JUGDMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Nashik dated September 30, 1991 in Civil Appeal No. 443 of 1986. The premises in question are owned by the respondent situated at Ratan Bhuvan, M.G. Road, Nashik admeasuring 10 x 10ft. on the southern side of the said building (hereinafter referred to as the "suit premises"). The petitioner was inducted as monthly tenant in the suit premises on 14-8-1972. According to the respondent the premises were let out to the petitioner for carrying on cloth business. However, the petitioner kept the premises closed from February 1982 for which reason the respondent instituted suit in the Court of Civil Judge, J.D. Nashik on September 13, 1983 being R.C.S. No. 739 of 1983. The suit for possession of the suit premises was originally on the ground of default under section 12 and non user under section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The plaint clearly avers that the petitioner had kept the suit premises closed for last 20 to 22 months and is not using the same for the purpose for which it was let out. In paragraph 3 of the plaint, it is clearly stated that the premises are not being used by the petitioner without any reason. Undisputedly, after the institution of the suit the petitioner started doing business of bakery in the suit premises with effect from October, 1983. As a consequence of which the respondent amended the suit by adding one more ground for eviction, namely, change of user. According to the respondent the premises were let out only for the business of cloth, whereas the petitioner had changed the user of the suit premises to business of bakery which was another independent ground for eviction under section 13(1)(a) of the Act. In response to this amended plaint, the petitioner amended the written statement. The trial Court however, decreed the suit by judgment and order dated March 25, 1986 and accepted the ground of non-user within the meaning of section 13(1)(k). The trial Court has not only adverted to the pleadings but also considered the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties. The trial Court however, decreed the suit by judgment and order dated March 25, 1986 and accepted the ground of non-user within the meaning of section 13(1)(k). The trial Court has not only adverted to the pleadings but also considered the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties. The trial Court has analyzed the relevant evidence on record and returned a clear finding of fact that the defence taken by the petitioner in the written statement that the petitioner intended to start business of bakery was after thought. The trial Court clearly found as a fact that the premises were kept locked continuously for the period of 6 months preceding the date of the institution of the suit without a reasonable cause. The trial Court has relied on the oral evidence of the respondent plaintiff that the premises were not used for the purpose for which they were let for continuous period of 6 months preceding the date of the suit without any sufficient reason. Besides the oral evidence, the trial Court in paragraph 15 also adverted to the documentary evidence which was pressed into service to support the case set up by the plaintiff that the premises were found locked. The documentary evidence was in the shape of extracts made available by the Maharashtra State Electricity Authority Exh. 36 indicating that the premises were found locked during the relevant period from February 1982 till October, 1983 when the petitioner commenced the business of bakery. The trial Court has also adverted to the fact that the suit summons was attempted to be served and, in fact, was served on the petitioner, on the address of Ceramic Centre which was different from the address of the suit premises and that evidence would reinforce that the petitioner at the relevant time was serving in the said centre. This is another circumstance which is taken into account for answering the issue against the petitioner. The suit was accordingly decreed on the said ground of non user only. The matter was carried in appeal by the petitioner being Civil Appeal No. 443 of 1986 before the District Court, Nashik. Even the Appellate Court has analyzed the entire materials on record including the pleadings, oral as well as documentary evidence and has affirmed the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. The matter was carried in appeal by the petitioner being Civil Appeal No. 443 of 1986 before the District Court, Nashik. Even the Appellate Court has analyzed the entire materials on record including the pleadings, oral as well as documentary evidence and has affirmed the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. It is this decision which is subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the courts below have completely overlooked the fact that the petitioner was always wanting to continue to do business in the suit premises; and, more so, the evidence on record would establish the fact that the stock in trade of the old business was lying in the suit premises and, during the relevant period, the petitioner was in fact making arrangement to dispose of the same, and as soon as necessary arrangements were made, the petitioner immediately commenced the business of bakery in the suit premises from October, 1983. According to the petitioner, the fact that the petitioner started new business of bakery in the suit premises will belie the claim of the respondent plaintiff that the premises were not used by the petitioner tenant or that he had no intention to use the said premises. In other words, it is contended that the petitioner had not abandoned the suit premises or gave up the activity related to business in the suit premises. Further, he not only retained the possession of the suit premises but also punctually paid the rent and other charges therefor. It is further contended that the courts below have misdirected themselves in relying on the circumstances of Court summons being served on the petitioner on the address of Ceramic Centre so as to conclude that the premises were found locked during the relevant period. In as much as the said service was attempted after institution of the suit and that fact would be of no consequence to answer the issue as to whether the petitioner had kept the suit premises locked continuously for a period of more than 6 months preceding the date of the institution of the suit without any reasonable cause. In as much as the said service was attempted after institution of the suit and that fact would be of no consequence to answer the issue as to whether the petitioner had kept the suit premises locked continuously for a period of more than 6 months preceding the date of the institution of the suit without any reasonable cause. The learned Counsel further contends that the finding of facts recorded by the Appellate Court on certain matters travel beyond what was pleaded, proved or contended on behalf of the respondent plaintiff. In as much as, the Court has went to the extent of finding that the petitioner had no intention to start any new business and, therefore, had accepted service in Ceremic Centre. The learned Counsel has criticized this approach of the courts below and, in particular of the Appellate Court and, contends that, if this finding is overturned, the correctness of the decision of the courts below would be under cloud. Lastly, he submits that there is absolutely no averment in the pleading filed before the trial Court that the petitioner did not use the suit premises continuously for a period of more than 6 months for the purpose for which it was let "without any reasonable cause". He submits that if there is no pleading or evidence of the plaintiff, about the non user "without any reasonable cause" then there would be no cause of action for institution of the suit on that ground and the suit as filed will have to be dismissed without going into any other aspects of the matter. In support of this submission, he has placed reliance on the decision of this Court reported in 1981 Mh.L.J. 437 (C.R. Shaikh v. L.D. Rohida and another)1, wherein it is held that the landlord should make out case of non user for continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of institution the suit and further also make out a case that the non user was without any reasonable cause or else he will not be entitled to a decree under section 13(1)(k). Reliance is also placed on another decision of this Court reported in 1973 Mh.L.J. 153 (Achut v. Sadashiv)2, to contend that the question whether non user for continuous period of six months prior to the suit was without reasonable cause is a question of fact and degree would depend on the circumstances of each case. This decision is relied upon to contend that in the present case the petitioner engaged himself in the business of bakery from October, 1983, albeit after the institution of the suit. If this aspect is kept in mind, the learned Counsel contends that, the Court will have to rule in favour of the petitioner that the petitioner had something more than a vague wish to return and had a real hope coupled with the practicable possibility of its fulfilment within a reasonable time. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Gujarat High Court reported is 1987 Bombay R.C. 191 (Shah Ochhavial Motilal v. Kansara Dhanlaxmi Becharlal)3, to contend that the onus to prove non user is on the landlord and the landlord cannot succeed on the weakness of the plea or evidence of the defendant. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 406 (Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana v. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah and another)4, that it is well settled that the landlord should specifically plead the requirement on the basis of which relief of possession is sought and in absence of pleadings of necessary ingredients, proof offered on matters though relevant for deciding the issue would be of no relevance. 3. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the two courts below have closely scrutinized the materials on record and have made reference not only to the pleadings but also to the oral as well as documentary evidence to record finding of fact that the suit premises were kept locked continuously for a period of more than 6 months and were not used for the purpose for which they were let out without any reasonable cause. He submits that such findings of fact ought not to be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction, even if the petitioner may succeed in pointing out some mistakes committed by the courts below on certain matters; whereas this Court should broadly examine as to whether the finding of fact arrived at by the courts below can be said to be perverse or manifestly wrong. In this context, he has drawn my attention to the pleadings of the parties as well as the relevant evidence and contends that it is not possible to take the view that the finding of fact recorded by the courts below can be said to be without any legal evidence on record and, if this be the position, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is warranted. He has further pointed out that the arguments now advanced on behalf of the petitioner are totally ill-advised and not supported by the materials on record. In the first place, he has drawn my attention to para 3 of the plaint wherein the plaintiff has clearly asserted that the premises has been kept locked and unused for the purpose for which it was let out continuously for more than 6 months preceding the date of institution of the suit without any reasonable cause. He has also drawn my attention to para 5 of the written statement which makes no reference to the specific case made in the plaint. On the other hand, the petitioner-defendant had taken a specific plea in the written statement that the premises were kept locked and unsued as stated in the plaint. The only stand taken in the written statement is that the defendant was contemplating to change the business and, therefore, was opening the shop for disposing of the stock of the previous business lying in the premises. It is therefore, contended that this specific plea taken in the written statement has not been accepted by the courts below after analyzing the oral evidence of the parties on record and in such a situation the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below ought not to be interfered. 4. Having considered the rival submissions, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the present writ petition is devoid of merits. 5. 4. Having considered the rival submissions, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the present writ petition is devoid of merits. 5. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the defendant started Bakery business in October, 1983 would clearly go to show that the defendant had something more than a vague wish to resort the business. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Achut v. Sadashiv reported in 1973 Mh.L.J. page 153. That decision clearly observes that the tenant must have something more than a vague wish to return and should have a real hope coupled with the practicable possibility of its fulfilment within a reasonable time. It is further held that the reasonable time has been stipulated by the statute being six months of non user and, therefore, if the tenant wanted to set up a defence that even beyond the period of six months there was sufficient or reasonable cause for non-user of the suit premises then, obviously, the onus would be on the defendant-tenant to establish that fact and that would be the matter for adjudication or appreciation to be done by the courts. However, in the present case the defendant has not approached the Court with any specific plea in the written statement in spite of the clear assertion made in the plaint that the premises were not used for more than six months and in fact for a period of about 20 to 22 months preceding the date of institution of the suit for the purpose for which they were let out without any reasonable cause. In the written statement, however, the defendant has merely generally denied the allegations in the plaint. Besides, the defendant has vaguely stated in the written statement that he was contemplating to change the business and nothing more. No other details are given much less explanation regarding the sufficient or reasonable cause beyond the period of six months. The defendant is not expected to offer explanation on day today basis but is obliged to plead specific cause and also prove those facts in evidence. As observed earlier, the petitioner has not stated any specific plea as to why he was required to keep the business closed for more than six months which is the statutory period. The defendant is not expected to offer explanation on day today basis but is obliged to plead specific cause and also prove those facts in evidence. As observed earlier, the petitioner has not stated any specific plea as to why he was required to keep the business closed for more than six months which is the statutory period. Merely stating that he was contemplating change of business by itself cannot be sufficient that too when both the courts have concurrently found that the premises have been found to be locked and unsued continuously for a period of 20 to 22 months prior to the institution of the suit. Moreover, commencement of some business after the institution of the suit cannot extricate the tenant from the rigours of that provision unless he pleads and proves the reasonable cause for non user beyond the statutory period of six months. If that be so, then, it necessarily follows that, decree on the ground of non-user within the meaning of section 13(1)(k) would be inevitable. The statute has given complete protection to the tenant only upto a period of six months prior to the date of institution of the suit and for period beyond six months he is obliged to plead and prove that there was a sufficient and reasonable cause for doing so. But, in the present case that is lacking. It is found as a fact, by the two courts below that the premises were kept locked for a period of more than 20 to 22 months. It is relevant to point out that even the evidence, as adduced before the trial Court, in examination-in-chief, the defendant stated that he had stopped the business of cloth as it was not running properly. No other particulars are mentioned. He further states that he was however, keeping the shop open for discussing the matter of commencing some new business and for disposing of the old clothes and that at present he is running bakery business in the suit premises. The defendant has no doubt specifically deposed that he never closed the shop premises prior to opening bakery business in the suit premises. This stand of the defendant has however, been rejected by the courts below. The courts below have found that the plea taken by the defendant has not been established. If that be so, then, no further adjudication is necessary. This stand of the defendant has however, been rejected by the courts below. The courts below have found that the plea taken by the defendant has not been established. If that be so, then, no further adjudication is necessary. No doubt, during the cross-examination certain searching questions have been put to the defendant. He was called upon to produce books of accounts or any documentary evidence to establish his case that the premises were not closed prior to opening of the bakery business. He was also confronted in the cross- examination with the contents of Exh. 36 and was called upon to produce electricity bills and other documentary evidence for which he expressed his inability. On broad scrutiny of the matter, I find no reason to take a different view than the one taken by the courts below especially on the findings of fact. It is not open for this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to reappreciate the evidence as such. But, it is well settled that the scope of interference of this Court is limited to seeing as to whether the sub-ordinate courts have discharged their duty of adjudicating the matter properly. That does not mean that this Court would sit as Court of Appeal and examine each and every aspect of the findings recorded by the courts below. It is well settled that if there is error here or there that by itself would not be sufficient for interfering under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But, it is only when the Court finds that the findings recorded by the courts below are manifestly wrong or would cause manifest injustice to the party then the Court would exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Understood thus, I see no reason to interfere with the findings and conclusion recorded by the two courts below. 6. As observed earlier, though much argument was advanced on the premises that there is absolutely no pleading regarding "reasonable or sufficient cause" for non user of the premises in the plaint, however, this argument is devoid of any substance. Inasmuch as, in the plaint the respondent has clearly averred that the premises have been kept closed and are not being used for the purpose for which they were let continuously for a period of more than six months preceding the date of institution of the suit without any reason. Inasmuch as, in the plaint the respondent has clearly averred that the premises have been kept closed and are not being used for the purpose for which they were let continuously for a period of more than six months preceding the date of institution of the suit without any reason. In this view of the matter, the decision in the case of C.R. Shaikh v. Lhabai D. Rohida and another, reported in 1981 Mh.L.J. 437 will have no application. Moreover, in the present case, it is seen that the trial Court proceeded to frame issue in that behalf, though burden was placed on the plaintiff which is improper. The onus to plead and prove regarding the factum of non-user of the suit premises for sufficient reason is on the defendant-tenant and cannot be placed on the plaintiff-landlord. Be that as it may, the parties went for trial understanding each other's case and the matter has been finally decided by the trial Court against the petitioner. It is relevant to note that no such grievance was made before the Appellate Court. Moreover, there is no such specific ground taken in the memo writ petition. Even for this reason the contention now raised that there is no pleading or proof by the respondent landlord on the factum of non-user being "without reasonable cause", would be of no consequence. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case of Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana v. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah and another, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 406 has observed that such a plea raised for the first time before that Court, the same cannot be permitted. Applying the same principle, it will not be open to the petitioner to make grievance about the lack of pleadings. In any case, I find that there is sufficient pleading that the premises were not used without any reasonable cause. Even there is sufficient evidence on record in that behalf. In fact the defendant has failed to prove that there was sufficient cause for non-user of the premises for a period of 20 to 22 months preceding the date of institution of the suit. Understood thus, there is no substance in the writ petition. Hence, the same is dismissed with costs. 7. At this stage the learned Counsel prays that the respondent landlord be directed not to give effect to this order for a period of 12 weeks from today. Understood thus, there is no substance in the writ petition. Hence, the same is dismissed with costs. 7. At this stage the learned Counsel prays that the respondent landlord be directed not to give effect to this order for a period of 12 weeks from today. The learned Counsel for the respondent has no objection in this behalf. In the circumstances, by consent the respondent shall not give effect to this order for a period of 12 weeks from today provided the petitioner to given usual undertaking to this Court within two weeks from today. It is made clear that if no such undertaking is filed in time, it will be open to the respondent to proceed to execute the decree forthwith. Writ petition dismissed. -----