JUDGMENT A. K. Ganguly, J.: In all the four writ petitions, the facts are identical, and as such, they have been heard analogously and are disposed of by this judgment treating the matters as on day's list. It may be noted that the facts in detail have been argued only in respect of the writ petition filed by Sk. Liakat Ali & Anr. and in this judgment those facts will be discussed. 2. The petitioner's case is that they are in occupation of Plot Nos. 4583 and 4588 on Mouza Galsi, J.L. No. 99, Khatian No. 1868 in the district of Burdwan and they have allegedly purchased the aforesaid plots from the successor-in-interest of one Sreenath Roy. In support of their alleged title the petitioners had relied on record of rights and also on certain deeds which have been annexed to the writ petition. 3. From a perusal of the record of rights it appears that the said record of rights prepared on the basis of cadestral survey shows that the superior interest in the land vests in Bharat Samrat and the name of one Sreenath Roy has been recorded as Raiyat Sthitiban. The said right of occupancy Raiyat was reflected only in the cadestral survey. The petitioners have not disclosed the latest record of rights after revisional survey. 4. It cannot be disputed that record of right is a document of possession and on the basis of such a document there may be presumption of title in certain cases. In the instant case, the plots in question, viz. Plot No. 4588 has been recorded as a road and Plot No. 4589 has been recorded as a slope. Therefore, none of them was recorded as either homestead or agricultural land. 5. Now the case of the petitioners is that on the said plots of land they have made certain structures and are in occupation of those structures. Now in the name of widening the G.T. Road, if the respondents want the possession of the land occupied by the petitioners, the respondents must initiate acquisition proceedings under the provision of National Highways Act, 1956. Now in the name of widening the G.T. Road, if the respondents want the possession of the land occupied by the petitioners, the respondents must initiate acquisition proceedings under the provision of National Highways Act, 1956. Admittedly in the instant case no such acquisition proceeding has been initiated and it is contended by the petitioner that in the absence of such a proceeding it is not open to the respondent-authorities to evict the petitioners from the aforesaid plot of land or to demolish the structures which are standing on those plots of land. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that in some other matters this Court has passed an order directing the Additional District Magistrate, Land Acquisition, Burdwan to find out on the basis of a spot enquiry whether the petitioners in those cases are occupying any portion of the land which can be called a part of the national highway, and similar order may be passed in these batch of cases. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the National Highway Authorities, Police Authorities as well as the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer have contested the said submission of the Counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the facts in these cases are different. 7. Without going into the question whether the facts of these cases are different or not, this Court finds that in the instant case the aforesaid prayer of spot enquiry by the petitioner is being resisted and attention of the Court has been drawn to the various aspects of the matter by the respondents whereas in other group of cases in which the Court passed the order on 18th December, 2001 for spot enquiry such a stand was not taken and detailed argument was neither advanced by the respondents. 8. Since various questions have been raised by the parties in this batch of cases, the court has to decide the same. 9. The stand of the respondents is that the widening of G.T. Road is a part of the national project undertaken by the Government of India for development of the road conditions and to establish better transport and on the basis of such programme widening of different national highways started in different parts of India and the said work has achieved some progress. Learned counsel relying on the averments made in the writ petition submitted that in the year 2000 itself the petitioner was given notice to the effect that the plots of land in question are within 75 feet from the center of G.T. Road. This fact has been stated in paragraph 8 of the writ petition. The said paragraph shows that the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer came to those plots and put a red mark as the said plot falls within 75 feet from the centre of the G.T. Road. It also appears from the writ petition that thereafter, the writ petitioners were requested twice by the Police Authorities to remove their structures from the portion of land which is within G.T. Road. 10. Learned counsel for National Highway Authorities submitted that the width of G.T. Road is about 150 feet but the said width of the road is not available now in view of encroachment and the petitioners are such encroachers. Therefore, the first attempt on the part of the respondent authorities in the said plan of widening the G.T. Road is to remove the encroachers from the G.T. Road and thus to restore the original width of the highway. To achieve that purpose the petitioners' plot which falls within 75 feet from the centre of G.T. Road was marked. 11. The question whether the width of G.T. Road is 150 feet or not possibly cannot be decided by the writ court nor it can be decide on affidavits. But in order to satisfy the conscience of this Court that the width of the road is 150 feet learned counsel for the Highway Authorities was directed to produce some materials or record. 12. Pursuant to such direction certain maps prepared by the Settlement Office under the authority of Government of India in 1940-47 vide Notification No. 5074 dated 6th April, 1940 under section 3 of the Bengal Survey Act and also Notification No. 5075 dated 6th May, 1940 under section 101(2)(d) of Bengal Tenancy Act were produced. 13. It is no doubt true that those maps were prepared much before the dispute arose and are authentic documents and the authenticity of those maps are not questioned. Those maps are public documents, and as such, admissible in Court proceedings. In the said map there is a scale. 13. It is no doubt true that those maps were prepared much before the dispute arose and are authentic documents and the authenticity of those maps are not questioned. Those maps are public documents, and as such, admissible in Court proceedings. In the said map there is a scale. Looking at the scale and looking at the width of G.T. Road as shown in the map it is obvious to the Court at least, prima facie, that the width of G.T. Road is not less than 150 feet. It may be more than 150 feet. And it is not possible for this court to come to any precise determination of the width of the G.T. Road. But looking at the said map and some other documents produced before this court, it is not possible for this court to come to the conclusion that the width of G.T. Road is less than 150 feet. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very fairly submitted that if the width of the G.T. Road is 150 feet then admittedly the petitioner has no case inasmuch as it has not been disputed that the plots of land which are now under the petitioner's occupation falls within 75 feet from the centre of the G.T. Road. But the counsel for the petitioner disputed that the width of G.T. Road is not 150 feet. It may be stated here that there is no basis for such dispute inasmuch as in the writ petition there is no averment that the width of the G.T. Road is less than 150 feet. In the absence of any such averment and on the other hand in view of the existence of those records which have been noted above, it is difficult for the Court to come to the conclusion that the width of the G.T. Road is not 150 feet. On the other hand the court is inclined to accept the contention of the National Highway Authorities at least, prima facie, that the minimum width of G.T. Road is 150 feet. 15. Now coming to the provisions of the National Highway Act, 1956, it appears that G.T. Road has been declared a national highway within the meaning of the said Act. 15. Now coming to the provisions of the National Highway Act, 1956, it appears that G.T. Road has been declared a national highway within the meaning of the said Act. If the schedule to the said Act is read with reference to section 2 thereof, it appears from Serial No.3 that the highway connecting Delhi, Mathura, Agra, Kanpur, Allhabad, Veranasi, Mohania, Barhi and Calcutta known as G.T. Road has been declared a National Highway. Since it is a National Highway all such National Highways vest in the Union. For the purpose of this Act, Highways have been meant to include:- "(i) all lands appurtenant thereto, whether demarcated or not: (ii) all bridges, culverts, tunnels, causeways, carriageways and other structures, constructed on or across such highways; and (iii) all fences, trees, posts and boundary, furlong and mile stones of such highways or any land appurtenant to such highways." 16. This has been provided in section 4. Therefore, section 4 makes it clear that all National Highways vest in the State including lands appurtenant thereto whether demarcated or not including all bridges, culverts etc. The definition of highway is therefore an inclusive one under the said Act. 17. The word 'vest' has been used in Indian Statutes in various ways. This has been noted in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Fruit & Vegetables Union vs. Delhi Improvement Trust, reported in AIR 1957 SC 344 . This appears form page 353 para 19 of the report. It has been made dear in that passage that vesting for the purpose of Land Acquisition Act would mean vesting absolutely in the Government and free from all encumbrances. This Court is inclined to accept the said connotation of the word 'vest' under section 4 of this Highways Act. This National Highways Act also contemplates acquisition proceeding in respect of a land which has not vested in the Union of India. This is clear from a perusal of the provisions contained in section 3A and various sub-sections thereof. So far as vesting under section 4 is concerned, the said vesting is free from all encumbrances. Therefore, 150 feet width of G.T. Road has already been vested in the Government of India along with land appurtenant thereto as mentioned in clauses (i), (ii) & (iii) of section 4. So far as vesting under section 4 is concerned, the said vesting is free from all encumbrances. Therefore, 150 feet width of G.T. Road has already been vested in the Government of India along with land appurtenant thereto as mentioned in clauses (i), (ii) & (iii) of section 4. If any structures stand on that vested land, that being a structure on vested land is an encroachment on that vested land. So no acquisition proceeding under section 3A of the Act is contemplated for removing that structure. The Government is not supposed to acquire the property which has vested in it. Such a construction is wholly absurd and is totally opposed to the scheme of the Act. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 18. Mr. Bandyopadhyay, appearing for the petitioner, has drawn the attention of this Court to a Division Bench judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Bhubaneswar Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in AIR 1995 Patna 1. In that case the Division Bench of Patna High Court was considering the question of demolition of house or the property of the petitioner by the State on the basis of mere executive fiat and without any legal sanction. In that context the Division Bench held that a Writ of Mandamus should issue restraining the Government from demolishing the structure where there is no legal sanction to do so. Those facts are not prevalent here. Here admittedly encroachments have been made on National Highway which has vested in the Government of India free from all encumbrances as pointed out above. 19. It may be noted in this connection that there can be no acquisition of title by title by prescription or even by possession on a public highway by any private individual inasmuch as, in respect of a public highway, members of public have a right of user and the said public highway must be maintained as a public highway. No individual can acquire any private right, title or interest on such land by mere prescription or possession. 20. Somewhat similar question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Scotts (P) Ltd. & Ors. vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in 79 CWN 883. No individual can acquire any private right, title or interest on such land by mere prescription or possession. 20. Somewhat similar question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Scotts (P) Ltd. & Ors. vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in 79 CWN 883. The question which arose in that case was whether the Corporation of Calcutta can set up a bazaar known as 'Meena Bazar' on Russel Street, a public street of Calcutta. Justice A. N. Sen (as His Lordship then was) while delivering the judgment held that even though the said public street vests in the Corporation of Calcutta but the Corporation of Calcutta has to maintain it as a through fare and as a public street and cannot give anybody a licence or right to use the said public street as a bazaar. Therefore, what the Corporation, on whom the street vests, cannot do, certainly cannot be done by a private individual on the basis of encroachment. The said judgment of the Single Judge in Scotts (P) Ltd. (supra), had been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Madhusudan Mills Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1976 Cal 133 . 21. Therefore, considering the case from all its angles, this Court is of the view that the petitioners have no right to continue to encroach the public highway and since the encroachment admittedly falls within 150 feet width of G.T. Road which is its normal width from the land appurtenant thereto. 22. This court is unable to interfere in favour of the petitioner nor can this Court pass any order on this batch of writ petition. 23. For the reasons aforesaid, all the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim orders, if any, are all vacted. 24. Having regard to the fact that the matter was heard on an urgent basis, the respondents could not file affidavits but they produced the records mentioned above. In the absence of affidavits, allegations made in the writ petitions are not admitted by the respondents. 25. There will be no order as to costs. Let xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned counsel for the parties expeditiously. Writ petitions dismissed. Interim orders vacated.