. Over the last few decades, press and electronic media have emerged as major factors in our nation s life. They are still expanding - and in the process becoming more inquisitive. Our system of Government demands - as do the systems of Government of the United States of America and United Kingdom - constant vigilance over exercise of governmental power by the press and the media among others. It is essential for a good Government. At the same time, we must remember that our society may not share the degree of public awareness obtaining in United Kingdom or United States. The sweep of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the freedom of speech and expression under our Constitution is not identical though similar in their major premises. All this may call for some modification of the principles emerging from the English and United States decisions in their application to our legal system. The broad principles set out hereinafter are evolved keeping in mind the above considerations. But, before we set out those principles, a few more aspects need to be dealt with. "then in para-26 it summerised the principles. "26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion : (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a right to be let alone . "then in para-26 it summerised the principles. "26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion : (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a right to be let alone . A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent-whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. (2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including Court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency (Article 19 (2)) an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz. , a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicized in press/media. (3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above - indeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (20) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of Court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule. (4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. (5) Rule 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923 or any similar enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media. (6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media. " ( 11 ) NOW, applying these principles and acknowledging that defamation is one of the exceptions created under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, we do not think that Section 499 or 500 suffers from any Constitutional infirmity. The excerpts from the judgment expressing doubts by Supreme Court with respect to vires of Section 499 or 500 I. P. C. have been expressed because it appears that such an argument had been made but it had not been tested by the Supreme Court. The excerpts from the judgment expressing doubts by Supreme Court with respect to vires of Section 499 or 500 I. P. C. have been expressed because it appears that such an argument had been made but it had not been tested by the Supreme Court. This appears to be a just passing reference and in the case in which this reference was made the facts would suggest that there was a likelihood of damage to the reputation of the persons concerned who had moved the Court, but even then the Supreme Court did not go into the question of vires of Section 499 and 500 I. P. C. We are of the considered view that right of freedom of press is not higher than the right of freedom of speech of an individual and this right, as is said, is not an absolute right. This is a right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and this right is subject to restrictions mentioned in Article 19 of the Constitution. Even without that, it is well settled principle of equity that, one s freedom to move his arm ends where somebody s nose starts. Freedom of expression or freedom of press would not certainly include freedom to defame. It would be, however, a different story if such publication is made which is factually correct and which is in public interest. Let us assume that a person is involved in antinational activities and a publication is made bringing it to the notice of the general public that such person is involved in antinational activities and if it is factually correct it would be in the interest of the public to know such accusation, but if such accusation is factually incorrect then damage would be done to the person about whom such a story is published. Therefore, we do not find that the law of defamation is in any way unreasonable or Section 499 of I. P. C. violates any principles on which our democratic set up rests. Truth is an exception to the law of defamation. Therefore, we do not agree with the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel. Therefore, we do not find that the law of defamation is in any way unreasonable or Section 499 of I. P. C. violates any principles on which our democratic set up rests. Truth is an exception to the law of defamation. Therefore, we do not agree with the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel. ( 12 ) THE learned Advocate General has also brought to our notice a Division Bench Judgment reported in K. V. Ramaniah v. Special Public Prosecutor, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 190 in which this question has already been addressed to and decided. We do not find ourselves in disagreement with the views expressed by the Division Bench as such we are bound by the judgment of a coordinate Bench. ( 13 ) NOW, coming to the last argument of Mr. S. Ramachandra Rao that truth should be a defence without further conditions, there are two conditions under Section 499 I. P. C. for truth to become an effective defence in a complaint of defamation. One is that it should be factually correct and the other is that it should be in public interest. We do not find how it is unreasonable. It is not always necessary to bring truth to the notice of general public. Let us assume that there is a victim of rape. In Indian society, if it is known that a particular woman has been subjected to rape there is guarantee for a miserable life to her. In such a social order the poor victim may try to hide this truth from the public. Would it be right for the press to publish such a story. After all, it is not going to serve any public purpose. In such a situation that poor lady shall be entitled to have a right to privacy although factually it would be correct that such a lady was raped. Therefore, it would not be always sufficient defence that the story published was factually correct. If the contention pleaded before us is accepted that truth should be a defence without further qualifications, then the pressmen shall enter anybody s bed-room. As has been held in R. Rajagopal s case (1 supra) that the right to privacy and right of freedom of press have to be balanced, therefore, a Laxman rekha has to be drawn somewhere and in our view the laxman rekha is the public interest. As has been held in R. Rajagopal s case (1 supra) that the right to privacy and right of freedom of press have to be balanced, therefore, a Laxman rekha has to be drawn somewhere and in our view the laxman rekha is the public interest. If publication of truth is in public interest it would not be a defamation, but if it has nothing to do with public interest and relates to privacy of an individual then it would certainly be defamatory. Therefore, in our view it would be dangerous if truth without further qualifications is made a defence in an action against defamation. ( 14 ) FOR these reasons, we dismiss the Writ petition. Tr. Crl M. P. No. 2213 of 1999 ( 15 ) SINCE we have dismissed the writ petition challenging the vires of Section 499 and 500 of I. P. C. , and the appeal is pending before the competent Court, therefore we do not think it proper to transfer the appeal to this Court. Therefore, we direct the lower Court to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law expeditiously. It is kept on record that we have not gone into merits of the case which will have to be gone into by the appellate Court while hearing the appeal. W. P. NO. 13959 OF 1996 ( 16 ) SINCE we have dismissed the writ petition challenging the vires of Section 499 and 500 of I. P. C. , that ground would not be available to the petitioners in this case. It appears from the facts that Government has permitted prosecution of the petitioners on the basis of an application by Sri Laxminarayana, IAS, Executive Officer of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam. Sri Laxminarayana had felt that he had been defamed by five articles written by the petitioners in Udayam from May 1 to May 5, 1986 and after permission was granted by the Government under Section 199 (2) of the Cr. P. C. the prosecution has been initiated before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. The only argument which has been advanced in the writ petition is that there was a Commission of inquiry appointed by the Government and Hon ble Justice Ramachandra Raju in his report dated 30th March, 1987 had givegiven a report indicting the officer concerned, therefore Government should withdraw the prosecution. The only argument which has been advanced in the writ petition is that there was a Commission of inquiry appointed by the Government and Hon ble Justice Ramachandra Raju in his report dated 30th March, 1987 had givegiven a report indicting the officer concerned, therefore Government should withdraw the prosecution. It is well settled that a criminal action is initiated by the Courts on being satisfied that there was a prima facie case and whether the petitioners were guilty of defamation or not would be questions of fact which would have to be gone into by the trial Court in the trial. Even the facts have not been placed before this Court. The publications have been placed. We do not want to go into those publications because that may prejudice the parties. The report of the commission has also been furnished. A report of ACB has also been produced. But, this is a material which will have to be considered by the trial Court. In any case, under Article 226 of the Constitution we cannot go into the question whether the petitioners are guilty or not. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.