KUMAR RAJARATNAM, J. ( 1 ) ONLY but substantial question of law that arises for consideration in these writ appeals is whether the learned Single Judge could reverse the finding of the judgment rendered earlier by another learned Single judge while exercising powers under Section 151 of the CPC? ( 2 ) THE appellant was an accused along with others in Crime Nos. 19 (A)/90-BLR, 20 (A)/90-BLR and 21 (A)/90-BLR. The case was registered by the Delhi Police Establishment (CBI) for the alleged offences under section 120-B read with Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC and section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (l) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption act, 1947 (old Act ). ( 3 ) THE allegation against the appellant and others related to the alleged inflated statement of stock and accommodation bills which were discounted by a company by M/s. Asian Wire Ropes Limited. The offence is alleged to have taken place during the years 1986 to 1988. ( 4 ) THE petitioner filed Writ Petition Nos. 12287 to 12289 of 1993 seeking to quash the First Information Report with respect to the said case. ( 5 ) THE matter came up before the learned Single Judge of this Court on 6-12-1993. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge of this court by its order dated 6-12-1993 passed the following order. "learned Senior Advocate Sri H. B. Datar, appearing for Sri venkata Reddy, for respondent 1 submits that the CBI does not want to proceed further in this matter. In view of this submission, learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks leave of the Court to withdraw the petitions. Petitions shall stand disposed of as withdrawn". ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY, on 6-12-1993, this Court disposed of the writ petitions on an undertaking given by the CBI stating that they will not proceed further in the matter and the CBI sought leave of the Court to withdraw the writ petitions. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petitions as withdrawn. ( 7 ) ON 21-1-1998, two interlocutory applications were filed by the CBI. One application was under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 4 years and 46 days in filing the application for recalling the order dated 6-12-1993. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petitions as withdrawn. ( 7 ) ON 21-1-1998, two interlocutory applications were filed by the CBI. One application was under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 4 years and 46 days in filing the application for recalling the order dated 6-12-1993. Along with this application, another application was filed on the same day under Section 151 of the CPC for recalling the order dated 6-12-1993 passed by the learned Single Judge in W. P. Nos. 12287 to 12289 of 1993. ( 8 ) ON 11-2-1999, the learned Single Judge allowed LA. Nos. I and II. ( 9 ) AGGRIEVED by the orders of the learned Single Judge in LA. Nos. I and II, dated 11-2-1999, the petitioner is before us in this appeal. ( 10 ) SINCE we are dealing with in larger question as to whether an order can be set aside or recalled by the learned Single Judge while exercising powers under Section 151 of the CPC, it may not be necessary to dwell at length with the reasons enumerated by the learned Single judge in recalling the orders. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, it would be appropriate to state briefly the reasons given by the learned Single Judge in allowing the applications before we deal with the legal position of whether such an application is maintainable or not. ( 12 ) IT was held by the learned Single Judge that at the time when the writ petitions were sought to be withdrawn, the Government of Andhra pradesh had accorded only a limited consent for the conduct of investigation under the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment act which prevented the CBI from investigating the case against privateindividuals in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Subsequently, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a notification dated 18-6-1994 empowering the CBI to exercise powers and jurisdiction under the said Act in the state of. Andhra Pradesh. By this notification, the power was given to the CBI to investigate against private persons and State Government employees upto first gazetted level while acting in consent with the central Government employees. Even this power, it appears, did not include a sitting MLA. The appellant was a sitting MLA at the relevant time. Andhra Pradesh. By this notification, the power was given to the CBI to investigate against private persons and State Government employees upto first gazetted level while acting in consent with the central Government employees. Even this power, it appears, did not include a sitting MLA. The appellant was a sitting MLA at the relevant time. It was only subsequently a further notification was issued by the government of Andhra Pradesh empowering the CBI, in the State of andhra Pradesh to investigate the three cases registered against the appellant. Accordingly, a notification was issued under Section 5 of the act on 27-10-1997 and that notification was received at Bangalore on 10th of November, 1997. ( 13 ) IT is only after that, an application was made to the Court to recall the earlier judgment before the learned Single Judge. ( 14 ) IN that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge allowed the applications, condoned the delay of more than 4 years and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 6-12-1993 and put the case back on its file to be dealt with on merits. There may have been every justification for the CBI to move the Court to get the earlier judgment off its back since they were now empowered to prosecute the appellant under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and other allied offences under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, but the question that looms large is whether the course adopted by the CBI, one under Section 151 of the CPC is the correct course. We called upon to determine only this question, no less no more. ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect of the matter in State of Uttar Pradesh v Brahm Datt Sharma and Another. On this very question, the Supreme Court pronounced as follows. "the High Court's order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondent's writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on 10-8-1984, thereafter nothing remained pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. "the High Court's order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondent's writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on 10-8-1984, thereafter nothing remained pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondent was aggrieved by the notice dated 29-1-1986 he could have filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided a separate cause of action to him. The respondent was not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court by means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which had already been decided. The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High court committed error in entertaining the respondent's application which, was founded on a separate cause of action. When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the Court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning". (emphasis supplied) ( 16 ) THE Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji , pronounced that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court in Budhia Swain and Others v Gopinath Deb and Others , answered the question as to what is the "power to recall". Since this question has been cropping up before Courts, it would be appropriate to look at the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the "power to recall": "para 6. What is a power to recall? Inherent power to recall its own order vesting in Tribunals or Courts was noticed in Indian bank v M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Private Limited. Vide para 23, this Court has held that the Courts have inherent power to recall and set aside an order (i) obtained by fraud practiced upon the Court, (ii) when the Court is misled by a party, or (iii) when the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party. Vide para 23, this Court has held that the Courts have inherent power to recall and set aside an order (i) obtained by fraud practiced upon the Court, (ii) when the Court is misled by a party, or (iii) when the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party. In a. R. Antulay v R. S. Nayak and Another, (vide para 130), this court has noticed motions to set aside judgments being permitted where (i) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all and was shown as served or in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had died and the estate was not represented, (ii) a judgment was obtained by fraud, (iii) a party has had no notice and a decree was made against him and such party approaches the Court for setting aside the decision ex debito justitiae on proof of the fact that there was no service. Para 7. In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. XIX) under the chapter "judgment - Opening and Vacating" (paras 265 to 284 at pages 487 to 510) the law on the subject has been stated. The grounds on which the Courts may open or vacate their judgments are generally matters which render the judgment void or which are specified in statutes authorising such actions. Invalidity of the judgment of such nature as to render it void is a valid ground for vacating it at least if the invalidity is apparent on the face of the record. Fraud or collusion in obtaining a judgment is a sufficient ground for opening or vacating it. A judgment secured in violation of an agreement not to enter judgment may be vacated on that ground. However, in general, a judgment will not be opened or vacated on grounds which could have been pleaded in the original action. A motion to vacate will not be entered when the proper remedy is by some other proceedings, such as by appeal. The right to vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver or estoppel. Where a party injured acquiesces in the rendition of the judgment or submits to it, waiver or estoppel results. Para 8. A motion to vacate will not be entered when the proper remedy is by some other proceedings, such as by appeal. The right to vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver or estoppel. Where a party injured acquiesces in the rendition of the judgment or submits to it, waiver or estoppel results. Para 8. In our opinion a Tribunal or a Court may recall an order earlier made by it if (i) the proceedings culminating into an order suffer from the inherent lack of jurisdiction and such lack of jurisdiction is patent, (ii) there exists fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment, (iii) there has been a mistake of the Court prejudicing a party, or (iv) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for reopening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available to be pleaded in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppel or acquiescence. Para 9. A distinction has to be drawn between lack of jurisdiction and a mere error in exercise of jurisdiction. The former strikes at the very root of the exercise and want of jurisdiction may vitiate the proceedings rendering them and the orders passed therein a nullity. A mere error in exercise of jurisdiction does not vitiate the legality and validity of the proceedings and the order passed thereon unless set aside in the manner known to law by laying a challenge subject to the law of limitation. In Him Lal Patni v Kali Nath, it was held. ". . . A mere error in exercise of jurisdiction does not vitiate the legality and validity of the proceedings and the order passed thereon unless set aside in the manner known to law by laying a challenge subject to the law of limitation. In Him Lal Patni v Kali Nath, it was held. ". . . The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seizin of the case because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or over the parties to it". ( 18 ) THE Supreme Court in State, of Kerala v MM. Manikantan Nair, pronounced that any subsequent order cannot be reviewed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code unless to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. ( 19 ) THE Supreme Court in Kewal Chand Mimani (dead) by L. Rs v s. K. Sen, also had an occasion to deal with the words "liberty to mention". The Supreme Court held that. "liberty to mention cannot be used as a means to achieve an advantage which is not otherwise available in law - a question which stands finally decided cannot be reopened, neither has the court any further jurisdiction upon the signature been appended on the judgment by oral mention. The issue stands concluded as soon as the judgment is pronounced and the same is signed. Be it noted, however, that the words "liberty to mention" have been as a matter of fact a phraseology which did come through judicial process without any definite legal sanction for the purpose of clarification, if needed, but not otherwise. It is a legal process which has been evolved for convenience and for shortening the litigation so that the parties are not dragged into further and further course of litigation, and it is in this context that the submissions of Mr. Gupta, that the Court has no jurisdiction to reopen the issue on the ground of availability of the legal phraseology of liberty to mention cannot be brushed aside. Gupta, that the Court has no jurisdiction to reopen the issue on the ground of availability of the legal phraseology of liberty to mention cannot be brushed aside. As noticed hereinbefore, the insertion of the above-noted legal phraseology is to obliterate any confusion or any difficulty being experienced in the matter - it does not give the right anew to the party to agitate the matter further nor does-it confer jurisdiction on the Court itself to further probe the correctness of the decision arrived at: review of a judgment cannot be had on the basis of this liberty. The circumstances under which review can be had are provided under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In any event, law is well-settled on this score that the power to review is not any inherent power and it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication". ( 20 ) AT best the subsequent events as enumerated by the CBI in their application before the learned Single Judge may have given rise to a separate cause of action as held by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar pradesh's case, supra, ( 21 ) ACCORDINGLY, we hold that the learned Single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 151 of the CPC as no proceedings were pending before the learned Single Judge on that date. ( 22 ) IN that view of the matter the impugned applications are set aside and the writ appeals are allowed. No order as to costs. We place on record the assistance 'rendered by Mr. Madhusudan Naik as 'amicas curiae'. --- *** --- .