Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 771 (PNJ)

Siri Ram v. Gram Panchayat Mau

2002-08-07

M.M.KUMAR

body2002
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the order dated 31.5.2001 passed by the District Collector, Gurgaon dismissing the revision petition of the petitioner in which the orders dated 1.2.2001 and 19.2.2001 of the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Gurgaon were impugned. The Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Gurgaon in his order dated 19.2.2001 has closed the evidence of the respondent- petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case which have led to the filing of the present petition and as unfolded in the pleadings of the parties are that on 29.10.1998, respondent Gram Panchayat filed an application for ejectment of the petitioner under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for brevity the Act), in the Court of Assistant Collector Ist Grade alleging that the petitioner is in unauthorised occupation over the passage. Notice of the application was issued to the petitioner and he contested the application. It is appropriate to mention here that application is directed against three persons namely Siri Ram, Hari Ram and Munni Devi. Hari Ram and Siri Ram are brothers. 3. In reply to the revision petition it is averred that the petitioner has been deliberately delaying the decision of the case on one pretext or the other. Illustrating its plea it is alleged that on 26.7.1999, the petitioner was to file written statement and thereafter the case was adjourned to 10.8.1999, 16.8.1999, 14.9.1999 and 21.9.1999. The last date given for filing the written statement was 10.10.1999 when the petitioner filed an application alleging that the civil dispute with regard to the same matter is pending but the application was dismissed on 11.11.1999. Still further the case was adjourned for filing of the written statement to 18.1.1999 then to 6.12.1999. At last the written statement was filed on 16.12.1999. It is further averred that the Gram Panchayat adduced its evidence on 3.1.2000 and 10.1.2000. Hari Ram and Munni Devi who were proceeded ex-parte filed an application seeking setting aside of the ex-parte proceedings and the case was adjourned to various dates. Eventually the ex-parte proceedings were set aside and Hari Ram again took time to file the written statement on 27.1.2000, 24.2.2000, 20.4.2000 and 4.5.2000. However, written statement was filed on 4.5.2000. Hari Ram and Munni Devi who were proceeded ex-parte filed an application seeking setting aside of the ex-parte proceedings and the case was adjourned to various dates. Eventually the ex-parte proceedings were set aside and Hari Ram again took time to file the written statement on 27.1.2000, 24.2.2000, 20.4.2000 and 4.5.2000. However, written statement was filed on 4.5.2000. Similarly Munni Devi, another respondent, who is facing ejectment proceedings has filed an application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings which was allowed on 17.7.2000. She also sought time repeatedly from 10.10.2000 to 31.4.2001. 4. It appears that the Assistant Collector Ist Grade became sick and tired from the attitude adopted by the petitioner and other persons who are facing ejectment proceedings like Hari Ram and Munni Devi and eventually passed an order closing the evidence of the petitioner on 19.9.2001 and the revision petition filed under sub-section (2) of section 13B of the Act before the District Collector against the afore mentioned order has been dismissed by the District Collector on 31.5.2001 by recording the following order : "I have heard the arguments raised by the counsel for both the parties and have also perused the original file. There are relatives of respondent Nos. 2 and respondent No. 3 of respondent No. 1 on the original file. Firstly ex- parte proceedings were got conducted against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 intentionally and when the ex-parte orders were passed then a cost of Rs. 50/- was imposed upon then but besides this the respondents have been given many opportunities for filing the written statement. Consequently the petitioner/revision-petitioner filed an application for staying the proceedings as the civil case was pending between the parties in the civil court. This application of the petitioner was also dismissed by the court below vide order dated 11.11.1999 after hearing both the parties. The case was fixed on 21.8.2000 for the defence evidence of the petitioner for the first time and after granting about ten adjournments the petitioner did not close his evidence and has been getting adjournments on each date of hearing by producing only one or two witnesses whereas the petitioner should have closed his evidence by getting the evidence of witnesses recorded in one or two opportunities. It has been fully proved on the file that the petitioner wants to prolong his case due to the pendency of the case in a civil court. It has been fully proved on the file that the petitioner wants to prolong his case due to the pendency of the case in a civil court. Therefore, the revision petition of the petitioner is dismissed finding no merit in the same. Both the parties are directed to appear before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade (Special Collector), Gurgaon on 11.6.2001." 5. I have heard Shri Manoj Bajaj, learned counsel for the petitioner who has argued that the present revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would be maintainable because it causes grave injustice and fundamental principles which are applicable to the proceedings before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade have been flagrantly violated. In support of his argument, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Trimbak Gangadhar Telang and another v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide and others, AIR 1977 SC 1222. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to the observations made in para 3 of the judgment to argue that if a Tribunal or subordinate Court : a) has acted in violation of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or b) where a patent or flagrant procedure or law has crept or c) where the order passed results in manifest injustice then the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is competent to intervene and set aside which an order. He has further placed reliance on another judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen, AIR 1977 SC 2077 and argued that the High Court may not quash a judgement of the subordinate Court merely on the ground that its finding was erroneous but it would be absolutely permissible for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate Court reached to the conclusion without any evidence or manifest misleading of the evidence or if its conclusions were perverse. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to certain observations of the Supreme Court in the cases of Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 and Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, (2002) 1 SCC 319. 6. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to certain observations of the Supreme Court in the cases of Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 and Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, (2002) 1 SCC 319. 6. On the basis of the afore mentioned principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court, the learned counsel has urged that if the petitioner is not allowed to adduce his evidence then his ejectment is likely to follow and he would be rendered homeless. Therefore, the order passed by the Assistant collector Ist Grade as affirmed by the District Collector would result into grave injustice to the petitioner and the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. Shri Rakesh Jain, learned counsel for the Gram Panchayat, respondent has submitted that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is clothed with power of superintendence over all the Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel, Article 227(2) of the Constitution envisages that the High Court is competent to call for record from such Courts which would not mean that the High Court would be entitled to exercise jurisdiction for setting aside the illegal, erroneous and wrong orders. According to the learned counsel, the High Court may be competent to exercise jurisdiction in following cases : a) where the Court or Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction; b) where the Court or Tribunal has refused to exercise jurisdiction; c) where the exercise of jurisdiction has resulted into violation of fundamental rights; and d) Where the principles of natural justice have been flagrantly violated. 8. For the afore-mentioned proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratap Singh, JT 1995(7) SC 400. Referring to para 9 of the judgement, the learned counsel has argued that under the garb of Article 227, the High Court cannot extend its jurisdiction to occupied fields because the Legislature in its wisdom has not provided for filing of second appeal or revision to the High Court. Referring to the provisions of sections 7, 13 and 13B of the Act, the learned counsel has submitted that there is a comprehensive machinery provided by the Act and hierarchy of authorities have been constituted to hear the appeals and revisions. Referring to the provisions of sections 7, 13 and 13B of the Act, the learned counsel has submitted that there is a comprehensive machinery provided by the Act and hierarchy of authorities have been constituted to hear the appeals and revisions. The learned counsel has also submitted that a mere wrong decision without anything more would not attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is not even to correct an error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law because the High Court does not act as an appellate Court or Tribunal. In support of this submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others, AIR 1984 SC 38. 9. He has also argued that power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution being extra ordinary is to be exercised more sparingly and only in cases where grave injustice might have resulted. He has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and another, AIR 1975 SC 1297. On similar proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on various other judgements of the Supreme Court namely Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v. Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala, AIR 1988 SC 184; Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, AIR 1987 SC 117 and Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School, AIR 2000 SC 3495. 10. The learned counsel has also referred to a Full Bench judgement of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shripatrao Dajisaheb Ghatge and another v. The State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1977 Bombay 384 to argue that the expression Courts used in Section 2 of Article 227 of the Constitution would not enable the High Court to assume jurisdiction on other subordinate authorities or the Tribunals. Therefore, there would be no jurisdiction with the Court to nullify the order passed by the District Collector or the Assistant Collector Ist Grade. According to the learned counsel all Tribunals which would not fall within the definition of expression Courts would not be covered by Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that the present revision petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution. According to the learned counsel all Tribunals which would not fall within the definition of expression Courts would not be covered by Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that the present revision petition is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been confined to exercise of superintending power to ensure that the inferior Courts and the Tribunals remain within the limits of their authority and do not cross those limits. In a case arising under the rent law, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that it is not merely a wrong or illegal decision which would furnish a ground for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227. This proposition of law was enunciated by their Lordships in the case of Ouseph Mathais case (supra) and the same reads as under : "It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extra ordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said article as a matter of right. In fact power under this article casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such courts and tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such courts and tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party." 12. Similarly in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwanis case (supra), the Supreme Court adversely commented upon the endeavour of the High Court to extend jurisdiction in matters which are already occupied by other statutory authorities under the Rent Act. Similarly in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwanis case (supra), the Supreme Court adversely commented upon the endeavour of the High Court to extend jurisdiction in matters which are already occupied by other statutory authorities under the Rent Act. The observations of their Lordships read as under : "Before parting with this judgement we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The Act is a special legislation governing landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. The legislature has, in its wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision to the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority. The Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes." When the principles enunciated in the afore-mentioned judgements are applied to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that under the Act elaborate procedure providing machinery for adjudication of various disputes has been made available. Any error committed by the subordinate Court could be rectified by filing appeal or revision before the superior authority. As a matter of fact, the petitioner had filed the revision petition under Section 13B of the Act which has been dismissed and if final order is passed then he can challenge the same in appeal. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be extended to areas which are already occupied by the machinery provided by the Act. 13. Another aspect which would require consideration is as to whether the authorities under the Constitution or under the Act would be covered by the expression Courts used in section 2 Article 227 of the Constitution. The Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shripatrao Dajisaheb Ghatges case (supra) has considered this question at length and has opined that the Court may be considered as Tribunal but not vice versa. The Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shripatrao Dajisaheb Ghatges case (supra) has considered this question at length and has opined that the Court may be considered as Tribunal but not vice versa. Therefore in order to be covered by the expression Courts, the Tribunal must have trappings of Court which would mean that adversary system is followed where fair opportunity is given and finality is attached to the judgements passed by such Tribunals. If the machinery provided by the Act is examined in the light of the criterion laid down by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court then it may be covered by the expression Courts. For that reason also, the provisions of section 2 of Article 227 of the Constitution may be available. However, I would not like to express any final opinion on this question and leave the same open because it is not necessary for decision of this case to decide that question. 14. The facts as unfolded in the reply filed to the revision petition do not help the petitioner because the conduct of the petitioner in attending the proceedings before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade is not credit worthy. There are numerous circumstances quoted by the respondents in its reply which do not leave any manner of doubt that the intention of the petitioner is to delay the decision on the application filed under Section 7 of the Act by the respondents as far as possible and therefore on that count also, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. Revision dismissed.